JUDGMENT (ORAL) Ashok Agarwal, J. – Rule By consent rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard counsel. 2. The petition seeks to impugn the detention of the five detenus named in Para 1 of the petition. A prayer is made for their immediate release. A further prayer is made to quash proceedings initiated against them under Section 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. A show cause notice is issued by the Special Executive Magistrate, Vadala Area, Bombay on 11th of January, 1995 under Section 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is served upon the aforesaid detenus on 16th January, 1995. Detenus have thereafter been lodged at the Arthur Road Jail on the ground that the detenus have failed to execute bonds along with sureties in terms of the Show Cause Notice. The petition impugns the said show cause notice as also their detention styling the same as unlawful and illegal. 4. The show cause notice reproduces the facts which have lead to the issue of the notice. It recites as under: "On 27.12.1994 at 19.45, you were coming alongwith your colleagues in the form of Morcha towards Barkat Ali Road while shouting slogans in loud voice. At that time, you were stopped at Vidya Hostel, Barkat Ali Road. On that occasion, you had gathered unlawfully in breach of order of Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay. Though you were ordered by the police preventing you from slogan shouting, you refused to obey such orders and continued shouting slogan. Thereby, you committed an offence of breach of public peace. Therefore, an offence was registered against you and your colleagues and you were arrested. " Based on the incident, it is observed in the show cause notice that the detenus are habituated to commit offences and that if they are released without any security they are likely to commit such type of offences again which may in all probability lead to breach of public peace resulting in threat to public life and public tranquility. " Based on the incident, it is observed in the show cause notice that the detenus are habituated to commit offences and that if they are released without any security they are likely to commit such type of offences again which may in all probability lead to breach of public peace resulting in threat to public life and public tranquility. In respect of the power of Magistrate to call upon a person to execute a bond, the Supreme Court in the case of "Madhu Limaye and another v. Ved Murti and others"1, observed, as under: "A Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only if he cannot complete the enquiry and “during the completion of enquiry" postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. The power to ask for an interim bond is not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask a person to furnish a bond for good conduct. Held on facts that if interim bonds were required from the petitioners the Magistrate ought to have entered upon the inquiry and satisfied himself, at least, prima facie about the truth of the information in relation to the alleged facts. Without making any inquiry neither could the Magistrate order the petitioner to be detained nor required them to execute a bond with or without surety." Similarly in the case of "Madhu Limaye and another v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and others"2" the Supreme Court has observed, as under. "The inquiry under the section is to ascertain the truth of the necessary information. It is pending the completion of the inquiry that an interim bond can be asked for if immediate measures are necessary and in default to put the person in custody. If the magistrate makes no effort to enquire into the truth of the allegations and adjourns the case from day to day and yet asks for an interim bond and places him in custody for default it becomes entirely one sided. It would be moving too far away from the guarantee of freedom if the view is permitted that without any inquiry into the truth of the information sufficient to make out a prima facie case a person is to be put in jeopardy of detention." 5. It would be moving too far away from the guarantee of freedom if the view is permitted that without any inquiry into the truth of the information sufficient to make out a prima facie case a person is to be put in jeopardy of detention." 5. As far as the present case is concerned, it is common ground that no inquiry whatsoever has been commenced by the Special Executive Magistrate against the detenus. In view of the above decisions of the Apex Court the impugned direction issued to the detenus to execute interim bond is illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. Similarly, the detention of the detenus based on the show cause notice is also liable to be quashed. 6. The notice in the instant case mentions only one solitary incident. Except the solitary incident no data is made available justifying the resort to the provisions of Section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. No antecedents are pointed out as far as the detenus are concerned. Hence, resort to the provisions of Section 110 and issuance of the impugned notice upon the detenus under Section III is not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, apart from the incident quoted in the notice, no material is pointed out in order to draw an inference that the detenus are by habit robbers, housebreakers, thieves, or forgers, or they habitually commit, or attempt to commit, or abet the commission of offences involving the breach of peace. We have not the slightest doubt that expressions like "you are habituated to commit such offences" cannot be flung in the face of a man with laxity of semantics. The Court must insist on specificity of facts and be satisfied that one swallow does not make a summer and a consistent course of conduct convincing enough to draw the rigorous inference that by confirmed habit, which is second nature, the counter-petitioner is sure to commit the offences mentioned if he is not kept captive preventive sections privative of freedom, if incautiously proved by indolent judicial processes, may do deeper injury. They will have the effect of detention of one who has not been held guilty of a crime and carry with it the judicial imprimatur, to boot. They will have the effect of detention of one who has not been held guilty of a crime and carry with it the judicial imprimatur, to boot. To call a man dangerous is itself dangerous, to call a man desperate is to affix a desperate adjective to stigmatize a person as hazardous to the community is itself a judicial hazard unless compulsive testimony carrying credence is abundantly available: (Gopalanachari v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 674). 7. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the impugned notice is misconceived and liable to be quashed. 8. The detenus have been produced before us in compliance with the directions earlier issued. We make the Rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). The detenus be released forthwith unless required in some other cases. Petition allowed. 1. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2481. 2. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486.