Judgement KHANNA, C. J. :- The present M.A. (F) (T) 78 of 1994 has been filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the decision given by the learned Asstt. District Judge No. 1, Guwahati on an application moved by the respondents/applicants under Section 8(2) and Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. As the questions involved in the present case are purely questions of law, the counsel for the parties have agreed that the appeal itself may be heard as Mr. Sarma has produced before us the original record on which the appellant is placing reliance. It is in this circumstance that the present appeal has been heard and disposed of finally after hearing the arguments raised by learned counsel appearing for both the parties and after perusing the original records produced by the appellant. 2. For the purposes of adjudicating the present appeal, the brief facts are that the plaintiff-respondents admittedly were awarded a contract in pursuance of the tender which were invited by the appellants for making certain constructions of the appellant for an approximate value of Rs. 6,39,120/-. A written contract was executed between the parties and admittedly there is an Arbitration Clause for referring the dispute for arbitration arising out of the contract between the parties. It has also not been disputed by the appellant that certain works have been executed by the applicant-respondents. However, on 18-6-89, the defendant-appellants terminated the contract. The applicant-respondent firm therefore, laid a claim for getting payment for 50% of the works already completed and also for compensation for causing heavy financial loss to the applicant-respondent. The appellant did not find that the case should be referred to the arbitration and therefore, the applicant-respondent filed application under Section 8(2) and Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the impugned judgment, the Asstt. District Judge No. 1, Gauhati has allowed the aforesaid application moved by the applicants-respondents. 3. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-respondents has contended before us that the Arbitration Clause in the agreement has no application in view of the general conditions of contract because of the provisions given in regulations for tenders contracts and the general conditions of contracts which are applicable to every agreement was executed by the appellant for awarding contract. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-respondents has contended before us that the Arbitration Clause in the agreement has no application in view of the general conditions of contract because of the provisions given in regulations for tenders contracts and the general conditions of contracts which are applicable to every agreement was executed by the appellant for awarding contract. Reliance has been placed on Regulation 62, which provides for excepted matter which should fall outside the purview of the Arbitration Clause. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied on Regulation 61(xiii)(B)(e)(bi) of the general conditions of contract. From the original record Mr. Sarma has also placed before us the written objection which has been filed before the trial Court and which has formed part of the record of the trial Court. We have carefully gone through the objection. The exception which has been provided under Regulation 61(xiii)(B)(e)(bi) of the general conditions of contract only relate to those situation where a retired Engineer or retired officer of the Railways either becomes a partner of the firm to which contract has been awarded after the execution of the agreement or being such a retired Engineer or Officer suppressed and does not disclose at the time of submitting the tender the fact of his being a retired Engineer or Officer that the contract can be terminated only first following the procedure prescribed i.e. the concerned Engineer of the Railway has to give 7 days notice intimating him the default of the contracting parties and they have given an opportunity to make good the default in so far as it is capable of being made good and it is only in case that the default is not being made good that the contract can be terminated after giving 48 hours notice in writing under the hand of the Engineer. From the objections which have been produced before us by Mr. Sarma, counsel appearing for the appellant, no such case has either been taken in the objection nor such material exists in the record to show that it is on this ground that the appellant had terminated the agreement which had been executed in favour of the applicant-respondents. From the objections which have been produced before us by Mr. Sarma, counsel appearing for the appellant, no such case has either been taken in the objection nor such material exists in the record to show that it is on this ground that the appellant had terminated the agreement which had been executed in favour of the applicant-respondents. If that be so, the Arbitration clause was fully applicable and the contention raised that the dispute could not be referred to arbitrator, is in our opinion is incorrect and the trial Court has rightly held that the dispute could be referred to the Arbitrator. The decision of the trial Court, in our opinion does not require any interference in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.