Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ application has been filed challenging, inter alia, a disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner on the allegation that while working as a Conductor on bus No. BHI 5737 of bhagalpur Depot plying from Bhagalpur to Jasidih Express service, it was found that out of total 58 passengers boarded on the Bus, five passengers were found un-booked by the Checking squad. In the disciplinary proceeding, the inquirying authority held the petitioner not guilty and gave him the benefit of doubt. 2. The defence of the petitioner. inter alia, was that those passengers were the local ruffians and that was a very troubled area and in spite of demand, those persons did not pay the price of the ticket. Ultimately the checking squad obtained the price of the same from those persons. 3. Be that as it may, the disciplinary authority while passing the order of dismissal dated 4th May.1989 disagreed with the findings of the inquirying officer and passed an order discharging the petitioner from service with immediate effect, The said order of discharge is nothing but an order of dismissal The said action of the Management of the Corporation was sent for approval under Sec.33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal, Patna and by order dated 30th April, 1993 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna, the said action of the management of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation was approved. It is settled position in law that an approval granted under Sec.33 (2) (b)of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will be deemed to be an adjudication on merits of the action taken by the management. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order of discharge on the basis of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1947 which admittedly governs the relationship between the parties. Clause 22 of the order provides for imposition of punishment for misconduct. The said clause is set out below : - "22. (i) Subject to the provisions of Circulars/orders that may be issued from time to time an employee found guilty of misconduct may be punished id one or more of the following ways :- (1) Warning or Censure. (2) Fine. (3) Withholding of increment or promotion. (4) Recovery from pay/wages of the whole or of part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation. (2) Fine. (3) Withholding of increment or promotion. (4) Recovery from pay/wages of the whole or of part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation. (5) Forfeiture of wages during the period of suspension. (6) Demotion and/or reduction in grade. (7) Removal from service. (g) Discharge or dismissal from service. (ii) In awarding punishments the Chairman/managing Director/ divisional Manager/work Manager/regional Works Manager or any other competent authority may take into account the gravity of the misconduct, previous records if any, of the employee and any other extrenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. " 5 Relying on the said clause 22 read with the Circular Appendix A attached to the said provision, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in case of un-booked passengers the order of punishment-has been categorised in the said Circular and draws the attention of the Court to item No.18 of the said Circular which is set out below :- "conductor. Carrying unbooked passengers (a) 1st Offence (a) (i) No. of un-booked passengers upto 10 per cent of the total no. of passengers in the vehicle at the time of check up. Proceedings (a) (i) Censure in the service book. (ii) No. of unbooked passengers more than 10 per sent and upto 25 per cent of the total no of passengers in the vehicle at the time of checking. Proceedings. (ii) A censure and fin: not below Rs 10 and not exceed ing Rs 25 according to twice the value of tickets of unbooked passegers. (iii) No. of unbooked passengers more than 25 percent of the total no. of passengers in the vehicle at the time of checking. Proceeding and suspension. (iii) Dismissal. (b) 2nd (b)Offence. (i) having a previous punishment under (a) (ii) and carrying unbooked passegers up to 10 per cent of total number of passengers in the vehicle at the time of checking. Proceedings. b) (i) A warning and a fine accroding to four times of the value of the tickets of unbooked passengers but not below Rs.20. (ii) Having a previous punishment under (a) (ii) and carrying un-booked passengers upto 10 per cent of the total number of passengers in the vechicle at the time of checking. Proceedings (ii) A final warning and fine ccording to five ime of the value of tickets of n-booked passengers but not below Rs.25. (ii) Having a previous punishment under (a) (ii) and carrying un-booked passengers upto 10 per cent of the total number of passengers in the vechicle at the time of checking. Proceedings (ii) A final warning and fine ccording to five ime of the value of tickets of n-booked passengers but not below Rs.25. (iii) Having a previous punishment ding under (a) (i) and carrying unbooked passengers exceeding 10 percent of the total number of passengers in the vehicle at the time of sheeting. Proceeding (iii) A final warning and fine times of the value of tickets of unbooked passeners but not below Rs.30. (iv) Having a previous punishment under (a) (ii) and carrying un-booked passengers exceeding 10 per cent out of the total number of passengers in the vehicle at the time of checking. Proceedings and suspension (iv) Dismissal. (c) 3rd Offence (c) Proceedings and suspension in all cases (c) Dismissal in all cases. If he has not committed any offence and has an un-blemished record of service for 2 years intervening between the second and 3rd offence, then he will begin from the beginning. In other words, the 3rd offence will be treated as first offence. " 6. Relying on the said Circular, learned counsel for the petitioner states that in this ease five unbooked passengers out of 58 passengers comes to about ten per cent of the total number of passengers in the vehicle at the time of checking and thus in that case the punishment, according to the said circular, should be recording of Centure in the petitioners service book. Only in case of more than 25 per cent of un-booked passengers of the total passengers in the vehicle, the punishment of dismissal can be passed. Evan in the case of second offence where the number of un-booked passengers is 10 per cent of the total number of passengers in vehicle, the punishment to be awarded is a warning and a fine according to four times of the value of the tickets of un-booked passengers but not below Rs.20/-. Evan in the case of second offence where the number of un-booked passengers is 10 per cent of the total number of passengers in vehicle, the punishment to be awarded is a warning and a fine according to four times of the value of the tickets of un-booked passengers but not below Rs.20/-. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the authority purporting to pass the order of punishment have acted in violation of the statutory provision which governs relationship between the parties, he can come to this Court under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India and need not to exhaust the statutory remedy of appeal provided under the said standing order. The reason is that the impugned order of dimissal is not an order within the meaning of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 As such the said order is wholly without jurisdiction and can be assailed in the writ jurisdiction. 7. Learned counsel appearing in support of the petitioner further states that with reference to the past conduct, which has been considered by the punishing authority, he was not given any opportunity. Further more the petitioner in paragraph 4 of the writ petition has asserted that even though he was a casual labourer in 1984, on the basis of good work done by him, in March, 1988 he was appointed as a Conductor on regular basis which shows that there is nothing against him with respect to his past conduct He further asserts that this factual position has not been denied by the Corporation in the counter affidavit filed before this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, states that the instant writ application is not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioner has not filed an appeal under clause 25 of the said Standing Order nor has he raised any industrial dispute under Sec.2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such this Court should dismiss this writ application. 9. The power, jurisdiction and competance of the disciplinary authority to pass a dismissal order is derived from the provisions of the said standing Order. 9. The power, jurisdiction and competance of the disciplinary authority to pass a dismissal order is derived from the provisions of the said standing Order. The said power is not an un-fettered one but is controlled by various provisions of the said Standing Order Clause 22 of the said standing Order is one such provision which controls and guides the power of the authority concerned to impose punishment on the employees of the said Corporation. The said clause must be read with the aforesaid Circular. 10. It is, therefore, clear that the disciplinary authority, while passing the order of punishment in exercise of its power , under clause 22 of the said standing Order, cannot ignore provisions of the said Circular but in the instant case the impuged order of dismissal has no reference to the said circular. As a matter of fact, the impugned order (Annexure 3 ). to my mind, has been passed in a manner which is contrary to Clause 22 read with the said Cicular inasmuch as for the admitted offence of the petitioner, a penalty of dismissal cannot be passed. 11. It is far too fundamental a proposition to require any authority, namely, that when an authority acting in discharge of power conferred on it under the statutory instrument, in this case the Standing Order, acts in violation of the very same statutory instrument from which he derives his power, such action of the authority concerned can be called an action without jurisdiction. The impugned order of dismissal is therefore without jurisdiction. 12. It is well settled that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion of the Court and is not a rule of law In the deleberated decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammd Nooh reported in 1958 scr. 12. It is well settled that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion of the Court and is not a rule of law In the deleberated decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammd Nooh reported in 1958 scr. Page 595, it has been held at page 606 that this rule requiring the axnaustion of stotutory remedies before the writ is granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law" Again at page 609 of the said report, the Supreme Court has been pleased to observe as follows :- "where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an interior court or tribunal of first instance ts so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of Infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifently conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior courts sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first inslance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had in it. " (emphasis supplied ). The apex Court further emphasised the following position at page 509 itself : - "this would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunal composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. " 13. " 13. In another Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Discount Company Limited V/s. Income Tax Officer, Companics district I, Calcutta and another reported in AIR 1951 SC page 372 while delivering the majority judgment, Justice K. C. Dasgupta was pleased to observe as follows id paragraph 27 at page 380 :- "the High Court is have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such acting of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harrassment. the High Courts, it is well settled, will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. " 14. There is another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of m. G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay and another V/s. Affs. Shantilal Chhotelal and Company, reported in AIR 1966 SC page 197 in which in paragraph 15 it has as follows :- "the existence of an effective remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, but it is only one of the circumstances that the court should take into consideration in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this case, the High Court thought fit to exercise its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution and we do not see any exceptional circumstance to interfere with its discretion. " 15. The second objection about raising of industrial dispute wholly mis-conceived inasmuch as the provision of Sec.33 (2) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act was resorted to only because of the fact that there was a conciliation proceeding pending before the tribunal at the time of dismissing the petitioner. In normal case, after the order of dismissal is passed, the same is not sent for approval before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is, therefore, open to the delinquent employee to file an appeal under clause 25 of the said Standing Order and in an appropriate case to approach the Hon ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But in the instant case, for the reasons aforesaid, I hold that the writ application without filing of appeal under clause 25 of the Standing Order, is maintainable. 16. But in the instant case, for the reasons aforesaid, I hold that the writ application without filing of appeal under clause 25 of the Standing Order, is maintainable. 16. I, therefore, set aside the order dated 4th May, l989 (Annexure-3)passed by the Additional Managing Director of the Respondent Corporation. As a consequence thereof, the subsequent order dated 30th April, 1993 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna (Annexure-5) is of no consequence and the same is also set aside. In view of the fact that the order dated 4th May, 1989 (Annexure-3) has been set aside, the subsequent order dated 9th November, 1989 (Annexure-4) communicating the aforesaid order is also set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within a period of seven days from the date of receipt/prodution of a copy of this order before them. The respondents are also directed to pay 50 per cent of the back wages of the petitioner from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. This writ application is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to cost. Writ Application Allowed.