Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. The petitioner is an assessee on the file of the second respondent in respect of the assessment year 1977-78. For the accounting period ending with March 31, 1977, the petitioner ought to have filed a return under section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), on or before July 4, 1977. The petitioner did not do so. But, later, on September 29, 1977, the petitioner filed Form No. 6, seeking extension till October 31, 1977. The reasons given by it are that the accounts had just been audited and finalised ; annual general meeting was to be held on September 29, 1977, statements were under computation and the return form was to be sent. Time was extended till October 31, 1977. But the return was not filed. On October 28, 1977, the petitioner requested further extension till November 30, 1977, for the purpose of collecting details for the computation of income. That was granted. But, even then, the petitioner did not file the return in time. Without getting any further extension, the petitioner filed the return on December 12, 1977, on the basis of which an assessment order was passed by the second respondent on September 4, 1980. A sum of Rs. 7, 636 was levied as interest under section 139(8) of the Act. On November 4, 1980, the assessment order was rectified for some mistakes. Interest was reduced to Rs. 6, 480. Thereafter, notice was issued on November 12, 1980, by the second respondent under section 154 of the Act to enhance the interest to Rs. 44, 160 on the ground that in the calculation of interest payable, tax paid under section 140A of the Act was wrongly taken into account. The petitioner sent a reply to the notice on November 18, 1980. The petitioner gave the following reasons for the delay in filing the return. 44, 160 on the ground that in the calculation of interest payable, tax paid under section 140A of the Act was wrongly taken into account. The petitioner sent a reply to the notice on November 18, 1980. The petitioner gave the following reasons for the delay in filing the return. "(a) the annual general meeting of the company for adopting the accounts for the year ended March 31, 1977, was held only on September 29, 1977 ;(b) the petitioner had applied for time up to November 30, 1977, for submitting the return of income ; (c) the petitioner had been provided with the return form by the office of the second respondent on November 21, 1977 ; and (d) after gathering all the relevant particulars, the petitioner was able to file the return on December 12, 1977." On that footing, the petitioner objected to the levy of interest under section 139(8) of the Act. Even at this stage, it should be pointed out that none of the reasons given by the petitioner in the said objections can amount to sufficient cause, as contemplated by the Act. The objections raised by the petitioner were overruled by order dated November 25, 1980, passed by the second respondent. He proceeded to pass the order for rectification confirming the proposal to enhance the interest to Rs. 44, 160. That order was not challenged by the petitioner. However, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the original order of assessment dated September 4, 1980, was disposed of on July 24, 1981. The challenge of the petitioner to the levy of interest under the assessment order was rejected. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Tribunal, but it did not challenge the levy of interest before the Tribunal. The petitioner sent a communication on January 17, 1983, for waiver of the interest charged under section 139(8) of the Act. In paragraph 2, it is stated as follows: "We request you to kindly waive the same in view of the valid reasons stated in our letter dated November 18, 1980, for the delay in furnishing our return of income for the assessment year 1977-78." Thus, by the said letter dated January 17, 1983, the petitioner had only reiterated what he has stated in the reply letter dated November 18, 1980, which was already rejected by the second respondent, by order dated November 25, 1980. The second respondent passed another order on September 28, 1983, rejecting the request for waiver of interest. The relevant part of the said order reads as follows "I find that in the order dated November 25, 1980, the Income-tax Officer has considered the chargeability of interest under section 139(8) with reference to your explanation for the delay in filing the return and has specifically held the reasonableness of the delay in filing the return is irrelevant in so far as the provisions of section 139(8) are concerned and he had, therefore, overruled your objection. Since the matter has already been considered by the Income-tax Officer and interest charged, the question of reviewing the matter and reducing or waiving the interest under section 139(8) does not arise." That order was challenged by the petitioner by a revision before the Commissioner of Income-tax, the first respondent herein. The Commissioner dismissed the revision by order dated July 9, 1984, on two grounds. (i) The application under section 264 has been delayed as it ought to have been filed within one year from the date of service of the order dated November 25, 1980, and no reasons are given for the delay in the submission of the application. Hence, the application is not maintainable; (ii) The assessee had gone in appeal against the assessment order of the Income-tax Officer and one of the grounds raised in the appeal was against the charging of interest. The appeal was decided against the assessee and in the appeal before the Tribunal, no issue has been raised regarding interest. Hence, the revision application under section 264 is not maintainable. It is the said order which is challenged in this writ petition by the petitioner herein. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the first respondent is in error in holding that his revision application was barred by limitation and that the petitioner ought to have filed the application within one year from the date of service of the order dated November 25, 1980. It is argued by learned counsel that the present revision application is against the order dated September 28, 1983, passed by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the request for waiver of interest under rule 117A of the Income-tax Rules and that revision petition is well within time and not barred by limitation. There is no merit in this contention. It is argued by learned counsel that the present revision application is against the order dated September 28, 1983, passed by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the request for waiver of interest under rule 117A of the Income-tax Rules and that revision petition is well within time and not barred by limitation. There is no merit in this contention. As pointed out already, the question whether the petitioner had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the return was considered at the instance of the petitioner at the time when the order of rectification was passed under section 154 of the Act by the second respondent on November 25, 1980. The petitioner could have invited the second respondent to consider that question at that time, by virtue of the proviso to section 139(8)(a) of the Act. Under that proviso, the Assessing Officer may, in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, reduce or waive the interest payable by any assessee under that sub-section. The circumstances contemplated in the proviso are prescribed by rule 117A. The Rules are framed under section 295 of the Act, which provides that the Board may make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. When the proviso to the section contemplates prescription of circumstances under which the proviso can be invoked, rule 117A has been framed, prescribing the said circumstances. Five circumstances have been prescribed in the rule. It is not necessary for the purpose of this order to set them out in detail. The fifth circumstance is where the assessee produces evidence to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time. Admittedly, this case does not fall under the other four circumstances. The only circumstance, which could be invoked and has been invoked by the petitioner is the fifth circumstance under which he has to satisfy the Assessing Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time. When this question was raised by the petitioner itself before the Income-tax Officer, at the time when the order was sought to be made under section 154 rectifying the mistake contained in the order of assessment made under section 139(8), that officer considered the same and rejected the case of the petitioner. When this question was raised by the petitioner itself before the Income-tax Officer, at the time when the order was sought to be made under section 154 rectifying the mistake contained in the order of assessment made under section 139(8), that officer considered the same and rejected the case of the petitioner. In such cases, there is no question of the petitioner being allowed to raise the same point for the second time under rule 117A independently. The rule cannot be read independent of the section. In fact, the first part of rule 117A reads thus: "In respect of the assessment relating to an assessment year commencing on or before the first day of April, 1988, the Assessing Officer may reduce or waive the interest payable under section 139 in the cases and in the circumstances mentioned below, namely :--" It may be noted that the rule refers not only to section 139 of the Act, but also uses the expression "circumstances". If the petitioner had not raised the objection at the time when the order of rectification was made, it might have been open to the petitioner to file a separate application under rule 117A, invoking the fifth circumstance. But when the petitioner had invoked that provision and contended before the officer that interest was not leviable because it had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the return and when that reason had been rejected by the officer, it is not open to the petitioner to file a separate application under rule 117A. Consequently, the revision, which is filed before the Commissioner of Income-tax, though it purports to be against the order dated September 28, 1983, is really and in effect only against the order dated November 25, 1980, which levied interest after rejecting the contention of the petitioner that it had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the return. The order dated September 28, 1983, is nothing but merely pointing out to the petitioner that an order had already been passed on November 25, 1980, and there is no question of reconsidering the subject-matter, at the instance of the petitioner. Hence, the Commissioner is justified in taking the view that the present revision before him is one against the order dated November 25, 1980, and that is beyond the period prescribed by law and, therefore, it is barred by limitation. Hence, the Commissioner is justified in taking the view that the present revision before him is one against the order dated November 25, 1980, and that is beyond the period prescribed by law and, therefore, it is barred by limitation. The second reason given by the Commissioner is also correct in the circumstances of the case. The petitioner, having challenged the levy of interest by an appeal before the appellate authority and failed therein, cannot contend that the interest should be waived under rule 117A of the Rules. It is to be noted that the petitioner did not raise any ground before the Tribunal, when it filed an appeal before the Tribunal with regard to levy of interestIn the circumstances, the order of the Commissioner, which is impugned in this writ petition does not suffer from any infirmity whatever. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.