S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) AS these two petitions arise out of identical facts and involve common questions, they are being decided by this common order. The arguments were heard in part on 17-2-1995. Thereafter the case was taken up on different dales, but till date no reply to these writ petitions is filed. Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has stated that there are number of other identical petitions which have already been decided by this Court on 17-6-1995, and the main petition was special Civil Application No. 2929/94 in which a detailed reply has been filed on behalf of the Board, and as such to avoid unnecessary repetition of the reply he prays that that reply be treated as reply to these petitions. I called for the file of special Civil Application No. 9299/94, and have gone through the contents of the said writ petition as well as the order passed in that writ petition, and cognate matters. I am satisfied that these are identical matters. In view of these facts the prayer which has been made by Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the respondents, is accepted and the reply filed by him in Special Civil Application no. 9229/94 is treated as reply to these writ petitions. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of these petitions as alleged therein by the petitioners are as follows: sca 8369/94 : in all four petitioners are there in this writ petition. The petitioners were appointed by order dated 12-2-1993 by respondent No. 1 as sweeper/peon/pagi (watchman) in the pay-scale of Rs. 750- 900 with effect from 13-2-1993 with dearness allowance, house rent allowance, compensatory local allowance, medical allowance, etc. on probation for one year on temporary basis. The appointment has been specifically for a period of one year with specific condition that their services are likely to be terminated at any time without any notice. Copy of the appointment order has been filed along with the writ petition and the respondents have also furnished English translation thereof. The petitioners having conie to know that there were vacant posts, had given their applications and on the basis of the applications they were appointed on the posts by respondent No. 1. The petitioners stated that since last many years respondent No. 1 used to make appointment on that basis, i. e. on the basis of applications. The petitioners having conie to know that there were vacant posts, had given their applications and on the basis of the applications they were appointed on the posts by respondent No. 1. The petitioners stated that since last many years respondent No. 1 used to make appointment on that basis, i. e. on the basis of applications. Some persons had filed writ petition before this High Court being Special Civil Application No. 7907 of 1993 on the ground that appointment of the petitioners and other 31 employees on the posts are contrary to the provisions of the Act. In the said petition this Court had issued notice. The petitioners have come up with the case that though the aforesaid writ petition is not finally disposed of by this Court, to the utter surprise of the petitioners, respondents made attempt to terminate the services of the petitioners. The termination of service is sought to be made on the ground that their appointments were not made by following the proper procedure. Having apprehension of termination of their services the petitioners, along with other employees similarly situated, filed civil suit in the Civil Court at Baroda being regular Civil Suit No. 1425 of 1993. In the said suit the petitioners and other plaintiffs had prayed for interim injunction. The application for interim relief filed by the petitioners in the aforesaid suit came to be rejected by the trial Court on 31-12-1993. The petitioners have stated that against the order of the Civil Court rejecting the application for interim injunction they had not preferred any appeal. The petitioners have come up with the case that rest of the plaintiffs in the suit had filed appeal against the order of rejection of the application for injunction and the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the matter was taken to this court by those persons by filing civil revision application, but that too has been dismissed. In these backgrounds the petitioners state that since the petitioners had not filed any appeal, this Court may entertain the petition and grant necessary prayers. The petitioners undertake that they will withdraw their suit by getting their names deleted from the suit, the moment this court entertains this petition. In these backgrounds the petitioners state that since the petitioners had not filed any appeal, this Court may entertain the petition and grant necessary prayers. The petitioners undertake that they will withdraw their suit by getting their names deleted from the suit, the moment this court entertains this petition. In the background of these facts the petitioners filed this writ petition with the following prayers:" (I) to quash and set aside the action of the respondents in trying to terminate the services of the petitioners, by issuing a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or order under art. 226 of the Constitution of India; (ii) to direct the respondents to hold proper enquiry or give opportunity of being heard to the petitioners before taking any action of terminating the services of the petitioners, by issuing a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or order under art. 226 of the Constitution of India; (iii) to grant interim injunction, restraining the respondents, their agents and/or servants, from terminating the services of the petitioners in any manner, by way of interim relief till this petition is finally heard and decided by this Honble court. "from the reading of the facts and prayers made as reproduced above, it is clear that the petitioners filed this writ petition in the apprehension of termination of their services. During the course of arguments, it is not disputed by the Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the services of the petitioners have already been terminated by the respondents by order dated 28-6-1984. This petition appears to have been filed on 28th June 1994. Notice was issued to the respondents on 29-6-1994. SCA 10716/94: ( 3 ) THE petitioner in this case is one of the appointees out of 35 appointments which were made by respondent No. 1 in glass IV service as peon in the pay-scale of Rs. 750-900 with all other allowances. His appointment has also been made only on application as it has been done in the case of petitioners of Special Civil application No. 8369 of 1994 and other thirty applicants. The petitioner has come up with the case that haying come to know that there were vacant posts in the office of the respondents he had given his application and on the basis of that application he was appointed. The petitioner has come up with the case that haying come to know that there were vacant posts in the office of the respondents he had given his application and on the basis of that application he was appointed. According to the petitioner, during the last many years respondent No. 1 used to make appointments on the basis of such applications. The petitioners has given out that some people had filed writ petition in this High Court being Special civil Application No. 7907/93 on the ground that appointment of petitioner and 34 other persons on the post of peon, water server or tekedar was contrary to the provisions of the Act, etc. ; that though the said petition was sub judice before this Court, to the surprise of the petitioner, attempt was made by the respondents to terminate his services. Having apprehension of termination of his services, the petitioner along with others had filed civil suit in the Civil court at Baroda, being regular Civil Suit no. 1425/93. In the suit the plaintiffs prayed for interim injunction. However, the Trial Court rejected the application for interim injunction on 31-12-1993 on various grounds, such as, appointment of the petitioner was not as per the rules, that the plaintiffs had suppressed the fact of pendency of Special Civil Application no. 7907/93 filed in this High Court. The petitioner, along with others, filed appeal against the order of the Civil Court rejecting the application for interim injunction, live appeal was dismissed, and the matter was taken to this Court by filing Civil Revision Application No. 703/93, but that too has been dismissed on 24-6-1994. Thereafter under order dated 28-6-1994 services of the petitioners were terminated. ( 4 ) FROM the narration of facts of both the petitions it is clear that these are identical matters and the facts are common. It is not in dispute that the respondents have made appointment of 35 persons on the basis of their applications and the services of all the thirty-five persons including the petitioners have been terminated. In the reply to the writ petitions the respondents have raised the following contentions :4. 1. That the petitioners have already availed of the remedy of civil suit in the matter of termination of their service and as such this writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. In the reply to the writ petitions the respondents have raised the following contentions :4. 1. That the petitioners have already availed of the remedy of civil suit in the matter of termination of their service and as such this writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. The civil suit filed by the petitioners is pending in the civil court, and as such the petitioners have abused the process of the court by filing this writ petition. When two parallel remedies are available to the petitioners, and once they have availed of the remedy of civil suit, simultaneously they could not have availed of the remedy of writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India. In the civil suit the temporary injunction prayed for has been declined and that order of the Civil Court has been confirmed in appeal and then by this Court in revision petition. The petitioners, when failed to get favourable orders in their favour in the civil suit by way of interim injunction, have filed this writ petition and again made attempt to get stay order from this Court. This conduct of the petitioners disentitle them from seeking relief from this Court. 4. 2. Appointments of the petitioners have been made without following the procedure laid down for making recruitments. Their names have not been called for from Employment Exchange, nor applications were invited from open market. These are all ad hoc appointments for a fixed period of one year. These appointments were irregularly made without following any procedure prescribed for appointment on the posts which were in hot in existence at all. As the appointments of the petitioners were illegal, no notice or opportunity of hearing was provided to them while terminating their services. 4. 3. Appointments of the petitioners were for fixed term which has come to an end on 12-2-1994, but they were continued in service as they filed civil suit and application for interim injunction which was finally decided by this Court in revision petition on 24-6-1994. In the meanwhile there was interim orders in favour of the plaintiffs in the suit, and after the decision of the application for temporary injunction finally by this court, order terminating the services of the petitioners was passed on 28-6-1994. In the meanwhile there was interim orders in favour of the plaintiffs in the suit, and after the decision of the application for temporary injunction finally by this court, order terminating the services of the petitioners was passed on 28-6-1994. In view of these facts no notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be afforded to the petitioners before passing the order of termination. ( 5 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 7907/ 94 which was filed on 8-8-1993 has been decided by this court on 16-8-1994. After hearing all the parties including the petitioners therein this Court was pleased to pass order in the aforesaid special civil application wherein, in view of the fact that the order of appointments of the petitioners does not survive and further fact that the Baroda Municipal corporation is proceeding with the inquiry against the erring officer, it was held that the writ petition does not survive. This Court further observed that if the petitioners have any grievance with respect to the conduct of any of the officer, they may approach the State government for taking appropriate action. Appointments were given by the then Administrative Officer. These appointments, On making inquiry by the director of Education as well as the baroda Municipal Corporation, were found to be irregular and illegal and therefore inquiry has already been initiated against the officer who made the appointments. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners mr. Majmudar contended that the appointments of the petitioners were made on probation and as such their services could have been discharged only in case their work would have been reported to be unsatisfactory. Mr. Majmudar contended that the petitioners services were not terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work, and as such termination of services of the petitioners is bad in law. It has, next been contended by Mr. Majmudar, learned counsel for the petitioners, that before terminating the services of the petitioners, neither notice nor an opportunity of hearing has been afforded, and as such the order suffers from the vice of not being fair and reasonable. As the order of termination of service of the petitioners affects their civil rights the respondents should have followed the principles of natural justice before making the order. As the order of termination of service of the petitioners affects their civil rights the respondents should have followed the principles of natural justice before making the order. Even if the petitioners appointment may be contrary to the rules, then also before dispensing with their services the principles of natural justice are to be followed. Carrying further this, argument mr. Majmudar contended that it is well- settled position of law that even if the initial appointment has wrongly been made, then also the minimum principles of natural justice are required to be observed before the same is brought to an end. It has further been contended by Mr. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the action of the respondents in terminating the services of the petitioners is highly unjust, arbitrary and violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Special Civil Application No. 7907/93 was sub judice before this Court on the day on which the order of termination of services of the petitioners was made and as such there was no justification for the respondents to terminate the services of the petitioners until that matter was decided finally by this Court. Lastly Mr. Majmudar contended that hostile discrimination is made by the respondents in the matter of termination of services of similarly situated persons. Since last many years respondent No. 1 used to make appointments on different post in the offices of the Corporation on the basis of applications submitted by the appointees, i. e. without following any procedure prescribed by the rules for making appointment to such posts. ( 7 ) ON the other hand Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for respondents, hotly contended this writ petition as well as the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Mr. Desai has reiterated the arguments which have been raised by the corporation in reply to the writ petition which has already been reproduced above. In addition to the contentions raised in the reply to the writ petition Mr. Desai contended that the appointments of the petitioners were back-door entries. It has next been contended that the appointments of the petitioners were in total violation of the provisions of articles 14 and 16. of the Constitution of india and as such their appointments were void ab initio. Desai contended that the appointments of the petitioners were back-door entries. It has next been contended that the appointments of the petitioners were in total violation of the provisions of articles 14 and 16. of the Constitution of india and as such their appointments were void ab initio. It has next been contended that as the appointment of the petitioners were for fixed term, the same has come to an end on expiry of the period, but as the litigation was pending and some interim orders have been passed by the Courts, they were continued till the date of termination of services. The matter regarding grant of injunction has been finally decided by this Court on 24-6- 1994 and immediately thereafter order of termination of services of the petitioners was passed. It is contended by Mr. Desai that even otherwise the geievance of the petitioners regarding following the principles of natural justice has no merits because as per the terms of appointment the termination of services could have been made without giving notice to the petitioners. Lastly Mr. Desai contended that it is a case of abuse of the process of the court and on this ground alone the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Carrying this argument further Mr. Desai contended with all vehemence at his command that in case the order of termination of services of the petitioners is set aside by this court, then it will amount to restoration of the orders of appointment of the petitioners which were ab initio illegal and was for fixed term of one year. ( 8 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties appearing in these writ petitions. ( 9 ) MR. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has not disputed the following facts: (i) That the petitioners filed civil suit in connection with the apprehension of their termination of their services in the Civil court at Baroda and that suit is pending till this day. (ii) The application for temporary injunction has been rejected by the Civil court and that decision has been confirmed by the Appellate Court and then by this Court in civil revision application. (ii) The application for temporary injunction has been rejected by the Civil court and that decision has been confirmed by the Appellate Court and then by this Court in civil revision application. Temporary injunction has not been granted in favour of the petitioners by the Civil Court on the ground that their appointments were irregular and they have concealed the fact of filing writ petition being Special Civil Application no. 7909 of 1993 before this Court in which their appointments have been questioned. Special Civil Application No. 7909 of 1993 has already been decided by this court. (iii) Appointments of the petitioners have not been made after following any procedure laid down for recruitment, as well as after following the selection process, i. e. after calling the names from employment exchange or inviting applications from open market and thereafter making selection. (iv) Appointment of all the thirty-five persons had been dispensed with. ( 10 ) BEFORE dealing with the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, i would like to deal with one of the objections raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the petitioners are not legally entitled to avail of two parallel remedies simultaneously available in respect of termination of their services. Leaving apart the question whether the appointments of the petitioners are valid or not, in case termination of the services of the petitioners has been made, they have the remedy to challenge the legality, validity and correctness of the same either by approaching the Civil Court by way of filing civil suit or by filing writ petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in case the authority who passed the order is state or instrumentality or agency of the state, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have the choice of the remedy and it was open for them to avail of either of the remedies. The first remedy is the remedy in respect of civil right enforceable under the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, and the second remedy is the constitutional remedy available under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The first remedy is the remedy in respect of civil right enforceable under the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, and the second remedy is the constitutional remedy available under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once the petitioners have chosen to approach a particular forum, i. e. the remedy of civil suit in the Civil Court, then it is not open to them to shift to another remedy available which at that point of time they have not chosen to avail. The peculiar facts of this case which have already been stated earlier are that the suit has been filed under apprehension of termination of services of the petitioners, and the petitioners have made attempt to take the discretionary relief of temporary injunction which appears to have been granted earlier but later on, on the objections filed by the respondents as defendants in the suit, the same has been vacated. The matter does not rest here: some of the plaintiffs, though the petitioners may not have chosen the remedy of appeal and revision petition before this Court, filed appeal in the first appellate Court against the order of the civil Court declining to grant temporary injunction. But the appeal has failed, and then the matter has been taken to this court under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 and that too has been dismissed. In the circumstances, availing of this remedy or shifting to the remedy under Article 226 of the constitution by the petitioners is not permissible. At the same time the petitioners could not have availed of the two parallel remedies, and such persons cannot be allowed to take another chance to get stay order from this Court where earlier the Civil Court has declined to grant the same. ( 11 ) AS stated earlier the suit is pending, but the explanation given out by the petitioners for availing of this writ petition is also very significant and important to be noticed, In this respect reference may be made to the averments made by the petitioner in para 8 of Special Civil Application No. 8369 of 1994 which reads as under :"the petitioners submit that along with other employees, petitioners had also filed a civil suit in Baroda Court, being regular Civil Suit No. 1425 of 1993, and had asked for interim injunction. However, the Trial Court rejected the application for interim injunction on 31- 12-1993, against which the petitioners had not preferred any appeal. However, it seems that rest of the plaintiffs of that suit had filed appeal as well as revision application against that order, which were also dismissed. However, since the petitioners had not filed any appeal, this honble Court may entertain the petition and grant necessary prayers. The petitioners undertake that they will withdraw the said suit by getting their names deleted from the suit, moment this honble Court entertains this petition. "from reading of the aforesaid averments it is no more in dispute that the only purported object of filing this writ petition by the petitioners is to get interim relief from this Court, when such relief has not been granted in their favour by the Civil Court in civil suit. Another important fact that the petitioners have not withdrawn the suit, meaning thereby - they have tried to keep both the remedies available to them in hand so that at appropriate time either of the remedies may be pressed for and may be used. The averment made in para 8 of the petition,"the petitioners undertake that they will withdraw the said suit by getting their names deleted from the suit, moment this honble Court entertains this petition"compels this Court to draw inference that it is an attempt to keep the petitioners themselves to ride on two horses at the same time. ( 12 ) SO far as Special Civil Application no. 10716 of 1994 is concerned, the petitioner has filed the writ petition before this Court challenging therein the order of termination and the petitioner has given explanation for filing the writ petition, in para 7 thereof as under:"the petitioner submits that since the petitioner was apprehending termination, he along with others had filed a civil suit in Baroda Court being Regular Civil Suit no. 1425 of 1993, and had asked for interim injunction. However, the Trial court rejected the application for interim injunction on 31-12-1993 on various grounds, such as appointment of the petitioner was not as per the Rules and regulations and that he had also suppressed the fact of pendency of special Civil Application No. 7907 of 1993 filed in the High Court. However, the Trial court rejected the application for interim injunction on 31-12-1993 on various grounds, such as appointment of the petitioner was not as per the Rules and regulations and that he had also suppressed the fact of pendency of special Civil Application No. 7907 of 1993 filed in the High Court. The petitioner, along with others, had also filed an appeal and that appeal was dismissed and the revision application was also rejected by this Honble Court. Annexed hereto and marked as annexure-C is the copy of the order passed by this Honble Court in C. R. A. No. 703 of 1993. However, thereafter by an order dated 28-6-1994, the petitioner was terminated from service by respondent No. 1. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-D is the copy of the termination order dated 28-6-1994. Since at the time of filing of the suit the termination order was not in existence and since the dismissal of application exh. 5 which was confirmed in appeal and in revision, was at the interlocutory stage, by this substantive petition the petitioner is challenging the termination order at Annexure-D. The petitioner submits that he will withdraw the civil suit if this petition is entertained by getting his name deleted from the civil suit. "this is absolutely no explanation or any justification whatsoever to resort to the remedy under Article 226 of the constitution of India. The petitioner, by filing this writ petition, has made an attempt to get stay order against the termination order. The petitioner could not have got the stay order against the termination order in the civil suit, obviously for the reason that the Court has already adjudicated the matter regarding grant of temporary injunction against termination of the services of the petitioner. The order of the Civil Court has already been upheld by the Appellate court. So the petitioner has chosen another forum or remedy only with the object to again make attempt to get some favourable interim order. Once the petitioner has chosen a particular forum or remedy, then he has to stick to the remedy and he cannot be permitted to shift to another parallel remedy mainly because in the earlier remedy which he availed of voluntarily he failed to get favourable interim order. Once the petitioner has chosen a particular forum or remedy, then he has to stick to the remedy and he cannot be permitted to shift to another parallel remedy mainly because in the earlier remedy which he availed of voluntarily he failed to get favourable interim order. ( 13 ) THE question of pursuing two remedies simultaneously, one invoking the jurisdiction of Civil Court and the other under the Constitution, when the subject-matter agitated upon is one and the same in both the forums, has come up for consideration before the Supreme court in the case of Jain Singh v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 989. The relevant observation made by the supreme Court in para 4 of the reported decision reads as follows:"the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it involved determination of disputed questions of fact. It was also observed that the High court should not in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction grant relief to the appellant when he had an alternative remedy. After hearing Mr. Sobhagmal jain on behalf of the appellant, we see no cogent ground to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt on the point that the extent of purity of the gypsum won by the appellant is a question of fact. It has also been brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellant has filed a suit, in which he has agitated the same question which is the, subject-matter of the writ petition. In our opinion the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. " ( 14 ) IN the case of Chemech Engineers pvt. Ltd. v. The Director of Industries and commerce, reported in AIR 1994 Madras 14, the aforesaid question has come up cor consideration of the Madras High court. Relying on the observations of the supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh (supra) the Madras High Court has taken the view that pursuit of one remedy invoking jurisdiction of civil forum and other writ jurisdiction, simultaneously is not permissible. The relevant part of the judgment of the Madras High Court reads as follows:"mr. Relying on the observations of the supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh (supra) the Madras High Court has taken the view that pursuit of one remedy invoking jurisdiction of civil forum and other writ jurisdiction, simultaneously is not permissible. The relevant part of the judgment of the Madras High Court reads as follows:"mr. V. Sridevan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents 4 and 5 would resort to make an incidental submission, adopted by learned Counsel appearing for the other respondents, revolving on the question of pursuit of parallel remedies simultaneously, one invoking the jurisdiction of the civil forum and the other writ jurisdiction, when especially the subject-matter agitated upon is one and the same in both the forums. In elaboration of this submission, he would say that the company, in the process of challenge or assailing the action of the department in taking steps for the removal of the alleged trespass committed by the company seeks to canvass the position that the Company was the owner of the plot, without even taking, action to set aside the earlier orders of cancellation of allotment and resumption of possession in the present action, which is the same relief, when compared with the relief of declaration and consequential injunction prayed for in the suit in C. S. No. / 213 of 1991 on the file of this Court. He would then pose a question, "whether the pursuit of such parallel remedies is permissible under law?" After posing such a question, he would say that the answer is provided by the Apex Court of this country in the case of Jai Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 898 . Before straightway staling the rule evolved therein, I feel it is better to pen down the basis or juridial facts in order to appreciate the facts of the present case in the best of fashion possible in the light of the ruling so arrived at. (a) In that case, the appellant took on lease 180 acres of land from the government of Rajasthan on June 18, 1962 for the purpose of mining gypsum ore for a period of 20 years. Section 9 (2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 relates to royalties in respect of mining leases. (a) In that case, the appellant took on lease 180 acres of land from the government of Rajasthan on June 18, 1962 for the purpose of mining gypsum ore for a period of 20 years. Section 9 (2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 relates to royalties in respect of mining leases. According to that provision, the holder of a mining lease granted on or after the commencement of the said Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the second Schedule in respect of that mineral. The Second Schedule provided at item No. 13 the rate on which royalty, etc. in respect of gypsum is to be paid. Accordingly to that item at the relevant time, royalty would be at the rate of Rs. 1. 25 per tonne of gypsum containing 85 per cent and above Caso42h2o and at the rate, of 75 paise per tonne of gypsum containing less than 85 per cent caso42+20. (b) Royalty was demanded from the appellant in respect of gypsum won by him at the rate of Rs. 1. 25 per tonne. The case of the appellant, however, was that the gypsum which was won by him contained less than 85 per cent caso42h2o. As against that, the stand taken by the respondents was that the appellant failed to furnish the analysis reports from a standard laboratory to show that gypsum won by him contained less than 85 per cent Caso42h2o. Revision filed by the appellant against the decision of the Rajasthan Government to charge royalty at the rate of Rs. 1. 25 per tonne was dismissed by the Central government. (c) The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it involved determination of disputed question of fact. It was also observed that the High court should not in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction grant relief to the appellant when he had an alternative remedy. (d) The matter had further been agitated before the Supreme Court. After the dismissal of the writ petition and prior to the matter being agitated before the supreme Court, the appellant had agitated the same question by filing of a suit. (d) The matter had further been agitated before the Supreme Court. After the dismissal of the writ petition and prior to the matter being agitated before the supreme Court, the appellant had agitated the same question by filing of a suit. (e) In such a context, the Supreme court while dismissing the appeal, said thus: it has also been brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellant has filed a suit, in which he has agitated the same question which is the subject-matter of the writ petition. In our opinion, the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. the observation of the Supreme Court as above is applicable on all fours to the case on hand. "in the present case both the petitioners have availed parallel remedies simultaneously, one invoking the jurisdiction of civil coram and the other the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when especially the subject-matter agitated upon is one and the same in both the forums. Though the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed only on this ground, but as the matters have been argued at length I have considered it to be fit case to consider the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners is correct to contend that the termination of services of the petitioners has not been made on the ground of their unsatisfactory work. But this contention is devoid of any force as the appointments of the petitioners cannot be said to be on probation. The appointment orders of the petitioners which are identical in both the cases mention the appointment as on probation for one year. But the learned Counsel for the petitioners has not appreciated that that was not the only phraseology used in the order. Relevant part of the appointment order of the petitioners contain two material phrases, "on probation for one year" and "on temporary basis". These two phrases contained in the appointment orders leave no doubt in the mind of the court that it was an appointment on temporary basis. The further term of the appointment, "that the petitioner will be liable to be discharged from service without any notice" also is significant on the question of nature of appointment. These two phrases contained in the appointment orders leave no doubt in the mind of the court that it was an appointment on temporary basis. The further term of the appointment, "that the petitioner will be liable to be discharged from service without any notice" also is significant on the question of nature of appointment. The appointment of the petitioners is made terminable without notice at any time and it was an appointment for fixed term of one year. It was an appointment on temporary basis and not on probation. Apart from this, appointment on probation is generally made on substantive basis. Appointment on substantive basis means appointment which is made against a permanent vacancy after following the procedure for recruitment as laid down under the relevant service rules or after calling names from Employment Exchange or after inviting applications from open market and after making selections out of those persons. In the present case the respondents have come up with the case that there was no post, what to say of permanent post, available in the corporation. So far as recruitment of the petitioners is concerned, it is contended by the respondents that these are back-door entries, i. e. the appointments which are made without following any procedure or even without calling names from the Employment Exchange or inviting applications from the market. These are the appointments which are made on the basis of applications of the petitioners without any element of selection and without affording equal opportunity for appointment in public employment to all the eligible candidates. The averments which have been made by the petitioners in para 3 of the petition, "having come to know that there were vacant posts the petitioners had given their applications and ultimately on that basis they were appointed on the posts" makes it abundantly clear, that their appointments had been made purely on ad hoc and temporary basis without following any procedure or without following the principles enunciated under articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india. When the appointments of the petitioners are purely ad hoc and temporary, and in sum and substance back-door entries, the same cannot be considered to be appointments on probation. When the appointments of the petitioners are purely ad hoc and temporary, and in sum and substance back-door entries, the same cannot be considered to be appointments on probation. When the petitioners appointments were not on probation it is too far to stretch by the learned Counsel for the petitioners to argue that the procedure to be followed in the case of discharge from service has not been followed in the present case. In view of these facts and the nature of appointment of the petitioners, the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is wholly devoid of any merits and the same is rejected. ( 16 ) THE second contention of the, learned Counsel for the petitioner that before terminating of the services of the petitioners neither notice nor opportunity of hearing was given is also devoid of any merits. Appointment of the petitioners, as stated earlier, was fixed term, temporary appointments. The appointment was made for one year and as such in all eventualities it has to come to an end on expiry of the period of appointment, i. e. one year. It is not the case of the petitioners that the term of appointment of the petitioners has been extended by the respondents. On the contrary the respondents even before the expiry of the period of one year proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioners. But the order of termination could not be made as the petitioners have filed civil suit and temporary injunction has been granted in their favour. Thereafter the matter of temporary injunction was taken to the appellate court as well as to this Court by some of the similarly situated persons and as such till the matter has been decided finally by this Court the respondents have not passed the order of termination. The civil revision application filed by some of the plaintiffs in the suit, in which the petitioners were also plaintiffs, has been decided by this Court on 24-6-1994. On 28th June 1994 the order of termination of the plaintiffs, including the petitioners, has been made. The respondents have acted very fairly and reasonably in the matter. When the application regarding grant of temporary injunction under identically situated persons were sub judice before this Court the respondents have rightly not passed the order of termination of the petitioners. On 28th June 1994 the order of termination of the plaintiffs, including the petitioners, has been made. The respondents have acted very fairly and reasonably in the matter. When the application regarding grant of temporary injunction under identically situated persons were sub judice before this Court the respondents have rightly not passed the order of termination of the petitioners. The petitioners had accepted the appointment subject to the condition that it was for one year and with further condition that the same was liable to be brought to an end without any notice even before the expiry of the term of one year. They cannot make any grievance against the order of termination of service on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been followed. When the appointment of the petitioners itself was ad hoc, temporary and for fixed term and subject to further stipulation that it was liable to be brought to an end earlier without notice, the principles of natural justice need not be followed while terminating the services of the petitioners. ( 17 ) A person who was appointed on temporary basis does not acquire any substantive right to the post, even though the post itself may be permanent. In the present case even there was no posts, and the appointments of the petitioners were made even though no posts were available. In the order of temporary appontment of the petitioners a specific term has been made that it is liable to be terminated at any time without any notice, even prior to the completion of the term of one year. Even if such condition would not have been therein, then also it is an implied term of such appointment that it may be terminable at any time without notice. In the case of madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas nigam Limited v. Devendra Kumar Jain, reported in JT 1995 (1) S. C. 198, the supreme Court has considered this very question of affording opportunity of hearing before termination of services of a person who has been appointed on temporary basis. In that case the Supreme court has observed that temporary government servant does not become permanent Unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or is declared as permanent servant. In that case the Supreme court has observed that temporary government servant does not become permanent Unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or is declared as permanent servant. It has further beep observed by the Supreme court that the respondents in that case all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. The Supreme court further held that in such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the constitution. The aforesaid observations were made in the case of termination of service of temporary employees by the corporation which was a Government company in that case. In the present case it is a matter of statutory Corporation. In the case which was under consideration before the Supreme Court the term of temporary appointment order was as under:". . . . ABOVE appointment is purely temporary and is liable to termination at any time without notice or assigning a reason. "after referring to the aforesaid term of appointment, the Supreme Court made observations in para 5 of the judgment as under:"a plain reading of these two orders will go to show that the appointments were made purely on temporary basis and their services were liable to be terminated at any time without notice or assigning any reason. In the case of appointment on temporary basis a servant who is so appointed does not acquire any substantive right to the post, even though the post itself may be permanent and it is an implied term of such appointment that it may be terminable at any time and without notice. A temporary Government servant does not become a permanent government servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant-company to have acquired that status. On the contrary the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. On the contrary the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. " ( 18 ) IN the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. Prari Mohan Misra, reported in JT 1995 (2) SC 54, the Supreme Court has considered the question whether mere prolonged continuous ad hoc service does ripen into a regular service to claim substantive status. In para 4 of the said decision the Supreme Court has observed that mere prolonged continuous ad hoc service does not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status. The employee would remain to be on ad hoc basis until further orders. In the case before the Supreme Court the officer had remained on ad hoc basis for more than six years and controversy has arisen when he was ordered to be reverted to the lower post. As already held, the appointment of the petitioners here was temporary appointment and, further, the same, was liable to be terminated without any notice at any time. No illegality whatsoever has been committed by the respondents in hot giving an opportunity of hearing or notice to the petitioners before terminating their services. ( 19 ) THE next-contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Special civil Application No. 7901/93 was sub judice before this Court and as such the services of the petitioners could not have been terminated is also devoid of any force. In Special Civil Application No. 7907 of 1993 ad hoc and temporary appointments of the petitioner and other identical appointees was challenged before this Court on the ground that those are back-door entries. In Special Civil Application No. 7907 of 1993 ad hoc and temporary appointments of the petitioner and other identical appointees was challenged before this Court on the ground that those are back-door entries. In the civil suit, while deciding temporary injunction the trial Court has declined to grant any interim relief to the petitioners and other identically situated persons on the ground that their appointments were illegal, and the fact of pendency of Special Civil application No. 7907/93 has not been brought to the notice of the Court. If the respondents themselves have considered the matter and decided to terminate the services of the petitioners who were temporarily appointed for one year it is in consonance with the claim made by the petitioners in Special Civil Application no. 7907/93. Once challenge has been made of appointment of the petitioners it is always open to the respondents to consider the same without waiting for the decision of this Court and in case they consider that the appointments are illegal, they have all the rights to set right the wrong. I fail to see any justification in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that until the decision in special Civil Application No. 7907/93 by this Court the respondents could not have terminated the services of the petitioners. Now it is no more in dispute that the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 7907/93 has already been disposed of and it is no more pending in this Court. ( 20 ) THE last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the matter of termination of service hostile discrimination has been made is also devoid of any substance. It is not in dispute that by one stroke of pen thirty- five persons including the petitioners were appointed on temporary basis by the then Administrator of the Corporation and the services of all the thirty-five persons including the petitioners have been terminated. In view of this fact it cannot be said that any discrimination is made amongst all similarly situated persons. But the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that earlier also in the Corporation appointments were being made from time to time on the basis of applications and not by following recruitment procedure as laid down, by calling names from employment exchange or inviting applications from open market. But the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that earlier also in the Corporation appointments were being made from time to time on the basis of applications and not by following recruitment procedure as laid down, by calling names from employment exchange or inviting applications from open market. In para 3 of Special Civil application No. 8369/94 averments have been made as follows:"the petitioners submit that having come to know that there are vacant posts, the petitioners had given their applications and ultimately on that basis they were appointed on that post. Since last many years, respondent No. 1 used to make appointment on that basis, i. e. on the basis of applications. "further averments in this respect have been made in para 4 of the petition, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:the proposed action of the respondents, by which they wanted to terminate the services of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In fact, since last so many years, the recruitment has been made only on the basis of some applications from the persons who want to be appointed as peon or water server. Even in the past respondent No. 1 has made so many appointments on those posts. There is, therefore, no reason to put an end to the services of the petitioners and that too without giving any hearing to them. "from the reading of the aforesaid averments made by the petitioners in the writ petition it is too difficult to accept the plea of discrimination. It is settled law that the burden of proof of discrimination lies on the person who make grievance on this ground. The aforesaid averments are hardly sufficient to make out any plea of discrimination. Moreover, the petitioners have failed to give out material particulars, i. e. names, date of appointment of those persons as well as the fact whether they are continued in service or not. Last but not the least, the petitioners and those persons who were appointed earlier, as alleged, on their own applications, do not constitute one class. They are two different classes of persons who were appointed at different points of time. Thirty-five persons who have been appointed in 1993 may constitute one class and, as observed earlier by me in this judgment, no discrimination is made amongst these persons by the respondents. They are two different classes of persons who were appointed at different points of time. Thirty-five persons who have been appointed in 1993 may constitute one class and, as observed earlier by me in this judgment, no discrimination is made amongst these persons by the respondents. Though the petitioners have not been able to make out any case on discrimination, even if it is assumed for the time being that earlier also appointments in such manner were made by the respondents, and those persons are continued in service, a question arises : whether on this ground the order of termination of services of the petitioners is liable to be set aside by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondents had earlier made illegal appointments in the case of other persons in the like fashion and manner as the appointment of the petitioners has been made can never be a ground for issuing writ in favour of the petitioners on the plea of discrimination. The appointments which have been made of other persons might not have been legal or in consonance with the constitutional provisions as contained in articles 14 and ,16 of the Constitution. Assuming that temporary appointments of those persons were contrary to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution, obviously such unconstitutional appointments cannot be made the basis for issue of writ compelling the respondents to repeat the illegality or to continue illegal temporary appointment of petitioners. The equitable jurisdiction or extraordinary discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised for such purposes. Earlier the respondents have committed some illegality in making temporary appointments. But that does not entitle this Court to compel the authority to repeat the illegality. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh, reported in AIR 1995 SC 705 . The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in para 8 of the reported decision read as follows:". . . Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in para 8 of the reported decision read as follows:". . . Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the high Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners case is similar to the other persons case. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners case is similar to the other persons case. But then why examine another persons case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. It is not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another persons case which other person is not before the Court nor in his case. In our considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and iegal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the supreme Court and High Court nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)"in view of the law laid down by the supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh administration (supra) the last contention of the petitioners deserves to be rejected. . ( 21 ) I find sufficient merit in the contention of Mr. Desai that in case the orders of termination of the services of the petitioners are set. aside by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the illegal orders of appointment as well as the appointments for fixed term will be restored. Appointments of the petitioners are back-door entries. Mr. Desai that in case the orders of termination of the services of the petitioners are set. aside by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the illegal orders of appointment as well as the appointments for fixed term will be restored. Appointments of the petitioners are back-door entries. Mr. Desai is correct to argue that in case the order of termination of services of the petitioners dated 28-6- 1994 is set aside, this court will be restoring the order of appointment of the petitioners which is ab initio illegal and unconstitutional. Sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court will not perpetuate any illegality or unconstitutionality. A similar question had arisen before the Supreme Court in the case of Gadde Vsnkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported, in AIR 1966 SC 828 . The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in para 17 of the reported decision reads as follows:"the result of the discussion may be stated thus: The Primary Health Centre was not permanently located at dharmajigudem. The representatives of the said village did not comply with the necessary conditions for such location. The Panchayat Samithi finally cancelled its earlier resolutions which they were entitled to do and passed a resolution for locating the Primary Health Centre permanently at Lingapalem. Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated March 7, 1962, and that dated april 18, 1963, were not legally passed : the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of Dharmajigudem village. In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the government dated April 18, 1963? If the high Court had quashed the said order it would have restored and illegal order it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. If the high Court had quashed the said order it would have restored and illegal order it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. "full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of A. M. Mani v. Kerala State electricity Board, reported in AIR 1968 kerala 76, held that high prerogative writ cannot be issued when the effect of doing so would be to perpetuate illegal orders. The relevant observations made by the kerala High Court in para 8 of the reported decision read as under:". . . Ext. p. 8 proceedings of the Board on which the petitioners right to continue in service upto 58 years of age was founded, is also tarred by the same brush. We were referred to the petitioners affidavit on O. P. No. 2560 of 1966, wherein he admitted that the Board by a majority decided not to extend the benefits of any increase in the age of superannuation to its employees. We understand paragraph 8 of the counter- affidavit filed by the Board in this writ petition, as a clear admission that Exts. P- 8 and P-9 proceedings of the Board, were also issued under the influence of the governments directive Ext. P-5. Such an admission is also contained in paras 11 and 12 of the Board / counter-affidavit in O. P. No. 25660 of 1966 (vide Ext. P. 17 ). If so, Exts. P-8 and P-9 proceedings are also tainted /by the same illegality which taints Ext. P.-14. The petitioner in such a case has no right or title to continue in service upto 58 years of age which alone will entitle him to maintain this writ petition. Nor can we issue the high prerogative writ sought for in this case, if the effect of doing so would be to perpetuate the illegal orders Exts. P.-8 and P-9. The petitioner in such a case has no right or title to continue in service upto 58 years of age which alone will entitle him to maintain this writ petition. Nor can we issue the high prerogative writ sought for in this case, if the effect of doing so would be to perpetuate the illegal orders Exts. P.-8 and P-9. "the Patna High Court in the case of devendra Prasad Gupta v. The State of bihar, reported in AIR 1977 Patna 166, again considered this point, relying on its earlier decision in the case of Abdul majid v. The State Transport Authority, reported in AIR 1960 Patna 333, and held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not to be exercised to quash an illegal order the effect whereof would be to revive another illegal order. The relevant observation of the Patna high Court contained in para 7 of the reported decision reads as follows:". . . IT is well-settled that the writ jurisdiction of this Court should not be exercised for the purpose of quashing an illegal order the effect whereof will be to revive another illegal order. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision in Abdul Majid v. The State transport Authority, 1960 BLJR 282= ( AIR 1960 Pat. 333 ). " ( 22 ) THE very same question had arisen before Full Bench of Rajasthan High court in the case of Jagan Singh v. State transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1980 Rajasthan 1. The relevant observation made by the Court in para 12 of the reported decision reads as follows:"in Gani Mohammed v. State transport Appellate Tribunal, 1976 Raj lw 201, it was observed that while granting a writ of certiorari, this court would not exercise its discretion in such a manner which would have the effect of restoring an illegal order passed by the regional Transport Authority. As we have already pointed out above, the effect of setting aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari would be restoring an invalid and illegal order passed by the Regional Transport authority. Reference may also be made to G. Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. As we have already pointed out above, the effect of setting aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari would be restoring an invalid and illegal order passed by the Regional Transport authority. Reference may also be made to G. Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 wherein the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that State Government had no power under Section 72 of the Andhra panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act to review its previous order, yet their lordships refused to interfere with the order passed by the State Government upon such a review on the ground that quashing of that order would lead to restoratoin of an illegal order passed earlier by the State Government. In this connection, their Lordships further refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. " again the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Himmat Jain v. The State of rajasthan, reported in AIR 1994 rajasthan 53, considered this point with reference to issuance of writ of mandamus. Relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of A. M. Mani v. Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) and that of Patna High Court in the case of Devendra v. State (supra), division Bench of Rajasthan High Court held that writ of mandamus which may perpetuate illegality would not be issued. The relevant observation contained in para 9 of the reported decision reads as under:"it is settled that the mandamus would not go when it appears that it would be futile in its results. It is also settled that the mandamus would not issue to perpetuate an illegality, or to revive another illegal order. "in the present case, in case the termination order of the petitioners is quashed, certainly it will amount to restoring the order of illegal temporary appointments which were made for fixed term, and which have come to an end long back. Sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court will certainly not perpetuate an illegality. ( 23 ) BEFORE parting with this case I think it proper to say a few words regarding back-door entries to public appointments. In the present case, it is the case of the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the appointments of the petitioners were back-door entries. ( 23 ) BEFORE parting with this case I think it proper to say a few words regarding back-door entries to public appointments. In the present case, it is the case of the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the appointments of the petitioners were back-door entries. Appointments of the petitioners were admittedly made without following any procedure of the recruitment or even without following the constitutional mandate, and as such these appointments are certainly back-door entries to the service of the Corporation. But the back-door entries are not unilateral entries. Somebody sitting in the Corporations office is responsible for these back-door entries. Petitioners themselves have not entered through back-door. But the then administrative Officer was the person who has permitted them to enter from back-door. The petitioners appointments have been terminated, and rightly so. The person who was really instrumental in making all these back-door appointments cannot and should not be allowed to go scot-free. It is that person who has put the corporation to suffer heavy monetary loss. He made the appointments, though post were not available, and as such the corporation had to bear the additional financial burden in making payment of salary to the petitioners and other similarly situated persons. That amounts of the Corporation which otherwise would have been used for public welfare, providing amenities and facilities, has been, if I may say so, wasted for making payment of salaries to the persons who have been inducted in service illegally. Mr. Desai has made statement before this court that against that Officer departmental inquiry has been initiated. But that is not the end. Issuing charge- sheet is not the ultimate solution. Such persons should be dealt with strictly and in case, on holding inquiry, ultimately it is found that he was the person wholly and solely responsible or was responsible with some other persons, the amount of salary which has been paid to the petitioners and other persons similarly situated should be realised wholly from him or to the extent he has shared the responsibility. This Court has its own reservation that in such cases, though the matter is brought to the High Court, very conveniently arguments are being advanced that explanation of the defaulting Officer has been called for or charge-sheet has been issued. Thereafter, what ultimately has culminated is not brought to the notice of the Court. This Court has its own reservation that in such cases, though the matter is brought to the High Court, very conveniently arguments are being advanced that explanation of the defaulting Officer has been called for or charge-sheet has been issued. Thereafter, what ultimately has culminated is not brought to the notice of the Court. Possibility of taking lenient view for allowing the Officer to go scot-free after this Court decides the matter cannot be ruled out. In such cases it should be put upon the respondents to bring to the notice of this Court what ultimately has been done with the officer or officers concerned. ( 24 ) IN the result these writ petitions fail, and the same are dismissed. The respondents are directed to produce before this Court the outcome of the inquiry which has been initiated against the then Administrative Officer of the corporation. Office is directed to place this case before the Court on December 8, 1995 for reporting of compliance of the direction aforesaid. ( 25 ) THE petitioners are persons who are unemployed. They made applications and they have been given appointment and as such they are not the persons who are blameworthy of back-door entries. At the same time because of these back-door entries their services have been terminated which has resulted in filing of civil suit and then the writ petitions. The corporation has paid them salaries, which amount otherwise would have been utilised for developmental work and welfare of the public at large. The funds of the Corporation have again been spent in these litigations. These litigations are the result of the illegal appointments which have been made by the then administrator, and as such he is the person who should make good the amount which has been spent by the corporation in this litigation. Though I could have straightaway passed order to realise the amount of cost of this litigation from the then Administrator, for two reasons I am not passing such order at this stage. Firstly, the respondents have not produced before this Court the actual cost which the Corporation has incurred in defending these petitions, and secondly, the then Administrator is no more in the services of the Corporation and the information about his present posting is also not on record. Firstly, the respondents have not produced before this Court the actual cost which the Corporation has incurred in defending these petitions, and secondly, the then Administrator is no more in the services of the Corporation and the information about his present posting is also not on record. As the amount of cost has to be realised from that Officer, before passing any order in that regard I feel it in the interest of justice to afford him an opportunity of hearing. The respondent-Corporation is directed to submit to this Court the actual amount of cost incurred by it in defending the writ petitions, The amount of cost shall include the fees paid to the advocates, and other expenses incurred relating to the conduct of these writ petitions as well as the expenses incurred by the Corporation in making payment of travelling allowance and daily allowances to the officers and staff in relation thereto. The respondents are further directed to submit the name of the then administrative Officer who made these appointments, together with details of present posting and address. These directions shall be complied with by the respondents within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On receipt of the aforesaid information, the office shall issue notice to the then administrative Officer of the Corporation at his present address, making it returnable on December 8, 1995. Rule discharged. .