ORDER A.K. Mathur, J. 1. The petitioner by this petition has prayed that by appropriate writ or direction the certification made by Certifying Officer by its order (Annexure P/1 and P/1-A) may be quashed. It is further prayed that the order dated September 20, 1993 (Annexure P/2) may be set aside, and the Certifying Officer may be directed to certify the Standing Orders in accordance with the Model Standing Orders and the Clause 33 of the Certified Standing Orders of the Industrial Orders Act (Annexure P/l) may be declared as ultra vires. 2. The petitioner No. 1 is a registered Union having registration No. 3466 and is affiliated to INTUC. The petitioner No. 2 is also a registered Union having its registration No. 3771 and is also affiliated to B.M.S. The Respondent No. 1 is General Manager, having full control over the affairs of Vindhyachal Super Thermal Power Project (VSTPP) which is a Unit of National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC). The Respondent No. 2 is Certifying Officer in terms of Section 2(c) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Respondent No. 3 is the Appellate Authority as prescribed under Section 2(a) of the aforesaid Act. It is alleged that Respondent No. 1 prepared a draft Standing Orders to be adopted in their unit i.e. V.S.T.P.P. which is situated in district Sidhi and submitted the same for certification to the Certifying Officer, the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 vide his order (Annexure P. 1) certified the draft proposals. The Standing Orders so certified have been placed on record as Annexure P/l (A), The petitioners along with other two Unions, challenged the aforesaid order of Certifying Officer and certification of the Standing Orders, before the Appellate Authority, (Respondent No. 3). The Respondent No. 3 after considering the matter, confirmed the order of the Respondent No. 2 by slight modification, a copy of which has been placed as Annexure P/2. However, the validity of Clause 33(a) has been specifically challenged. Clause 33(a) reads as under : "Clause 33--Discharge and Termination of service 'Except as provided specially in the contract of service or in Standing Order No. 29 or the Industrial Disputes Act, the management may terminate the services of a workman after giving the following notice or after payment of wages in lieu thereof. (a) in the case of permanent workman, one month's notice. 3. (a) in the case of permanent workman, one month's notice. 3. Shri Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this clause appearing in series of various local authorities, has been declared ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, learned counsel has invited our attention to West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Desk Bandhu Ghosh (1985-I-LLJ-373) and in that case, the same closure was sought to be challenged. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme -Court in this case observed at p 374-375 : "The West Bengal State Electricity Board is the principal appellant in this appeal by special leave which we have just now granted. The first respondent, a permanent employee of the West Bengal State Electricity Board, filed the writ petition out of which the appeal arises in the Calcutta High Court to quash an order dated March 22, 1984 of the Secretary, West Bengal State Electricity Board terminating his services as Deputy Secretary with immediate effect on payment of three months' salary in lieu of three months' notice. The order gave no reasons for terminating the services of the respondent and there was nothing in the order which could possibly be said to attach any stigma to the respondent. Apparently the order was made under Regulation 34 of the Board's Regulations which enables the Board to terminate the services of any permanent employee by serving three months' notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof. The High Court contrasted Regulation 34 with Regulation 33 which provides for the termination of services of both permanent and temporary employees of the Board on attaining the age of superannuation, as a result of the disciplinary action etc. For the sake of convenience we extract below Regulation 33 and the first paragraph (which aione is relevant) of Regulation 34 : "33. (1) Unless otherwise specified in the appointment order in any particular case, the services of a permanent employees of the Board may be terminated without notice:-- (i) on his attaining the age of retirement or by reason of a declaration by the competent medical authority that he is unfit for further service; or (ii) as a result of disciplinary action; (iii) if he remains absent from duty, on leave or otherwise, for a continuous period exceeding 2 years. (2) In the case of a temporary employee, his service may be terminated by serving of- (a) one month's notice on either side or on payment of a month's salary in lieu thereof ; or (b) notice on either side for the period specified in the appointment order or contract or on payment of salary in lieu thereof, as the case may be; (c) the service of a temporary employee shall also be deemed to have been terminated automatically if the period of extraordinary leave without pay and/or of unauthorised absence from duties exceeding a maximum period of 90 days. 34. In case of a permanent employee, his services may be terminated by serving three months' notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof." Contrasting Regulations 33 and 34, the High Court came to the conclusion that Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination. The High Court, therefore, struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 34 and as a consequence quashed the order terminating the services of the first respondent." Their Lordships further held that:-- "We are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the Board. On the face of it, the regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination. It is a naked 'hire and fire' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationship is fast approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII class so familiar to administrative lawyers." The same point has been reiterated by the Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath, (1986-II-LLJ-171) which reads as under at 12: "Whereas various other provisions of the service Rules of the Corporation mention grounds on which services of an employee can be terminated, Clause (i) of Rule 9 is the only Rule which does not state in what circumstances a permanent employee can be removed from service. Clause (i) of Rule 9 is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as: being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it confers upon the Corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice: in writing or by paying him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of such notice in that, besides being arbitrary and unreasonable. It wholly ignores audi alterem partem rule. It is also violative of directive principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41. It cannot be supported on the basis of mutuality on the ground similar right is conferred on employees also. The right conferred on the employee by the Clause to: resign is, however, not void, 1986 Lab IC 494 (Cal.), partly Reversed." The Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court further reiterated the same point in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991- I-LLJ-395) and further held at 1452-- "Regulation 9(b) which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution." 4. Therefore, in view of the consistent view taken by the Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no way but to declare the Clause 33 of the Certified Standing Orders Act, ultra vires, 5. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent, however, tried to persuade us with reference to the said Rules that there is no option with the Company in terms of the Model Standing Orders contained in Schedule-I of the Act. However, there is no (sic.) escape except to strike down this provision in view of various decisions of their Lordships of Supreme Court. 6. Therefore, we allow this petition and declare Clause 33 of the Certified Standing Orders Act to be ultra vires of Article 14 being arbitrary. However, it is open to the respondent to frame proper provision in accordance with law.