Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. In this action, the X District Magistrate and District Collector of Chengalpattu - MGR. District (first respondent) passed the impugned order of detention in BDFGIS No.27/94, dated 23. 1994, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act XIV of 1982 - for short ‘the Act’) on the alleged detenu Mani (petitioner herein). 2. Pursuant to the said order of detention, the alleged detenu had been taken into custody on 23. 1994 and lodged in Central Prison, Madras. The grounds of detention had been communicated to him oh the same day at the Central Prison, Madras. The booklet of documents, on which grounds of detention had been formulated by the first respondent, as prepared by the Inspector of Police, Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Tambaram (Sponsoring Authority) had also been served upon him at the Central Prison, Madras, along with the grounds of detention. From the booklet of documents supplied to the said detenu, it transpires that the same had been prepared and kept ready even on 23. 1994 for service on the detenu, in case an order of detention is to be clamped upon him by the first respondent-Detaining Authority. 3. The other facts are not relevant and material, inasmuch as Mr.T. Sudanthiram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-detenu based his submission on the ground that since the booklet of documents had been prepared by the sponsoring Authority, two days earlier to the passing of the impugned order of detention, it goes without saying that there was pre-conception in the mind of first respondent-Detaining Authority, and therefore it is, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside. .4. In support of such a submission, learned counsel placed implicit reliance upon an unreported decision in the case of Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994, dated 17. .4. In support of such a submission, learned counsel placed implicit reliance upon an unreported decision in the case of Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994, dated 17. 1994, wherein a Division Bench of this Court expressed an opinion that it prima facie looks feasible that the passing of the impugned order was rather preconceived, since the paper book was ready for supply even three days earlier before the passing of the impugned order and expressing such an opinion, learned Judges, constituting the Bench, were satisfied that such sort of infirmity-was rather serious and would certainly enure to the benefit of the detenu and consequently the said impugned order of detention was set aside and the said detenu was directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is otherwise required. 5. We are unable to share such an opinion by learned Judges constituting the said Bench. The reason for such a conclusion are rather manifold. In the preamble portion of the said order by the Bench what was expressed was the preconception of the passing of the order of detention by the sponsoring Authority, while in the fag end of the portion of the said order, what was expressed was the preconception of the passing of the order of detention on the part of the Detaining Authority. 6. In the scheme of things under the Act and other similar detention laws, the conception of passing of an order of detention is relatable to the application of the mind of the Detaining Authority alone and no-one-else. The preconception of passing of an order by any authority, other than the Detaining Authority, is of no consequence and what is material is the application of mind of the Detaining Authority and consequent arriving at subjective satisfaction, on perusal of the materials placed before it by the sponsoring authority, to constitute an idea of passing of an order of detention, in order to prevent the detenu from committing any further prejudicial activities. 7. There is a time frame under the Act for the communication of the grounds of detention and affording the earliest opportunity of making a representation to the State Government against the order of detention, making a reference to the Advisory Board, expression of an opinion by the Advisory Board and eventually passing of the order of confirmation by the State Government. .8. .8. Sec. 8 of the Act prescribes that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. It is thus crystal clear that there is a mandate cast upon the Detaining Authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu within five days from the date of detention and shall also afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. 9. The said section had been framed, in tune with the constitutional mandate, as had been prescribed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. The right of making a representation against the order of detention to the State Government is a very valuable right enshrined in constitution, so as to protect the priceless liberty of individual citizen of this country. 10. Without the documents, on which the grounds of detention are based, there cannot be any opportunity for the detenu to make an effective representation against the order of detention to the Government. Therefore, though the provisions of Sec. 8 of the Act do not categorically state that the documents on which the grounds of detention are based are to be furnished to the detenu, yet such documents are required to be furnished to the detenu, alongwith the grounds of detention, within the period specified therein, so as to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order to the State Government. The resultant position is that the Detaining Authority shall, not only communicate to the detenu the grounds of detention but also the booklet of documents, on which the grounds of detention are based within the prescribed period of five days from the date of detention, so as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the order to the State Government, or otherwise, such a valuable right would become illusory. It does not mean that after the formulation of the grounds by the Detaining Authority by proper application of mind, on going through the materials placed by the sponsoring authority, the grounds so formulated and other connected records, on which such grounds are based are to be communicated to and served personally on the detenu by the Detaining Authority itself. It is equally not necessary that the booklet of the documents on which the grounds of detention are based are to be prepared and consequently served upon the detenu by the Detaining Authority. The preparation of the booklet of documents is after all an executive act and the same may be caused to be prepared or done by any one, inclusive of the sponsoring authority and in such state of affairs, the fact that the booklet of documents had been prepared by the sponsoring authority alone is of no consequence. .11. The further question that arises for consideration is as to whether the preparation of the booklet of documents is to be done by any authority, inclusive of the sponsoring authority only subsequent to the formulation of the grounds of detention by the Detaining Authority. A Bench of this Court in the case, as referred to above, as already indicated, expressed an opinion that the sponsoring authority prepared the booklet of documents, on which the grounds of detention are based which would tantamount to preconception of the passing of the order of detention on the part of the Detaining Authority. We are unable to appreciate as to how such sort of a preparation of documents by the sponsoring authority would tantamount to preconception of the passing of the order of detention on the part of the Detaining Authority. It is the normal practice that the sponsoring authority placed all relevant materials in the shape of documents in original to the Detaining Authority for perusal of those documents and arriving at subjective satisfaction as to whether there is any impelling necessity for clamping the order of detention, with a view to prevent the alleged detenu from indulging in further prejudicial activities. .12. In this case, it is not at all disputed that such a procedure had been adopted. This apart, what had been done by the sponsoring authority, as already indicated, is the preparation of the booklet of documents some two days earlier to. .12. In this case, it is not at all disputed that such a procedure had been adopted. This apart, what had been done by the sponsoring authority, as already indicated, is the preparation of the booklet of documents some two days earlier to. the passing of the impugned order of detention. The reason why the sponsoring authority prepares such booklet of documents is not far to seek. As already indicated, the booklet of documents has to be served upon the detenu, along with the grounds of detention, within five days from the date of detention. If the booklet of documents is prepared, subsequent to the formulation of the grounds of detention by the Detaining Authority there is every likelihood of inordinate delay being caused in the preparation and communication of those documents to the detenu. It is not as if the Detaining Authority and the sponsoring authority, are located or available in one and the same place. In the case it is to be held that the booklet of documents is to be prepared only after the formulation of the grounds by the Detaining Authority, then it goes without saying that the Detaining Authority has to send a communication to the sponsoring authority, after the formulation of the grounds of detention to prepare the booklet of documents and requisite number of copies of booklets of documents are to be made available to the Detaining Authority, so as to enable it to cause such documents to be served upon the detenu, along with the grounds to be served upon the detenu, at the prison, where the detenu was lodged. There is likelihood of so much delays being caused, if such a procedure is to be adopted. 13. It is with a view to curtail the delay to be so caused, in practice, we are told, the sponsoring authority is required to prepare the booklet of documents in advance before the passing of any order, so as to enable the Detaining Authority if need be, to serve such booklet of documents, along with the grounds of detention, in case an order of detention is to be passed. Assuming for arguments sake, if no order of detention has been passed by the Detaining Authority the booklet of documents prepared by the sponsoring authority would become unnecessary and that is all and nothing further. Assuming for arguments sake, if no order of detention has been passed by the Detaining Authority the booklet of documents prepared by the sponsoring authority would become unnecessary and that is all and nothing further. We may again reiterate that by the preparation of the booklet of documents by the sponsoring authority before the passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority, no serious informity or consequence is likely to flow therefrom. As already indicated, the Detaining Authority would persue original records, as submitted by the sponsoring authority, for passing the order of detention. 14. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the preparation of the booklet of documents by the sponsoring authority, anterior in point of time of passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority cannot at all be construed as an infirmity, so that the detention order could be quashed as had been held by a Bench of this Court, in the case, as already referred to. 15. However, decency and decorum demand on us in all fairness, to make a reference for such a question to be decided by a Full Bench of this Court, since such a question very often comes up for consideration before this Court. 16. In this view of the matter, the Registry is directed to place the records before our Lord, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, so as to enable him to constitute a Full Bench for making an authoritative pronouncement on the aspect of the matter, as we have referred to earlier. Constitution of a Full Bench at the earliest is necessary or otherwise, various habeas corpus petitions involving such a question cannot at all be decided and if there is any delay caused in constituting the Full Bench, there is every likelihood of the detenus in those cases, to undergoing the entire period of detention. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 1. 1995 and made herein and the order dated 1. 1995 in the office note by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, this matter having been posted in the presence of the Hon’ble Mr.K.A. Swami, Chief Justice, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Somasundaram, and the Hon’ble Mr. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 1. 1995 and made herein and the order dated 1. 1995 in the office note by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, this matter having been posted in the presence of the Hon’ble Mr.K.A. Swami, Chief Justice, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Somasundaram, and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Raju, this matter coming on for hearing on Friday, the 3rd day of February 1995 upon perusing the order of reference, the petition, and affidavit filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of T. Sudanthiram, for Petitioner and B. Sriramulu, Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the Respondents and having stood over for consideration till this day the court delivered the following judgments on 22. 1995. The Order of the Court was made by Raju, J.: The above habeas corpus petition has been placed before us pursuant to the order of reference dated 1. 1995 by a Division Bench of this Court (Janarthanam and Thangamani, JJ.) for consideration of the Full Bench, the question as to whether the preparation of the booklets of documents served on the detenu by the sponsoring authority anterior in point of time of the passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority can be considered to be an infirmity so as to vitiate the detention order passed justifying the interference of this Court to quash such an order on that ground. 18. The necessity for the reference, as could be seen from the order of reference itself, arose on account of an earlier unreported decision of another Division Bench of this Court (Arunachalam and Jayarama Chouta, JJ.) in Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994, dated 17. 1994, wherein the said Division Bench held that the preparation of the paper book ready for supply to the detenu even three days prior to the passing of the order of detention was rather pre-conceived and that such infirmity was rather serious and would certainly enure to the benefit of the detenu. 1994, wherein the said Division Bench held that the preparation of the paper book ready for supply to the detenu even three days prior to the passing of the order of detention was rather pre-conceived and that such infirmity was rather serious and would certainly enure to the benefit of the detenu. In the present petition, the learned Judge of the Division Bench, who referred the matter for the consideration of the Full Bench, were not prepared to share the view of the other Bench and rather were of the opinion that the preparation of the booklet of documents by the sponsoring authority anterior in point of time of the passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority cannot at all be considered as an infirmity so that the detention order could be quashed. To avoid conflict and to have an authoritative opinion the reference thus came to be made for consideration of the issue by the Full Bench. 19. The petitioner had been taken into custody on 23. 1994 and lodged in Central prison, Madras pursuant to an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate and District Collector of Chengai MGR. District the first respondent herein in B.D./ F.G.I.S./No. 27/94, dated 23. 1994 in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982, Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ The detention was on the ground that the petitioner was a bootlegger within the meaning of the Act and his detention was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health. The petitioner has filed the above petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus setting aside the order of detention referred to above and for setting him at liberty on several grounds. 20. The petitioner has filed the above petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus setting aside the order of detention referred to above and for setting him at liberty on several grounds. 20. At the time of the petition before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to have contended that since the booklet of documents had been prepared by the sponsoring authority two days earlier to the passing of the impugned order of detention, it goes without saying that there was a pre-conception in the mind of the first respondent-Detaining Authority and, therefore, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed in support of such a claim on the decision in H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994 (supra) of the other Division Bench. No other points or facts or grounds have been adverted to since if the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was acceptable, the order is bound to be set aside on the other facts and grounds of challenge would arise only if the said challenge made to the order does not meet with the acceptance of the Division Bench. Since as noticed earlier the Division Bench was not prepared to agree with the ratio of the earlier Division Bench on the only question referred to supra, this reference came to be made. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated his submission and contended that the fact that the booklet of documents has been prepared even two days earlier to the detention order would go to show that there was pre-conception in the mind of the Detaining Authority and this by itself is sufficient ground to vitiate the impugned order. It was also contended that the opinion expressed by the earlier Division Bench in H.C.P. No. 125 of 1994 supra, lays down the correct position of law on the issue and merits acceptance and there was no legally justifiable reason to take a difference view or to declare the said view to be incorrect. It was also contended that the opinion expressed by the earlier Division Bench in H.C.P. No. 125 of 1994 supra, lays down the correct position of law on the issue and merits acceptance and there was no legally justifiable reason to take a difference view or to declare the said view to be incorrect. It was also contended for the petitioner that Sec. 8 (1) of the Act contemplates the communication to the detenu not later than five days from the date of detention of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government and, therefore, there was no need for preparing the booklet of documents even ahead of the date of passing of the order of detention and that such preparation even prior to the passing of the order would amount to a predetermination and the passing of the order a mere fait accompli. 22. The learned Public Prosecutor, while controverting the stand taken on behalf of petitioner, would contend that the preparation of the documents by the sponsoring authority and the stage or date of preparation of such documents which came to be served ultimately upon the detenu after the passing of the order of detention has no relevance to the exercise of mind or an independent formation of opinion by the Detaining Authority and there is no rhyme or reason in the plea that such preparation by the sponsoring authority is an indication of a pre-conception or of a closed mind. It was also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that often the Supreme Court emphasised the need for supplying the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the supporting material therefore, ‘pari passu’ with the service of the order or date of detention notwithstanding the time specified and, therefore, the diligent preparation of the booklet consisting of the supporting material even prior to the actual passing of the order of detention cannot be construed to be a tainted act or infirmity of the nature undermining the credibility or validity of the decision of the Detaining Authority. The learned Public Prosecutor has pointed out in view of some of the decisions of this court as also that of the Apex Court repeatedly emphasising the need for almost simultaneous supply to documents containing the supporting material and the lapse on the part of the authorities in doing so resulting in frequent interference with the orders of detention by courts, extra care and caution has been taken by the authorities to have the documents almost kept ready for immediate service and, therefore, the real object or spirit behind the action cannot be dubbed or doubted to be a vitiating factor to the order of detention. 23. We consider it necessary to advert to some of the decisions relevant to the consideration before us. The decision reported in Icchudeviahoraria v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, arose under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). The learned Judges of the Supreme Court while construing the mandate expressed in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Sec. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act were of the view that when those provisions stipulated that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what was meant was that the grounds of detention in their entirely must be furnished to the detenu and if there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. In the decision reported in Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of Maharashtra and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 510, the Supreme Court while reiterating those principles further held that the right to make a representation implies what it means ‘the right of making an effective representation, and, therefore, the grounds of detention would be incomplete, when certain documents are relied upon in the grounds, without such documents, thereby emphasis the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention along with the documents relied upon. 24. 24. In Smt.Ana Carelina D’Souza v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1620, the learned judges of the Supreme Court straightway ordered the release of the detenus for the only reason that the documents upon which the grounds of detention were based were not supplied to the detenus along with the grounds of detention. In Mohamed Zakir v. Delhi Administration, (1982)3 S.C.C. 216 , it was held that the question of even demanding the documents is wholly irrelevant because it is the constitutional mandate which requires the Detaining Authority to give the documents relied on or referred to in the order of detention ‘pari passu’ the grounds of detention in order that the detenu can make an effective representation immediately and promptly instead of waiting for such documents. In Sunil Dutt v. Union of India and others, (1982) 3 S.C.C. 405 , it was held that the documents and materials which formed a basis for the grounds on which the detention order was made, the same being ex-hypothesis in existence at the time of the issuance of the detention order and framing of the grounds, should be supplied to the detenu along with the grounds and that the non-supply of such material and documents along with the grounds would clearly amount to a violation of the safeguard guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the said case before the Supreme Court the supply of copies of documents seven days after furnishing of the grounds of detention was considered to constitute violation of the mandate contained in the constitution as also the Act and ordered for the release of the detenu forthwith. The reason which weighed with the learned Judges, in all these cases to come to such conclusion is that unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenu along with the grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter would give the detenu not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a representation to the Detaining Authority. 25. There is no controversy over the position that the scheme underlying the various detention laws including the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 are almost similar and identical and the laws in this regard carry pari materia provisions barring a few minor changes or variations of some details and not the substance of the law. 25. There is no controversy over the position that the scheme underlying the various detention laws including the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 are almost similar and identical and the laws in this regard carry pari materia provisions barring a few minor changes or variations of some details and not the substance of the law. Such similarity of uniformity was necessitated due to the specific mandate contained in Art.22 of the Constitution of India and the imperative need of those laws to conform to the Constitutional safeguards enshrined therein. So far as the Tamil Nadu Act in question is concerned, Sec. 8 provides that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, it not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. The principles laid down or the law as declared by the Supreme Court of India in the various decisions referred to supra has equal application to the Tamil Nadu enactment under consideration and the situation on hand. There is equally no controversy over the position that ‘the sponsoring authority’ as it is called who proposes to place the matter for the consideration of the Detaining Authority also necessarily collects the various material or records and documents which provide the basis for the grounds of detention and places them before the Detaining Authority with a solemnly sworn affidavit, affirming those material as basis and seek for the intervention of the Detaining Authority to consider and pass orders of detention to prevent recurrence of the detenu indulging himself in such prejudicial activities in future as would affect public health, life and public order and ensure that the detenu does not act in a manner prejudicial to the public order. .26. .26. The principles referred to above would go to show that notwithstanding the time provided for in the respective detention laws in the matter or service of the grounds of detention courts have consistently held that the communication of grounds meant the communication of the documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention ‘pari passu’ with the order of detention to render the provision for making representation a real and effective one. While that be the position and requirement of law, could the fact that the Sponsoring Authority who collected the documents, statements and other materials and submitted the same with a sworn affidavit to the Detaining Authority for its consideration had also prepared the required number of copies of such documents, statements and other materials in a book form or in a presentable shape and forwarded the same also to the Detaining Authority whether along with the request for consideration or separately, per se has the consequence of undermining the quality of determination or the credibility of the decision of the Detaining Authority so as to vitiate the exercise of power by the Detaining Authority and render the detention void or illegal entitling the detenu for release on that ground alone, For our part, in spite of a careful consideration of the matter, we are unable to see that the claim on behalf of the petitioner carries any weight or merit of acceptance either on account of the serious or sensitive nature of the powers exercised by the Detaining Authority or the safeguards inbuilt in the provisions regulating such exercise or the deleterious consequence an order of detention has, on the freedom or fundamental rights secured to a citizen. First of all, the preparation of a booklet of documents by the subordinate sponsoring authority even prior to the date of order of detention cannot, be considered to have any direct nexus to the process of reasoning or determination by the detaining authority and secondly the said conduct of the sponsoring authority cannot per se, be considered to either influence or affect process of determination by the Detaining Authority or render such decision of the Detaining Authority a preconceived one or a foregone conclusion. Often, the sponsoring Authority and the Detaining Authority may be located in different places. Often, the sponsoring Authority and the Detaining Authority may be located in different places. Distance apart, the sponsoring authority may have their own official commitments and constraints on time and to avoid any unexpected delay in carrying out the directions to prepare copies of documents for service on the detenu the sponsoring authority may think it expedients to prepare the copies of such documents in book form in advance and make it readily available with the sponsoring authority. The diligence of a sponsoring authority in this regard, in our view, is not to be treated as indicative of a preconception of mind on there part of the Detaining Authority. The possibility of the Detaining Authority not deciding to detain the person concerned in spite of the proposal made by the sponsoring authority or not relying upon any one or more of the material placed before it or not being relied upon with the inevitable consequences of the booklet of documents becoming unnecessary or useless for service or use is no ground, in our view, to assume that the preparation of the booklet of documents in advances or ahead of the order of the Detaining Authority renders the decision by the Detaining Authority a fait accompli or a foregone conclusion or a preconceived one. We are unable to appreciate any direct nexus or impact upon the credit worthiness or quality of the decision ultimately arrived at by the Detaining Authority. 27. That apart, testing the legality and propriety of the decision of the Detaining Authority on the basis of or with relevance to the particular action of the sponsoring authority would amount to court importing material aliunde and wholly extraneous into the process of determination by the Detaining Authority without any other evidence to link the mind of the Detaining Authority without any other evidence to link the mind of the detaining authority with that of the sponsoring authority preceding to or anterior to the stage of placing the proposal for detention before the Detaining Authority. The opinion held or course of conduct or action attributable to the sponsoring authority has no relevance whatsoever to test the quality of the decision or exercise of discretion by a totally different functionary, who is superior to in hierarchy and status also to the sponsoring authority. The opinion held or course of conduct or action attributable to the sponsoring authority has no relevance whatsoever to test the quality of the decision or exercise of discretion by a totally different functionary, who is superior to in hierarchy and status also to the sponsoring authority. The action of the sponsoring authority in preparing the booklet of documents even sufficiently in advance of the passing of the order of detention must in our view only to be reasonably construed as a diligent step or extra care on the part of the sponsoring authority to adhere to the time schedule stipulated in the Act and the law declared by Courts, and not as a vitiating factor and that too as vitiating the order of detention. .28. Consequently, we are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to or approve the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in the unreported decision dated 17. 1994 in H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994 (supra). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us by holding that the preparation of the booklet of documents by the sponsoring authority sufficiently in advance and anterior in point of time of the passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority, per se, cannot be construed as either an indication of the preconception of mind of the Detaining Authority or as an infirmity undermining the very process or determination arrived at by the Detaining Authority thereby rendering the order or detention null and void or illegal, necessitating it to be quashed. 29. No other issue on the merits of the claim have been urged and they have been reserved for being projected before the Division Bench. The matter will now be placed before the Division Bench, again for further consideration on merits and on other issues. Pursuant to the orders of the Pull Bench dated 22. 1995 this matter having been posted for hearing on this day upon perusing the order of the Full Bench, dated 22. 1995 and the order of reference, dated 1. 1995 the petition and affidavit filed in support thereof, and upon hearing the arguments of T. Sudanthiram, for Petitioner and R. Raghupathi, Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Janarthanam, J.: When this matter came up for hearing before us on 1. 1995 and the order of reference, dated 1. 1995 the petition and affidavit filed in support thereof, and upon hearing the arguments of T. Sudanthiram, for Petitioner and R. Raghupathi, Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Janarthanam, J.: When this matter came up for hearing before us on 1. 1995, Mr.T. Sudanthiram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner took up the one and the only point in assailing the impugned order of detention viz., that since the sponsoring Authority prepared the booklet of documents, some few days prior to the passing of the impugned order and gave such booklet to the first respondent Detaining Authority along with the original materials, for perusal and consideration for passing of an order under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982, (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) it would tantamount to pre-conception, on the part of the first respondent-Detaining Authority. In support of the said submission, learned counsel relied upon an unreported decision of a Division Bench, of this Court consisting of Arunachalam and Jayarama Chouta, JJ, in Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No. 125 of 1994, dated 17. 1994, wherein the said Division Bench, held that the preparation of the paper book ready for supply to the detenu even three days prior to the passing of the order of detention would be indicative of the fact that the order of detention was rather preconceived and such sort of infirmity was rather serious and would certainly enure to the benefit of the detenu. 31. To the ratio so laid down by the said Division Bench, we were unable to share our opinion and consequently we made a reference for such a question to be decided by a Full Bench of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement, since such a question very often comes up for consideration before this Court. The question so referred was answered by a Full Bench of this Court, consisting of the Hon’ble Mr. K.A. Swami, C.J., Somasundaram and Raju, JJ. Mani v. The District Magistrate and District Collector of Chengalpattu MGR. District at Kancheepuram and another, H.C.P.No.733 of 1994, dated 22. The question so referred was answered by a Full Bench of this Court, consisting of the Hon’ble Mr. K.A. Swami, C.J., Somasundaram and Raju, JJ. Mani v. The District Magistrate and District Collector of Chengalpattu MGR. District at Kancheepuram and another, H.C.P.No.733 of 1994, dated 22. 1995, thus "we are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to or approve the view taken by the earlier Division bench in the unreported decision dated 17. 1994 in H.C.P. No. 125 of 1994 (referred to supra). We therefore, answer the question referred to us by holding that the preparation of the booklet of documents by the sponsoring authority sufficiently in advance and anterior in point of time of the passing of the order of detention by the Detaining Authority, per se cannot be construed as either an indication of the preconception of mind of the Detaining Authority or as an infirmity undermining the very process of determination arrived at by the Detaining Authority, thereby rendering the order of detention null and void or illegal, necessitating it to be quashed." 32. In view of the answers so given by the Full Bench of this Court, it goes without saying that this habeas corpus petition deserves to be dismissed. 33. This apart, it is brought to our notice that the impugned order of detention had been passed on 23. 1994 and it had been duly executed on the next day, viz., on 23. 1994. In such state of affairs, even otherwise the entire period of detention had already expired. 34. For all the reasons above, this habeas corpus petition is dismissed.