JUDGMENT - A.V. SAVANT, J. :---This is an appeal by the husband - original petitioner - Bension Joseph Hayeema, whose petition for divorce has been dismissed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bombay on 7th March, 1992. The brief facts giving rise to the matrimonial dispute are as under: 1. The appellant - Bension - married respondent Sharon in accordance with the Jewish law of Marriage on 29th December, 1974 at Bombay and the spouses started living together at Coronation Mansion, Dadasaheb Phalke Road, Dadar, Bombay 400 014. The flat consists of a big drawing room, a bed room, kitchen, two bathrooms and two balconies. However, apart from the appellant and his wife, his parents, two unmarried sisters, two brothers, one of them with his wife, were also staying in the said premises. 2. On 20th October, 1975, daughter named Florence was born. She is today 19 years of age and has just passed her B.Com. On 31st October, 1978 a son named Gideon was born, who is today 16 years of age and has recently passed his S.S.C. examination. It is alleged that from 1975 onwards, the relations between the spouses got strained. In 1977, the appellants sister Rebecca got married. For some time between 1977 to 1980, the appellant alleges that there was no cohabitation between him and his wife. However, the parties reconciled their differences at the intervention of their friends and cohabited in 1981 and 1982. In 1982 the appellants other sister Jerusha got married. In December, 1982, the relations between the spouses again got strained. 3. On 30th December, 1982, the appellants Advocate wrote a letter at Ex. A-1 to the plaint to the respondents father at Simla suggesting a meeting for discussion of the matrimonial problems. On 14th January, 1983 Advocate for the respondents father replied by Ex. A-2 expressing his ignorance about the alleged differences between the spouses and stated that he had not received any complaint from his daughter regarding the alleged disputes. Again on 14th February, 1983 the appellants Advocate wrote to the advocate of the respondents father at Ex. A-3 reiterating his desire to obtain divorce on account of the alleged mental and physical cruelty to which the appellant was subjected by the respondent. A letter Ex. Again on 14th February, 1983 the appellants Advocate wrote to the advocate of the respondents father at Ex. A-3 reiterating his desire to obtain divorce on account of the alleged mental and physical cruelty to which the appellant was subjected by the respondent. A letter Ex. B-1 was sent by the appellants Advocate to the respondent herself on 9th April, 1983 suggesting a meeting for discussing the problem and a meeting did take place on 19th May, 1983. Another letter Exh. B-2 dated 30th May, 1983 was sent by the respondents Advocate to the appellants Advocate suggesting another meeting. Accordingly, a meeting took place on 23rd June, 1983 between the spouses and their Advocates as a result of which the spouses reconciled their differences and resumed cohabitation. 4. It is, however, alleged that in February, 1984, relations again became strained and, therefore, on 19th November, 1984 the appellants Advocate wrote to the respondents Advocate (Ex. C-1 to the plaint) suggesting divorce by consent as permissible under the Jewish law of Divorce. On 1st December, 1984, the respondents Advocate wrote promptly to the appellants Advocate (Ex. C-2 to the plaint) denying the allegations against the respondents behaviour and refusing to agree to divorce by consent. On 16th January, 1985, the appellants Advocate again wrote to the respondents Advocate (Exh. C-3 to the plaint) suggesting a "without prejudice" meeting on 19th January, 1985 between the spouses failing which the appellant threatened to adopt legal proceedings. The meeting did not take place and on 20th March, 1985 M.J. Suit No. 904 of 1985 was filed by the appellant in this Court for divorce in accordance with the law then prevailing. Such a petition lies on the original side of this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The appellant tried to take out two grounds for obtaining divorce. One is that of obstinate refusal of connubial rights during the whole year; relevant period being February, 1984 and March, 1985 and the second ground is insulting the father-in-law in the presence of the husband and insulting the husband himself. These two grounds find a mention in Chapter XIV dealing with "Dissolution of Marriage" in the standard book on the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in ancient and modern times by the well-known Jewish Scholar and Prof. of Talmudic Literature at the Hebrew Union College, Rev. These two grounds find a mention in Chapter XIV dealing with "Dissolution of Marriage" in the standard book on the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in ancient and modern times by the well-known Jewish Scholar and Prof. of Talmudic Literature at the Hebrew Union College, Rev. M. Mieliziner, Ph.D., D.D. (Second revised edition). Chapter XV dealing with "Divorce" deals with the various kinds of divorces granted, namely, (i) by mutual consent, or (ii) upon a petition by the wife or (iii) upon a petition by the husband and (iv) a divorce enforced by Court. Since, we are presently concerned with the divorce granted upon a petition by the husband, the relevant grounds on which the husband can obtain the divorce are to be found at page 122 placitum 72 which are as under : The husband is entitled to divorce : i) On account of the wifes adultery, and even on strong suspicion of her having committed this crime. ii) On account of her public violation of moral decency. iii) On account of her change of religion or proved dis-regard of the Ritual Law in the Management of the House-hold, by which she caused him to transgress the religious precepts against his will. iv) On account of obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year. v) On account of her unjustified refusal to follow him to another domicile. vi) On account of insulting her father-in-law in the presence of her husband, or for insulting the husband himself. vii) On account of certain incurable diseases, rendering cohabitation impracticable or dangerous, as epilepsy etc. (Emphasis supplied). 5. On reading the pleadings, it was conceded before us by both the learned Counsel that the husbands case would fall only under ground (iv) and ground (vi) mentioned above. Our attention was also invited to the causes for divorce considered in modern legislation in some parts of England and United States to which a reference is made in the said treatise by Rev. M. Mielziner at pages 125 onwards, placitum 75. Taking a review of the laws in England and the United States, the principal causes on which divorce could be granted are to be found at page 127 which are as under : i) Adultery. ii) Cruelty, differently described in the laws of the different States, as: intolerable severity, injuries treatment indignities making life burdensome etc. Taking a review of the laws in England and the United States, the principal causes on which divorce could be granted are to be found at page 127 which are as under : i) Adultery. ii) Cruelty, differently described in the laws of the different States, as: intolerable severity, injuries treatment indignities making life burdensome etc. iii) Desertion, also termed abandonment, absence without good cause. The time of willful absence required to constitute desertion is differently fixed in the statues, varying from one to five years. iv) Habitual drunkenness. v) Imprisonment for crime. The time of imprisonment varies in different States. vi) Neglect to provide for the wifes maintenance and support, though being able to do so. Also gross neglect of duty on the part of the wife is ground of divorce in some of the States. vii) Importance- in several States qualified as existing before marriage, and in this case even a cause for annulling the marriage, so as to render it void ab initio viii) Joining a religious society which holds marriage to be unlawful is by the statutes of a few States made a ground for divorce. ix) In some of the States the causes for which divorce may be granted are wholly or in part left to the discretion of the courts. (Emphasis supplied) It was conceded before us by both the learned Counsel that ground (iv) in the old law, namely, obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year would more or less correspond with ground (iii) under the Modern law, namely, desertion also termed abandonment, absence without good cause; the time of willful absence required to constitute desertion is differently fixed in the statues varying from one to five years. Similarly, it was conceded before us by both the learned Counsel that ground (vi) in the old law, namely, insulting her father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulting husband himself would correspond more or less to ground (ii) under the Modern law, namely, cruelty differently described in the laws of the different States as intolerable severity, injurious treatment, indignities making life burdensome etc. We are not concerned with the other grounds on which divorce could be sought by the husband. 6. As stated earlier, the petition has been filed on 20th March, 1985. We are not concerned with the other grounds on which divorce could be sought by the husband. 6. As stated earlier, the petition has been filed on 20th March, 1985. The facts constituting the above two grounds on which divorce is sought, are set out in para 11 of the petition in a some what vague and general manner. There are hardly any details much less dates of specific instances. There is no reference to the alleged obstinate refusal to cohabit during a whole year. The allegation of insulting the father-in-law or husband, is given in a some what vague manner indicating more or less normal wear and tear of matrimonial life in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, to which, we will make a detail reference when we will appreciate the evidence on record. 7. The written statement was filed by the wife on 30th July, 1985. The wife denied the allegations made against her. She described her plight in being compelled to take a teaching job and tuitions to support the family. Despite the husband having a good job with a reputed company like Glaxo, it appears that he was not in a mood to spend on his wife and children which necessitated the wife supporting the family by her own meagre earnings. She had to put up with all sorts of insults and humiliation; but she bravely faced the situation and educated her children. She denied the allegation made against her in para 11 of the petition and putforth her version. She pointed out that the appellant-husband was interested in the widow of his friend Samson viz. Flory Samson and she pointed out the favours shown to Flory Samson as against the humiliation which she herself suffered. The wife was constrained to take a teaching job in the King George High School, Dadar, Bombay and then took uptuitions to support herself and her children since the husband refused and neglected to maintain his family. The wife denies having refused to cohabit with the husband during the whole year February, 1984 to March, 1985 and has pointed out that the husband himself was not interested in her and himself started sleeping separately in the hall. The wife denies having refused to cohabit with the husband during the whole year February, 1984 to March, 1985 and has pointed out that the husband himself was not interested in her and himself started sleeping separately in the hall. She has further pointed out that she never insulted her father-in-law or the husband; but on account of the peculiar situation in which she found herself and the humiliation suffered by her, she had, at times, to assert her independent views in her own interest and in the interest and welfare of her children, which appears to us to be perfectly justified . 8. On 6th November, 1986, this Court transferred the Matrimonial dispute pending under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to the City Civil Court, Bombay. Accordingly, on 10th August, 1989 M.J. Suit No. 904 of 1985 pending in this Court was transferred to the Bombay City Civil Courts and was numbered as M.J. Suit No. 7813 of 1986. On 22nd September, 1989 there was a meeting between the spouses for settling the draft consent terms. However, on 25th September, 1989 the wife refused to sign the said terms. On 31st October, 1989 upon establishment of the Family Courts in Bombay, M.J. petition was transferred to the Family Court from the Bombay City Civil Court and was numbered as M.J. Petition No. 7813 of 1986. In the mean-while, in February 1988, the appellants brother Samson got married and left the premises at Dadar and started living separately. In May, 1988 the appellants other brother Joseph left the premises with his wife and 3 children and started living separately. On 4th January, 1992 the appellants father expired. 9. At the trial, the husband examined himself and his mother Rachal. The wife -Sharon examined herself. This is the entire evidence on record. The learned trial Judge, appreciated the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the husband had failed to prove any of the grounds alleged by him. It was held that the husband was neither entitled to divorce nor to a decree for judicial separation. He was also held dis-entitled to the custody of his children. However, the wife also was held disentitled to any alimony. In the result, the Family Court dismissed the petition and directed the spouses to bear their own costs. It was held that the husband was neither entitled to divorce nor to a decree for judicial separation. He was also held dis-entitled to the custody of his children. However, the wife also was held disentitled to any alimony. In the result, the Family Court dismissed the petition and directed the spouses to bear their own costs. It is this judgment dated 7th March, 1992 which is challenged before us in the appeal filed by the husband. 10. We have heard both the learned Counsel Shri Shah on behalf of the husband and Smt. Agarwal who was appointed as amicus curiae on behalf of the wife. Both the learned Counsel have taken us through the pleadings and entire evidence on record. Consisting of letters exchanged between the parties and evidence of the three witnesses mentioned above. Since, there was some uncertainty about the exact law applicable on the question of divorce claimed by the husband, both the learned Counsel have invited our attention to the exhaustive commentary by Rev. M. Mielziner on the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in ancient and modern times. The law has been divided into two parts; (i) Old Law according to the religious scripture referred to as the Mosaic Law and its Rabbinical Interpretation and Provisions and (ii) the causes for divorce considered in the modern legislation in England and the United States. We have already referred to the two grounds on which the husband has filed the petition. As per the old law, namely, the Mosaic Law and its Rabbinical Interpretation and Provisions, they are (i) obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year and (ii) insulting her father-in-law in the presence or her husband or insulting the husband himself. We have also indicated, as agreed by both the learned Counsel, that under the "Modern Legislation" these two grounds would correspond to (i) ground of desertion also termed abandonment, absence without good cause; the time of wilful absence required to constitute desertion being differently fixed in the statutes, varying from one to five years and (ii) cruelty differently described in the laws of the different States, as; intolerable severity, injurious treatment, indignities making life burdensome etc. 11. Shri Shah the learned Counsel for the husband has also invited our attention to the decision of this Court of Crump, J., in (Rachel Benjamin v. Benjamin Soloman Benjamin)1, reported at Vol. 11. Shri Shah the learned Counsel for the husband has also invited our attention to the decision of this Court of Crump, J., in (Rachel Benjamin v. Benjamin Soloman Benjamin)1, reported at Vol. XXVIII Bombay Law Reporter page 328. That was a case of the wife filing a petition for divorce in accordance with the Jewish Law in the Bombay High Court. It has been observed in the said decision that the Jews in Bombay come mainly from Baghdad and it was improbable that they regard the Jewish law in precisely the same light as the Jews living in England or in America. It was, therefore, plain that the custom of the community must be considered on points where there was a room for doubt. (page 341 of the report). Referring to the uncertainty, prevailing in India about the exact state of Jewish law on "divorce" Justice Crump suggested for consideration of the Jewish community whether they would not be well advised to place upon a more satisfactory basis the adjustment of their matrimonial disputes. This could be done either by the establishment of a "bethdin" such as is found in Jerusalem and Baghdad and perhaps in London or by special legislation similar to the Parsi Marriage Act. It was observed that the community was enlightened and progressive and should appreciate the benefit of certainty as to the law and procedure upon these matters which must vitally affect domestic life among them. (page 346 of the report). 12. Shri Shah also invited our attention to another exhaustive decision of this Court rendered by Madon, J., (as he then was) in the case of (Mozelle Robin Soloman v. Lt.Col. R.J. Soloman)2, reported at 81, Bom.L.R. 578. This judgment takes a review of the entire law on the subject of marriage and divorce among Jews; the old Mosaic Law with its Rabbinical Interpretation and Provisions and the Modern Legislation. A reference is made by Madon, J., to the judgment delivered by Crump, J., in the case of Rachel Benjamin V. Benjamin Soloman Benjamin reported at Vol. XXVIII Bom.L.R. 328 (supra). A reference is made by Madon, J., to the judgment delivered by Crump, J., in the case of Rachel Benjamin V. Benjamin Soloman Benjamin reported at Vol. XXVIII Bom.L.R. 328 (supra). At page 585 in the said decision in M.R. Solomans case, it has been observed by Madon, J., as under: "According to the Jews, their law has a divine origin, It was revealed by God in the wilderness of Sinai to Moses who transmitted it to the people and is to be found in the first five books of the Old Testament (namely, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy), commonly known by the Greek Word "Penatateuch". meaning "the five rolls". The Jews call these five books the Torah meaning "The law" or, literally, "Direction or "guidance". In course of time enormous bodies of law and commentary came to be compiled known as the Talmud, meaning "teaching or "instruction", which interpreted, modified expounded and adapted to changed times and circumstances the Scriptural Law. The Mishnah Talmud was reduced to writing in the second, the Palestnian Talmud in the fourth and the Babylonian Talmud in the sixth century. The Talmud consists of (1) the Mishnah, a systematic collection of religious - legal decisions developing the laws of the Old Testament and (2) the Ganara which is a supplementary commentary based on the Mishnah. The Mishnah states a law in a few lines while the Ganara is discursive being in the nature of a commentary on the Mishnah, giving the diverse opinions of leading rabbis on the Mishnah text, describing the circumstances which might require the law to be modified and giving illustrations, Orthodox tradition ascribes divine origin to the Talmud also holding that Moses had left to his people not only a Written Law in the Penatateuch but also an Oral Law which had been handed down and expanded from teacher to pupil and from generation to generation." 13. A reference is then made by Madon, J., to the treatise by Rev. M. Mielziner on the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce to which we have made a reference earlier. Madon, J., has referred to the two books on the subject at pages 587 in the following words. "The two books to which both learned Counsel have referred me are (1) Rev. Dr. M. Mielziner on the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce to which we have made a reference earlier. Madon, J., has referred to the two books on the subject at pages 587 in the following words. "The two books to which both learned Counsel have referred me are (1) Rev. Dr. M. Mielziners book entitled "The Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in Ancient and Modern Times", second revised edition published in 1901 and (2) the fifth volume headed Deuteronomy of the work entitled "The Pentateuch and Haftorahs. Hebrew Text, English Translation with Commentary" edited by Chief Rabbi J.H. Herts. The commentary on the Deuteronomy by Chief Rabi Hertz is not a book which seeks to or even claims to give any account or exposition of the Jewish Law. It is a commentary on the Pentaeuch and though this book contains much interesting information and makes instructive reading, it is what it professes to be -- a commentary on the first five books of the Old Testament, the religious book of the Jews. Its basis is naturally therefore religious and ethical and not legal and in part its endeavour is to show how in most respects the Hebrew Society, manners and customs were and are superior and more advanced than those of Christiandom. It is, therefore, not of any assistance in ascertaining what the Jewish law on any particular subject is. The book by Rev. Dr. Mielziner, who was the professor of Talmudic Literature at the Hebrew Union College, on the other hand, in the words of Crump J., in the case of Rachel Benjamin v. Benjamin Soloman Benjamin, (supra). "Contains, so far as can be judged, a clear and accurate account of the law based on the original sources which are cited throughout." 14. The grounds on which the Jewish wife could obtain divorce have been reproduced by Madon, J., from Dr. Mielziners book at page 591 of the report . We need not deal with them because in this case we are concerned with a petition by the husband. 15. The grounds on which the Jewish wife could obtain divorce have been reproduced by Madon, J., from Dr. Mielziners book at page 591 of the report . We need not deal with them because in this case we are concerned with a petition by the husband. 15. Having carefully considered both the above mentioned judgments in detail, we are of the view that the husband has to make out one of the two grounds mentioned in the Mosaic Law and its Rabbinical Interpretation and Provisions, namely, (i) obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year and (ii) insulting her father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulting the husband himself. 16. In view of the above, the two points which arise for our consideration are : i) Whether the husband has proved that the wife has obstinately refused connubial rights during a whole year viz. February, 1984 to March, 1985 and ii) Whether the wife has insulted her father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulted the husband himself ? 17. Our answers to both the points are in the negative for the reasons which follow. 18. We have gone through the entire evidence on the question of obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year. The case sought to be made out is of absence of cohabitation between February, 1984 to March, 1985. However, husbands evidence in para 6 of his examination in chief gives a complete go-by this ground as under : "When I used to sleep with her she always used to quarrel with me and abuse me. Hence I started sleeping separately in the year 1979 and I was living separately till February 1981. Then in February, 1981, a friend of mine had met respondent and her parents and then he had brought reconciliation between us and then we were living together till June, 1982. But again I started living separately and she had not shown any improvements and she was behaving rudely with me. Then again in June, 1983, a friend of mine and my Advocate and her Advocate brought reconciliation between us and then we started living together and we were living together till February, 1984. From February, 1984 we again started living separately in the same house." The cross-examination of the husband shows that he paid very little attention to his wife and children. From February, 1984 we again started living separately in the same house." The cross-examination of the husband shows that he paid very little attention to his wife and children. He admitted having an affair with the widow of his friend Samson namely Flory Samson. He admitted having provided very little to his wife and children necessitating the wife to take a teaching job and tuitions from which earning also he was drawing some amount. There is nothing on record to show that the wife obstinately refused to cohabit with the husband. The evidence of the mother of the husband does not suggest any obstinate refusal on the part of the wife to cohabit with the husband. On the contrary, the evidence of the wife Sharon shows that there was a regular cohabitation between the spouses. Even after the petition was filed they were living in the same house and she admitted having sexual relations with the husband in 1987-88 also. She categorically says that the husband paid no attention to her or to their children and that she was forced to support the family. The articles of furniture, T.V. etc. in the house were admittedly purchased by the wife since the husband did not find it worth-while spending in his own house. The husband did not bother to wish the wife on her birthday on 31st December, but on the birthday of Flory Samson on 8th September he had bought a cake. The wife was repeatedly humiliated in the presence of Flory Samson and the parents and sisters of the husband. The wifes ornaments were taken in 1977 at the time of marriage of the husbands sister Rebecca. Those gold ornaments weighed as many as 9 tolas and nothing was given to her in return. Similar demand was made to her at the time of marriage of husbands younger sister Jerusha in 1982, Naturally, the wife protested and we find nothing wrong in her behaviour in asserting her own views in the family where she was trying to support the family by her meagre earnings because her husband was not interested in her but was interested in Flory Samson. Thus on appreciation of the entire evidence, we find that the husband has failed to prove the allegation that the wife had obstinately refused to cohabit with him during one year i.e. from February 1984 to March. 1985. Thus on appreciation of the entire evidence, we find that the husband has failed to prove the allegation that the wife had obstinately refused to cohabit with him during one year i.e. from February 1984 to March. 1985. Evidence on this point is wholly unsatisfactory and we can find no fault with the wife for the manner in which she behaved. 19. On the second ground of the wife insulting her father-in-law in the presence of the husband or insulting husband himself, we find the evidence equally un-satisfactory. There are no details of this conduct in the petition. What is alleged in para 11 of the petition, is general picture of the relation between the husband and wife where the husband was not spending enough on the family resulting in the wife taking tuitions and trying to support the family with her meagre earnings. The specific instance alleged is only regarding the disagreement over the behaviour of their daughter Florence. Whereas the mother wanted to discipline her daughter in a particular way, the father had different views on the subject. In the peculiar facts on record where we find that the mother was doing more for the family and the children, she was trying to impose her discipline on her daughter. There are no specific instances alleged in the petition to suggest that the wife insulted her father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulted the husband himself. When we examine the evidence of the husband, he refers to some disagreement between the parties on some minor incidents, which, in our opinion, constitute the daily wear and tear of matrimonial life. Though the husband was earning enough from his job with Glaxo, he was not spending enough on the family. This was the reason which compelled the wife to take a teaching job and tuitions. From the meagre earnings which she got, she had to give the usual cuts to the teachers who recommended the students to her for tuitions. The husband did not give her liberty of spending her entire income from the tuitions. Out of her meagre income of about Rs. 400/- p.m. the husband used to withdraw a sum of Rs. 200/- p.m. and was paying her only Rs. 100/- This is clear from his admission in para 15 of his evidence. The evidence further shows that the wife had no respect in the house. Out of her meagre income of about Rs. 400/- p.m. the husband used to withdraw a sum of Rs. 200/- p.m. and was paying her only Rs. 100/- This is clear from his admission in para 15 of his evidence. The evidence further shows that the wife had no respect in the house. The parents of the husband and his sisters used to humiliate the wife despite her sacrifice for the family. If in these circumstances, the wife tried to assert her view we do not think that such a conduct can be construed as insulting the father-in-law or insulting the husband himself. 20. It is further clear from the evidence that at the time of marriage of the sister of the husband viz. Rebecca in 1977, the wifes gold ornaments weighing 9 tolas were taken away from her and nothing was given to her in return. On top of it in 1982 when the younger sister Jerusha was to be married a fresh demand was made from the wife. In our opinion, the wife was perfectly justified in turning down the request. Her evidence shows that she was spending enough for the family. Apart from the childrens education she used to buy items like furniture, T.V. etc. If a lady faced with such a situation expressed her views to the dislike of her father-in-law, it is not possible, in the facts of the case, to consider her conduct as insulting her father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulting the husband himself. Infact, the evidence of the husband, his mother and the wife shows that it was the wife who was being insulted repeatedly in the presence of other members of the family and in the presence of Flory Samson. It must be borne in mind that the husband has no courage to make any allegation against the wifes character or her chastity. She has come out in the evidence as one who was sacrificing for the family at the cost of suffering humiliation by the husband as he was not interested in her and was obviously interested in Flory Samson so much so that he was not even spending enough on the education of the children. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in rejecting the husbands contention that the wife was insulting the father-in-law in the presence of the husband or insulting the husband himself. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in rejecting the husbands contention that the wife was insulting the father-in-law in the presence of the husband or insulting the husband himself. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we find nothing wrong in the wife asserting her own views and she was perfectly justified in keeping her dignity. She appears to be one who was conscious of her duties to the family and was sacrificing enough for the family while she was suffering the humiliation. It is unfortunate that the husband has chosen to make such an irresponsible allegation against the wife merely for the purpose of getting rid of her since he was no longer interested in her. In our view, the evidence on record is insufficient to prove either of the two grounds namely obstinate refusal of connubial rights during a whole year or insulting the father-in-law in the presence of her husband or insulting the husband himself. 21. We are of the view that there is no merit in the petition filed by the husband. The evidence of the husband is totally discrepant. The conduct of the husband shows that he was at fault. The evidence of the husband himself shows that no objection could be taken to the conduct of the wife who behaved in a responsible manner trying to support the family and the children at the cost of a great personal sacrifice. 22. In despair, Shri Shah invited our attention to the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of (V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat)3, reported at A.I.R. 1994, Supreme Court 710. Relying upon the observations in the said decision, it was suggested by the learned Counsel that the wife making the allegation of the husband having an affair with Flory Samson amounts to cruelty under the matrimonial law and on this ground alone, the husband must get a decree for divorcee. We are afraid, the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in V. Bhagats case can have no application to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court, the wife levelled wild and baseless allegations against the husband, describing him as a mental patient, a person who was not normal, one who required psychological treatment to restore his mental health and that he was suffering from paranoid disorder and mental hallucinations. In the case before the Supreme Court, the wife levelled wild and baseless allegations against the husband, describing him as a mental patient, a person who was not normal, one who required psychological treatment to restore his mental health and that he was suffering from paranoid disorder and mental hallucinations. The wife further went to the extent of saying that the husband and all members of his family were a bunch of lunatics. It was held by the Supreme Court that the allegations were not made in a fit of anger or under emotional stress, but they were made in a formal pleading filed in the Court and questions to that effect were put by her counsel, at her instructions, in the cross examination, and the wife had miserably failed to substantiate the allegations. It was in these peculiar facts that the Supreme Court held that making these wild and baseless allegations constituted mental cruelty and hence the husband could not be asked to live with the wife. In the facts of the case before us, it would be evident from the cross-examination of the husband that he admits his closeness to Flory Samson. The wife has deposed to several instances where the husband gave preferential treatment to Flory Samson ignoring the wife. There is no parallel between this case and Bhagats case before the Supreme Court. Reliance placed by the learned Counsel on Bhagats case is wholly misplaced. The suggestion of mental cruelty as a result of the wife making a truthful allegation of the husbands affair with Flory Samson has to be summarily rejected as wholly baseless. 23. We must place on record our appreciation of the able assistance afforded by both the learned Counsel, Shri Shah and Smt. Agarwal. But for their able assistance and the research they did, it would have been difficult for us to know what exactly was the Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. Stand over to Tuesday the 18th July, 1995. for further orders and/or for settlement as suggested by both the learned Counsel. 25. Counsel for the parties have expressed their inability to arrive at any settlement though the matter was adjourned on 13th July, 1995 for settlement at their behest. 24. Stand over to Tuesday the 18th July, 1995. for further orders and/or for settlement as suggested by both the learned Counsel. 25. Counsel for the parties have expressed their inability to arrive at any settlement though the matter was adjourned on 13th July, 1995 for settlement at their behest. Under the circumstances, in view of the findings recorded by us above, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. *****