B. N. KIRPAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition of the appellant, challenging the order of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, who had held that he had no jurisdiction to review an earlier order. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are that the appellant had purchased land, measuring 1600. 34 sq. metres, part of which was leased and part of which was sold, to two different persons. The requisite forms under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) act, 1976 were filled by the appellant in 1976 and after some protracted proceedings, the Competent Officer, by an order dated 3rd October, 1987/11th November, 1987, declared 503. 28 sq. metres as surplus land. ( 3 ) AN appeal was filed before the Urban Land Tribunal, who confirmed the said order. Thereafter, on 29th November, 1990, notification under Sec. 10 (3) of the U. L. C. Act, was passed. A notice was issued, requiring the appellant, to hand over all the surplus land. ( 4 ) THE appellant received a letter dated 2nd of April, 1991, whereby the Town development Officer informed that construction on land could be made only after leaving 30 metres of land from the river bank. By raising a contention that land on which construction could not be raised cannot be taken into consideration in determining the surplus land, the appellant herein filed a review application before the Urban Land Tribunal. In the meantime, as no Tribunal was functioning, a writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 2058 of 1991, was filed, in which order was passed on 8th of December, 1993, whereby direction was issued to decide the review apposition before 31st March, 1994. ( 5 ) BY the impugned decision dated 28th June, 1994, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no power of review, as there was no specific provision in the Urban Land Ceiling Act. ( 5 ) BY the impugned decision dated 28th June, 1994, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no power of review, as there was no specific provision in the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Again, Special Civil Application No. 10157 of 1994 was filed (decided on 2-5-1995), A. N. Divecha, J. by judgment under appeal, inter alia, came to the conclusion, by referring to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 1160 that the power under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to a second appeal was exercisable by the same judge and by no other Judge, in as much as the Appellate authority, who had passed the original order, had retired and, therefore, the review application, which had been filed by the appellant could not have been decided by the successor-in-office. The learned Judge, however, came to the conclusion, by referring to an earlier decision in the case of J. B. Vadiwala v. Competent Authority, air 1995 Guj. 25 : ( 1995 (1) GLR 831 ), to the effect that the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, including the right to file a review application, would be applicable to the proceedings under Sec. 33 of the U. L. C. Act before the appellate authority. ( 6 ) THE net result was that though the Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of a review application because of the decision in J. B. Vadiwalas case, but as the incumbent has changed, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the power of review could not be exercised by the successor. ( 7 ) IN our opinion, the learned single Judge did not correctly appreciate the ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Devaraju Pillai (supra ). In that case, a single Judge of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal, had decided the case on merits. An application was filed for the review of the same and the Supreme Court observed that the single Judge hearing the review application, who was not the same Judge who had decided the earlier appeal, by virtually sitting in judgment over the decision of the single Judge, had decided the matter on merits. It was observed that the single Judge hearing a review could not do so. It was observed that the single Judge hearing a review could not do so. It was in this context that it was observed that a party aggrieved by the single Judges judgment in the Second Appeal should have filed an appeal against same and a remedy by way of an application for review was entirely misconceived and that :-". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE learned single Judge who entertained the application totally exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the review and upsetting the judgment of the learned single Judge merely because he took a different view on a construction of a document. . . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis added)THE Supreme Court did not at any stage observe that because the Judge who heard the review was different from the Judge who had originally decided the Second Appeal, the Second Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the review. The observations with regard to the jurisdiction was only in the context of the limited jurisdiction which has to be exercised by a Judge in hearing a review application, in as much as the provisions of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code has to be kept in view while dealing with such an application and a court hearing a review application cannot rehear the case on merits as if it was an appellate Court. With respect to the learned single Judge, we are unable to agree that merely because an incumbent who had passed the original order is no longer available, the remedy by way of review would be lost. ( 8 ) IN view of the judgment in J. B. Vadiwalas case, the Land Tribunal had the jurisdiction to decide the review application which had been filed by the appellant before that authority on 3rd of April, 1991 and the authority was wrong in holding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the review application. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reason, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge as well as the order dated 28th June, 1994, passed by the Tribunal are set aside. Direction is issued to the Tribunal to decide the review application filed by the appellant on merits. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reason, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge as well as the order dated 28th June, 1994, passed by the Tribunal are set aside. Direction is issued to the Tribunal to decide the review application filed by the appellant on merits. Till the decision of the said review petition, the possession of the appellant will remain undisturbed subject to the condition that the appellant will also maintain status quo as of today. ( 10 ) THE review application should be disposed of expeditiously. There will be no order as to costs. .