Order Initially, this writ application was filed for quashing the seniority list dated 28.5.1995, contained in Annexure 7/A. whereby respondent nos. 5 and 6 were shown senior to the petitioner in the rank of Associate Professors. But during the pendency of this writ application, vide a notification dated 20.6.1994, contained in Annexure 7/D respondent no. 5 was promoted as Professor Incharge, General Medicine Department, P.M.C.H. Therefore, a prayer was also made for quashing of that notification. 2. The petitioner claims seniority over respondents 5 and 6 on basis of his placement in Annexure 2 dated 14.11.1979, whereby he and others were promoted as Associate Professors with effect from the date of joining. But the petitioner did not join at that time whereas respondent nos. 5 and 6 joined immediately in terms of the notification. At the time of promotion, in the notification, admittedly the petitioner was shown senior to respondent nos. 5 and 6. But the promotion to the ranks of Asst. Professor was to be made effective from the date of joining. 3. Admittedly the petitioner did not join 'his place of posting till 29.11.1980, but on the other hand, respondent nos. 5 and 6 joined their posts then and there. Therefore in view of terms and conditions of their promotion, 'they became senior to the petitioner. In fact, the petitioner joined at Patna subsequently on 29.10.1980 therefore, he was not entitled to count the period between 14.11.1979 to 29.10.1980 for fixation of seniority. 4. Thus in substance, the petitioner has claimed retrospective promotion on the post of Associate Professor. But in my view, since .the petitioner did not join the place of posting as assigned under Annexure 2 and other respondents joined much earlier to him, he cannot be allowed to claim retrospective promotion. If the petitioner did not join at that stage, nobody can be blamed for that. That apart, a bare reference to the order dated. 11.8.1994, passed in this case, would indicate that a Bench of this Court after hearing the parties has virtually closed this issue, holding that retrospective promotion was not permissible in such cases. 5. Therefore, if the petitioner is allowed promotion retrospectively, with effect from the date of Annexure 2, i.e. 14.11.1979, it will tantamount to restore his seniority over respondent nos. 5 and 6. 5. Therefore, if the petitioner is allowed promotion retrospectively, with effect from the date of Annexure 2, i.e. 14.11.1979, it will tantamount to restore his seniority over respondent nos. 5 and 6. If as per the terms and conditions of promotion enumerated in Annexure 2, the petitioner failed to join at Darbhanga and preferred to continue at Patna, at his risk, how can he be allowed at this stage to claim seniority over respondent nos. 5 and 6, who had joined much before his joining. 6. The other grievance of the petitioner is that M.D. Degree of respondent no. 5 contained in Annexure Y, purported to have been issued by the Magadh University is forged and fabricated. A bare reference to the copy of Degree, it would appear that Shri Chintu Naik, who has signed, was not the Vice-Chancellor at the relevant time. In fact, there is no signature of the Vice Chancellor who was holding the post in the year 1975 at the time when Degree was granted. A reference was also made to a letter of the Controller of Examinations, Magadh University dated 17.1.1995, Annexure 14, to show that there was no. provision in any of the Medical Colleges under Magadh University to impart education in Post Graduate standard, hence, there was no question issuing such a degree. 7. Having heard the parties with respect to the aforesaid grievance, I directed learned counsel for the University to produce the relevant records and also file affidavit so as to verify the genuineness of the grievances. Learned counsel for the University accordingly produced relevant records in presence of advocates of all the parties and also filed a counter affidavit accepting therein that such degree was granted to the petitioner. On perusal of the counter affidavit of the respondent University and the relevant records, there appears no doubt that the copy of the Degree was issued by Magadh University. In that view of the matter, there is no substance in such a grievance of the petitioner. 8. Coming to the last question, which in fact would be very crucial, if answered in affirmative can lead to a far reaching consequence. In that view of the matter, there is no substance in such a grievance of the petitioner. 8. Coming to the last question, which in fact would be very crucial, if answered in affirmative can lead to a far reaching consequence. It is well known that the post graduate qualification in the subject is a since qua non for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor, in terms of the provisions of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and various statutory recommendations and circulars issued thereunder. Section 19A of the Act prescribes minimum standard of medical education. It empowers the Council to prescribe minimum standard of medical education required for granting recognised medical qualifications by the Universities or medical institutions. 9. Admittedly, respondent no. 5 was not awarded M.D. degree from any of the institutions recognised by the Medical Council of India. A question, therefore, has been raised whether respondent no. 5 was at all qualified for appointment on the basis of M.D. degree, which was not granted by an institution recognised by the Medical Council of India. 10. There is no dispute that respondent no. 5 got M.D. degree in question from Rajendra Memorial Research Institute, Medical Sciences, Agam Kuan, Patna. This is not the claim of any of the respondents that this Institute was ever recognised by the Medical Councilor even, a permission to establish such an institute was obtained from the Council. Therefore, there cannot be any occasion to trace out the name of this Institute in a schedule prepared under the provisions of the Act in fact a perusal of the schedule would indicate that only two medical institutions under the Magadh University, namely, Nalanda Medical College Hospital, Patna and A.N. Medical College, Gaya were included in the schedule. It has been urged that apart from the said infirmities, there was no facility or standard of teaching in this Institute in terms of various regulations prescribing standard of teaching and syllabus etc. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the aforesaid grievance placed reliance over the letters of the Deputy Secretary, Medical Council of India dated 3rd August, 1994, and 17th October, 1994, (Annexures 11 and 12) to indicate that Rajendra Memorial Research Institute was not recognised by the Council, therefore, not competent to teach Post Graduate or Ph. D. courses. 12. D. courses. 12. A reference has also been made to annual report of the year 1991 published by the Department of Health, Government of Bihar containing list of medical institutions. In the report, names of as many as 18 medical colleges have been mentioned which are provided with facilities of medical teaching etc. but the name of Institute in question is not there. 13. It further appears that even the Bihar Public Service Commission through a letter dated 22nd April, 1994, contained in Annexure 7/C, informed the Additional Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar that the proposal to grant promotion to respondent no. 5 as Professor (General Medicine) was not acceptable, since his M.D. degree was not recognised by the Medical Council. The Commission asked the Government to clarify within 15 days, failing which the proposal for promotion be deemed to have been withdrawn. Unfortunately, nothing has been brought on the record to show that the State Government obtained concurrence of the Commission even at a subsequent stage. 14. I have been informed by the parties that the post in question was not advertised by the Government, since it is required to be filled up by promotion on the basis of seniority maintained against the post immediately below the rank of Professor. But the appointment to the post of Assistant Professor is admittedly made on open advertisement. A copy of such advertisement of the year 1994 has been brought on the record with the counter affidavit. Although this advertisement has nothing to do with the present case but it shows that for appointment as Assistant Professor a candidate must possess at least a post graduate degree in the concerned subject from a Medical College or Institute duly recognised by the Medical Council of India. I have already indicated, although the post of Professor was not advertised but admittedly basic qualification for appointment against all three posts, i.e. Assistant Professor, Associate Professor or Professor is the same. 15. It is well known that Medical Council of India with the best intention due to fall in standard of medical teaching and having noticed mushroom growth of private uncontrolled fake institutions, felt it necessary in the public interest to prescribe essential qualifications for appointment/promotion against various teaching posts in medical colleges. 16. 15. It is well known that Medical Council of India with the best intention due to fall in standard of medical teaching and having noticed mushroom growth of private uncontrolled fake institutions, felt it necessary in the public interest to prescribe essential qualifications for appointment/promotion against various teaching posts in medical colleges. 16. The scheme of the Act appears to be that the Medical Council will maintain a proper medical register and prescribe minimum standard of medical education, required for granting recognised medical qualifications. 17. Having regard to such essentials, the Council under exercise of its power conferred under Section 33 of the Act, duly approved by the Government of India, framed a regulation, which says that teacher in medical colleges except tutors, residents, registrars and demonstrators must possess requisite recognised post graduate qualification in the respective subject. 18. As is manifest from the pleadings of the parties that no statutory rule was framed by the State Government under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, prescribing mode of recruitment and eligibility criteria for appointment/promotion against various teaching posts in medical colleges. Therefore, in absence of such a rule, regulation framed by the Medical Council has to be read as mandatory. 19. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. K.N. Nivedita Jain ( AIR 1981 SC 2045 ), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of the regulation framed by the Medical Council of India and various executive orders issued by the State Government. Relevant observation of the Court (at page 2063) is as below:- "17. . . . . . An analysis of the various sections of the Act indicate that the main purpose of the Act is to establish Medical Council of India, to provide for its constitution, composition and its functions, and the main function of the Council is to maintain the medical register of India and to maintain a proper standard of medical education and medical ethics and professional conduct for medical pracititioners. The scheme of the Act appears to be that the Medical Council of India is to be set up in the manner provided in the Act and the Medical Council will maintain a proper medical register, will prescribe minimum standards of medical education required for granting recognised medical qualifications, will also prescribe standards of post-graduate medical education and will further regulate the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and code of ethics for medical practitioners." 20. However, in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Dr. R. Murali Babu Rao & Anr., 1988 (3) SCR 173 , a question arose whether because of any conflict between the rules framed under Article 309 by the State Government and regulation framed by the Medical Council of India, the recommendation of the Council has to be read recommendatory or mandatory? The Supreme Court held that recommendation made by the Medical Council is only recommendatory because right to be considered for promotion is condition of service and it can only be regulated by a rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. It held that the recommendation of the Medical Council would not override the effect of the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. 21. But I have already noticed there was no statutory rule of the State Government prescribing any specific criteria in the present case. It would be useful to notice that in the case of Dr. Ganga Prasad Verma etc. v. State of Bihar & others, the Supreme Court held although in the case reported in 1988 (3) SCR 173 (supra), it was held that regulation framed by the Medical Council is directory but while examining the case of Dr. Ganga Prasad Verma, it was noticed that no statutory rule was framed by the State of Bihar. Therefore, it was held that the regulation made by the Medical Council of India under Section 33 of the Act would certainly bind State Government. A copy of the judgment is Annexure 19 to the writ application. It would be appropriate to quote a relevant passage from the aforesaid judgment hereunder: "... No doubt, this Court had held therein that the regulations framed by the Medical Council of India are only directory and would give place to the statutory rules made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution by the Governor. It would be appropriate to quote a relevant passage from the aforesaid judgment hereunder: "... No doubt, this Court had held therein that the regulations framed by the Medical Council of India are only directory and would give place to the statutory rules made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution by the Governor. The regulations made by the Medical Council of India does not have any overriding effect on the statutory rules. Rule 5 prescribed 5 years' teaching experience after DM which was upheld. In this case, admittedly, no statutory rules have been made by the State of Bihar. Therefore, the regulations made by the Medical Council of India under Section 33 would bind the State Government. The conditions prescribed therein namely, for promotion to the post of Professor or Associate Professor, the qualification in the specialty namely M.Ch. concerned after M.S./F.R.C.S. is a must. Since the appellant did not have the qualification of M.Ch. though he had the experience, he is not entitled to be considered for promotion as Associate Professor in super-session of the claim of the 7th respondent and other similarly situated persons." 22. I have already noticed that this is an admitted position that the institute in question was not recognised by the Council. According to respondents, since the institute was affiliated by the Magadh University and approved by the State, it was immaterial whether there was any recognition of the Council. Their stand is that the appointment of respondent no. 5 on the basis of same degree was made to the post of Assistant Professor and subsequently promoted as Associate Professor as back as in the year 1979, therefore, it is unjust to challenge the same at this stage. 23. Admittedly, no such question was ever raised earlier by the petitioner or anybody else either before the respondent State or this Court. It has been contended that like respondent no. 5, there are several doctors who have obtained post graduate degree from different medical colleges but not recognised by the Medical Council. Therefore, simply because the institute was not recognised by the Medical Council, the genuineness of the degree which was granted by the University in favour of respondent no. 5 cannot be doubted. 24. On behalf of respondent no. 5 reliance was placed on decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Therefore, simply because the institute was not recognised by the Medical Council, the genuineness of the degree which was granted by the University in favour of respondent no. 5 cannot be doubted. 24. On behalf of respondent no. 5 reliance was placed on decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Arun Kumar Agrawal v. The State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1991 SC 1514 ). Relevant portion of the judgment is hereunder:- "9. The controversy has been raised before us that the M.Ch. degree course in Neuro-Surgery awarded by Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi University is not yet recognised for the purposes of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and a letter of Medical Council of India dated 27.2.1991 has been placed on record in this regard. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 has tried to contend that M.Ch. degree obtained by the appellant was of no value as the same has not been recognised so far by the Medical Council of India. We find no force in this contention as this course was started by the Ranchi University in 1980 with the consent of Medical Council of India and the State of Bihar has recognised such degree imparted by the Ranchi University and even before this Court learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar has admitted this position. We are not concerned in this case about the value of such degree for places outside State of Bihar, but so far as the present case is concerned which relates to the post of Assistant Professor in Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna, which post is Linder the Bihar Government, no such objection can be maintained by the respondent No.5." 25. In my view, the ratio of the aforesaid case may not be applicable in the present case, for the simple reason that in that case, Ranchi University had already obtained consent of the Medical Council of India in the year 1980 for imparting teaching in M.Ch. courses. Therefore, it would not be safe to say that the teaching standard in various subjects were not approved by the Medical Council of India. 26. Besides the aforesaid, other grievances were also made about genuineness of the Institute. It was urged that the Institute was neither attached with any hospital nor there was any proper syllabus and teaching arrangement etc. for teaching to Post Graduate standard. 26. Besides the aforesaid, other grievances were also made about genuineness of the Institute. It was urged that the Institute was neither attached with any hospital nor there was any proper syllabus and teaching arrangement etc. for teaching to Post Graduate standard. It was stated that probably except respondent no. 5 nobody else was awarded M.D. degree from the institute in question. But as the institute is not a party in this case, it would not be proper to examine all these questions and to make any comment. 27. But a question arises whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution after such inordinate delay. It has been already noticed that the respondent no. 5 obtained M.D. degree in the year 1975 and was promoted to the post of Associate Professor in the year 1979. In terms of the notification whereby the petitioner and respondent no. 5 were given promotion he became senior at that stage itself. It has also been noticed that the petitioner did not challenge the appointment and promotion of respondent no. 5 at that stage. Therefore, such inordinate delay in challenging the validity of M.D. degree and promotion of respondent no. 5 at this stage would naturally unsettle the things settled so far. It is well known that such delay is not only the factor for the court to refuse appropriate relief but also relevant consideration not to unsettle things. In the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1974 SC 2271 ), the person aggrieved by order of promotion of juniors over his head, approached the court after 14 years. It was held although there is no specific period of limitation for the courts to exercise the power under Article 226 but certainly it should not be exercised by a person who is approaching the court after 14 years. Similarly, in the case of Malcon Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India & others ( AIR 1975 SC 1269 ) also the seniority of the respondents was challenged after lapse of many years. It was held that it is essential that when anyone feels aggrieved with an administrative decision, affecting one's seniority, it would act with due diligence and not to sleep over the matter. It was held that it is essential that when anyone feels aggrieved with an administrative decision, affecting one's seniority, it would act with due diligence and not to sleep over the matter. Therefore, in the interest of smoothness and efficiency such matters should not be touched after lapse of long time. It would be useful to notice relevant finding as under:- "8. x x x x Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years." 28. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of K.R. Mudgal and others v. R.P. Singh & others ( AIR 1986 SC 2086 ). It would be appropriate to quote relevant passage of the aforesaid judgment herein :- "7. x x x x The petitioners who filed the writ petition should have in the ordinary course questioned the principle on the basis of which the seniority lists were being issued from time to time from the year 1958 and the promotions which were being made on the basis of the said lists within a reasonable time. For the first time they filed the writ petition in the High Court in the year 1976, nearly 18 years after the first draft seniority list was published in the year 1958. Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the Government servants created by the petitions filed after several years as in this case." 29. Yet similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of G.C. Gupta & others v. N.K. Pandey & others ( AIR 1988 SC 654 ). I n this case claim for determination of inter se seniority was raised after lapse of 16 years. Relevant finding of the Supreme Court in this case is as follows:- "15. x x x x It cannot be doubted that an ulimited and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder, sense of insecurity and uncertainty. May be, there may have been isolated cases of hardship but there must be some reservation about limitation on the Court's power in the public interest. x x x x It cannot be doubted that an ulimited and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder, sense of insecurity and uncertainty. May be, there may have been isolated cases of hardship but there must be some reservation about limitation on the Court's power in the public interest. Obvious considerations of public policy make it first important that the person aggrieved must take action requisite effectively to assert his right to that end so that if the contention can be justified, the Government service may be disturbed as little as possible." 30. In this regard, reference can also be made to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kapoor Saini v. State of Haryana and others (AIR 1994 SC 1529). There is no doubt to explain the delay in approaching this Court. Mr. Chaubey pointed out that the petitioner had already filed representations before the authority for determination of inter se seniority but no order was passed. He contended that in any view of the matter, there is no delay in challenging the notification whereby respondent no. 5 was given promotion to the rank of Professor. 31. It is well known that for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor, a candidate must possess M.D. degree in that subject. Therefore, if respondent no. 5 was not qualified for appointment to the post of Professor, naturally he was not qualified for other posts as well. Apart from that, admittedly, promotion to the post of Professor was given on the basis of seniority maintained by the parties in -the rank of Associate Professor. Therefore, unless seniority of the petitioner is predetermined, so as to declare him senior to respondent no. 5, the claim for his promotion does not arise. 32. It has been noticed that institution in question was recognised by State Government and respondent University but not by M.C.I. The respondent no. 5 obtained M.D. degree in the year 1975, but nobody challenged at any stage, although he got his appointment and promotion on different posts on that basis. Therefore, in view of different decisions of the Supreme Court, as noticed above, it would not be in the interest of justice to unsettle things at this stage particularly when respondent no. 5 is due to retire in the month of January, 1996 itself. 33. Therefore, in view of different decisions of the Supreme Court, as noticed above, it would not be in the interest of justice to unsettle things at this stage particularly when respondent no. 5 is due to retire in the month of January, 1996 itself. 33. In the background of the facts stated above, it would not be proper to entertain such a stale claim of the petitioner to unsettle the matter after lapse of so many years. 34. For the reasons stated above, I have no option but to dismiss this application. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.