D. K. SETH, J. This appeal arises out of order dated 11th July, 1983 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-1, Sultanpur, in Misc. Case No. 2 of 1983 arising out of an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex pane decree dated 21st May, 1982 passed in Suit No 23 of 1982. 2. The fact of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal arc as hereinafter. The plaintiff- respondent filed an application under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 seeking to institute the suit in forma pauperis. The said application was allowed on 22nd January, 1982. After the said application was allowed the suit was registered on 16th February, 1982, and was ultimately decred ex parte on 21st May 1982. 3. The appellants thereafter filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the decree on the grounds made out in the said application, which was registered as Misc. case No. 2 of 1982. After con tested hearing by an order dated 11th July, 1983 the said Misc Case was dismissed. Against the said order dated 11th July, 1983, present F. A. F. O. No. 152 of 1983 has been preferred by the appellants herein. 4. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that since no notices were served upon the defendants/appellants the ex pane decree is liable to be set aside. According to him in view of the provision contained in Rule 8 of Order XXXIII of the Code, after the plaintiff was allowed to sue as indigent person, the suit shall be numbered and registered and the same shall proceed in all other aspects as a suit instituted in ordinary manner. Therefore, though at one point of time the District Government Counsel appeared in the proceedings under Order XXXIII but the same cannot be treated to be an appearance in the suit itself. He had referred to the order-sheet of the suit and submitted that there is nothing to show that the summons were served upon the defendants. He has further pointed out that there is no indication that summons were ever served on the defendants. According to him, therefore the ex pane decree was liable to be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff vehemently opposed the contention of Mr. Rizvi. He has further pointed out that there is no indication that summons were ever served on the defendants. According to him, therefore the ex pane decree was liable to be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff vehemently opposed the contention of Mr. Rizvi. According to him since the District Government Counsel has participated in the proceedings under Order XXXIII, therefore, the defendants had notice and knowledge of the suit. He had further submitted pointing out to the order sheet of the suit that there were proper service of summons. He had also relied on an application praying for time for filling written statement on behalf of defendant No. 1. He submits that the same clearly indicates that defendants had notice and knowledge of the suit. The notice of defendant No. 1 would amount to be notice of the other defendants which are all departments of the defendant No. 1. He refers to Order V, Rules 9 and 21 of the Code and the Allahabad amendment of Rule 21. According to him the defendant No. 6 was served by registered post, which is docu ment No. 37/1/gha (2) of the trial court record, being the postal acknowledgement card signed on 27th April, 1982. He also points out to the order dated 30th March, 1982, and submits that the same clearly shows that steps for service by registered post was taken. Since neither undelivered covers nor acknowledgement cards returned, therefore, under the second proviso of Order V, Rule 19-A sub-rule (2) there is a presumption that there was service of summons. He refers to paragraphs 16, 18 and 20 of the application under Order IX, Rule 13 and submits that there is no such averments, that the defendants did not have knowledge. On the contrary the same clearly indicates that the defendants had sufficient notice and knowledge of the suit. 6. He also refers to the decisions reported in 1988 SCD 306, 1989 SCD 401, 1988 SCD 313 and AIR 1944 Pat 103 in support of his contention. 7. Under Order XXXIII, Rule 8 of the Code it is provided that as soon an application to sue in forma pauperis is granted the suit is to be registered and the same shall proceed as an ordinary suit except with regard to the payment of court fees. 7. Under Order XXXIII, Rule 8 of the Code it is provided that as soon an application to sue in forma pauperis is granted the suit is to be registered and the same shall proceed as an ordinary suit except with regard to the payment of court fees. Therefore, according to us appearance in the proceedings for leave to sue in forma pauperis is irrelevant for the purpose of considering service of summons of the suit in an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code. Since after the registration of the suit. It has to proceed in ordinary manner, therefore, all the provisions for service of summons as prescribed under Order V of the Code are attracted and, therefore summons are to be issued. In the case of Thhakurdas Majhi v. Chand Majhi reported in AIR 1960 Cal 538 it was held that Order XXXIII, Rule VIII, of the Code does not have the effect of cutting down Order V, Rule 1 and, therefore, summons in the suit must be served on the defendants after application to sue as pauper is granted and the application is registered as a suit. 8. Therefore, the necessity of service of summons is mandatory. Order V provides the manner of service of summons and indicates as to how the summons are to be issued and service is to be effected and what should be the contents of the summons. The records of the trial Court has been called for. We have examined the same but we do not find any copy of the summons in the record in order to enable us to find out the contents of the summons. Even then we cannot take much notice about the contents of the summons in the absence of any copy of the summons in the record inasmuch as even if summons did not conform to the manner prescribed in Order V even then that would be a mere irregularity in terms of the second provisio to Rule 13, Order IX. Irregularity cannot be looked into if the defendants had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. 9. In the present case the defendant No. 1 was within the jurisdiction of the learned trial court. Whereas the defendant Nos. 2 to 6 all were out side the jurisdiction of the said learned court. 9. In the present case the defendant No. 1 was within the jurisdiction of the learned trial court. Whereas the defendant Nos. 2 to 6 all were out side the jurisdiction of the said learned court. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are of Lucknow, defendant No. 4 is of Allahabad and defendants Nos. 5 and 6 are of Jaunpur. Service of summons is to be effected under Rule 9 upon the defendant who resides within the jurisdiction of the court. Whereas the summon outside the jurisdiction are to be served under Rule 21. From the record it does not appear that the summons upon defendant No. 1 was served under Rule 9. But, however, learned Counsel for the defendant points out to the order dated 16th March, 1982 wherein reference has been made to the application for lime to file written statement being document No. 26 (Gha) filed on behalf of the defendant No. 1. However, the said document is not available on the record of the trial court. We, however, accept the position that the defendant No. 1 had notice of the suit. We are unable to treat his notice as notice of the defendants Nos. 2 to 6. 10. Checking the document No. 37/2/ga (2) Mr. Rizvi said that acknowledgement card does not contain any signature of the addressee. Be that as it may, form the Order-sheet it does not appear that the said service was accepted by the learned trial court as good service. It also does not appear that there was any attempt to or that any steps were taken for service of the summons in ordinary manner. On the other hand we find that service was never served in ordinary manner. However, there are reference of service by registered post. 11. Drawing our attention to the order-sheet, Mr. Tripathi pointed out that the summon for service by registered post were submitted and have been issued. He refers to the registration receipts. But neither the undelivered cover not acknow ledgement card in respect of defendants Nos. 2 to 5 have returned. Therefore, a presumption is to be drawn on the basis of the proviso to Rule 19-A (2 ). Tripathi pointed out that the summon for service by registered post were submitted and have been issued. He refers to the registration receipts. But neither the undelivered cover not acknow ledgement card in respect of defendants Nos. 2 to 5 have returned. Therefore, a presumption is to be drawn on the basis of the proviso to Rule 19-A (2 ). According to him the summons were properly addressed prepaid duly sent by registered post with acknowledgement due, therefore the same shall be deemed to be a proper service of summons and as such the trial court was right in rejecting the application under Order IX, Rule 13. 12. We, however,cannot agree to such contention. In as much as Rule 19 (A) (2) provides that as soon acknowledgement signed by the defendants or his agent is received by the court or postal article containing the summons is received back by the court with an endorsement purporting to have been made by postal employee to the effect that the defendants or his agent had refused to lake delivery of the postal article containing the summons when tendered lo him the court issuing summons shall declare that the summons have been duly served on the defendants. Provided that where the summons was properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post with acknowledgement due, the declaration referred to in the sub-rule (2) shall be made notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgement having been lost or mislaid or of any other reason has not been received by the court within 30 days from the date of issue of the summons. 13. In the present ease there is nothing on record to arrive at a finding that the summon were properly addressed and prepaid. We think that under sub-rule (2) it is mandatory for the court lo declare in such circumstances that the summons had been duly served on the defendants. Unless there is such declaration the summons cannot be said to have been served under Rule 19-A. In the present case it does not appear from the record that there was any such declaration made under sub-rule (2) read with the proviso thereunder. 14. For the reasons above, we are of the clear view that so far as defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are concerned there is nothing on record to arrive at a conclusion that the summons were served upon the in. 15. 14. For the reasons above, we are of the clear view that so far as defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are concerned there is nothing on record to arrive at a conclusion that the summons were served upon the in. 15. Now coming to the question whether notice upon defendants No. 1 and 6 would amount to notice of the defendants No. 2 to 5 as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents, since according lo him those are all departments of the defendant No. 1. We are unable to accede to such contention. Inasmuch as though they may be departments of the defendant No. 1 but they have been made party-defendants. Therefore, summons is necessary to be served upon each of them. Notice upon one of the defendants cannot be treated to be notice upon other defendants for the purpose of Order IX, Rule 13 though they are departments of the defendant No. 1. 16. Now turning to the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents that the defendants had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. We find from the record that after the suit was registered on 16th February, 1982 the same was transferred to the present court which records an order on 18th February, 1982 for service of sum mons. By the order dated 16th March, 1982 the suit was adjourned, thereafter it was further adjourned on 30th March, 1982 and then 27th April, 1982 and thereafter 4th May, 1982, 14th May, 1982, 20th May, 1982 and 21st May, 1982. Except the applica tion for time filed by the defendant No. 1 as mentioned in order dated 16th March, 1982, there is nothing to show that the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 had notice of the date of hearing of the said suit. 17. We are unable 10 accept the above contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents. Going through the case of M/s. Sardar Cold Storage & Ice Factory v. Punjab National Bank reported in 1988 SCD 313 we are unable to hold that the said decision could be of any help to the plaintiff case. In the said case it was held that the registered post summon/were issued though the court did not indicate that summons were to be issued by registered post. In the said case it was held that the registered post summon/were issued though the court did not indicate that summons were to be issued by registered post. The acknowledgement receipt relevant to the service were available on the record. Therefore, it was held that since summons were served only by registered post without any direction by the Court and that summons in the ordinary course having not been served, on the face of proof of service by registered post the absence of service in ordinary course, the service by registered post without any indication of the manner of the service by Court is merely an irregularity. But in the present case there is no proof of service within the meaning of Rule 19-A. 18. So far as the case of Om Prakash v. Smt. Satya Devi and another reported in 1989 SCD 401 and relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent is concerned, is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case it was decided that the Courts should not readily accept whatever is alleged to explain away the default. A litigant, who is careless and negligent and who fails to establish his bona fides, cannot be held to be entitled to this so-called indulgence as otherwise, the system cannot ensure its effective and purposeful function ing. In the case at hand we find that the suit was disposed of within a period of about three months from the date of its registration and there appears to be doubtful situation, as we find from the order-sheet itself, relating to the service. In any event court should have recorded a declaration under Rule 19-A (2) proviso. In the ab sence thereof we can safely conclude that there was no service at all. Therefore, we cannot look at the question of irregularity. So far as the other two decisions cited by Mr. Tripathi appears to us wholly inapplicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 19. On the other hand in the case of Navab Zada Mohd. Ishaq Khan v. Delhi Iron & Steel Corporation. AIR 1979 All 366 expresses the Allahabad view that there would be no proof of "due service" if the person is not examined. In that case the ex pane decree was set aside since the postman was not examined. 19. On the other hand in the case of Navab Zada Mohd. Ishaq Khan v. Delhi Iron & Steel Corporation. AIR 1979 All 366 expresses the Allahabad view that there would be no proof of "due service" if the person is not examined. In that case the ex pane decree was set aside since the postman was not examined. In the present case also no attempt was made to examine the postman. 20. Admittedly, exercise of jurisdiction of Order IX, Rule 13 is discretionary. In the case of Currim Bhoy v. Moos, reported in (1921) 31 Bombay L. R. 468 and also reported in 117 I. e. 593 and AIR 1929 Bombay 250 it was held that ex parte decree cannot be set-aside as matter of course even if the defendant applies on the same day. It is a matter of discretion of the court. But this is a case where the discretion should have been exercised in favour of the defendant because it appears that the court has not recorded its proceedings properly leaving doubt about the correctness of the approach to the suit. This is a case where the decree cannot be separated as between defendants. It is an admitted position which is not denied by the counsel for the plaintiff. Therefore it has to be set aside, if necessary as a whole. 21. We are of the opinion that the second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 does not apply in the present case. In as much as we do not find from the record that there was any service of summons even according to Rule 19-A (2) upon the defendant No. 2 to 5. Therefore, we cannot bring that within the ambit of irregularity in the service. The second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 does not apply where there is no service of summon at all. It covers only irregularity in service. A person claiming benefit of the proviso must prove that all necessary conditions have been fulfilled. Such view of ours is supported by the decision in the case of Rampati Devi v. Chandrika Devi, AIR 1979 Pat 314 . 22. Accordingly the order appealed against is hereby set aside, the Misc. It covers only irregularity in service. A person claiming benefit of the proviso must prove that all necessary conditions have been fulfilled. Such view of ours is supported by the decision in the case of Rampati Devi v. Chandrika Devi, AIR 1979 Pat 314 . 22. Accordingly the order appealed against is hereby set aside, the Misc. Case No. 2 of 1983 and the application under Order IX, Rule 13 is allowed and the ex pane decree dated 21st May, 1982 passed in Suit No. 23 of 1982 by the 1st Additional District Judge, 1st Court Sultanpur is set aside. The suit be restored to its file and proceed accordingly. Since the defendants now have notice, therefore, there is no further necessity of any service upon them. The defendants are directed to file their written statement within a period of one mo-nth from the date of receipt of the records by the trial court. The suit should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. The parties shall not take any adjournment unless the same is extremely necessary. We expect that the suit should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. 23. In the result the appeal succeeds. there will be no order as to costs. The records may go down to the courts below immediately. Appeal allowed. .