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1995 DIGILAW 363 (KER)

Kanaran Nair v. Madhavan Nair

1995-10-31

K.T.THOMAS, P.SHANMUGAM

body1995
Judgment :- Thomas ag. C. J. In a suit for recovery of possession of a plot of land the plaintiff took out a commission to measure the disputed land. Commissioner filed report and plan, but defendant in the suit sought to have them set aside. Trial Court remitted the commission report to the same commissioner for rectifying the errors pointed out and to drwa up a plan with the assistance of the Taluk Surveyor. Commissioner prepared a fresh report and got a new plan drawn up and filed them in court. Now it was the plaintiff who filed objections against the report and plan and that both may be set aside. Learned Munsiff declined to do so as per the order challenged in this revision. 2. Initially it was thought that revision is not maintainable as the impugned order was not "a case which has been decided by any court" as envisaged in S.115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the code'). Such a view has been expressed by Guttai, J. in Mytheen Kunjuv. Azeezkunju (1992(1) KLT 713). The same learned judge reiterated the position in 1992(2) KIT 102. John Mathew, J. before whom the present C. R. P. came up expressed the opinion that the said view requires reconsideration by a larger bench. Accordingly this case has been referred to a Division Bench. '3. We need not vex our mind on the question whether the impugned order would fall within the ambit of "any case which has been decided by any court" as envisaged in Section 115(1) of the Code because another Division Bench of this court has held in Mathew v. Saramma (1995(1) KLT 61) that any order failing to exercise jurisdiction vested in the court or exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it could as well be "a case decided" falling within the ambit of the Section. 4. But that is not enough to conclude that the impugned order in this case is revisable under S.115 of the Code. 4. But that is not enough to conclude that the impugned order in this case is revisable under S.115 of the Code. Proviso to the sub-section reads thus : Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." If the inhibition contained in the proviso would grapple the order what is the use in exercising revisional power in respect of that order? Power of the High Court to vary or reverse the order can be exercised only if the order possesses one of the characteristics mentioned in the proviso ie. If reversal of the order would result in culmination of the suit, or if the order has the potency to cause failure to justice injury to the party. 5. Reversal of the impugned order in this case would not finally dispose of the suit. So the attempt made by the counsel was to show that the order would occasion failure of justice unless it is set aside before the disposal of the suit. It is an uphill task for the petitioner to show how the impugned order would occasion a failure of justice. Even now the court can, in spite of the present nature of the order, at subsequent stages modify or alter it. When the suit reaches final stage the court may perhaps get a better opportunity to decide whether the present report of the commissioner can be acted upon. There is nothing which inhibits the court from doing so at a later stage. In this context, reference can be made to Order XVI Rule 10 of the Code. It show that report of the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. But the court is empowered to allow the parties to examine the commissioner touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report or as to the manner in which he has conducted the investigation. It show that report of the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. But the court is empowered to allow the parties to examine the commissioner touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report or as to the manner in which he has conducted the investigation. Sub-rule (3) provides that if the court is diss satisfied with the proceedings adopted by the commissioner the court can direct further enquiry to be made. Power of the court conferred by the sub-rule seems to be very wide by using the words "where court is for any reason diss satisfied" the court can direct further enquiry in such manner as the court "shall think fit". Utility of the commission report is that the same can be used as evidence in the case, it is, therefore, subject to all the checks to which any other item of evidence is subject in lwa. 6. The above discussion leads to the position that there is scope for raising contentions at all the subsequent stages for satisfying the court that the report of the commissioner cannot be relied on. The impugned order is only interlocutory in nature and nothing contained in it would trammel the trial court from taking a different view if otherwise satisfied at a subsequent stage. Parties are entitled to use other evidence including materials elicited through examination of the commissioners as a witness for satisfying of the court that findings in the report are faulty. Hence, from any angle the impugned order cannot be treated as having the potency to occasion failure of justice. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended on the premises that there can be instance where party would not have any other evidence to be adduced except the commission report. It is, no doubt, only a hypothetical situation and is not a usual occurrence in court. Even assuming that there could be such cases we have-no reason to think that the impugned order would prevent the court from taking a different view of the final stage. We, therefore, hold that the order challenged now is not revisable under S.115 of the Code G.R.P. is accordingly dismissed. No costs.