Judgment B. L. Vaclav, J. 1. Ours being an agricultural country, hence in respect of the legislation and litigation pertaining to agriculture, efforts must be made, to make articulate, the inarticulate premise but only to the extent which follows from necessary compulsion of the situations and the Constitutional position. The litigation pertaining to agriculture has to be carefully dealt with The Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, used to say that India lives in villages and if some body wants to see India he has to go to the villages. We are faced with baffling questions of interpretation of Sections 37-A and 37-B of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of fragmentation Act, 1956 (compendiously "the Act" ). 2. This Letters Patent Appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters patent of the Patna High Court Rules is directed against the judgment dated 23.1.1995 rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in [cw. JC. No.10592 of 1993] by which the learned Single Judge allowed the said writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India filed by Must. Hasibunnisa Bibi (respondent no.6 in this appeal) against the present appellant. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that the consolidation proceedings commenced in respect of R. S. Khata Nos.137 and 209 situate in village manpur, P. S. Chainpur. District Rohtas, the former khata being ancestral whereas the latter was acquired by purchase. The genealogical table is given below :- 4. After death of a common ancestor i. e. Diwan Niyaz Mohammad khan, his three sons separated from each other in cultivation and mess. The relevant R. S. Khata No.209 (in dispute) was in the share of one diwan Quadir Khan and R. S. Khata No.137 came to him as ancestrat property. The other two sons of Diwan Niyaz Mohammad Khan also got other lands in their share. Diwan Quadir Khan made an oral gift in favour of his second wife Batulan Bibi in respect of R. S. Khata No.209, who accepted the same and came in peaceful possession. This R. S. Khata No.209 became exclusive property of Batulan Bibi; whereas R. S. Khata No.137 remained a joint tenancy. Revisional Survey Khatian was prepared in the name of Batulan Bibi for her gifted property of Khata No.209, as provided under Sec.9 of the Act. She became ex-landlord after en-forcement of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. This R. S. Khata No.209 became exclusive property of Batulan Bibi; whereas R. S. Khata No.137 remained a joint tenancy. Revisional Survey Khatian was prepared in the name of Batulan Bibi for her gifted property of Khata No.209, as provided under Sec.9 of the Act. She became ex-landlord after en-forcement of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. In this R. S. Khata No.209 an area of R. S. Plot No.2889 was wrongly recorded, for which an objection was filed by Diwan Junaid Khan under Sec.10 (2) of the Act which was allowed by the Consolidation Officer on the 20th of April, 1990 and the name of Most. Nasibunnisa Bibi (respondent no 6) was expunged (Annexure 5 ). 5. An appeal was filed by Most. Hasibunnisa Bibi (respondent no.6)under Sec.10 (6) of the Act before the Assistant Director of Consolidation, rohtas which was dismissed on 22.7.1993 (vide Annexure 6) and the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 20.4.1990 (Annexure 5) was maintained. Thereafter a Revision Petition was filed by Most. Hasibunnisa Bibi under section 35 of the Act before the Joint Director of Consolidation, which was also dismissed by an order dated 24.9.1993 (Annexur 7 ). 6. Being aggrieved by the said orders, Most. Hasibunnisa Bibi filed the [c. W. J. C. No.10592 of 1993] in this Court whith a prayer to quash the impugned orders dated 24.9.1993, 22.7.1993 and 20.4.1990 (Annexures 7, 6 and 5 to the writ petition), which was allowed by the learned single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 23.1 1995, relying upon the case of Ram Sigashan pathak V/s. K. P. Sinha, [ air 1989 Pat 39 ]. Against the judgment of the learned single Judge the present L P. A. has been preferred. . [ blj (2)-28 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the findings of the learned single Judge are based on surmises and conjectures, inasmuch as, both oral and documentary evidence were led by the parties and there is statement of fact to that effect in the judgment of the Consolidation officer, Assistant Director of Consolidation and Joint Director of Consoli-dation (vide Annexures 5, 6 and 7 ). But the learned single Judge assumed that no evidence was led by the parties, and even if it was led it was not in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. But the learned single Judge assumed that no evidence was led by the parties, and even if it was led it was not in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned single Judge has also assumed wrong facts which were facts of the case in ram Singashan Pathak V/s. K. P. Sinha, [ air 1989 Pat 39 ] (supra), whereas that case was decided on the facts of that particular case and the consolida-tion authority was not treated as court in that case. The consolidation authorities are not courts in the real sense of the expression "court", but in view of Sec.37 of the Act, the Consolidation authorities were to be treated as Court by virtue of legal fiction. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and urged that the judgment of the learned single Judge is perfectly correct and the earlier decision reported in ram Singashan Pathak V/s. P. K. Sinha (supra) has correctly been followed as an authority on the subject. The consolidation authorities are "courts" in the real sense of the term. 9. The learned single Judge allowed the C. W. J. C. primarily on the ground that the entire proceedings from the stage of objection under Section 10 (2) till the Sec.35 of the Act (from the stage of Consolidation Officer to the Joint Director of Consolidation) have been vitiated for non-considera-tion of both oral and documentary evidence in accordance with law, as held in ram Singashan Pathak V/s. K. P. Sinha (supra ). The relevant observations made in the said decision (Ram Singashan Pathaks case) in paragraphs, 26 and 27 are extracted below :- "26. Taking therefore into consideration all aspects of the matter from all its remifications, I am of the view that the authorities under the Act are courts within the meaning of the Indian evidence Act and as such before determining the issues involved in the case before them, they are bound to follow the provisions of the Evidence Act strictly.27. From a perusal of the facts as mentioned herein before it is evident that the concerned respondents have not at all taken into consideration the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. They have also not examined any witness for determining the issues in question nor the documents relied upon by them were legally brought on the record. From a perusal of the facts as mentioned herein before it is evident that the concerned respondents have not at all taken into consideration the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. They have also not examined any witness for determining the issues in question nor the documents relied upon by them were legally brought on the record. There cannot therefore be any doubt that in passing the impugned orders the concerned respondents have committed infirmities in following the procedures required under the Act and the Rules. The said authorities therefore, have misdirected themselves in law as their decisions are not in accordance with law. " 10. From the aforesaid observations it is evident that the single Judge in the aforesaid case has held that the consolidation authorities including the consolidation Officer, Assistant Director of Consolidation and the Joint director of Consolidation are Courts within the meaning of the Indian evidence Act. Hence before determining| any issue these Courts are bound to follow the provisions of the Evidence Act. We shall deal later as to whether the Consolidation Authorities including the Consolidation Officer, Assistant director of Consolidation and the Joint Director of Consolidation are full-fledged Courts or by just a deeming fiction they are Courts of competent jurisdiction, while hearing objections or appeals or deciding dispute under the Act. 11. As a matter of fact only those are full-fledged Courts which have been defined under the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts act, 1988. In common parlance the term "court" means the Sovereigns place or Kings place, where justice is administered. A Tribunal can have trapings of a Court and may decide the dispute between the parties or also accept the evidence led by the parties and adjudicate upon a controversy, but nevertheless it may not be a Court. 12. In Halsburys Law of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 10 there is following statement of law (in para 701) : ". . . . . . . . All tribunals, however, are not courts, in the sense in which, the term is here employed. Courts are tribunals which exercise jurisdiction over person by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs and the like. Although they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not courts in this sense of that term. . . . All tribunals, however, are not courts, in the sense in which, the term is here employed. Courts are tribunals which exercise jurisdiction over person by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs and the like. Although they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not courts in this sense of that term. On the other hand, a tribunal may be a court in the strict sense of the term even though the chief parts of its duties is not judicial. Parliament is a Court. Its duties are mainly deliberative and legislative, the judicial duties are only part of its functions. " 13. The another question is that whether the tribunal is a Court, not whether it is a Court of justice, for there are courts which are not courts of justice. In our opinion there is a clear cut distinction between the tribunal, the Court and the Court of Justice. We have to ascertain whether the consolidation authorities including the Consolidation Officer, Assistant Director of Consolidation and the Joint Director of Consolidation are Courts. 14. A tribunal may not be a court even though it may decide the dispute between the parties, hear the witnesses on oath and the parties may appear before it and it may give decision in respect of the rights of the parties. It is better to quote the following discussion of law in Halsburys laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 10 : (Para 702): ". . . . . . . A tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense of exercising judicial power merely because (1) it gives a final decision ; (2) it hears witnesses on oath ; (3) two or more conten-ding parties appear before it between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects ; (5)there is an appeal to a court: and (6) it is a body to which a matter is referred by anotherjbody. Many bodies are not courts even though they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality. " See Copartnership Farms V/s. Harvey Smith [ (1918) 2 K. B.405]; Addis V/s. Crocker, [ (1961) 1 QB 11. Many bodies are not courts even though they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality. " See Copartnership Farms V/s. Harvey Smith [ (1918) 2 K. B.405]; Addis V/s. Crocker, [ (1961) 1 QB 11. ; (1960) 2 All ER 629]; United Engineering Works Union V/s. Devanayagam, [ (1968) AC 356); and Ranaweera V/s. Wickramsinghe. [ (1970) AC 951 PC. 15. It is thus evident that even though a tribunal may exercise judicial function, it may decide the dispute between the parties and hear the witnesses on oath and even the parties, may appear before it and decide the right of the parties, but it need not be a Court. Obviously the consolidation authorities in strict sense of term cannot be said to be a Court, rather they are tribunals. But by a legal fiction created by the legislature by employing expression "shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction" the consolidation authorities have been indicated to be courts, but they art at the best courts of limited jurisdiction. What is the meaning to be assigned to the expression "deemed to be"? 16. By employing expression "deemed to be" one is directed to assume an imaginary state of affairs as real. In other words legal and substantial thing is not so, but it is obviously different. But legislature for some positive purpose can direct that under special circumstances it may be assumed to be a real state of affairs. In East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough council, [1952 AC 109] it was held as follows :- "if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as read, the consequences and incidents, which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from and accompanied it. The State says that you must imagine certain stats of affairs, it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. " 17. The State says that you must imagine certain stats of affairs, it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. " 17. In Industrial Supplies Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Union of India, [ air 1980 SC 1858 j it has been held as follows :- "it is now axiomatic that legal fiction is incorporated in statute, the court has to ascertain for what purpose, the fiction is-created. After ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. The Court has to assume all the facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. " 18. To the same effect there is an observation of their Lordships of the Apex Court in. Appukuttan V/s. Janki Amma, [ air 1988 SC 587 ]. It is thus evident that legislature in its wisdom has employed legal fiction so that the consolidation authorities may be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction. It is significant that the legisla ture itself was not satisfied that the consolidation authorities can be courts in their legal sense, as the consolidation authorities have to carry out different duties tinder the Act, including deciding the dispute between the parties and obtaining evidence they were directed to be treated as courts of competent jurisdiction. 19. In Md. Illias V/s. Md. Zulfakkar, [1986 PUR 442] it was held as follows:- ". . . the consolidation authorities including the Consolidation Officers are vested with powers, rights and privileges, While hearing any matter in dispute they can be treated to be court few certain specific purposes. . . . . . . . " 20 To be precise EK ABUNDANTI CANTELA, the statutory provisions of Sec.37a and 37b of the Act are set out:- 37a. Authorities under the Act to be deemed courts of competent jurisdiction,-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Director of consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Assistant director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while bearing objections or appeals or deciding disputes under this Act. "37b. "37b. Authorities under this Act to have powers and privileges as are vested in a civil court in certatn matters.- (1) the Directors of consolidation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall have all such powers, rights and privileges while hearing any matter in dispute as are vested in a civil court in respect of the following matters, namely :- (a) the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and issuing a com-mission to examine witnesses ; (b) compelling any person for the production of any document: (c) punishing the person guilty of contempt. (2) A summon signed by such officer may be substituted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process capable of being issued in any action by a civil court for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of any document. " Both these Sections may be read as a whole. We are reminded of an lat in Maxim "injus TUM EST NISI TOTA LEGE INSPECTA DE UNA aliqua EJUS PETICULA PROPOSITA JUDICARE VEL RBSPONDER!" which connotes that the statute and its relevant provisions must be interpreted as a whole. It would be unjust to refer to any one part without referring aad examining the whole of it. There is another Maxim "pracedentibus et CONSEQUENTIBUS OPTIMA FIT INTERPRETATION" which signifies that the best interpretation is from the context. The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Apart from considering these two Sections together the intention of the legislature has also to be kept in mind. 21. It would not be inapt to refer to the relevant principles as stated in American Jurisprudence, Volume-I, pages 838-839 (paras 36 and 37)as fellows:- "the prime object of construction of laws is to carry out and ascertain the intent of the legislature. The Courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction. At the same time, the Courts have no power to interpret that which has no need of interpretion. It is for the Courts to ascertain neither to add or substract, delete or distort the meaning: (see Guisappi V/s. Welling, [324 US 244]; barsky V/s. Board of Regents [347 US 452]: and Flemming V/s. Floride citrus Exch. [358 US 153]. " 22. It is for the Courts to ascertain neither to add or substract, delete or distort the meaning: (see Guisappi V/s. Welling, [324 US 244]; barsky V/s. Board of Regents [347 US 452]: and Flemming V/s. Floride citrus Exch. [358 US 153]. " 22. In our Indian Jurisprudence there have been great Thinkers, authors and Philosophers, whose ideas and view points on interpretation (Meemanse) are collected in authoritative Text e. g. Narad Smiriti, Ketyayan Smiriti, Gautam Smiriti, Parashar Smiriti, Vrihaspati smiriti, Manus Smiriti and Jemims Sutrat etc. We may refer to the following Shlokes from Narad Smiriti and Vrihaspati Smiriti:- This means that as an efficient surgeon takes out arrow or some other undesirable element by operation from human body similarly it is the duty of a Judge to interpret the law so deeply as to do complete justice in the case. There is another Sbloke from Vrihaspati Smiriti: this connotes that normally the interpretation has to be according to the language employed, but in some cases only on the basis of words employed, the interpretation need not be made but, it, has to be kept in view the interpretation of legislature and the principles of justice otherwise it would lead to miscarriage of justice. 23 In case the legislature wanted to declare that the consolidation authorities indicated in Sec.37a of the Act would be Courts with all the powers and jurisdiction like a Court or Civil Court, in the event it was not- inoperative to indicate by a legal fiction that the consolidation authorities , would be deemed to be Courts of competent jurisdiction. The language employed under Sec.37b of the Act indicates that the consolidation authorities shall have powers of Civil Court as a full-fledged Civil Court, but only while hearing objections and revisions etc. To put it differently, these two Sections postulate that the consolidation authorities are not full-fledged courts but would be deemed to be Courts for the purposes of deciding objection and appeals etc. 24. In fact Sec.37-B of the Act qualifies the scope of Sec.37-A. This Sec.37-A of the Act is more comprehesive and general in nature. It postulates that all the consolidation authorities while deciding objections, appeals or revisions, would be deemed to be Courts. 24. In fact Sec.37-B of the Act qualifies the scope of Sec.37-A. This Sec.37-A of the Act is more comprehesive and general in nature. It postulates that all the consolidation authorities while deciding objections, appeals or revisions, would be deemed to be Courts. What Sec.37-B restricts is that the consolidation authorities would be treated to be Courts, but only for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, compelling any person for production of any documents etc. Section 37-B of the Act is substantially added by the Legislature to operate as a proviso. 25. Keeping in view the duties to be performed by the consolidation authorities and as they decide the rights of the parties and obtain documentary and oral evidence of the parties and also examine the witnesses on oath, they, are to be assumed as courts with competent jurisdiction with the help of legal fiction created by legislature, but in fact they are not courts. As in that case reported in [ air 1989 Pat 39 ] (supra) it has been observed in para 30 that the consolidation authorities have passed orders without there being any legal evidence on record. Consequently the impugned orders in that case were held to be perverse being based on no evidence. In that Ram singaaHon s case (supra) the provisions of the Evidence Act were not taken into consideration and no witnesses were examined nor the documents were filed by the parties. We have to ascertain as to whether in the instant case evidence was led by the parties. 26. Diwan Junaid Khan who was respondent no.6 in [c. W. J. C. No.10592 of 1993], has filed documentry evidence also which are indicated at page 70 (Annexure 5 to the said writ petition ). The correct observations are as follows :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . Mudaiya ne apne dawa ke samarthan men takrari khata no.137 ke sambandh men koi kagji sakchh prastut nahikiya hai jisse uske dawa ka samarthan ho sake. Unke videawan adhiwakta ne kewal kursinama ke adhaar par mudaiya ka hak ho ne ka tark prastut kiya tatha muddalah dwara kiye gaye hibba ko galat bataya. Iskebiprit muddalah Junaid khan ne unhi kagji sakshyon ka vivran prastut kiya jo bad sankhya 332/82-83 ke liye bhi kiya gaya hai. Unke videawan adhiwakta ne kewal kursinama ke adhaar par mudaiya ka hak ho ne ka tark prastut kiya tatha muddalah dwara kiye gaye hibba ko galat bataya. Iskebiprit muddalah Junaid khan ne unhi kagji sakshyon ka vivran prastut kiya jo bad sankhya 332/82-83 ke liye bhi kiya gaya hai. Junaid Khan ne hi Niyaz Mohammad Khan dwara wars 1946 me kiye gaye hibba ko pramanit karne ke liye junaid Khan dwara 1945 me diye gaye swal ka hawala dete hue kaha ki hibba ke turant baad hi Junaid Khan tatha anya hibbadaran ne sarkari sirishte me apna naam darj karane ka awedan diya. Isper adesh bhi parit hua. Adesh ki sachchi pratilipi ki poto copy abhilekh me sanlagn hai. . . . . . . . . . " 27. Apart from the evidence mentioned above, the consolidation officer had made local inspection. At the time of inspection Diwan Jalaluddin khan and Diwan Quadir Khan also made statement and oral statements were also examined by the parties. The Consolidation Officer has made specific statement and on the basis of the documentary aud oral evidence on record he has reached to the conclusion. The exact words are quoted below :- ". . . . . . . . . . . Is parkar apne do putron ko dakhal kabja de diya". 28 The appellate court also made observation at page 92 of the brief (Annexure 6 of the writ petition) to the effect that after looking into the facts and evidence led by the parties it has been decided. Later on the facts about the plot in question was also mentioned. It is significant to mention that at page 94 of the brief the order of ths appellate court (Annexure 6 of the writ petition) it has been specifically mentioned that in the photo copy of register only the name of the respondent no.6 of the writ petition appears, and the photo copy of Ishtehar in Case No.349. of 1946-47 and the copy of the order passed by the Munsif in T S. No.62 of 1972, and copy of the rent receipt of 1968-69 and copy of the return filed at the time of abolition of Zamindari were also filed. In this way specific mention was made about the documentary and oral evidence led by the parties. of 1946-47 and the copy of the order passed by the Munsif in T S. No.62 of 1972, and copy of the rent receipt of 1968-69 and copy of the return filed at the time of abolition of Zamindari were also filed. In this way specific mention was made about the documentary and oral evidence led by the parties. At the time of filing of these documents and leading oral evidence no objection was raised either by the present appellant or the contesting respondent no.6. That formality contemplated under the Indian Evidence Act or any other oral evidence has not been complied with. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that evidence was not led by the parties in the instant case consistent with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The instant case is different from Ram Singashan Pathaks case (supra ). There may not be evidence led in the case. In that case no legal evidence could have been led, but similar are not the facts in the present case, rather in the present case documentry and oral evidence were led by the parties consistent with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 29. What requires emphasis is that the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1955 and Rules framed thereunder arc self contained Code in respect of the procedure to be followed in respect of leading evidence, examination of the parties and witnesses etc. Section 10 (5) Of the Act provides that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shafl, after taking into consideration, the opinion of the Consolidation Committee in case no conciliation is arrived at submit the report to the Consolidation officer who shall dispose of the objection in the manner prescribed. Rule 6-D (9) (b) of the Rules provides as how the objection has to be dicided by the consolidation Officer. Rule 6-D (9) (b) runs as follows : "on the date fixed under sub-rule (8) or any subsequent date fixed for the purpose the Consolidation Officer shall hear the parties, frame issues on the points in dispute, take evidence both oral and documantary and decide the objections". 30. The only inescapable conclusion from the aforesaid provision is that the Consolidation Officer has to take evidence, both oral and documentary. 30. The only inescapable conclusion from the aforesaid provision is that the Consolidation Officer has to take evidence, both oral and documentary. But how it has to be taken is silent The Consolidation Officer has to evolve his own procedure, but the Indian Evidence Act has not been made applicable in terms. But with a view to do justice between the parties, the substance of the procedure has to be followed. But the learned single judge was not justified in holding that the Indian Evidence Act would apply in letter and spirit. 31. The learned single Judge has allowed the writ petition without scrutinising the facts of the present case just by making sweeping observation similar to Ram Singashan Pathaks case (supra ). The statements of facts made in the judgment of a court has to be normally assigned sanctity and has to be taken as final. In respect of those statements of facts, if any body doubts or wants to prove otherwise, in that event he has to apply for review for correction of the statements of facts before that very court which has decided the matter. See State of Maharashtra V/s. Ram Das Sri Nivas Nayak, [ air 1982 SC 1249 ]. 32. As the consolidation authorities stated that the evidence was led by the parties, it has to be held as conclusive and final. These were findings of fact and ought to have takan as final. The learned single Judge did not look into the statements of fact in the judgment of the consolidation authorities in order to ascertain if the evidence were led or not. In our opinion, therefore, the learned single Judge deciding the case of Ram Singashan Pathak (supra) was also not correct in holding that the consolidation authorities are courts within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act. As a matter of fact by legal fiction created by the legislature the consolidation authorities are to be treated as courts or to be assumed as Courts of competent jurisdiction, while hearing the objections or appeals etc. At the cost of the re petition it may be stated that under legal fiction created the consolidation authorities are to be treated and assumed as Courts of competent jurisdiction but in the real sense of the expression it is not so. 33. At the cost of the re petition it may be stated that under legal fiction created the consolidation authorities are to be treated and assumed as Courts of competent jurisdiction but in the real sense of the expression it is not so. 33. In view of the premises aforesaid and by applying the principle of Aristotelian and Baconian reasonings the present Letter Patent Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge is hereby set aside and the judgment and orders of the Consolidation authorities are maintained. There will be no order as to costs. L. P. A. allowed.