Rosario F. Barreto v. State of Goa and others — 1995 DIGILAW 364 (BOM)

JUDGMENT - D.R. DHANUKA, J. :---The petitioner claims to be the owner of the land admeasuring 1146 sq. mts. situate at Village Cansaulim surveyed under No. 4/3. The petitioner has built two houses on the said land bearing Village Panchayat No. 205 and No. 205(A). 2.On 24th July, 1987, a Notification was published by the Government of Goa bearing No. 22/92/87-RD under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stating therein that various plots of land specified in the Schedule appended to the said Notification were likely to be needed by the Government for the public purpose set out therein, i.e. land acquisition for construction of road from Madalem Candatem to Cansaulim Church via Arosim in Village Panchayat, Cansaulim. By the said Notification duly published in the Government Gazette on 24th July, 1987, it was notified that the Government intended to acquire 24,675 sq. mts. of land belonging to several owners for the public purpose set out in the said Notification. By the said Notification it was inter alia provided that the land admeasuring 275 sq. mts. forming part of Survey No. 4/3 of village Cansaulim was likely to be needed for the public purpose specified in the said Notification. It appears from the contents of the Award dated 21st September, 1988 (Exh. R. 1 to the affidavit in reply) that the said Notification besides being published in the Government Gazette at pages 94 to 95 of Series II No. 9 was also published in two local newspapers, namely (1) Gomantak dated 30th July, 1987 and (2) Navhind Times dated 8th September, 1987. It is also recited in the said Award that the substance of the Notice was published at various places in the locality through the Mamlatdar of Mormugao on 15th January, 1988. Individual notices were served on the interested parties in the various plots of land under acquisition. By letter dated 17th August, 1987 (Annexure p. 2 to the petition), the petitioner filed his objections with the Additional Deputy Collector (2) as permissible under section 5 A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner did inspect the necessary plan available in the Deputy Collector's office at Margao before filing the said objections. By letter dated 17th August, 1987 (Annexure p. 2 to the petition), the petitioner filed his objections with the Additional Deputy Collector (2) as permissible under section 5 A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner did inspect the necessary plan available in the Deputy Collector's office at Margao before filing the said objections. The petitioner stated in the said letter dated 17th August, 1987 that the projected road was sought to be connected to the Cansaulim - Vasco da Gama road by means of a by-pass road passing through some fields etc. The petitioner specifically contended that the said by-pass was then shown touching his house without any space remaining between the by-pass and his house and the proposed by-pass was neither necessary nor advisable. The petitioner pointed out that if the proposed road was constructed as intended, the set backs would be affected and no space will be left between the houses of the petitioner and the proposed by-pass resulting in making the life of the petitioner and the members of his family unsafe. By the said letter the petitioner requested for a personal hearing in the matter. It was also stated in the said letter of objection that the proposed by-pass was sought to be made with ulterior motive on account of local influence of certain persons who were not on good terms with the petitioner. The Collector made the necessary report to the State Government. 3.Ultimately, on 27th May, 1988, the Government of Goa issued Notification No. 22/92/87-RD and made the necessary declaration as contemplated under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The area earlier notified for acquisition being 24,675 sq. mts. was reduced to 14,580 sq. mts. The petitioner's land to the extent of 275 sq. mts. was intended to be acquired at the stage when section 4 Notification was issued on 24th July, 1987. At the stage when section 6 Notification was issued the area of the petitioner's land under acquisition was also reduced from 275 sq. mts. to 155 sq. mts. 4.On 28th July, 1988, the petitioner filed this writ petition in this Court challenging the abovereferred Notification No. 22/92/87-RD dated 24th July, 1987, issued by the appropriate Government under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also Notification No. 22/92/87-RD dated 27th May, 1988 issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. mts. to 155 sq. mts. 4.On 28th July, 1988, the petitioner filed this writ petition in this Court challenging the abovereferred Notification No. 22/92/87-RD dated 24th July, 1987, issued by the appropriate Government under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also Notification No. 22/92/87-RD dated 27th May, 1988 issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 insofar as the said two Notifications related to the petitioner's land admeasuring 155 sq. mts. bearing Survey No. 4/3 of part of Village Cansaulim. The petitioner also sought certain consequential reliefs as set out in prayer Clause (b) of the petition. 5.On 1st August, 1988 this Court admitted the writ petition. While admitting the writ petition, the Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:- "Rule. Respondents may continue with the acquisition proceedings but should not take possession of the land referred to and subject matter of this petition." The acquisition proceedings were continued. An Award was thereafter made on 21st September, 1988. None of the other persons interested in various plots of land under acquisition challenged the acquisition proceedings. The public project of construction of road is duly completed except only to the extent of the stretch covering 155 sq. mts. in view of the interim order of this Court restraining the respondents from taking possession of the said land. 6.The learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the abovereferred Notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Act on various grounds which were set out in para 7 of the petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that neither the Notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 impugned in the petition, nor the Declaration made by the State Government under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were published in any newspaper in regional language (Konkanni) circulating in the locality of the land proposed to be acquired. It has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court that such Notification or Declaration can be published in a newspaper in either of the two regional languages, i.e. either in Marathi or in Konkanni circulating in the locality of the land proposed to be acquired. It has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court that such Notification or Declaration can be published in a newspaper in either of the two regional languages, i.e. either in Marathi or in Konkanni circulating in the locality of the land proposed to be acquired. It is stated in the affidavit in reply as well as in the Award that Notification dated 24th July, 1987 was published in local newspaper namely 'Gomantak' dated 30th July, 1987 and the 'Navhind Times' dated 8th September, 1987. It is also stated in the affidavit in reply and the Award that the Notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was also published not merely in the Government Gazette but also in two local newspapers i.e. 'Gomantak' dated 1st June, 1988 and the 'Navhind Times' dated 2nd June, 1988. The 'Navhind Times' is a newspaper published in English language. At all material times 'Gomantak' was a local newspaper published in Marathi language circulating in the loacity of the land proposed to be acquired. We accept the averments made in the Award and in the affidavit in reply referred to hereinabove. 7.The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the burden of proof is on the respondent to produce the cuttings of the newspaper 'Gomantak' dated 30th July, 1987 and 1st June, 1988 and prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the impugned Notifications dated 24th July, 1987 and 27th May, 1988 were in fact published in the said newspaper. Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume that all official acts were done by the officers concerned in the ordinary course. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of the recitals made in the Award dated 21st September, 1988 or the statements made in the affidavit in reply of Mr. E.A. Cardozo, Under Secretary (Revenue) through the State of Goa, in this behalf. It is of considerable significance that the averments made in para 7 of the petition are merely in the nature of submissions and the same are verified by the petitioner only as submissions which were believed to be true. E.A. Cardozo, Under Secretary (Revenue) through the State of Goa, in this behalf. It is of considerable significance that the averments made in para 7 of the petition are merely in the nature of submissions and the same are verified by the petitioner only as submissions which were believed to be true. If the petitioner desires to be that technical the petitioner ought to have taken care to make factual averments in the petition and verify the same as true to his personal knowledge or as true to his information disclosing the source of information or as true to his belief, disclosing the grounds on which the belief was based. The pleadings filed on behalf of the petitioner in this respect are undoubtedly defective. We leave it at that. The petitioner could have produced the newspaper 'Gomantak' published in the abovereferred two dates and shown that the Notifications under section 4 and 6 of the Act were not published in the said newspaper in regional languages on the relevant dates and the recitals made in the award were untrue. The petitioner has not undertaken any such exercise. In our opinion the averments made on behalf of the respondents on this aspect of the case are believable. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this ground of challenge. 8.The learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that public notice of the substance of the impugned Notifications was not published at convenient places in the locality as required by section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On this aspect also, we do not find any factual averment in the petition duly verified on affidavit insofar as the petitioner herein is concerned. As against this we find recitals in the Award that public notice of the substance of the Notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published at the requisite places in the locality through the Mamlatdar of Mormugao. We have no hesitation in believing this averment made on behalf of the respondents. It is true that full details in respect of publication of such public notice are not set out in the Award or in the affidavit in reply. We have no hesitation in believing this averment made on behalf of the respondents. It is true that full details in respect of publication of such public notice are not set out in the Award or in the affidavit in reply. Our attention has not been invited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to any specific rules requiring publication of public notice of the substance of the impugned Notification by adopting a particular mode and in a particular manner. The fact remains that necessary objections were filed by the petitioner on merits of the intended acquisition by letter dated 17th August, 1987 and the members of the public had full knowledge in respect of intended acquisition and the necessary opportunity to file their objections under section 5 A of the Act. We have no hesitation in rejecting this ground of challenge as well. 9.The learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the impugned Notification and the impugned Declaration were issued by the appropriate Government without application of mind as there was no ward/area in the limits of the Village Panchayat of Cansaulim in the name of Candatem. We are not impressed by this ground of challenge as well. When an over all view is taken of all the facts and circumstances of the case emerging from the record, it is found that the area of land under acquisition at the stage of issue of section 4 Notification was 24,675 sq. mts. and the same was thereafter reduced to 14,580 sq. mts. Even as far as the petitioner's land is concerned the area of land under acquisition was reduced from 275 sq. mts. to 155 sq. mts. The basic grievance of the petitioner set out in the letter of objection dated 17th August, 1987, no longer exists as in view of the area of the petitioner's land under acquisition being reduced it cannot be now stated that the houses of the petitioner will be affected by reason of acquisition of part of the land and no proper space would be left between the said house and the by-pass. By and large the grievance of the petitioner has been remedied and set right as is obvious from the facts set out hereinabove. All these facts show due application of mind on the part of the Government and its authorised officials. By and large the grievance of the petitioner has been remedied and set right as is obvious from the facts set out hereinabove. All these facts show due application of mind on the part of the Government and its authorised officials. 10.It is of some significance that by letter dated 17th August, 1987, addressed by the petitioner after taking inspection of the necessary plan with the office of the Deputy Collector that the petitioner had even sought a personal hearing from the Land Acquisition Officer concerned before any report was made by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Government when the matter could be clarified further. It is not the grievance of the petitioner in the petition that no personal hearing was granted to the petitioner. We therefore assume that personal hearing must have been granted to the petitioner as sought for. In any event, the petitioner has no grievance whatsoever on this aspect. All these facts do show that the respondents have acted fairly and reasonably. Even if there is no ward of the name Candatem within the limits of the Village Panchayat of Cansaulim and there is a slight error in describing the land under acquisition, the impugned acquisition is not invalidated by reason of the alleged error in this behalf, if any. The necessary plan was drawn by the authorised officers before issuing the said Notification and the inspection thereof was made available to the petitioner and all other concerned. The lands under acquisition were described with reasonable particulars and no one was misled by reason of the alleged error, if any, in this behalf. 11.The learned Counsel for the petitioner has then submitted that the impugned Notifications were issued by the appropriate Government in colourable exercise of its powers and that the public purpose set out in the impugned Notifications could not be considered as public purpose at all. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned acquisition was meant to benefit individuals interested in having access to the Church and the purpose of construction of the road was thus not a secular public purpose. The respondents have seriously controverted all these allegations in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondents. The respondents have contended that it is open to the Government to acquire land to connect an internal village road to the main Vasco da Gama -Cansaulim P.W.D. road. The respondents have seriously controverted all these allegations in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondents. The respondents have contended that it is open to the Government to acquire land to connect an internal village road to the main Vasco da Gama -Cansaulim P.W.D. road. It is stated in para 10 of the said affidavit that the road proposed to be constructed as set out in the impugned Notifications was described to be a road from Madalem Candatem to Cansaulim Church mainly for the purpose of identifying the areas which were covered by the proposed acquisition and the said road was not necessary for purpose of going to the Church. In the affidavit in reply of Mr. E.A. Cardozo, it is also stated that the road proposed to be constructed was and is intended to provide an access to the main Cansaulim - Vasco-da-Gama road for the benefit of residents of the village generally. It is far too obvious to us that acquisition of land for providing road for the villagers in a village or for connecting the same to the main P.W.D. road is liable to be considered as a public purpose. We shall deal with this aspect in little more detail while discussing the case law cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner at the Bar. 12.The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Khub Chand ors. v. State of Rajasthan ors.)1, reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1074. In this case the Court held that section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) was mandatory and the publication of public notice as provided by the said section was imperative. The Court held that if the mandatory directions pertaining to publication of the Notification under section 4 of the Act were not complied with, the land acquisition proceedings taken in pursuance of the impugned Notification under section 4 of the Act would be equally void. We have already held that in this case section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was duly complied with and the Notification was in fact published in the Government Gazette as well as the two local newspapers including the local newspaper in regional language circulating in the locality. We have already held that in this case section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was duly complied with and the Notification was in fact published in the Government Gazette as well as the two local newspapers including the local newspaper in regional language circulating in the locality. We have already held that public notice of the substance of the Notification was also given by the concerned authority through the Mamlatdar of the area of land under acquisition at convenient places in the locality. We therefore do not find reference to this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court useful for the purpose of deciding this writ petition. 13.The learned Counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of the Court to the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Narinderjit Singh anr. v. The State of U.P. ors.)2, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 552. In this case it was held that the provisions of section 4(1) of the Act were required to be complied with even where an application of the provisions of section 5-A of the Act were dispensed with as permissible under section 17(4) of the Act. The Court held that where the Collector had failed to cause public notice of the substance of the Notification to be given at convenient places in the locality, the entire acquisition proceedings were vitiated. In this case we have accepted the averment that the respondents had as a matter of fact published the public notice of the substance of the impugned Notification at convenient place in the locality as recited in the Award and as set out in the affidavit in reply. 14.The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in the case of (Balagouda Nijagouda Patil anr. v. State of Karnataka ors.)3, reported in A.I.R. 1981 Kant. 111. In this case the High Court had before it Rule 3 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 prescribing the specific mode of publication of the substance of the Notification in the locality as required by section 4(1) of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that no such rules are made by the Government of Goa and no particular mode is yet prescribed by the appropriate authority which alone should be followed for publication of the substance of the Notification in the locality. The learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that no such rules are made by the Government of Goa and no particular mode is yet prescribed by the appropriate authority which alone should be followed for publication of the substance of the Notification in the locality. In view of there being no comparable rule in the State of Goa, we do not find reference to this case useful or relevant for purpose of deciding this petition. 15.The learned Counsel for the petitioner also invited the attention of the Court to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shari ors.)4, reported in 1992(2) S.C.C. 168 . In this case the Notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was totally vague and defective. Only the word "residential" was mentioned in the column for public purpose. Having regard to the vagueness of the impugned Notification the Court held that the Notification impugned before the Court in that case was substantially defective. It was also found by the Court that the said Notification did not set out details of land under acquisition or the locality in which the land was situated and the said Notification was therefore vitiated also on ground of absence of details in respect of the land under acquisition as well as in the absence of details of public purpose for intended acquisition. The facts of this case are totally different. The impugned Notifications are neither vague nor devoid of particulars. The petitioner found no difficulty in making his representation to the Land Acquisition Officer as contemplated under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, i.e. addressing representation/objection vide letter dated 17th August, 1987. The ratio of this judgment has no applicability to the admitted or proved facts of this case. 16.The learned Counsel for the petitioner also invited the attention of the Court to the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry ors.)5, reported in 1994(4) S.C.C. 675 . In this case the Court held that the question as to whether the impugned Notifications were issued in colourable exercise of power or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which the acquisition was sought for. In this case the Court held that the question as to whether the impugned Notifications were issued in colourable exercise of power or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which the acquisition was sought for. In this case it was also held by the Court that the interest of a section of the society may be public purpose, when it was benefited by the acquisition. 17.It is now necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Smt. Somawati ors. v. State of Punjab ors.)6, reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151. It was held by the Supreme Court in this case that where in a particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the appropriate Government to be satisfied about. It was held that if the purpose for which the land was being acquired by the State was within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final subject only to one exception. It was held that the exception was that if there was a colourable exercise of power the declaration would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The Court proceeded to give illustrations of situations where it could be held that the impugned Notifications were issued by the appropriate authority in colourable exercise of power. It appeared to the Court that what the Government was satisfied about was not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all, the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act. It was held that the question as to whether a particular action was a result of fraud or not was always justiciable, provisions of section 6(3) notwithstanding. The ratio of this judgment has stood the test of time. Even in a recent judgment the Supreme Court has clearly held that there was a scope for minimal judicial review in respect of the challenge to the impugned acquisition on the ground that the said acquisition was not for a public purpose. The ratio of this judgment has stood the test of time. Even in a recent judgment the Supreme Court has clearly held that there was a scope for minimal judicial review in respect of the challenge to the impugned acquisition on the ground that the said acquisition was not for a public purpose. Unless the petitioner proves that the impugned Notifications were issued by the appropriate Government in colourable exercise of power, the Court cannot sit in judgment over the declaration of the State Government to the effect that the land under acquisition was acquired for public purpose. It was held by K. Ramaswamy, J., in the case of (Bajirao T. Kote (dead) by LRs. Anr. v. State of Maharashtra ors.)7, J.T. 1995(1) S.C. 85, speaking for the Apex Court, that when an act was done by the State under colour of authority of law the acquisition must be presumed to be for the lawful purpose envisaged under the Act. In this case the impugned acquisition was undoubtedly for a public purpose. Construction of road for the villagers and connecting such road with the main P.W.D. road is undoubtedly a public purpose. 18.As regards the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the acquisition of land for construction of road providing access to the Church was not a public purpose also, we find no merit in the submission whatsoever. Shri E.A. Cardoza, Under Secretary (Revenue) has clearly stated in his affidavit that the said road is meant for all the villagers and the road intended to be constructed was described to be a road from Mandalem Candatem to Cansaulim Church only for the purpose of identifying the area which was covered by the proposed acquisition. 19.In the case of Bajirao T. Kote (supra) the Supreme Court in terms observed that providing access to Temples was a public purpose. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was not argued in that case that providing access to the Temples or a Church could not be considered as a secular public purpose. We find no merit whatsoever in this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was not argued in that case that providing access to the Temples or a Church could not be considered as a secular public purpose. We find no merit whatsoever in this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In our opinion, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is in error when he uses the words "non secular" in the context of making provisions for construction of public roads which may inter alia also provide access to Temples or to the Churches. Even providing facility and/or access for a section of the public constitutes public purpose. We are not prepared to hold that the impugned acquisition was motivated in this case to benefit few individuals or the Catholic population of the village alone. We are more than satisfied that the impugned acquisition was meant to cater to the need of villagers generally and the State Government was justified in initiating acquisition proceedings for the public purpose specified in the impugned Notifications. 20.Before we part with this case, we must refer to the fact that the road contemplated to be constructed is already constructed except so as to cover the stretch which is left to be constructed in view of the interim order passed by this Court on 1st August, 1988. In para 14 of the affidavit in reply, it is stated that the petitioner's land though admeasuring hardly 155 sq. mts. is required to be acquired to provide to the villagers in Cansaulim village a proper vehicular access to the main Cansaulim Vasco da Gama road and the impugned acquisition is thus in public interest and serves public purpose. 21.We have carefully considered all the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The learned Advocate General for the State did argue that the petition was barred by laches insofar as the challenge to the Notification dated 24th July, 1987 issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was concerned. Since we have found no merit in the grounds of challenge, we do not propose to deal with the abovereferred submission made by the learned Advocate General on the ground of laches. Since we have found no merit in the grounds of challenge, we do not propose to deal with the abovereferred submission made by the learned Advocate General on the ground of laches. As regards the criticism of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in respect of the affidavit in reply being defective, the learned Advocate General submitted that the petition itself was defective insofar as no factual averments were made in the petition on oath on basis of which grounds formulated in para 7 thereof could be urged. The learned Advocate General did submit that even if para 7 of the petition is to be considered as a mixed pleading setting out facts as well as the grounds, the defect in the pleading of the petitioner subsisted inasmuch as the factual aspect concerning the averments inter mixed with the grounds formulated in para 7 of the petition were not verified on oath at all. We find substance in the criticism of the learned Advocate General. It is however not necessary to pursue this line of discussion any further in view of our findings on merits to the effect that the petitioners have failed to prove the grounds of challenge in respect of the impugned acquisition proceedings. The respondents have acted bona fide and within the scope of their powers in public interest and public purpose. 22. In the result, the petition fails. The petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Interim order passed by this Court on 1st August, 1988 stands vacated with immediate effect. Petition dismissed.