Judgment 1. B. L. Yadav, J-This is a defendants second appeal in a suit for eviction of the defendants from the house in suit and also for recovery of rs.750/- as arrears of rent. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that one Haricharan Sao had two sons, namely, Suraj Prasad and Badri narayan Prasad. Both brothers had separated and partitioned the properties, and had been enjoying separate possession. Suraj Prasad had two sons, namely, Gopalji Prasad and thakur Prasad. The plaintiffs claim to be the heirs of Thakur Prasad. Badri prasad had one son, namely, Ramji prasad. Badri Prasad sold his property to one Ramawtar Ojha and he sold the property to Thakur Prasad and Gopalji prasad and they were put in possession. Later on in a partition between Thakur Prasad and Gopalji prasad the house in dispute fell in the share of Thakur Prasad, after whose death the property came in the share of the plaintiffs. One. Maheshilal jaiswal took the house on rent and started a liquor shop therein. Maheshilals son-in-law Ramdeo prasad Jaiswal used to pay rent to the plaintiffs. Later on defendants came in possession of the house in dispute as tenants. The defendants after some time stopped payment of rent and hence the suit. 3. The defendants-respondents contested the suit denying the title of the plaintiffs. They claimed title in krishna Prasad on the basis of sale deed executed by Ramji Prasad in 1976. The property, in tact, came to the share of Badri Prasad, son of haricharan as indicated above. Maheshilal Jaiswal was neither a tenant nor he paid rent. Defendant no.1 had been running his business since 1952 in the house of Badri prasad which was later on purchased by him through a registered sale deed. As defendant No.1 was not tenant of the plaintiffs, hence the suit either for ejectment or recovery of arrears. of rent was liable to be dismissed. 4. The Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment. The defendants appeal before Lower Appellate Court failed hence the present second appeal has been filed by the defendants. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the findings of the Court below are that defendants were not tenants, nor there is any relationship of land-lord and tenant but it was field that defendants were in possession. The defendants appeal before Lower Appellate Court failed hence the present second appeal has been filed by the defendants. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the findings of the Court below are that defendants were not tenants, nor there is any relationship of land-lord and tenant but it was field that defendants were in possession. The title of the defendants was not held to be illegal, nor the possession of the defendants was denied. In case the defendants-appellants were in possession for the last more than 12 years, in that event the suit cannot be decreed for ejectment without considering the nature and duration of the possession. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, on the other hand, refuted the submissions of the appellants. The defendants were not in possession as title holder but as licensee. The plea advanced by the defendants are liable to be rejected and the decree of the Court below was correctly passed. Reliance was placed on Puwada Venkateswara V/s. Chidamana venkata Ramana, [a. I. R.1976 S. C.8691 ; Raghubar Dayal Prasad V/s. Ramekbal Sah, 1985 B. B. C. J.696 ; Bhagwati Prasad V/s. Chandramaul. A. I. R.1966 S. C.735]. 7. Having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions on either side in all its ramifications, questions that fall for determination are whether on the findings recorded by the Courts below that the defendants were in possession of the house in suit not as a tenant or trespasser without indicating the nature of possession and its duration and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, can the suit be decreed. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to decree the suit. 8. As regards first question the courts below have recorded a finding that the defendants were in possession without indicating its nature and the title of the plaintiffs has been assumed to be proved, even though there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. Before decreeing the suit the nature of the possession as a lessee, a owner or licensee etc. ought to have been ascertained according to its concept in common parlance. 9. It is convenient to refer to the concept of possession in English jurisprudence. The expression possession, however, in common parlance denotes to occupy, to have or hold as owner, to obtain, to maintain. ought to have been ascertained according to its concept in common parlance. 9. It is convenient to refer to the concept of possession in English jurisprudence. The expression possession, however, in common parlance denotes to occupy, to have or hold as owner, to obtain, to maintain. R. W. M. Dias in his admirable commentary on Jurisprudence (4th Edition) has stated under Chapter twelve on page 367 that an understanding of the way in which lawyers employ the term possession" has been obscured by too much theorising, and what is worse, by the distortion of actual decision so as to fit them into pre-conceived ideas. In roman law the Chief advantages attached to the possessor, were (a)that possession was prima facie evidence of ownership (b) the possession was the basis or certain remedies, specially the possessory interdicts. Even a wrongful possessor was protected, not only against the world at large but also against the true owner who dispossessed him without due process of law, (c) possession was an important condition in acquisition of ownership in various ways. Savignys theory of possession has two ingredients, Ist possession is effective control and 2nd animus domini (the intention to hold as owner ). To the same effect was the text of Paul, who emphasized that both these ingredients must have lost before possession was lost. Iherings theory was somewhat contrary to it. He approached the problem as sociological jurist. 10. More than a century ago "possession" said Erle C. J. is one of the most vague of all vague terms and shifts its meaning according to the subject matter to which it is applied-varying very much in its sense, as it is introduced either into civil or criminal proceedings (see R. V. Smith, (1855) 6 Co C. C.554 ). 11. In Towers and Co. Ltd. V/s. Gray, (1961) 2 Q. B.351, Lord Parker, C. J. said, "for my part, I approach this case on the basis that the meaning of possession depends on the context "in which it is used. " According to Salmonds jurisprudence (7th Edition, Chapters 13 and 14), there is possession in fact and "possession in law". He treated possession in fact as a conception. G. W. Williams (Vide Language and the Law, (1945) 61 L. Q. R.391)has pointed out that there cannot be two conceptions. " According to Salmonds jurisprudence (7th Edition, Chapters 13 and 14), there is possession in fact and "possession in law". He treated possession in fact as a conception. G. W. Williams (Vide Language and the Law, (1945) 61 L. Q. R.391)has pointed out that there cannot be two conceptions. In fact, it is only one conception about possession and it is possession in fact, i. e possession "in truth and in fact". He also stated, which according to me appears to be startling, that possession in law is "fictitious". G. W. Patons Jurisprudence (3rd ed.) states on page 523, that the concept of possession in the law is not a simple concept which can be satisfactorily described in terms of facts grouped into essential and differentiating criteria for the purpose of definition. On page 527, it is stated, "in the landlord and tenant cases there are varying pressure from times when there is a special need to protect the interest of tenants to other times when it is felt that landlords have been too restrictively treated by law" (See middleton V/s. Baldock,, (1950)1 K. B.657; Errington V/s. Errington, (1952)1 K. B.290 ). 12 In view of the aforesaid discussions about different theories and meaning to the expression possession in my opinion, the possession, broadly speaking can be prima facie evidence of title, it can be basis of certain remedies to be made available, i. e. unless some body is in possession the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted to him. There are two elements, Ist, Corpus possession is (effective control) and the animus domini (the intention to hold as owner ). In the instant case there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. The defendant, was, therefore, in possession not as tenant but in his independent capacity. But the duration of possession has not been indicated on the basis of evidence on record. That appears to be imperative. 13. Now coming to the cases cited at the Bar. Raghubar Dayal Prasad V/s. Ramekbal Sah (supra) (DB) where the possession of the defendants was held to be merely permissive or that of licensee. The plaintiffs proved their title of the suit property. In that connection Division Bench ratio is that the suit can be decreed for ejectment even though specific relief for ejectment or possession was not claimed. Raghubar Dayal Prasad V/s. Ramekbal Sah (supra) (DB) where the possession of the defendants was held to be merely permissive or that of licensee. The plaintiffs proved their title of the suit property. In that connection Division Bench ratio is that the suit can be decreed for ejectment even though specific relief for ejectment or possession was not claimed. But in the instant case the courts below have not recorded any finding about duration of possession of defendants. In case it was more than prescribed period suit cannot be decreed. Bhagwati Prasad V/s. Chandramaul (supra) was a case decided by the Supreme Court. In that case Courts below have held that possession of the defendants was permissive, where as in the present case the possession of defendants was not permissive. Puwada Venkateswara rao V/s. Chidamana Venkata Ramana (supra) was a case where controversy was as to whether lease was necessary before filing a petition for eviction under section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Controlact. 14. Reverting to the second question whether the suit was maintainable in that particular Munsifs Court, even though land was situate elsewhere, the answer is simple that the plea was not raised at proper stage. 15. In Manager, Hardware and tools Ltd. V/s. Sam Smelting Pvt. Ltd. (A. I. R.1983 All 329) a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that the plea of territorial jurisdiction can be raised at the initial stage but in some cases it can be in the appeal when failure of justice occurs. In absence of any finding in this regard, the Appellate Court was not justified in entertaining any objection as to place of suing. In Hira Lal Patni V/s. Sri Kali nath (A. I. R.1962 S. C.199) it was held by their Lordships of Supreme Court that objection regarding territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the Court and can, therefore, be waived. I do not find any substance in the second submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. 16. The finding is that defendants were in possession over the building etc. , not as a tenant, but in the independent capacity. Defendants were in permissive possession are findings of fact which nave become final as plaintiffs did not challenge them. They cannot be disturbed. 17. 16. The finding is that defendants were in possession over the building etc. , not as a tenant, but in the independent capacity. Defendants were in permissive possession are findings of fact which nave become final as plaintiffs did not challenge them. They cannot be disturbed. 17. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying Aristotelian and baconian reasonings this Second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. It is remanded back to the lower Appellate Court with the direction mat Lower Appellate Court would determine the duration of possession of defendants and in case it is more than the prescribed period, the suit shall be dismissed. As the matter has dragged on far too lone hence what is required is expedition. The cost shall abide the result. Appeal Allowed