Mohd. Shamim ( 1 ) THESE are three Revision Petitions Nos. 219/94; 227/94and 10/95 preferred TO by Miss. Sangita, Mrs. Usha Singh, Mrs. Pooja and Rekha. Besides the above, Mrs. Usha also filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 872/94. All theaforesaid petitions are being taken up together as they raise the same pleas andlegal issues which can be disposed of by a common judgment and order. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts which led to the presentation of the present petitions are asunder: that Inspector P. L. Suri, S. H. O. PS Kamla Market was present at G. B. Roadalongwith a lady constable and staff in connection with his usual patrolling dutyduring the night of 12/06/1994. He received a secret information that certainminor girls were indulging in prostitution in premises No. 5216, G. B. Road, Delhi. On receipt of the said information, he organised a raiding party and includedtherein two members of the public known as Rajesh Chawla r/o 2860/3, and Mrs. Sneh Srivastava r/o 107/1, Railway Colony, Thomson Road, Special Police Officerof PS Kamla Market. The abovesid premises were searched which resulted in therecovery of nine girls from the said premises including the present petitioners. Allof them were produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate who afterconducting an enquiry u/sec. 17 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act for the sake of convenience) ordered the detentionof the petitioners i. e. Usha Singh, Sangita, Pooja and Rekha for a period of threeyears in a Protective Home through his judgment and order dated 16/08/1994. ( 3 ) THE petitioners on being dis-satisfied with the abovesaid order approachedthe Court of Session. The appeals were dismissed vide order dated 17/10/1994. ( 4 ) IT is in the above circumstances that the petitioners are before this Court. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitionrs have assailed the legality and validity ofthe judgment and order passed by the Courts below, inter aha, on the followinggrounds: that the raiding party was not constituted in accordance with theprovisions of Section 13 and Section 15 (6-A) of the Act inasmuch as it did notindude two lady Police Officers. The interrogation was not done in the presence ofa lady member of a recognised welfare institution. The constitution of the Tribunalwas also not valid and legal inasmuch as it was in flagrant disregard of themandatory provisions of Section 17 (5) of the Act. The interrogation was not done in the presence ofa lady member of a recognised welfare institution. The constitution of the Tribunalwas also not valid and legal inasmuch as it was in flagrant disregard of themandatory provisions of Section 17 (5) of the Act. There is absolutely no evidenceon record to show and prove that there was sexual exploitation or abuse of thepetitioners for commercial purposes. The case of the petitioners does not fall withinthe domain of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Hence no action could have been takenagainst the petitioners. ( 6 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutors have urged to the contrary. ( 7 ) IT has been urged for and on behalf of the petitioners that the learnedmagistrate who was working as a tribunal for the purposes of limited jurisdictionwas not assisted at the relevant time by a panel of five respectable persons asenvisaged by Section 17 (5) of the Act. It thus as a corollary whereof renderednugatory the entire proceedings before the learned Magistrate since a duty hasbeen cast on the shoulders of the Magistrate to have the assistance of the panel offive respectable persons while discharging his functions under Sub-section (2) ofsection 17. Thus, the learned Magistrate was left with no option but to seek theassistance of the said panel comprised of five persons as provided under Section17 (5) while discharging his functions under the said Section. The learned PPs, onthe other hand, have contended that it was not incumbent on the Magistrate to seekthe assistance of a panel of five persons as spoken of under Section 17 (5) of the Actinasmuch as the word used therein is may which gave an ample option andlatitude to the Magistrate and left to his judicious discretion to have the services ofthose five persons or to ignore the same. ( 8 ) SINCE we are concerned with the construction of Section 17 of the Act itwould be just and proper to examine the provisions of the said Section beforeembarking upon a detailed discussion. In view of the above I am inclined toreproduce Section 17 of the Act in extenso. It is in the following words:- ( 9 ) "17. ( 8 ) SINCE we are concerned with the construction of Section 17 of the Act itwould be just and proper to examine the provisions of the said Section beforeembarking upon a detailed discussion. In view of the above I am inclined toreproduce Section 17 of the Act in extenso. It is in the following words:- ( 9 ) "17. (L) When the special police officer removing a person under Sub-section (4) of Section 15 or a Police Officer rescuing a person under Sub-section (1) ofsection 16, is for any reason unable to produce him before the appropriatemagistrate as required by Sub-section (5) of Section 15, or before the Magistrate issuing the order under Sub-section (2) of Section 16, he shall forthwithproduce him before the nearest Magistrate of any class, who shall pass suchorders as he deems proper for his safe custody until he is producd before theappropriate Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Magistrate issuing theorder:provided. . . . . . . . . (i ). . . (ii ). . . (2) When the person is produced before the appropriate Magistrate undersub-section (5) of Section 15 or the Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section16, he shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, cause an inquiryto be made as to the correctness of the information received under Sub-section (1) of Section16, the age, character and antecedents of the person and thesuitability of his parents, guardian or husband for taking charge of him andthe nature of the influence which the conditions in his home are likely to haveon him if he is sent home, and, for this purpose, he may direct a Probationofficer appointed under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, (20 of 1958), toinquire into the above circumstances and into the personality of the personand the prospects of his rehabilitation. (3 ). . . Provided. . . . Provided. . . . (3 ). . . Provided. . . . Provided. . . . (4) Where the Magistrate is satisfied, after making an inquiry as requiredunder Sub-section (2),- (a) that the information received is correct; and (b) that he is in need of care and protection,he may, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), make an order that suchperson be detained for such period, being not less than one year and not morethan three years, as may be specified in the order, in a protective home, or insuch other custody as he shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considersuitable:provided that such custody Shall not be that of a person or body of persons ofa religious persuasion different from that of the person and that thoseentrusted with the custody of the person including the persons in charge of aprotective home, may be required to enter into a bond which may, wherenecessary and feasible, contain undertakings based on directions relating tothe proper care, guardianship, education, training and medical and psychiatric treatment of the person as well as supervision by a person appointed by thecourt, which will be in force for a period not exceeding three years. (5) In discharging his functions under Sub-section (2), a Magistrate maysummon a panel of five respectable persons, three of whom shall, whereverpracticable, be women to assist him and may, for this purpose, keep a list ofexperienced social welfare workers, particularly women social welfare workers, in the field of suppression of immoral traffic in persons. (6 ). . . . . " ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Senior Advocate,sodhi Teja Singh and Mr. T. Gaur, on the basis of the provisions of law alluded toabove, have argued with great zeal and fervour that no doubt it is true that thelegislators in their wisdom have used the word may while authorising a Magistrate to summon a panel of five persons in order to assist him in the due dischargeof his duties as a Tribunal. However the word may has been used in the sense of shall making it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to have the services of fiverespectable persons while performing his functions and duties under Section 17 ofthe Act. According to them there is no escape from the said conclusion keeping inview the context in which the word may has been used. According to them there is no escape from the said conclusion keeping inview the context in which the word may has been used. ( 11 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutors, Mr. H. J. S. Ahiuwalia and Ms. Meera Bhatiahave urged to the contrary. ( 12 ) THUS the pertinent question whereon hinges the fate of the present caseswhich comes to the tip of the tongue is as to whether the legislators have used theword may in the sense of shall and as such a duty was cast on the shoulders ofthe learned Magistrate to summon a panel of five respectable persons to assist himand to advise him in the due discharge of his functions under Section 17 of the Act. ( 13 ) IT is a well established principle of law that the word may and the word shall are interchangeable terms. It cannot be deduced ipsofacto from use of word may in a particular statute that it has been used in the sense of directory conferringan ample discretion on the part of the authority to take recourse to particular courseof action or not. Much would depend upon the context in which the word may has been used and the intention of the legislature which they want to conveythrough a particular enactment. It is true that ordinarily whenever the words shall and must are used they issue a mandate and a duty is cast thereby on theshoulders of an authority to carry out the said obligations. On the other hand, if itappears from the context that the legislators have used the word may in the senseof shall keeping in view the statute as a whole and with regard to its nature andobject in that eventuality it would be appropriate for the Courts to construe theword may as shall . It has also been held time and again that in case the word may occurs in a statute concerning the rights and interests of the public and ifsome benefit is proposed to be conferred on the persons affected by the said statutein that eventuality the word may would be construed as shall and would havea mandatory meaning. ( 14 ) ADMITTEDLY the present Act is meant to prevent immoral traffic in thehuman beings. The said Act was enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of theinternational Convention signed at New York on the 9th day of May 1950. ( 14 ) ADMITTEDLY the present Act is meant to prevent immoral traffic in thehuman beings. The said Act was enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of theinternational Convention signed at New York on the 9th day of May 1950. Furthermore, Art. 23 of our Constitution deals with right against exploitation. Itlays down traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forcedlabour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offencepunishable in accordance with law. Art. 35 casts a duty on the shoulders of theparliament to make laws as soon as possible after the commencement of theconstitution. Thus, the present Act is a piece of social legislation. It is meant toameliorate the lot of the persons of this contrary who are being exploited by others. Hence the present Act is meant for the benefit of those persons who are sufferingand being exploited at the hands of others. Consequently according to wellestablished principles of interpretation theword may which occurs in Section17 (5) of the Act is to be read as shall and as such, whatever, is contemplatedtherein cannot be ignored. I am tempted here to refer to the enthralling commen-tary on the Law of Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 1940 Edn. page 246, insupport of my above view:-"statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the benefit of others, or, as itis sometimes said, for the public good or the advancement of justice, haveoften given rise to controversy when conferring the authority in terms simplyenabling and not mandatory. In enacting that they "may" or shall, if theythink fit," or, "shall have power," or that "it shall be lawful" for them to dosuch acts, a statute appears to use the language of mere permission, but it hasbeen so often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases suchexpressions may have - to say the least - a compulsory force, and so wouldseem to be modified by judicial exposition. On the other hand, in some cases,the authorised person is invested with a discretion, and then those expressions seem divested of that compulsory force, and probably that is the prinmfacie meaning. . . . . . . . . . On the other hand, in some cases,the authorised person is invested with a discretion, and then those expressions seem divested of that compulsory force, and probably that is the prinmfacie meaning. . . . . . . . . . Again, Sec. 13 of the Weights and Measures Act,1889 (c. 21), which provides that an Inspector "may take in respect of the verification and stamping of weights, measures, and weighing instruments the feesspecified," has been held to be obligatory and to impose on the inspector aduty to take the fees in all cases". ( 15 ) CRAWFORD in his famous book " The Construction of Statutes" has got tosay the following at page 519 in this regard:-"ordinarily the words "shall" and "must" are mandatory, and the word"may" is directory, although they are often used inter-changeably in legislation. This use without regard to their literal meaning generally makes itnecessary for the Courts to resort to construction in order to discover the realintention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by thecourt that the legislature intended to use the words in their usual and naturalmeaning. If such a meaning, however, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the obvious intention ofthe legislature, then words which ordinarily are mandatory in their naturewill be construed as directory, or vice versa. In other words, if the languageof the statute, considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature andobject, reveals that the legislature intended the words "shall" and "must" tobe directory, they should be given that meaning. Similarly, under the samecircumstances, the word "may" should be given a mandatory meaning, andespecially where the statute-concerns the rights and interests of the public, orwhere third persons have a claim de jure that a power shall be exercised, orwhenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the publicgbod, or is necessary to sustain the statute s constitutionality. ( 16 ) YET the construction of mandatory words as directory and directorywords as mandatory should not be lightly adopted. The opposite meaning shouldbe unequivocally evidenced before it is accepted as the true meaning, otherwise,there is considerable danger that the legislative intent will be wholly or partiallydefeated. " ( 17 ) I would also like to cite a few lines from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82,art. 380, page 880. . . The opposite meaning shouldbe unequivocally evidenced before it is accepted as the true meaning, otherwise,there is considerable danger that the legislative intent will be wholly or partiallydefeated. " ( 17 ) I would also like to cite a few lines from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82,art. 380, page 880. . . " may construed as mandatory. Where, from a considerationof the whole statute, and its nature and object, it appears that the intent of thelegislature was to impose a positive duty rather than a discretionary power, theword may will be held to be mandatory. A mandatory construction will usuallybe given to the word may where public interests are concerned, and the public orthird persons have a claim de jure that the power conferred should be exercised, orwhenever something is directed to bedone for the sake of justice or the public good;but never for the purpose of creating a right. Accordingly, in a proper case the word may will be construed as must or shall . Such a construction is warranted onlywhere it is necessary to effectuate a manifest legislative intent, and, if no imperativereason exists for a mandatory construction, the word may will be construed aspermissive. The word may will be construed as shall , when the statute canthereby be upheld, if construction to the contrary would render it abnoxious to aconstitutional inhibition. ". ( 18 ) TO the same effect are the observations of their Lordships of the Supremecourt as reported in Shri A. C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi andanother v. Mst. Ram kali, etc. (1968) I SCR 205, wherein their Lordships had hadan occasion to construe the words appearing may take cognizance under Section190 (l) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their Lordships opined that themagistrate is bound to take cognizance of any cognizable offence brought to hisnotice under Section 190 (l) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The words maytake cognizance in the context means must take cognizance . He has no discretionin the matter, otherwise that Section will be viola tive of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) THEIR Lordships gave vent to the same view in State (Delhi Admn.) v. I. K. Nangia and Another, (1980)1 SCC 258 ,. . . . " Normally, the word may implies whatis optional, but for the reasons stated, if should in the context in which it appears,mean must . ( 19 ) THEIR Lordships gave vent to the same view in State (Delhi Admn.) v. I. K. Nangia and Another, (1980)1 SCC 258 ,. . . . " Normally, the word may implies whatis optional, but for the reasons stated, if should in the context in which it appears,mean must . There is an element of compulsion. It is a power coupled with aduty. " Their Lordships cited with approval theobservations of Lord Kaims injulius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1974-80) 5 A. C. 214. . . . . " There may be somethingin the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for whichit is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to bedone, somethingin the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised,which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person inwhom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so. " ( 20 ) THERE is another side of the picture. A close scrutiny of Section 17 (4)reveals that when the Magistrate has satisfied himself that the information withregard to a particular person is correct and that such person is in need of care andprotection then he will pass an order subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5) thatsuch person be detained for such period being not less than one year and not morethan three years as may be specified in the order in a Protective Home. It impliesthereby that an order under the said Section can be made only subject to theprovisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 17which has already been adverted to above provides that the Magistrate whiledischarging the functions under Section 17 would be assisted by five respectablepersons out of whom whenever it is practicable three would be women to assisthim. ( 21 ) IN view of the above it can be safely inferred therefrom that the legislaturewhile using the word may wanted to use it in the mandatory sense otherwise theywould not have subjected the exercise of powers under Sections 17 (2) to 17 (5 ). Itis axiomatic that nothing can be made subject to which is discretionary. ( 21 ) IN view of the above it can be safely inferred therefrom that the legislaturewhile using the word may wanted to use it in the mandatory sense otherwise theywould not have subjected the exercise of powers under Sections 17 (2) to 17 (5 ). Itis axiomatic that nothing can be made subject to which is discretionary. ( 22 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutors have contended that after the amendment ofsection 17 in the year 1986 the legislature introduced an enquiry by a Probationofficer with regard to the circumstances, character and antecedents of the womenand girls and the prospects of their rehabilitation. Thus, the Magistrate was left freeto adopt either of the two modes i. e. he could have an enquiry conducted throughthe Probation Officer under Section 17 (2) of the Act, as was the case in the instantcase, or could have summoned a panel of five respectable persons as contemplatedby Section 17 (5) while discharging his functions. The Magistrate took a recourse tothe procedure provided under Section 17 (2 ). Thus he need not have followed themode provided under Section 17 (5) of the Act. I feel the learned Public Prosecutorshave construed amiss the provisions of Section 17 (2) and Section 17 (5 ). A closescrutiny of the said Sub-sections leaves one in no doubt that every function of thelearned Magistrate whichever is to be performed by him is subject to the provisionsof Sub-section (5) of Section 17. Had it not been so the legislators would not haveprovided that every function under the said section to be performed by a Magis-trate would be subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5 ). ( vide Sub-section (4) ofsection 17 ). To the same effect are the observations of a Division Bench of theallahabad High Court as reported in 1963 ILR 543, Smt. Ram Devi v. State andothers,suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act has been used in thesense of shall i. e. in the sense of being imperative with the result that indischarging his functions under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 the Magistrate has tosummon a panel of five respectable persons. ( 23 ) THE panel of five respectable persons is summoned in order to assist themagistrate discharging all his functions under Sub.-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act andnot only part of those functions and that the panel is an integral part of thetribunal. (2) of Sec. 17 the Magistrate has tosummon a panel of five respectable persons. ( 23 ) THE panel of five respectable persons is summoned in order to assist themagistrate discharging all his functions under Sub.-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act andnot only part of those functions and that the panel is an integral part of thetribunal. " ( 24 ) THE next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners isthat no offence was being committed by the petitioners. In any case there is noevidence to the effect that the petitioners were living or carrying on or were beingmade to carry on prostitution in a brothel at the time of the raid. Hence theimpugned order is liable to be set aside. ( 25 ) A perusal of the relevant provisions of the Act goes a long way to show thatthe purpose and the object of the Act is not to abolish the prostitute or theprostitution. There is no provision under the Act which makes the prostitution perse a criminal offence or punishes a personbecause he is indulging in prostitution. What is punishable under the Act is sexual exploitation or abuse of persons forcommercial purposes and to earn the bread thereby except where a person iscarrying on prostitution in the vicinity of a public place (vide Section 7) or when aperson is found soliciting or seducing another person (vide Section 8 ). ( 26 ) IT is thus crystal clear from above that the prostitution by itself is not anoffence except when it is committed in the vicinity of a public place or somebodyseduces or solits a person for the purpose of prostitution. Learned Counsel for thepetitioners thus contend that in the instant case no evidence has been placed onrecord that the petitioners were indulging in prostitution as defined under Section2 (f) of the Act. There is no evidence to show and prove that the petitioners wereseducing any person for the purposes of prostitution. There is no evidence againon record that the petitioners were running a brothel. The learned Magistrate itappears was swayed while passing the impugned order by the fact that thepetitioners belonged to a particular caste. To my mind, no order could have beenpassed against the petitioners for the removal from their rooms simply becausethey belonged to Badya caste whose profession is stated to be dancing and singing. The learned Magistrate itappears was swayed while passing the impugned order by the fact that thepetitioners belonged to a particular caste. To my mind, no order could have beenpassed against the petitioners for the removal from their rooms simply becausethey belonged to Badya caste whose profession is stated to be dancing and singing. ( 27 ) THE second factor which weighed with the learned Magistrate was that onbeing medically examined they were found to have had sexual intercourse veryrecently, such as within a week before their medical examination. To my mind asi have already observed above, sexual intercourse by itself is not an offence. Thus,the learned Magistrate was wrong in coming to his conclusion that the petitionerswere indulging in prostitution as defined under the Act. ( 28 ) SECTION 16 of the Act deals with the rescue of person. It provides " Wherea Magistrate has reason to believe from information received from the police orfrom any other person authorised by the State Government in this behalf orotherwise, that any person is living, or is carrying on or is being made to carry on,prostitution in a brothel, he may direct a Police Officer not below the rank of a Subinspector to enter such brothel, and to remove therefrom such person and producehim before him. " It is manifest from above that a person can be removed from hishearth and home only in those discerning few cases when he is living or carryingon or is being made to carry on prostitution in a brothel. The respondents for thebest reasons known to them have not placed anything on record to make the caseof the petitioners fall within the domain of Section 16 of the Act. ( 29 ) THE above view was also given vent to by a Division Bench of theallahabad High Court as reported in Smt. Jiam Devi s case (supra ). . . " From thisit would follow that Sec. 16 can only apply if some person is gaining by any acts ofprostitution committed by a girl or when one or more prostitutes carry on theprofession for mutual gain. There is thus nothing in the Act which punishes ormakes liable for action a woman, who carries on prostitution for her own gain,unaided by others or who carries it on for the mere pleasure or fun of it. There is thus nothing in the Act which punishes ormakes liable for action a woman, who carries on prostitution for her own gain,unaided by others or who carries it on for the mere pleasure or fun of it. " ( 30 ) THE other contention put forward by the learned Counsel for thepetitioners is that even the raiding party was not constituted in accordance with themandate of Section 13 of the Act. Hence the entire proceedings in the instant casewere an exercise in futility as the non compliance of the said provisions renderedthem to be nugatory. Since the point raised by the learned Counsel for thepetitioners requires a close examination of the relevant provision of law, alluded toabove, the same can be adverted to with profit. Section 13 of the Act lays down" (1) There shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in thisbehalf a Special Police Officer appointed by or on behalf of that Governmentfor dealing with offences under this Act in that area. (2) The Special Police Officer shall not be below the rank of an Inspector ofpolice. (2a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) For the efficient discharge of his functions in relation to offences under thisact- (a) the Special Police Officer of an area shall be assisted by such numberof subordinate Police Officers (including women Police Officers wherever practicable) as the State Government may think fit; (b ). . . . . . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . ". ( 31 ) SECTION 15 (6a) envisages "the Special Police Officer or the traffickingpolice Officer, as the case may be, making a search under this section shall beaccompanied by at least two women Police Officers, and where any women or girlremoved under Sub-section (4) is required to be interrogated, it shall be done by awoman Police Officer and if no woman Police Officer is available, the interrogationshall be done only in the presence of a lady member of a recognised welfareinstitution or organisation. " ( 32 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners on the basis of the above provisionsof law have found fault with the constitution of the raiding party and have arguedthat aduty has been cast on the shoulders of the Special Police Officer to include inthe raiding party at least two women Police Officers. Admittedly, the learedcounsel contend there were no two women Police Officers in the raiding party. The raiding party consisted of a woman constable and a lady member of the public. Thus the constitution of the raiding party fell far short of the requirements of theprovisions of law, alluded to above. ( 33 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel I feel does not hold much water. Aclose scrutiny of Section 13 (3) (a) reveals that it provides that women Police Officersbe included in the raiding party as and when it is practicable. Thus, it has been, Ifeel, left to the discretion of the Special Police Officer which leads the raiding partyto indude women Police Officers as and when they are available. The Policeofficer, I feel, in view of the above was not bound to include women Police Officersif the same were not available. ( 34 ) A careful perusal of Sub-section (6a) of Section 15 of the Act reveals thatthe Special Police Officer would be accompanied by at least two women Policeofficers. However, again it has been left to the discretion of the Special Policeofficer to include two woman Police Officers at the time of the search and at thetime of the interrogation. This intention of the legislature is crystal from thesubsequent last lines of Sub-section (6a) inasmuch as it provides that if no womanpolice Officer is available in that eventuality interrogation shall be done only in thepresence of a lady member of a recognised welfare institution or organisation. ( 35 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. Admittedly the raiding party in theinstant case consisted of Inspector P. L. Suri who was a Special Police Officer, SIUday Singh and a lady constable Ms. Julia, Smt. Sneh Srivastava, a Special Policeofficer of PS Kamla Market, and Shri Rajesh Chawla, residents of 107/1 and 2860/3, Thomson Road, New Delhi. Thus the raiding party had two women Policeofficers. Hence even if the contention of the learned Counsel is taken to be correcteven then they cannot find fault with the constitution of the raiding party. Julia, Smt. Sneh Srivastava, a Special Policeofficer of PS Kamla Market, and Shri Rajesh Chawla, residents of 107/1 and 2860/3, Thomson Road, New Delhi. Thus the raiding party had two women Policeofficers. Hence even if the contention of the learned Counsel is taken to be correcteven then they cannot find fault with the constitution of the raiding party. ( 36 ) THE next limb of the argument in support of the above contention is thatthe constitution of the raiding party was not in accordance with law inasmuch asall the members of the raiding party were not above the rank of the Head Constablei. e. not below the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector of Police as required videnotification No. F. 5/67/88-Home (P)/estt. dated 14/12/1988. The learnedcounsel in this connection has led me through the abovesaid Notification. It is inthe following words:- "in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of theimmoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956, read with Government of India,ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. 37/1/57-P-11 dated 26/04/1958, the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi is pleased to appointall Assistant Commissioners of Police, working as Sub-Divisional Policeofficers, all Station House Officers, and all the Assistant Commissioners ofpolice of the Crime Branch, Palam Airport and Railways, as Special Policeofficers within the said territory for purposes of the said Act. He is furtherpleased to direct under Sub-section (3) (a) of the said Section 13 that thesubordinate Police Officers ( not below the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector ofpolice) shall assist their respective officers so appointed as Special Policeofficers. " ( 37 ) THE learned Counsel on the basis of the above Notification has contendedthat it is mandatory in view of the above Notification that all the members of theraiding party should not be less than the Assistant Sub-Inspectors of Police in rank. Admittedly, according to the learned Counsel there was one lady police constablein the raiding party. Thus all the members of the raiding party were not above therank of Head Constables. Thus the said raiding party can by no stretch ofimagination be called to be legal and validly constituted raiding party. ( 38 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel I feel is without any substance. Acareful perusal of the said Notification shows that there is no mandate that all themembers of the raiding party should not be below the rank of Assistant Subinspectors of Police. ( 38 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel I feel is without any substance. Acareful perusal of the said Notification shows that there is no mandate that all themembers of the raiding party should not be below the rank of Assistant Subinspectors of Police. What is required by the said Notification is that a Special Policeofficer would be assisted by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Subinspector of Pol ice. The raiding party consisted of an Inspector of Police known asinspector P. L. Suri and a Sub Inspector of Police known as SI Uday Singh and a ladyconstable. Thus the Inspector of Police who was a Special Police Officer was beingassisted by a Sub Inspector of Police. Thus the constitution of the raiding partycannot be found fault with on the said score. ( 39 ) IN the circumstances stated above the petitioners are entitled to succeed. The petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 16/08/1994 passed bythe learned Magistrate and the order dated 17/10/1994 passed by the learnedadditional Sessions Judge are hereby set aside. The petitioners be set at liberty incase they are not required to be detained in connection with any other case.