Judgment O.N.Asthana, J. 1. This is the Miscellaneous Civil Appeal preferred against the order dated 26th April, 1995 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna in Matrimonial Case No. 105 of 1989, whereby the Trial Judge disallowed the application of Sushma Kumari for her examination as a witness in the case. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the husband Om Prakash filed matrimonial Case No. 105 of 1989 against Sushma Kumari for restitution of conjugal rights. Om Prakash pleaded that his love marriage with the inter-caste girl Sushma Kumari was solemnised according to Hindu rites by a Pandit in Kali Mandir at Darbhanga house in presence of the well-wishers. 3. Earlier Om Prakash managed to get filed a forged and fictitious vakalatnama on behalf of Sushma Kumari and obtained the ex parte decree against her. When Sushma Kumari came to know, she moved a petition in the Family Court in the case for the cancellation of that vakalatanama and by the order dated 6th July, 1990 Sushma Kumari was allowed to put contest in the case. Sushma Kumari filed the written statement denying the performance of her marriage with Om Prakash. 4. As the progress in the case was slow and Sushma Kumari was advancing in age (reading 25 years of age) her father searched a bridegroom resident of Arrah and she was married to him on 25th February, 1993 and she started living at Arrah. 5. Om Prakash concluded the examination of his oral evidence on 13th October 1993, Mahadeo Prasad father of Sushma Kumari was examined on 2nd December, 1993 and other witnesses of Sushma Kumari were examined on 17th February, 1994. 6. On 19th January, 1994 an application was moved that Smt. Sushma Kumari might be examined on commission at Arrah, and again on 2nd February, 1994 a request for her examination on commission was made as she was pregnant and was advised complete bed rest by the doctor. On the direction of the Presiding Judge she got herself examined again by the expert doctor and submitted the medical report. In the mean time she gave, birth to a child on 13th April, 1994. The Family Court remained vacant as no presiding Judge was there from 30th March, 1994 to 7th June, 1994. On the direction of the Presiding Judge she got herself examined again by the expert doctor and submitted the medical report. In the mean time she gave, birth to a child on 13th April, 1994. The Family Court remained vacant as no presiding Judge was there from 30th March, 1994 to 7th June, 1994. On 8th July, 1994 the Presiding Judge directed the appellant to be present on 25th July, 1994 for her statement in Court. But with the consent of the Advocate of both the parties the date was changed from 25th July, 1994 to 5th August, 1994. 7. On 5th August, 1994 a petition was moved on behalf of Sushma Kumari that as per customs of her in-laws family she would not be going our from the house and a Court Commissioner be appointed for her examination at Arrah. The Presiding Judge fixed 19th August, 1994 for her examination in chamber of the Presiding Judge. On 19th August, 1994 as her newly-born child had fallen ill an application was moved that Sushma Kumari was unable to be present in Court. The Presiding Judge fixed 9th September, 1994 for evidence. 8. On 9th September, 1994 Sushma Kumari came to Court in person, for her statement but the Presiding Judge was on leave and 20th September, 1994 was fixed for evidence. On 20th September, 1994 Sushma Kumari appeared in the Court to make the statement but unfortunately her conducting lawyer Sri Mohan Sharma did not come to the Court and thus the case was adjourned on the ground of counsel for 7th October, 1994 for her statement on oath in the Court. Navratra (Kali Puja) started from 6th October, 1994 and her in-laws did not allow her to go out of the house with the newly born child and thus an application was moved on her behalf for adjournment and the Presiding Judge adjourned the case for 25th November, 1994. The Presiding Judge did not hold the Court on 25th November, 1994, and from 16th December, 1994 the Government employees strike started and it continued for about two months. This case was fixed for 8th March, 1995, and as she had no knowledge of the date, in the case an application was moved for adjournment. The Trial Judge was pleased to reject this adjournment application of Sushma Kumari and fixed the case for 26th April, 1995 for, argument. This case was fixed for 8th March, 1995, and as she had no knowledge of the date, in the case an application was moved for adjournment. The Trial Judge was pleased to reject this adjournment application of Sushma Kumari and fixed the case for 26th April, 1995 for, argument. On 26th April, 1995 Sushma Kumari appeared personally in the Court to make her statement on oath, and a written request by way of petition was submitted to the Court to record her statement. The Presiding Judge rejected this prayer of Sushma Kumari and fixed the case for 12th May, 1995 for argument. 9. Learned Advocate for the respondent Om Prakash brought to the notice that earlier on 17th February, 1995 a petition was moved on behalf of Sushma Kumari that she was at Arrah and she had no knowledge about the functioning of the Court and thus she could not come and the case be adjourned for her evidence. The Presiding Judge adjourned the case for 8th March, 1995 and again on 8th March, 1995 another application was moved on behalf of Sushma Kumari that she could not come to Court and the case be adjourned for recording her statement. 10. In this appeal the grounds are raised that Smt. Sushma Kumari put her personal appearance on a couple of days and this shows her bona fide intention to appear to make the statement on oath and to contest the case and that the Presiding Judge should have taken a lenient view and should have examined her on 26th April, 1995, when she was present in person, when the case was listed for argument. 11. Om Prakash filed a counter-affidavit raising questions of fact, and also raised the plea that this appeal does not lie as the order of the Family Court Judge dated 26th April, 1995 is an interlocutory order. 12. On 26th April, 1995 the Presiding Judge rejected the application of Sushma Kumari for recording her evidence observing that for more than a year she had been taking a number of adjournments on one ground or the other and had harassed the other party and delayed the disposal of the case and thus the petition of Sushma Kumari does not deserve any onsideration. 13. 13. The question for determination before this Bench is whether the above-said order dated 26th April, 1995 passed by the Presiding Judge of the Family Court is appealable, or otherwise revision under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies against the above-said order. 14. Sec. 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 , relevant for the above said question is as follows: 19. Appeal-- (1) Save as provided in Sub-sec. (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2)... (3)... (4) Except As aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. (5)... 15. Learned Advocate for the appellant urged that not permitting the examination of the appellant namely Smt. Sushma Kumari who is the best person to rebut on oath the allegation of marriage is virtually the decision of the issue in the negative for her. Thus the order of the court-below should not be taken to be an interlocutory order as this order blocking her examination on oath affects her substantial right. The Advocate for the appellant has drawn attention to the decisions ; Madhu Limaye V/s. State of Maharashtra -- and Amaranth v. State of Haryana -- . 16. In Madhu Limayes case the Supreme Court observed that there may be an order passed during the course of the proceeding which may not be final but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure and simple. By a reason of harmonious contractions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must be held that the bar in Sub-sec. (2) is not meant to be attracted to such kind of intermediate order. In Amarnaths case the Supreme Court held that the orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 17. In Amarnaths case the Supreme Court held that the orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 17. In the later V.C. Shuklas Case reported in A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 962, the Supreme Court examined the similar provision contained in Sec. 11(1) and (2) of the Special Court Act; where a non-obstante clause has been placed in this Sec. 11 and is as follows: Sec. 11(1). Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law; (2) except as aforesaid no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. The Supreme Court held that the term interlocutory order used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused. But in the Special Acts which have been framed with the objective to attain quickest despatch and speediest disposal the expression interlocutory order shall be taken in the natural sense, and the non-obstante clause bars the appeal against any interlocutory order, whether it is of intermediate nature or is quasi final. 18. In this V.C. Shukla case, the Supreme Court summed up the essential attribute of an interlocutory order which is that it merely decides some points or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought to, not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. 19. Thus it is definite that the wider concept of interlocutory order with reference to the revisional powers of the High Court of Sessions in Criminal matters have no application whatsoever in considering the scope and ambit of the expression interlocutory order in Sec. 19(1) of the Family Courts Act. 20. 19. Thus it is definite that the wider concept of interlocutory order with reference to the revisional powers of the High Court of Sessions in Criminal matters have no application whatsoever in considering the scope and ambit of the expression interlocutory order in Sec. 19(1) of the Family Courts Act. 20. Advocate for the respondent has drawn attention to the decision Major Raja P. Singh V/s. Smt. Surendra Kumar -- , where examining the provisions contained in Sec. 19 of the Family Courts Act, the Division Bench accepted the concept of the expression interlocutory order spelt out by the Apex Court in V. C. Shuklas case, and held that the order rejecting application in comparison of signatures and handwriting did not decide the matter finally and appeal against such interlocutory order was not maintainable. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Sunil Hansraj Gupta V/s. Payal Sunil Gupta -- examining the provisions contained in Sec. 19 of the Family Courts Act held that the appeal provision has been made more stringent in Sec. 19 of the Family Courts Act by incorporating non-obstante clause therein. Even revision against an interlocutory order is barred under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act. 21. The definition of the word interlocutory order in Whartons Law Lexion reads as under: An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally disposes of the rights of the parties. 22. The expression "interlocutory order" in Sec. 19(1) of the Family Courts Act shows its use in natural sense. This expression includes all the orders except one which finally decide the rights of the parties and/or otherwise dispose of the trial/case fully. 23. The order passed by the Family Court, Patna, on 26th April, 1995 does not conclude the trial, and also does not decide the right of the parties. Accordingly this order dated 26th April, 1993 is simply an interlocutory order and no appeal shall lie against this order in the High Court. 24. This appeal cannot be treated a revision as Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 19 created express bar that no revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of the Family Court. 25. There is hardship to Smt. Sushma Kumari due to this order dated 26th April, 1995. 24. This appeal cannot be treated a revision as Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 19 created express bar that no revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of the Family Court. 25. There is hardship to Smt. Sushma Kumari due to this order dated 26th April, 1995. But Smt. Sushma Kumari shall be getting an opportunity to show that she was prejudiced by this order which stopped her examination on oath if she is required to file on appeal against the final judgment in the case by the Family Court, Patna. 26. Being not maintainable this appeal, is hereby dismissed. Dharampal Sinha, J. 27 I agree