PARITOSH K. MUKHERJEE, J. The management of Janta Shiksha Samiti, Newada, Allahabad and others are the petitioners in the instant writ petition, which arises out of the judgment and order dated March 25, 1987, passed by Sri Vimal Kishore, VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad. 2. The case of the aforesaid management is that on the basis of certain delinquency and embezzlement of the funds of the school namely, Shivaji Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalay, Newada, Allahabad, Triveni Lal Srivastava, Principal of the aforesaid school, being respondent No, 3 was placed under order of suspension on April 24, 1986. Thereafter on resolution passed by the Committee of the Management of the aforesaid School,, the respondent No. 3 was charge-sheeted, which he has accepted. 3. Sri Triveni Lal Srivastava, respondent No. 3 herein, preferred a misconceived appeal and representation before the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad being respondent No. 2, who under misconception and total misapprehension has exercised appellate order and thereby issued notice to the Management as to why the order of suspension should not be revoked. 4. Against the said show cause notice, a competent suit was tiled by the Management of the school, and, the said suit was concluded by an order dated August 22, 1986, passed by Kumari Radha Tiwari, Additional Munsif VIO, Allahabad, wherein it has been held that District Inspector of Schools had no power to review his previous order vide 1985 UPLBEC 829 (para 7) and 1985 UPLBEC 737, (para 44 ). 5. Against the aforesaid order the delinquent Principal, being respon dent No. 3, further preferred an appeal which was disposed of by Vll Addi tional District Judge, Allahabad by delivering judgment on March 3, 1987 whereby the appeal was allowed with costs, and, the order dated August 22,. 1986 passed by Additional Munsif, VI11, Allahabad was set aside. 6. Sri D. K. Singh, learned counsel holding the brief of Sri S. N. Singh and Sri S. K, Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners firstly argued that the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad having no supervisory power to issue the said show cause notice against the Management, the initial order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad was void and illegal and the same should be interfered with by this Court. 7. 7. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that the Management admitted ly being the employer of the respondent No. 3 have inherent power to initiate departmental disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No. 3, as has been done in the present case, and, if any order of suspension is passed, Dis trict Inspector of Schools has to accord his approval in terms of provisions of Section 16-G (7) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921, which shows that "no such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by Inspector, remain in force for more than 60 days from the date of commence ment of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, or as the case may be, from the date of such order, and the order of Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned to any court. " 8. Learned counsel further submitted that by reason of the appellate order dated March 25,1987 passed in Appeal No. 153 of 1986 whereby the said appeal was allowed and the order dated August 22, 1986 passed by Additional Munsif VIII, Allahabad was set aside, in fact the respondent No. 3 was allowed to resume duties after lifting of the order of suspension, though the enquiry was still pending on the basis of resolution passed by the Manage ment of the School. 9. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner a peculiar situa tion has been created by reason of the aforesaid appellate Judgment, by which the Principal of the school, against whom specific charge of embezzlement is made and is being enquired into, has been entrusted with administrative duties of the Principal for the disbursement of the school funds which should not have been done, under the facts of the present case. 10. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 District Inspector of Schools tried to support the action of the said respondent, in view of the provisions of Section 16-G (7) of the aforesaid Act. 11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent No. 3 also submitted that there is no infirmity in the appellate order, passed by the VII Additional District, Judge, Allahabad, which has been impugned in the instant writ petition. 12. 11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent No. 3 also submitted that there is no infirmity in the appellate order, passed by the VII Additional District, Judge, Allahabad, which has been impugned in the instant writ petition. 12. Having heard the rival submission of both the parties, and, having considered the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act, particularly S. 16-G (7) of the Act, I am of the view that since the decision to suspend the respondent No. 3 has been taken by the Management of the school and since resolution has already been passed to initiate the disciplinary enquiry against the respon dent No. 3 on the basis of specific charge-sheet which has been accepted by the respondent No. 3, it was not fit and proper on the part of the District Inspector of Schools to issue show cause notice against the petitioner. 13. In this connection, this Court is not unaware of the similar provi sion contemplated under S. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (being Central Act), wherein similar provision has been embodied when any dispute is pending between the management and the workmen for taking any action, "an approval" has to be obtained from Tribunal, under the said provision and if such approval is sought for, the tribunal is duty bound to accord its approval, as a matter of course, just like a rubber stamp, unless of course, it appears to the tribunal that there was departure in the matter of holding disciplinary enquiry by violation of principle of natural justice and fairplay. 14. Be that as it may, in the facts of the present case, I am of the view that respondent No. 3 should not be allowed to function as principal of the school by virtue of the appellate order, dated March 25, 1987 passed by VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad any further from today, and, the respon dent No. 3 will co-operate with the disciplinary enquiry against the charges levelled against him, initiated by the Management. Accordingly appellate order, dated March 25, 1987 is hereby set aside. 15. Management is also duty bound to supply copy of the relevant docu ments regarding the aforesaid enquiry to the respondent No. 3 so that enquiry could be concluded at an early date. 16. Accordingly appellate order, dated March 25, 1987 is hereby set aside. 15. Management is also duty bound to supply copy of the relevant docu ments regarding the aforesaid enquiry to the respondent No. 3 so that enquiry could be concluded at an early date. 16. However, it is desired that the enquiry should be completed as quickly as possible, preferably within a period of six monthe from the date of communication of this order upon the concerned authority, and, after the enquiry, if the respondent No. 3 is exonerated from the charges levelled against him, he would be entitled to get full salary and other admissible benefits during the period of suspension. As the petitioner has already been paid full salary while discharging duties, the Management will not be entitled to adjust by deducting full salary from the future subsistence allowance pending finalisation of the departmental enquiry. 17. With the aforesaid observations writ petition is disposed of finally. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition disposed of. .