JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - The petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused') faced trial under Sections 341 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in G. R. Case No. 2286 of 1990, Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhubaneswar, on consideration of the evidence adduced while convicting the accused persons of the offence u/s 323/34, IPC and sentencing each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs. 300/-, in default to suffer further period of rigorous imprisonment for one month, acquitted them of the offence u/s 34, IPC. On appeal being preferred against the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence, the learned additional Sessions Judge on a re-appraisal of the evidence concurred with the findings of the trial Court, but so far as sentence is concerned, he reduced the period of rigorous imprisonment from three months to one month. Feeling aggrieved by the judgments of both the. Courts below the accused persons have come up to this Court by filing the present revision. 2. Shortly stated, the prosecution case was that on 31-7-1990 at about 1.30 p. m. white Manguli Swain, PW 2 was going to river for bath, ail the accused persons intercepted and assaulted him near the school with lathis and fist blows. He raised hue and cry hearing which some students of the school came to the spot where after the accused persons leaving him there fled away. PW 2 was then removed to Capital Hospital, Bhubaneswar, where he was admitted as indoor patient. Written report of the incident was lodged by PW 2's son at Bhubaneswar Police Station whereupon a case u/s 341 and 307/34, IPC was registered and after usual investigation Charge-sheet was laid against the accused persons to stand their trial u/s 341 and 323/34, IPC. 3. When examined u/s 313, Cr PC, the accused persons denied the prosecution case and claimed that they have been falsely implicated due to political rivalry. 4. Five witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Of them PW 2 is the injured and PW 3 is his grand-son. Doctor, PW 4 who examined PW 2 found 10 to 18 number of bruises all over his body, scratch injury with bleeding on the lateral aspect of the forearm, lacerated injury on the right elbow and suspected compound fracture of right humerus. Of them PW 2 is the injured and PW 3 is his grand-son. Doctor, PW 4 who examined PW 2 found 10 to 18 number of bruises all over his body, scratch injury with bleeding on the lateral aspect of the forearm, lacerated injury on the right elbow and suspected compound fracture of right humerus. There was X-ray examination of the humerus which did not indicate any bony injury. So PW 4 opined that all the above injuries were simple in nature and the same could be possible by blows with lathis and iron rod. His evidence regarding presence of aforesaid injuries on the person of PW 2 remained unassiled during cross-examination by the defence. In this view of the matter, the only question before the trial Court was whether it was the accused persons who assaulted PW 2 and caused injuries. 5. The prosecution in order to prove the involvement of the accused persons in the incident relied upon the ocular testimony of PWs 2 and 3. Learned trial Court on assessment of their evidence accepted the same to be cogent and convincing and consequently arrived at the guilt of the accused persons. 6. Shri B. P. Ray, learned counsel for the accused, assailing the correctness of the findings of both the Courts below, raised the following contentions : (1) That there was unexplained delay of more than one day in lodging the FIR and therefore, prosecution case should be viewed with suspicion ; (2) That Netrananda Sahu, an independent witness who owns a tea-stall near the place of occurrence, was not examined by the prosecution and no explanation having been offered for his non-examination, adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the prosecution ; and (3) That in view of the admitted enmity between the parties and on consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence, benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been extended to the accused persons. Learned counsel Shri P. K. Sahoo for the informant and the learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State submitted that both trial Court and the appellate Court on consideration of the totality of the facts, circumstances and the evidence arrived at a right conclusion which this Court sitting in revision should not interfere with. 7. Admittedly there was delay of more than 30 hours in lodging report to the police. 7. Admittedly there was delay of more than 30 hours in lodging report to the police. The incident happened on 31 -7-1990 in between 1.00 and 1.30 p. m. and the FIR was lodged by PW 1 on the next day at 9 p. m. Because of such delay, submits Shri Ray, reasonable doubt arises as to the truth of the prosecution case. I am not persuaded to accept this argument since it is a well-settled law that delay by itself will not be fatal to the prosecution case unless there is some indication in the report that it has been lodged after due deliberation and consultation. In this context it would be useful to refer to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apran Joseph alias Current Kunjukunju v. State of Kerala : AIR 1973 SC, page 1, where their Lordships observed thus : "x x x the receipt and recording of information report by the police is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. Nor does the statute provide that such information report can only be made by an eye-witness. First information report u/s 154 is not even considered a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant's evidence in Court. But this information when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the informant. It is very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant's a memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the Court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. In our opinion, no duration of time in the abstract can be fixed as reasonable for giving information of a crime to the police, the question of reasonable time being a matter for determination by the Court in each case. Mere delay in lodging the first information report with the police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the prosecution. The effect of delay in doing so in the light of the plausibility of the explanation for such delay accordingly must fall for consideration on all the facts and circumstances of a given case. Mere delay in lodging the first information report with the police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the prosecution. The effect of delay in doing so in the light of the plausibility of the explanation for such delay accordingly must fall for consideration on all the facts and circumstances of a given case. 8. In the case in hand the informant, PW 1 first rushed to the hospital with his injured father for treatment. His evidence reveals that since he was looking after the treatment of his father, he went to the police station on next day and lodged report. Considering his statement which is quite natural and probable, I would hold that delay occasioned in lodging report has been properly explained away by the prosecution. 9. This takes me to the next question as to whether adverse inference should be drawn for non-examination of Netrananda Sahu the tea-stall owner. A look at the FIR story reveals that Netrananda Sahu was one of the associates of the accused persons who bore grudge against PW 2. Moreover PW 2 in his evidence has stated that during occurrence Netrananda Sahu was instigating the accused persons to give knife blows and commit his murder. In view of such evidence, he cannot be termed as a disinterested witness, and if he was examined, he would not have unfolded a true version of the incident. There is no set rule of law that evidence of interested witnesses should be discarded in absence of independent corrobation. However, prudence requires that evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with more care and when that has been done and there appears a ring of truth in such evidence, it could be relied upon without there being corroboration. PWs 2 and 3 in the present case are no doubt interested witnesses. But the learned Magistrate who had the occasion to see them in the witness box and mark their demeanor accepted their evidence on proper scrutiny. Equally the learned appellate Court also on evaluation of evidence agreed with the trial Court's findings and consequently affirmed the order of conviction recorded against the accused persons. Shri Ray In course of argument could not bring to my notice any discrepancy or incongruity in the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 so as to doubt their credibility, I am. Equally the learned appellate Court also on evaluation of evidence agreed with the trial Court's findings and consequently affirmed the order of conviction recorded against the accused persons. Shri Ray In course of argument could not bring to my notice any discrepancy or incongruity in the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 so as to doubt their credibility, I am. therefore, of the considered opinion that both the Courts below were justified in relying upon the evidence of these two witnesses for finding the accused persons guilty u/s 323, IPC. 10. The next consideration is whether punishment imposed upon the accused persons is proportionate to the charge. Admittedly there was bad blood between the parties due to political rivalry. The incident did not occur at the spur. it was preplanned and prearranged. The accused persons were lying in wait to assault PW 2. The manner the incident occurred coupled with the number of injuries that PW 2 sustained it appears that the accused persons actuated by previous enmity due to political rivalry mercilessly assaulted him with lathis and fist blows and caused injuries. Taking alI these aspects into consideration, I think it would be a misplaced sympathy if benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act is extended to the persons. However, since five years have elapsed in the meantime and the accused persons have suffered a lot, both mentally and financially, it would not be proper to send them behind the prison bar. Consequently, while maintaining the conviction and sentence of fins, the substantive sentence of one month Imprisonment awarded to them is set asi e. On realisation of the fine amount, compensation as ordered by the trial Court shall be paid to the injured, PW 2. With the modification of the sentence as aforesaid, the revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed