JUDGMENT This appeal by special leave arises out of suit for eviction filed by the appellant against the respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act III of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) 2. The facts in brief, are as follows : House No.52 in Moh. Gossianpura at Jhansi is said to have been purchased by the appellant and her step son Babu Lal on June 27, 1950. The appellant claims that she is the owner of half share in that house. One Ram Nath had obtained two decrees. Decree No. 910/55 against Kanhaiya Lal, the husband of the appellant, and Decree No.449 of 1960 against Babu Lal, the step son of the appellant from the Court of Munsif, Jhansi. In execution of the said decrees the two portions of the house were sold and were purchased by Ram Nath. The auction purchaser obtained possession of the two portions of the house on July 7, 1962 and September 7, 1963. The respondent is said to have been inducted as a tenant by the appellant in her portion of the house some time in January 1962. The appellant appears to have filed objections against the sale of her share in the house in execution of the decree passed against her husband, Kanhaiya Lal, but the said objections were dismissed and thereafter, she filed a regular suit of declaration of her title in respect of half portion of the house. The said suit was decreed by the appellate Court on July 4, 1966. The appellant, thereafter, served a notice dated July 21, 1966 on the respondent demanding rent from March 1, 1965 and on his failure to pay the rent as demanded she filed the suit giving rise to this appeal. 3. The case of the respondent was that Ram Nath. the auction purchaser, had filed a suit against him claiming the rent of the premises in his occupation and that he received the summons of the said suit in March 1965. The respondent states that though he contested the said suit it was decreed against him and the said decree was maintained in appeal filed by the respondent which was decided on July 30, 1966. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The respondent states that though he contested the said suit it was decreed against him and the said decree was maintained in appeal filed by the respondent which was decided on July 30, 1966. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. But on appeal, the said decree was set aside by the District Judge, Jhansi and the suit was dismissed. The said decree of the District Judge, Jhansi has been affirmed in second appeal by the High Court of Allahabad by judgment and decree dated September 20, 1978. The High Court has held that as a result of the dismissal of her objections filed under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC the title of the appellant in the property came under a cloud and the cloud over her title was cleared only when her suit for declaration was decreed by the District Judge, Jhansi on July 4, 1966. The High Court has further found that the respondent was not a party to the suit filed by the appellant and in her notice dated July 21, 1966 she did not mention that the suit for declaration had been decreed in her favour and that the respondent could not know that any decree had been passed, under which the appellant had been declared to be the owner of the premises and that on the other hand the respondent knew that a decree had been passed against him on July 30, 1966 in the suit filed by Ram Nath. The High Court has, therefore, held that if the respondent did not pay rent to the appellant in response to the notice dated July 21, 1966, he cannot be held to be a defaulter for the purpose of Section 3, of the Act. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the respondent was inducted as a tenant by the appellant, he was bound to pay the rent to the appellant and on his failure to pay the rent the appellant is entitled to seek his eviction. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the respondent was inducted as a tenant by the appellant, he was bound to pay the rent to the appellant and on his failure to pay the rent the appellant is entitled to seek his eviction. In this connection, the learned counsel has also invited our attention to Section 7-C(2) of the Act which prescribed that where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of any accommodation, the tenant may deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court, or by the settlement between the parties, continue to deposit, in like manner, the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building. The said provision can have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case because so far as respondent is concerned he was obliged to pay rent to Ram Nath, auction purchaser on the basis of the decree passed in the suit filed by Ram Nath against him. The respondent could be held to be bound to pay the rent to the appellant only after he was informed about the passing of the decree in her favour in the declaratory suit filed by her. This fact was not stated by the appellant in her notice dated July 21, 1966. The respondent cannot, therefore, be said to have committed default in payment of rent in having not paid the rent to the appellant in pursuance of the said notice. 6. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed For Citation: AIR 1995 SC 2321