Judgment R. N. Prasad, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against the order dated 28.8.1982 passed in Execution Case No.4 of 1969 whereby the court rejected the claim of the judgment debtor-petitioners and held that the controversy about the deed of gift can be thrashed out in a separate properly constituted suit and allowed the petition of the decree holder- opposite party for effecting delivery of possession with regard to the property allotted to bhekh Narain Singh. 2. The relevant facts of the case are that Sadhu Singh S/o Bhekh Narain Singh and widow of Jadu Singh, Daughter-in law of Bhekh Narain Singh filed Title Suit No.125 of 1959 for partition of the joint family property against Bhekh Narain Singh and deo Sharan Singh, the brother of Bhekh narain Singh. The suit was decreed on 1.10.1963. Two first appeals i. e. First Appeal no.28 of 1964 and First Appeal No.29 of 1964 were filed against the said judgment and decree. The first appeals were compromised and by compromise Deo Sharan singh, Bhekh Narain Singh and his two sons i. e. Plaintiffs were allotted separate share in the suit property and the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise on 2.8.1967. 3. The opposite party filed Execution case No.4 of 1969. Bhekh Narain Singh died in the year 1971 during the pendency of the Execution case. On 2.6.1981 the opposite party filed a petition in the Execution case for effecting delivery of possession in their favour with regard to the property allotted to bhekh Narain Singh claiming to 6e the legal heirs of Bhekh Narain Singh. On 26.8.1981 the petitioners filed a rejoinder to the said petition stating therein that Bhekh narain Singh executed a deed of gift on 14.5.1967 in their favour with regard to the property allotted to him and by virtue of the said deed of gift they are in possession of the suit property and accordingly prayer was made to reject the claim of the opposite party. 4. The executing court while dealing with the claim and counter claim as made by the decree holders and the judgment debtor held that the controversy with regard to the deed of gift can be thrashed out in separate suit and directed the opposite party to take proper steps for issue of delivery of possession over the property allotted to Bhekh narain Singh by the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the executing court has committed error of law in saying that the controversy with regard to the deed of gift can be thrashed out in a properly constituted suit. This is the dispute between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and such dispute has to be decided by the executing court under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by,a separate suit. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, contended that the decree-holders are legal heirs of the deceased Bhekh narain Singh and they are entitled to possession over the property left over by him. The deed of gift as claimed by the petitioners is not a genuine document. The controversy raised by the heirs of Deo sharan Singh can only be decided by a separate suit and not by executing court under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the code. Learned counsel also says that delivery of possession over the suit property has already been effected. 6. On consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record it is manifest that Deo Sharan Singh and Bhekh narain Singh were full brothers and were defendants in the suit. The sons of Deo sharan Singh, the petitioners were also defendants in the suit. The suit was filed by the son and daughter-in-law of Bhekh narain Singh in which share to Bhekh narain Singh, Deo Sharan Singh and the plaintiffs was allotted. The claim of the petitioners was that Bhekh Narain Singh gifted his property to them. Sec.47 of the Code deals with the question to be determined by the court executing the decree. Under Sec.47 of the Code it has been made clear that all questions arising between the parties to the suit, in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Clause 3 of the aforesaid Sec.47 of the Code says that question as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party shall, for the purpose of this Section, be determined by the court. 7. Clause 3 of the aforesaid Sec.47 of the Code says that question as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party shall, for the purpose of this Section, be determined by the court. 7. In the instant case, the petitioners are claiming the property of Bhekh Narain singh by virtue of deed of gift executed by him. The word representative cannot be confined to mean "the legal representatives". A purchaser of the property also comes within the meaning of representative. Thus it can safely by said that the petitioners, although were the judgment debtors, are also representatives of the deceased Bhekh Narain Singh as Bhekh narain Singh executed the deed of gift in their favour and if any dispute arises between the decree holder and the judgment debtor or the representative of the parties, the executing court has to decide such dispute and not by a separate suit as a separate suit is barred under the provision of Sec.47 of the Code. In the case of a. P. V. Rajendra vs. S. A. Sundararajan (A. I. R.1980 Madras 123) relied upon by the opposite party, the court while considering the scope of Sec.47 and Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code has held that Sec.47 of the Code is enough to cover all applications to set aside sales on the ground either of illegality or irregularity but its scope has to be restricted so as to give due effect to order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. If the sale is sought to be set aside on the ground of material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale within the meaning of order 21 Rule 90 of the Code then Section 47 of the Code cannot come into play at all and the sale could be set aside by invoking order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. But if the sale is claimed to be void for certain illegality or voidable on the ground of material irregularity not referred to in Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code then Sec.47 of the Code has to be invoked and in all such cases order 21 Rule 90 of the Code cannot come into play at all. Thus, it is obvious from the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party, referred to above, that the said decision is on the scope of. Thus, it is obvious from the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party, referred to above, that the said decision is on the scope of. Sec.47 and Order 21 Rule 90 of the code. Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code applies in a case where sale in execution of a decree is sought to be set aside on the ground of material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale. It is obvious from the discussions made above that the instant case is not covered under Ordar 21 Rule 90 of the Code as there is no ciaim that the disputed property was purchased in execution of decree. However, in the above mentioned decision also it has been held that if the case is not covered under the provision of Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code then Sec.47 of the code has to be invoked and in such cases Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code will not come into play. Thus, I am of the view that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party does not help him. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision in the case of Md. Akhtar Ali versus Badruddin and others (A. I. R.1973 Patna 187 ). In the said decision one Bibi Aisha obtained a decree of eviction against Pardeshi Wali Mohammad. She levied an execution case for execution of the decree. During the pendency of the said proceeding the decree holder, Bibi Aisha, died. Her two sons and two daughters were parties to the proceeding and her husband, jamun Mian, got himself substituted in place of Bibi Aisha as a decree-holder. In the year 1967 Jamun Mian also died. On 3rd of October, 1969 one Akhtar Ali, son of the brother of Jamun Mian, also filed a petition in the execution case. His case was that Bibi Aisha had made an oral gift of the said house to him in the year 1962 and the tenant put him in possession over it and hence the decree stood satisfied and there was nothing to be executed. However, the claim of the children of Bibi Aisha was that their mother did not make any oral gift of the house to Akhtar Ali nor the tenant delivered possession to him and therefore, there was no substance in the petition of akhtar Ali. However, the claim of the children of Bibi Aisha was that their mother did not make any oral gift of the house to Akhtar Ali nor the tenant delivered possession to him and therefore, there was no substance in the petition of akhtar Ali. In the said case the executing court held that the petition of the appellant was maintainable under Sec.47 of the code and Bibi Aisha did make an oral gift of the house to the said Akhtar Ali. In appeal it was held that the application was not maintainable and Bibi Aisha did not make any oral gift to Akhtar Ali. The matter came up to the High Court and the question of application of Sec.47 of the Code and the question of maintainability of the appeal was raised before it. The Division Bench after considering several decisions on the point held that the application was maintainable under section 47 of the Code and the appeal would lie before the lower appellate court against the order passed by the executing court. The facts of the case are similar to the aforesaid decision. In the instant case also judgment-debtors are claiming the property left by Bhekh Narain Singh by virtue of the deed of gift executed by him although they did not file any application before the executing court but they filed rejoinder to the petition of the decree-holder claiming the property of Bhekh narain Singh by virtue of the deed of gift executed by him. The petitioners were also party in the suit as defendants and they being representatives of Bhekh Narain singh raised the dispute with regard to the property left by Bhekh Narain Singh. Thus, in my view such dispute is covered under the provision of Sec.47 of the Code and the same has to be decided by the executing court and not by a separate suit. 9. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, I am of the view that the executing court has committed error in holding that the dispute with regard to the deed of gift can be thrashed out in a properly constituted suit and thus I find merit in this application. Accordingly, this and the order impugned is set aside. Accordingly, this and the order impugned is set aside. The case is remitted to the executing court to decide the question with regard to the claim of the petitioners, which is based on the deed of gift. Since the litigation is very old, the court concerned is directed to dispose of the matter at the earliest without adjourning the case on flimsy ground and in routine manner. Since the delivery of possession has already been affected the parties shall maintain status quo till the decision of the controversy by the executing court