JUDGMENT 1. S. P. Srivastava, J. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the appellate authority remanding the case to the prescribed authority for disposing of the application filed by the landlord respondent under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction; Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act') seeking release of the accommodation in dispute after setting aside the finding holding the said application to be barred by the principle of estoppel, the petitioner tenant has now approached this court seeking redress praying for setting aside of the appellate order. 2. I have heard Shri Tarun Agrawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri N. C. Rajvanshi, learned counsel for the opposite parties and have carefully perused the record. The only contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of this writ petition is that since under the terms and conditions contained in the compromise entered into between the parties in a suit filed by the landlord for the ejectment of the tenant in respect of the premises in dispute whereunder the landlord had agreed not to evict the petitioner from the said premises, his right to seek release of the accommodation in dispute in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act will be deemed to have been waived and consequently no such application could be entertained. The contention is that the prescribed authority was fully justified in rejecting the application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute holding that it was barred by principle of estoppel. In any case, it is urged, the right to get the benefit secured under Section 21 of the Act having been waived by the landlord respondent of his own will and volition the order passed by the prescribed authority rejecting the aforesaid application on the said ground did not require any interference by the appellate authority. 3. In any case, it is urged, the right to get the benefit secured under Section 21 of the Act having been waived by the landlord respondent of his own will and volition the order passed by the prescribed authority rejecting the aforesaid application on the said ground did not require any interference by the appellate authority. 3. The learned Counsel for the respondent has, however, asserted that there is nothing in the compromise relied upon by the petitioner which can lead to an inference that the landlord has waived his right secured under Section 21 of the Act and in the circumstances, the application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute could not be deemed to be either barred by the principle of estoppel or liable to rejection on the ground that the right to get the premises released stood waived. 4. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S. B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, reported in AIR 1968 SC 933 , waiver is an intentional reliquishment of a known right. It is obvious therefore, that there can be no 'waiver' unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed has full knowledge of his right and the facts enabling him to take effective action for the enforcement of such a right. There can be no manner of doubt that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or a public policy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Lachhumal v. Radhey Shyam, reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1213 observed that if there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of anyone entering into a contract which is so prohibited but whore there is no such prohibition, it will have to be seen whether an act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. It was noticed in that case that there are many statutory provisions expressed to apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. It was noticed in that case that there are many statutory provisions expressed to apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. The provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act secure a valuable right in favour of the landlord and afford the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated therein. The pro visions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. However, since Section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision. 5. The U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is indeed in the nature of social welfare legislation intended to protect the tenant against the harassment and exploitations of the landlord safeguarding at the same time the legitimate interest of the landlords. A statute may be enacted for protecting the oppressed from the oppressor and the oppressed cannot waive a statutory protection under the law. Further a statute may be enacted with the intention of protecting the general public or a section of general public and in such a case a member of the protected class cannot waive statutory protection. There may be a situation where the law confronts the estoppel if it seems to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interest of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise. This was no clarified in the case of Kok Hoong v. Leong Cheong Kwang Mines Ltd., reported in 1964 (2) WLR 150 decided by the Privy Council. In the aforesaid decision the Privy Council had further observed that a general social policy does from time to time require the denial of legal validity to certain transactions by certain persons. This may be for their own protection. In all such cases there is no room for the application of any general and familiar principle of law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit, for what is for a roan's benefit and what is for his protection are not synonymous terms. This may be for their own protection. In all such cases there is no room for the application of any general and familiar principle of law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit, for what is for a roan's benefit and what is for his protection are not synonymous terms. It was further observed" nor is it open to the court to give its sanction to departure from any law that reflects such a policy even though the party concerned has himself behaved in such a way as would otherwise tie his hands. " 6. In the present case, in the compromise it was agreed by the landlord that the tenant will continue to remain a tenant as before and that during the period of reconstruction/repairs and alterations, the tenant will not be required to vacate the premises. The aforesaid terms contained in the compromise which were heavily relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to support the plea of waiver and estoppel, it seems to me, do not lead to any such inference as is sought to be drawn. In this connection it may be noticed that what the landlord had agreed was that the tenant in spite of his tenancy having been terminated: was entitled to continue to retain his status as the tenant as before and during the period when alterations/reconstructions etc. were being carried out was not be required to vacate the premises. These terms can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to indicate that the landlord had waived his right secured under the statutory provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act or that he stood estopped from prosecuting the application for release, filed by him. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am clearly of the opinion that neither the application for release could be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of landlords having waived his right to seek a release nor on the ground of estoppel. 7. The view taken by the appellate authority does not appear to be vitiated by any error much less manifest error of law which may justify any interference by this Court, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.