JUDGMENT 1. S. P. Srivastava, J. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the revisional court allowing a revision filed by the tenant under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act whereunder the decree of the Judge Small Causes Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment of the defendant from the premises in dispute and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profit as well as water tax and cost of notice as claimed together with pendent lite and future mesne profit was modified dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment and decreeing the same only for an amount of Rs. 888. 33 p. for arrears of rent and water tax and Rs. 153 for water tax, the petitioner plaintiff has now approached this court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the revisional order. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this court lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff-petitioner had filed a suit claiming a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the premises in a suit and recovery of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation, arrears of water tax and future mesne profits inclusive of water tax and cost of notice on the allegations that the defendant alone was the tenant of the premises in dispute which had been let out for business purpose only but without any permission of the landlord a part whereof had been converted for residential purposes inconsistent to the terms of the tenancy on which the premises had been let out. It was alleged that the defendant was a defaulter in the payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and in spite of the service of the composite notice contemplated under the aforesaid provision he had neither cleared of the arrears of vacated the premises, hence the suit. 3. 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendant asserting that the building in suit had been let out to M/s. U. P. Crockery House which is a partnership concern having four partners including the defendant and as such the suit was not maintainable against the defendant and the notice of demand and ejectment was illegal and invalid as it was directed against only one of the partners. It was also asserted by the defendant that he had not committed any default in the payment of rent, the rate of rent as claimed was also denied asserting that it was nof Rs. 100 per month as claimed but only Rs. 80/- per month including water tax. The tenant also claimed that the property in question from its very beginning was being used partly for business and partly for residential purpose. The tenant also claimed adjustment of an amount of Rs. 320/- towards white wash and annual repairs etc. He also claimed the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 20 (4) of the Act. 4. The trial court after an appraisal of evidence on the record came to the conclusion that initially a big hall of the premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant which was subsequently partitioned by him and was being utilised partly for residential purpose and partly for business purpose. It was found that the premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant for business purpose only, for which purpose it was being utilised by the previous tenant also. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the partial conversion of the premises in dispute for its user as a residence was inconsistent to the purpose for which the defendant had been admitted to the tenancy and in the absence of the consent in writing as envisaged under Section 20 (2) (d) of the Act, the bar envisaged under Section 20 of the said Act in regard to the maintainability of the suit stood lifted. The trial court also found that the premises in dispute had been let out at rental of Rs. 100/-per month as claimed by the plaintiff. It was also found that the defendant was also liable to pay water tax at the rate of Rs. The trial court also found that the premises in dispute had been let out at rental of Rs. 100/-per month as claimed by the plaintiff. It was also found that the defendant was also liable to pay water tax at the rate of Rs. 6/- per month with effect from 15- 9-1972 in view of the provisions contained in Section 7 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as claimed by the plaintiff. It was noticed at this stage that the provisions contained in Section 7 of the aforesaid Act clearly stipulate that the payment of water tax contemplated thereunder has to be treated as part of the rent in addition to the rent already agreed upon. The trial court further recorded a clear cut finding that the defendant was not entitled to an adjustment of Rs. 320 towards white wash and repairs etc. in the absence of the permission and consent of the plaintiff. In view of the conclusions reached as above, the trial court found that the defendant was clearly a defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. The trial court further came to the conclusion that the premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant alone and the crockery business in the name of U. P. Crockery house was started after letting had taken place. The statement of the plaintiff in this regard was believed by the trial court. In the circumstances indicated hereinabove on the findings returned by the trial court in favour of the landlord-plaintiff, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff negativing the claim of the defendant in regard to the protection available under the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act on the ground that the requisite amount contemplated under the aforesaid provision was not deposited by the prescribed date which was held to be 1-8-1977 and further on the ground that the amount deposited by the tenant was not unconditional as contemplated under the aforesaid provision and, therefore, no order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction could be granted. 5. The revisional court affirmed the finding of the trial court in regard to the rate of rent in respect of the premises in dispute which was found to be Rs. 100/- per month. 5. The revisional court affirmed the finding of the trial court in regard to the rate of rent in respect of the premises in dispute which was found to be Rs. 100/- per month. However, the finding of the trial court to the effect that the defendant alone was the tenant and the premises in dispute had been let out to him was set aside by the revisional court on the re-appraisal of evidence holding that since in the partnership deed executed in the year 1967 relied upon by the defendant it has been recited that the partnership had been existing since October 1961 it stood proved that the premises had been let out to a partnership firm having partners other than the defendant tenant also. In view of the above the revisional court came to the conclusion that the defendant alone was not the tenant of the disputed premises and since the notice had neither been addressed to the other partners or the firm nor had been served on them. It was not sufficient to terminate the tenancy and was, therefore, invalid. The revisional court further came to the conclusion that property in dispute had been taken on the rent in the year 1961 and was being used almost since then both for residential and business purpose. The revisional court relying upon the defendants statement that he has raised the wall to use the property both for residential and commercial purposes almost immediately after taking of the property on rent was relied upon and holding that the property in dispute was being used for residential and business purpose from much before the coming in force of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the user as such could not be held to be inconsistent to the purpose of the lease. The revisional court also found that the relevant date for the deposit of the amount contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act had to be 16-2-1978 which was the date on which the issues were framed and not 1-8-1977. The revisional court also found that the relevant date for the deposit of the amount contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act had to be 16-2-1978 which was the date on which the issues were framed and not 1-8-1977. It was the revisional court which had by its order dated 21-7-1977 allowed ten days' time to the defendant for filing his written statement and fixed 1-8 1977 as the date in the suit on which date instead of filing a written statement the defendant moved an application foe time for the filing of the same which was allowed and the case was taken up for final hearing on 10-2-1978 and thereafter the date fixed was 16-2-1978 on which date the issues were framed and evidence recorded. On the above findings the revisional court modified the decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit so far as the relief for ejectment was concerned and decreed the same for a sum of Rs. 888. 33 p. towards arrears of vent and Rs. 153 towards water tax. 6. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord has vehemently urged that the revisional court has exceeded its jurisdiction envisaged under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act while reversing the finding of the trial court on the question of the status of the defendant. It is urged that on an appraisal of oral as well as documentary evidence on the record, the trial court had come to the conclusion that the premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant alone in his personal capacity and that he alone was the tenant of the accommodation in dispute. Further it was on appraisal of the evidence and the materials on record that the trial court had arrived at a conclusion that it was the defendant who bad been admitted to the tenancy of the premises in dispute who intended to start a business therein in the name and style of U. P. Crokery House. It is urged that the revisional court was not justified in relying on the admission of the defendant in his own favour as contained in the partnership deed executed in the year 1967 and the said deed could not be utilised to set aside the finding of the trial court. It is urged that the revisional court was not justified in relying on the admission of the defendant in his own favour as contained in the partnership deed executed in the year 1967 and the said deed could not be utilised to set aside the finding of the trial court. It is also urged that the finding in regard to the inconsistent user was also based on an appraisal of evidence and was not liable to be interfered with while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the defendant has, however, urged that the aforesaid findings stood vitiated in law and had been rightly set aside by the revisional court. This court in its decision in the case of Ram Narain v. Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma and another, reported in 1965 ALJ 989, which was decided by a Division Bench has clearly held that a revisional court could not reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the Small Cause Court upon the evidence before it with the observation that the revisional court is not empowered to look into the evidence of the case and to decide whether the finding of fact arrived at by the court below is justified by the evidence on record or not. Similarly in another case of Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, decided by a Division Bench of this Court and reported in 1979 AWC 746; 1981 ARC 545 (DB), it has been held that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to reassess or re-appraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself, but if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires. It was clarified in that case that if revisional court cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact it can send the case back after laying down proper guidelines and that it cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. 7. In the present case the trial court had assessed oral evidence led by the parties and rejected the evidence of the defendant and accepting the evidence led by the plaintiff had come to the conclusions indicated above. 7. In the present case the trial court had assessed oral evidence led by the parties and rejected the evidence of the defendant and accepting the evidence led by the plaintiff had come to the conclusions indicated above. The revisional court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in re-assessing the evidence and upsetting the findings recorded by the trial court on question of fact. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that on the findings recorded by the trial court upholding the claim of the landlord in regard to the rate of rent of the premises indispute which was found to be Rs. 100/- per month which finding has not been upset by the revisional court and further the finding recorded by the trial court to the effect that the defendant was not entitled to adjustment of Rs. 320 as claimed there could be no doubt that the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 specially when as contemplated under Section 7 of the aforesaid Act the water tax which was found to be due against the defendant had to be treated as part of the rent. The findings in regard to the above having not been interfered with by the revisional court, it is urged that the defendant could not be relieved against his liability for eviction granting him the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the aforesaid Act as the deposits made by him in this connection were liable to be ignored not only because they had been made subsequent to the prescribed date but also fell short of the total amount required to be deposited as contemplated under the aforesaid provision. The learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered by a three Judge Bench in the case of Subhash Chand Jain v. I. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sahajanpur and others, reported in 1989 (15) ALR page 300. In the case of Subhash Chand Jain (supra) an ex parte decree was set aside by the appellate Court and 30-5-1977 had been fixed by the small cause court in the suit. By this date the full amount required to be deposited as contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act had not been deposited". The deposit was made on a subsequent date. By this date the full amount required to be deposited as contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act had not been deposited". The deposit was made on a subsequent date. The High Court took the view that May 30, 1977 was the date of first hearing in the suit. The Apex Court observed that as the suit was in the nature of small cause suit, and as the provincial Small Cause Courts Act did not contemplate the fixation of any date for settlement of issues, it must be taken that May 30, 1977 was the date of first hearing in the suit, and inas much as the entire amount due as arrears of rent had not been deposited within time, the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition. 9. In the present case, considering the ratio of the aforesaid decision there can be no escape from the conclusion that the trial court was right in holding that after the setting aside of the ex parte decree under the order dated 21-7-1977, the' next date fixed in the suit viz. 1-8-1977 was the date of first hearing as contemplated under Section 20 (4) of the Act and since admittedly the required amounts had not been deposited by that date no order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction could be passed provided him the benefits available under Section 20 (4) of the Act as the prerequisite conditions for providing such a benefit could not be deemed to have been satisfied. The revisional court, therefore, patently erred in granting the benefits envisaged under Section 20 (4) of the Act to the defendant. 10. In view of the conclusions indicated hereinabove sufficient ground has been made out for interference by this Court. The writ petition accordingly succeeds. The impugned order passed by the revisional court is quashed and the order of the trial court is restored. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.