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Kerala High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 373 (KER)

Syed Mohammed v. State of Kerala

1995-11-03

K.T.THOMAS, P.SHANMUGAM

body1995
Judgment :- Thomas, ag. CJ. Land was needed for construction of municipal bus stand at punalur. So acquisition proceedings were resorted to by the Government on the requisition made by the Municipality. A notification was published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short 'the Act') stating that a certain extent of land was needed for the purpose. Later a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was also published. Land Acquisition Officer who was appointed by the Government for this purpose after holding the enquiry, has passed an award under Section 11 of the Act fixing the market value of different plots of land involved and determining the amount of compensation payable to each of the owners of the land. But now the acquisition proceeding are under challenge. Some of the owners of the land involved have filed the present original petition mainly on the strength of two contentions. First is that notification under Section 4(1).of the Act stood lapsed with the expiry of one year from the date of publication, and hence no declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act should have been published thereafter Second contention is that even assuming that declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was published within time the award should have been passed within two years there from. According to the learned counsel the award now passed is not legally enforceable as the same was passed only after two years, from the date of publication. 2. Learned single judge before whom the original petition came up dismissed it repelling both contentions. The present appeal is, therefore, filed by the land owners reiterating the twin contentions pressed before the learned single judge. 3. Admitted facts are the following: Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the official gazette on 3.12.1991 and it was later published in two newspapers having circulation in the locality. (For convenience it will be referred to as the notification hereafter). Declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was published in the official gazette on 22.1.1993 and later it was published in two newspapers also (for convenience it would be referred to as the Declaration hereafter). Award was passed on 9.3.1995 as per Section 11 of the Act. 4. (For convenience it will be referred to as the notification hereafter). Declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was published in the official gazette on 22.1.1993 and later it was published in two newspapers also (for convenience it would be referred to as the Declaration hereafter). Award was passed on 9.3.1995 as per Section 11 of the Act. 4. If the publication in the official gazette is regarded as the date of publication, neither the Declaration nor the Award can be sustained as both were made after the period prescribed. But Government contended that the date for reckoning the period envisaged in the Act is the date of publication of the Notification in the locality. The same is the position for reckoning the period envisaged in Section 11 of the Act for passing the award. 5. According to the Government, a site publication of the substance of the Notification was made on 23.7.1992 and the Declaration was published at the site on 21.3.1993. But appellants have slightly refuted this factual premise. According to them, no such publication at the site has been made either of the notification or of the Declaration. 6. So the first question to be determined is (assuming that site publication was made) whether the relevant date for reckoning the period is the date of publication in the official gazette or the date on which publication was made at the site. Of course, there is the next question whether site publications were, in fact, made as claimed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 7. In order to gauge the first question noted above, we have to refer to the relevant provisions, as both sides adopted divergent interpretations on them. Learned counsel who argued for Punalur Municipality strongly supported the interpretation put forward by the learned Government Pleader. 8. Section 4(1) of the Act enjoins that a notification shall be published when it appears to the Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. There modes are prescribed for such publication: (1) in the official gazette (2) in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality (3) substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. There modes are prescribed for such publication: (1) in the official gazette (2) in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality (3) substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. Section 4(1) ends with the following limb: "The last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification". 9. After such publication different steps have to be adopted by the officials such as measuring and surveying the land, making the boundaries, hearing objection etc. On completion of such steps, Government have to be satisfied that the land concerned is needed for the public purpose. If it is so satisfied, Section 6(1) of the Act enjoins that a declaration shall be made to that effect. Section 6(2) also prescribes three modes of publication of the declaration which are the same as the three modes prescribed for the notification. Section 6(2) contains a parenthetical clause reading thus; "The last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration". 10. The Declaration so published shall be followed up with different steps prescribed in the Act. An award showing the true area of the land acquired, compensation fixed and a portion of the compensation among the claimants should be passed under Section 11(1) of the Act. 11. Section 11A states that "the collector shall make an award under Section 11 of the Act within a period of two years of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse". Thus two periods are prescribed as the interval between two important steps. One is the period of one year between the Notification and the Declaration The other is the period of two years between the Declaration and the award. 12. Shri. S. Venkitasubramania Iyer, learned senior counsel who argued for the appellants contended that date of publication in the official gazette is the relevant date for counting both periods. For examining the correctness of the contention we may point out that all the three modes of publication prescribed need not necessarily be implemented on the same date. They can be done on three different dates as well. For examining the correctness of the contention we may point out that all the three modes of publication prescribed need not necessarily be implemented on the same date. They can be done on three different dates as well. If so, the last date of such publication becomes the date of publication for certain purposes as could be noticed from Section 4(1) of the Act. The word "hereinafter" used in the last limb of that sub-section is expected to convey the legislative intent that the period of one year envisaged in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act, shall commence only from such last date of publication. The said proviso reads thus: "provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4 Sub-section (1) shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of notification." 13. Similarly, the stipulation contained in the parenthetical clause in Section 6(2) is intended to apply to the period of two years envisaged in Sec. 11-A of the Act. As the word "hereinafter" is again used in the said clause, the last date of publication of the Declaration is the date for reckoning the interval period of two years between Declaration and Award. If the legislation intent was otherwise we find no reason why the Parliament again used the word "hereinafter" in the second proviso to Sec. 6(2) also. Parliament could have instead used the word "hereinbefore" if it had the contrary intention. 14. Both sides have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and another v. Makrand Singh and others (1995(2) S.C.C. 497) which was rendered by a bench of two judges (K. Ramaswamy and Venkitachala JJ.). We may point out in this context that in Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1995 S.C.1549) their Lordships (K. Ramaswamy and Hansaria JJ.) have clearly stated the legal position while dealing with the contention in another land acquisition case that the declaration made under Section 6 was invalid on the ground that it was published only after one year of the Notification. According to the learned judges: "It is seen that under Clause (2) of S.6 the declaration shall be published within one year from the date of the publication of the notification under S.4(1).That section clearly adumbrates that one year has to be counted from the date of publication namely in the Gazette or last of the dates of publication envisaged there under excluding the time during which further proceedings were stayed by the High Court, The last date is referred to as the date of the publication of the notification to reckon one year." 15. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh (1995 (2) S.C.C. 497) the question which Supreme Court considered was whether last publication of the declaration should be taken for reckoning the period of interval between the Notification and Declaration. It is clear from the decision that the starting date is the date of last publication of the Notification, while the ending date is the first publication of the Declaration(Publication in the official gazette). Supreme Court made the following observations in that decision: "The last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the purpose hereinafter referred to would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act, as it was already done, but for purposes to be followed thereafter. Otherwise, the language would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration under Section 6(1) for other steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or in computation prescribed in Section 11-A". 16. We are not persuaded to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel that the above decision would bolster up the plea of the appellant. It is to be noticed that Supreme Court has by the said decision, set aside the judgment of the High Court which allowed the original petition filed by the land owners. 17. The alternative contention is that no publication at the site has been made either of the notification or of the Declaration. As pointed out earlier, the stand of the Government is that a site publication of the notification was made on 23.7.1992 and of the declaration was made on 11.3.1993. 17. The alternative contention is that no publication at the site has been made either of the notification or of the Declaration. As pointed out earlier, the stand of the Government is that a site publication of the notification was made on 23.7.1992 and of the declaration was made on 11.3.1993. Since appellants seriously disputed the aforesaid stand of the Government, we got down the official file concerning this acquisition proceedings. On snooping the relevant papers, we are satisfied that local publications have been made of the notification as well as the declaration at the local site on the dates mentioned above. For the aforesaid reasons, appellants are not entitled to succeed. Appeal is hence dismissed.