TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) COMPULSORY retirement from the service of the respondent-Bank in consequence of a Disciplinary Enquiry held against him. He also challenges the vires of Regulations 3 and 24 of the indian-Bank Officers Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, (for short the 'conduct Regulations') and the legality of his suspension pending enquiry. The facts in the background are brief and may be stated first. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was working as Manager of the New Timber Yard Layout Branch of the respondent-Bank at Bangalore. He was served with a Charge-sheet accusing him of misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 3 (1) read with Regulation 24 of the Conduct Regulations. The petitioner's reply to the charges was found unsatisfactory resulting in the initiation of a formal enquiry. The Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of the witnesses and on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence concluded that the charges framed against the petitioner had been proved. The Disciplinary Authority, then passed an order on 21st of April, 1992 accepting the findings returned by the inquiring Authority that the petitioner had allowed temporary over-drafts and clear loans far beyond his discretionary powers, and had acted in total disregard of the prescribed procedure for the grant of open cash credits and allowed the borrowers to divert the Bank's funds for acquiring fixed assets. It also concurred with the finding that the petitioner had failed to follow the norms and guidelines for purchasing Bills and had far exceeded his discretionary powers in that regard besides granting clear loans to salaried class even when he was not empowered to do so. A major penalty of compulsory retirement as per Regulation 4 (f) of Indian-Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, was accordingly imposed upon the petitioner. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority which failed. A Review Petition before the managing Director also met the same fate. ( 4 ) DISSATISFIED with the above orders, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the same on a variety of grounds. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority which failed. A Review Petition before the managing Director also met the same fate. ( 4 ) DISSATISFIED with the above orders, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the same on a variety of grounds. ( 5 ) APPEARING on behalf of the petitioner Sri Krishnaiah learned Counsel, strenuously urged that the order of punishment imposed upon the petitioner suffered from a patent perversity in that even if the allegations made against the petitioner were taken as proved, the same did not amount to misconduct so as to attract the penalty imposed upon him. He contended that the violation of a general provision like regulation 3 of the Conduct Regulations applicable to the petitioner could not constitute misconduct within the meaning of regulation 24 thereof, and that misconduct unless specifically enumerated by the regulations, could neither be alleged nor said to have been proved on the touchstone of such a general provision. In support of this submission he placed heavy reliance upon two judgments of the Supreme Court in M/s. Glaxo laboratories (I) Limited v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, meerut and Others and in A. L. Kalra v The Project and equipment Corporation of India Limited. ( 6 ) SRI Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the principle laid down in the two judgments relied upon by Sri Krishnaiah had no application to the present case and placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v Hindustan motors Ltd. and Others and in State of Punjab and Others v ram Singh, Ex-Constable , to argue that even in the absence of an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute misconduct, it is, legally permissible to proceed against an employee if his conduct was contrary to what was expected of a reasonably prudent person placed in his position. ( 7 ) IN order to properly appreciate the rival contentions of the learned Counsel it is necessary to examine the true scope and the purport of the Conduct Regulations applicable to the Officer employees of the respondent-Bank. These regulations it is apparent have a statutory flavour, for the same have been framed in exercise of the powers vested in the respondent-Bank under Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. These regulations it is apparent have a statutory flavour, for the same have been framed in exercise of the powers vested in the respondent-Bank under Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. A plain reading of these regulations shows that they entirely deal with what the Officer employees of the respondent-Bank should or should not do. For instance while Regulation 3 enjoins upon all the Officer employees to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and discharge their duties with utmost integrity, honesty devotion and diligence, Regulation 4 commands them to maintain secrecy in regard to the confidential affairs of the Bank. Similarly while regulation 5 forbids the Officers of the Bank from securing employment for any one related to them in any manner, by use of his position, Regulation 6 forbids them from engaging themselves in any trade, business or employment, without the previous sanction of the Bank. Suffice it to say that the entire scheme of these regulations is to provide for what the Officer employees of the Bank should do or forbear from doing. These regulations neither actually enumerate nor do they purport to identify let alone exhaustively so all such acts as would amount to misconduct. The term misconduct has not been given any precise definition by the Conduct Regulations, or the Discipline and Appeal Regulations of the Bank which regulate the procedure for the conduct of disciplinary enquiries against the employees, the penalties that can be imposed and the provisions regarding appeals against such penalties. Regulation 24 of the conduct Regulations simply provides that the violation of any provision of the said regulation would constitute misconduct and reads thus:"acts of misconduct 24. A breach of any of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Indian Bank (Discipline and Appeal) regulations, 1976". ( 8 ) IT is obvious that the regulation does not exhaustively enumerate the various acts of omissions or commission which can constitute misconduct. All that is provided is that the violation of any provisions of these regulations would constitute misconduct. The regulations on the other hand make provision for only some of the matters, enumerated in Regulations 4 to 23. Apart from the said enumeration however a general provision is made by Regulation 3 which reads thus:"general 3. All that is provided is that the violation of any provisions of these regulations would constitute misconduct. The regulations on the other hand make provision for only some of the matters, enumerated in Regulations 4 to 23. Apart from the said enumeration however a general provision is made by Regulation 3 which reads thus:"general 3. (1) Every officer-employee shall at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank Officer. (2) Every officer-employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and negotiations. (3) No officer-employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior; (4) Every officer-employee shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons for the time being under his control and authority". placed in juxtaposition Regulations 4 to 23 appear to be reiterating what is otherwise covered by the sweeping embrace of regulation 3 (supra ). All that Regulations 4 to 23 do is to make a specific provision by special reference to the subjects covered by the said regulations even though each one of the subjects covered by them is in some measure or the other provided for by the provisions of Regulation 3. Take for instance a case where an officer-employee of the Bank divulges confidential information relating to the affairs of the Bank, which is forbidden by Respondent 4. He can be said to have acted without due diligence and failed to protect the interests of the Bank as enjoined upon him by Regulation 3. Similarly if an Officer-employee uses his position to secure employment for any relative of his contrary to regulation 5, he may be acting in a manner un-becoming of an officer of the Bank contrary to Regulation 3. So also is the position in regard to other subjects covered by Regulations 4 to 23, which too are covered by the general Provisions of Regulation 3 in one form or the other. So also is the position in regard to other subjects covered by Regulations 4 to 23, which too are covered by the general Provisions of Regulation 3 in one form or the other. In other words Regulations 4 to 23 are only a partial elaboration of what is generally prescribed by regulation 3. That however does not mean that the regulations do not postulate any misconduct, beyond what is specifically prescribed by Regulations 4 to 23. On the contrary Regulation 24 provides, that the violation of any one of the Conduct Regulations would amount to misconduct, meaning thereby that the violation of any regulation including what is contained in regulation 3 would amount to misconduct. ( 9 ) SRI Krishnaiah argued that the expression "breach of any of the provisions of the regulations" appearing in Regulation 24 must be limited to a breach of any of the provisions of regulations 4 to 23 only. He submitted that since Regulation 3 appears under the subject hearing 'general' the provisions of any such general regulation could not be made a basis for any disciplinary action against an employee. He argued that if the regulations are so interpreted it would mean that an employee can be accused of misconduct only if he committed breach of any one of the provisions contained in Regulations 4 to 23; and since the petitioner had not committed, any such breaches, the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the impugned order against him were all improper and unsustainable. I find no substance in the submissions of Sri Krishnaiah. The fact that regulation 3 is placed under the caption 'general' does not mean that the same is beyond the sweep of the words "any of the provisions of the regulations" as they appear in Regulation 24. These words do not, admit of exclusion of any provision from the purview of Regulation 24 not even Regulation 3 which although placed under the heading General, is never the less a part of the regulations. It therefore follows that as per the scheme of the regulations; the violation of any one of the provisions thereof would amount to misconduct and this could include a violation of regulation 3 also which inter alia casts an obligation upon all the Officer employees of the Bank to act honestly, diligently, and do nothing which would be unbecoming of an Officer of the bank. ( 10 ) LET me now examine the principal argument of Sri Krishnaiah that unless, specifically enumerated no act of omission or commission can be treated to be misconduct ex-post facto; for the purpose of punishing an employee on the basis thereof. The term 'misconduct' not having been given a precise definition by the regulations, assistance for its true meaning shall have to be drawn from the dictionaries. Webester defines 'misconduct' thus:" (1) Mismanagement especially of governmental or military responsibilities was charged with of the war; (2) intentional wrong doing deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behaving esp. , by a Government official: malfeasance (one of his district Judges has been removed from the Bench; xx XX XX XX (1) To manage badly, MISMANAGED the expedition, losing half his supplied; (2) to behave (oneself) improperly himself in office". ( 11 ) IN Black'a Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 'misconduct' has been described thus:"a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behaviours, wilful incharacter, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness". "xx xx xx xx any unlawful behaviour by a public Officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act". From the meaning given to the term 'misconduct' it is apparent that the same implies wrongful intention but does not mean a mere error of judgment. It does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. It is a term which will have to be construed by reference to the subject matter and the context where in the term occurs. Generally speaking it implies wrong or improper conduct and in common parlance it is understood to mean a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. The courts have taken conduct prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to the master or to the reputation of the master as misconduct. Acts, which are so grossly immoral that all reasonable men may say that the employee cannot be trusted or acts which show that the Master cannot rely upon the faithfulness of the employee have also been treated to be 'misconduct'. Acts, which are so grossly immoral that all reasonable men may say that the employee cannot be trusted or acts which show that the Master cannot rely upon the faithfulness of the employee have also been treated to be 'misconduct'. Acts by which the employee is shown to have not discharged his duties properly or is found to be habitually negligent in respect of his duties for which he has been engaged have also been held to be tantamount to 'misconduct'. ( 12 ) IN Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari and Others v Central Railway (Divisional Superintendent, Nagpur ), a division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the implied conditions of service in which an employee works include conditions that the servant should be trustworthy that his acts should justify the confidence of the employer, that the employee will not so act as to prejudice or damage the interests of the employer, that the employee would not act or conduct or behave himself in a way, inconsistent or incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duties to be employer, that he would not behave in an insulting or insubordinate manner, that he would not be habitually negligent, etc. The Court identified 10 illustrative types of 'misconduct' to point-out that the same proceed on the fundamental principle that to justify the dismissal of the servant he must be shown to have contravened an express or implied condition of his service. To the same effect is a Division bench Judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Jagmohandas jagjivandas Mody v State of Bombay , wherein the Court was considering the question as to whether the defamatory remarks made by an employee of the Government against the Revenue minister could amount to 'misconduct'. Holding in the affirmative the Division Bench observed that any remark made by an employee which had the tendency to affect the reputation of his Master would entitle the Master to dismiss him from service. The Court identified the illustrative acts of 'misconduct' which could amount to a breach of the fundamental conditions of employment and thereby entitle the employer to remove the employee from service. ( 13 ) IN S. Govinda Menon v Union of India , an I. A. S. Officer holding the post of Commissioner, Hindu Religious and charitable Endowments, was accused of 'misconduct' in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner. ( 13 ) IN S. Govinda Menon v Union of India , an I. A. S. Officer holding the post of Commissioner, Hindu Religious and charitable Endowments, was accused of 'misconduct' in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner. On behalf of the delinquent, it was argued that since the functions discharged by him were quasi-judicial in nature the same could be questioned in Appeal or Revision under the Act, and therefore the government was precluded from taking disciplinary action in regard to such actions. Repelling the argument the Supreme court held that even though the propriety and legality of the orders passed by the delinquent could be questioned, in higher fora the Government was not preclude from taking disciplinary action if there was proof that the Commissioner had acted in a grossly reckless manner in the discharge of this duties or had failed to act honestly or in good faith. ( 14 ) IN P. H. Kalyani v Air France, Calcutta, the delinquent employee was found to have committed two mistakes while checking load-sheets and the balance-charts which mistakes could involve possible accident to the Air craft and possible loss of human life. Negligence in the work in the context of the serious consequences that could ensue was treated as 'misconduct'. ( 15 ) IN M. Kasi v Indian Bank , an employee of the respondent-Bank was accused of 'misconduct' in almost identical circumstances. The delinquent was alleged to have sanctioned temporary over-drafts under Open Cash Credits to certain constituents of the Bank in breach of Regulation 3 (1) of the conduct Regulations. Aggrieved of the punishment imposed upon him the employee filed a petition in the High Court of madras and contended that the Acts alleged against him did not amount to 'misconduct' so as to expose him to any disciplinary proceedings. The argument was repelled by a Single Bench of the High Court of Madras and it was held that the action of the employee did amount to 'misconduct' even when regulations did not specifically enumerate the same as one of the misconduct which could be punished. ( 16 ) IN Ramsingh's case, supra, the Apex Court was considering the question as to what should amount to a "gravest act of misconduct" without therebeing any definition provided for such a term in the service rules. ( 16 ) IN Ramsingh's case, supra, the Apex Court was considering the question as to what should amount to a "gravest act of misconduct" without therebeing any definition provided for such a term in the service rules. Relying upon the definition given in the Law Dictionaries, Their Lordships held that even though the word misconduct was not capable of any precise definition, it received its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its affect on the discipline and nature of the duty. The following passage from the judgment of their Lordships sums up the position succinctly:"thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection, receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful, in character forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but nor mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order". ( 17 ) IT is therefore apparent that even when the regulations do not give a precise definition to the term 'misconduct'. The said term has to be understood as meaning transgression and violation of some established and defined rule of action, a dereliction of duty or a behaviour which is improper or unlawful. Any action that an Officer employee of the Bank takes in discharge of the duties of his office, which action the holder of the office had no right to perform or which he performs improperly would amount to misconduct. The conduct must be wilful in character and must be forbidden for it is only the forbidden quality of the act which renders the same an act of 'misconduct'. The conduct must be wilful in character and must be forbidden for it is only the forbidden quality of the act which renders the same an act of 'misconduct'. In other words, a conduct which jeoparadise the interest of the Bank or its reputation or an act which the employee was not authorised to perform or performed it without due diligence and caution, would expose the employee to a charge of misconduct. It therefore follows that even when there may be no specific enumeration of the various acts of omission and commission which would constitute misconduct, the employer may be entitled to charge an employee with such misconduct and prove the same by reference to the nature of the duties and the office held by him if the said conduct was forbidden, improper or unbecoming on his part. So proved, any such act of omission or commission would constitute misconduct no matter the same is not specifically enumerated as an act of misconduct. I am supported in this by a judgment of the supreme Court in M. S. Dhantwal's case, supra, wherein the question that arose was whether an act which is not enumerated as constituting misconduct can be made a basis for the removal of the employee by treating it so ex-post facto. Repelling the argument Their Lordships observed thus:"standing orders of a company only describe certain causes of misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct which a workman may omit. Even though a given conduct may not come within the specific terms of misconduct described in the standing orders. It may still be a misconduct in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. Ordinarily, the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so". ( 18 ) SRI Krishnaiah however places heavy reliance upon the judgment of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories and A. L. Kalra's cases, supra. He contended that the Apex Court has taken the view that specific enumeration of the acts of misconduct is a condition precedent for making any such act a basis for any disciplinary proceedings against an employee or his eventual removal from service. Both these judgments are in my opinion clearly distinguishable and have no application to the instant case. He contended that the Apex Court has taken the view that specific enumeration of the acts of misconduct is a condition precedent for making any such act a basis for any disciplinary proceedings against an employee or his eventual removal from service. Both these judgments are in my opinion clearly distinguishable and have no application to the instant case. In M/s. Glaxo laboratories' case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the standing orders made by the employer company under the Standing Orders Act. The question was whether the company could punish one of its employees for a misconduct not otherwise enumerated under Standing Order 22. It was urged on behalf of the company that even though the acts of misconduct were enumerated in Standing Order 22, yet the power to punish for misconduct conferred upon the company in terms of Standing order 23 was not limited to only such acts as were included in standing Order 22. Repelling the contention Their Lordships pointed out that in terms of item 9 of the Schedule to the industrial Standing Orders Act, the employer-company was under an obligation to draw up with precision all those acts of omission and commission which would constitute misconduct. The Court observed that workmen were entitled to know in definite terms as to which act constitute a misconduct so as to be visited with penalty. The Court held that the statutory obligation to prescribe with precision in the standing order all those acts of omission and commission which would constitute misconduct made it difficult to accept the submission urged on behalf of the Company that any act of omission or commission may tantamount to misconduct even though not provided for in the Standing Order. Their Lordships held that upon a harmonious constructions the expression 'misconduct' in standing Order 23 must refer to only those acts of omission or commission which constitute 'misconduct as enumerated in standing Order 22 and none else. A careful reading of the above judgment, leaves hardly any doubt that the obligation to enumerate with precision the acts of omission or commission which would amount to a 'misconduct' was identified by Their lordship by reference to the mandatory provision contained in the Industrial Employment Standing Order Act. A careful reading of the above judgment, leaves hardly any doubt that the obligation to enumerate with precision the acts of omission or commission which would amount to a 'misconduct' was identified by Their lordship by reference to the mandatory provision contained in the Industrial Employment Standing Order Act. The requirement of enumeration of the acts of omission or commission constituting 'misconduct', it is significant to note is related only to the provisions of the Act aforesaid and not to any other recognised principle of law. This is fairly clear from the following passage of the said judgment: "the submission is that the expression 'misconduct' under Standing Order 23 is not qualified as the one set out in Standing Order 22 and, therefore, any other act of omission or commission which would per se be misconduct would be punishable under Standing Order 23 irrespective of the fact whether it finds its enumeration in Standing order 22. The Act makes it obligatory to frame standing orders and get them certified. Section 3 (2) requires the employers in an industrial establishment while preparing draft standing orders to make provision in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment, and where, model standing orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far as is practicable, in conformity with such model. Item 9 of the Schedule provides 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which constitute misconduct. It is therefore obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for -misconduct. The workmen must, therefore, know in advance which act of omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty. The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing order all these acts of omission or commission which would constitute misconduct. . In the face of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the submission that some other act of omission which may be misconduct though not provided for in the standing order would be punishable under Standing Order 23. Upon a harmonious construction, the expression 'misconduct' in standing Order 23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in standing Order 22 and none else. Upon a harmonious construction, the expression 'misconduct' in standing Order 23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in standing Order 22 and none else. ( 19 ) THIS however is not the position in the instant case. There is no standing order framed by the respondent-Bank in terms of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act nor is there any enumeration contained in any such standing order as was the position in the case of 'glaxo Laboratories'. It is therefore difficult to borrow the principle settled by Their Lordships in the aforesaid case for application to the facts of the present case. ( 20 ) THE other judgment relied upon by Sri Krishnaiah, also does not lend much assistance to him. In that case, the employee had secured a House Building Advance which he had failed to return. The relevant rules regulating the grant and repayment of the advance themselves provided for the consequences of the breach if any committed by the employee. Upon failure of the employee to return the advance he was proceeded against departmentally. The Supreme Court held that the failure on the part of the employee to return the advance did not amount to misconduct. Dealing with the conduct and discipline rules of the employer-corporation, the Supreme Court noticed that the acts of misconduct had been enumerated in Rule 5 and that Rule 4 which bore the heading general, could not be telescoped into rule 5. But what provides a striking distinction between two cases is that in Kalra's case, Rule 5 which dealt with misconduct did not provide that anything violative of Rule 4 would amount to misconduct. This position is clear from the following passage:"rule 4 styled as 'general' specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct, it would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in the two hands of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well as be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct, committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct". ( 21 ) IN the instant case this is not so. Here Regulation 24 specifically provides that the violation of any of the Conduct regulations would constitute 'misconduct' which expression as observed by me earlier is wide enough to include within its fold even Regulation 3 which even though placed under the heading 'general' yet meaningfully enjoins upon the employees of the bank to discharge their duties with utmost honesty integrity and diligence. The judgment in Kalra's case is therefore of no avail to the petitioner. 21a. Sri Krishnaiah also relied upon Rasiklal Vaghajibhai patel v Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Another. That is a judgment which follows the earlier judgment of the Supreme court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories' case. Since, however, the glaxo Laboratories' case is a judgment distinguishable for the reasons stated by me earlier, the judgment in Rasiklal's case, supra, also lends little help to the petitioner. ( 22 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter to which I must advert at this stage and this relates to the anomalous consequences that may follow if one were to accept the interpretation being placed by Krishnaiah upon the Regulations in question. If a specific enumeration of an Act of omission or commission as 'misconduct' were to be treated as imperative, it would mean that no act of an employee howsoever grave, obnoxious improper or corrupt, the same may be, would amount to misconduct unless such as act, was specifically enumerated as an act of omission or commission tantamount to misconduct. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion it would mean that the framers of the regulations which as pointed out earlier are statutory in character, did not envisage any act of 'misconduct' other than one failing within the purview of regulations 4 to 23. A reference to these regulations would however show that the same do not make mention or enumerate such acts of 'misconduct' as can be conceived of in relation to the business affairs of a Bank. For instance the regulations do not make any provision that misappropriation of Bank's money would constitute 'misconduct'. A reference to these regulations would however show that the same do not make mention or enumerate such acts of 'misconduct' as can be conceived of in relation to the business affairs of a Bank. For instance the regulations do not make any provision that misappropriation of Bank's money would constitute 'misconduct'. They also do not provide that defalcation of accounts would also amount to a 'misconduct' or that fraud and forgeries committed by an employee could be made a basis for disciplinary proceedings and eventual removal of the employee concerned. Does that mean that the framers of the regulations never intended to make these serious acts were never intended to provide a justification for the Bank to remove the employee from the service? My answer clearly is in the negative. It is inconceivable that such acts as can be said to be commonly associated with the business of the respondent-Bank could be said to be too trivial or inconsequential to deserve any notice. For that matter, the regulations do not even provide that if a person is convicted of an offence of moral turpetitude of whatever gravity, can be removed from service. Does that mean that in the absence of such a regulation it is impossible for the bank to remove an employee from service simply because such an act is not specifically enumerated as one that can result in the removal of the employee from service. Suffice it to say that like all statutory provisions the regulations in question must be harmoniously and rationally interpreted so as to avoid situations where anomalous results like the one indicated above may follow as a necessary consequence. A harmonious interpretation of the provisions which advances the purpose rather than defeats the same shall have to be preferred over one which makes the situation look bizare. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by Sri Krishnaiah that enumeration of the acts of misconduct alone gives to the employer the authority to proceed against the employee and that any act not so enumerated in the Conduct Regulations can never be made a basis for any disciplinary proceedings against the employee. ( 23 ) THAT takes me to the other limb of Sri Krishnaiah's argument namely the constitutional validity of regulations. ( 23 ) THAT takes me to the other limb of Sri Krishnaiah's argument namely the constitutional validity of regulations. It was urged by the learned Counsel that since Regulation 3 makes a very vague provisions insofar as what would amount to 'misconduct' the same was capable of abuse and therefore was discriminatory and hence ultra vires of Article 14 of the constitution. He placed reliance upon a judgment of the supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation u D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, in support of his submission that the provision being wholly arbitrary deserves to be struck down as unconstitutional. ( 24 ) I do not find any substance even in this argument. The judgment in Delhi Transport Corporation's case, supra, deals with the validity of Regulation 9 (b) of the Delhi Transport authority Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations, 1952 which provided for removal of even a permanent employee of the Corporation, without assigning any reasons and without holding any enquiry whatsoever. The Supreme Court by a majority judgment held that the power conferred by Regulation 9 (b) on the authority was wholly arbitrary thereby violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that public corporation which are instrumentalities of the State were subject to the observance of the fundamental rights and service rules and regulations framed by them were liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14. Procedure prescribed by the rules it was held must be reasonable, fair and just instead of being arbitrary, unjust or fanciful. Therebeing no guidelines in the regulations as to when and in which cases the power of termination could be exercised the regulation was found to be wholly unacceptable and was struck down. This, judgment bears no analogy to the present case. In the present case Regulation 3 is not open to any mischief like the one noticed by Their lordships in the above case. This, judgment bears no analogy to the present case. In the present case Regulation 3 is not open to any mischief like the one noticed by Their lordships in the above case. The apprehension of Sri Krishnaiah in fact is that since terms like 'protect the interests of the Bank' at all times, 'act with due diligence' 'acts unbecoming of an employee of the Bank' are vague and capable of different interpretations at different points of time in regard to the different employees, the said provision could result in discriminatory treatment being meted out to people similarly situated and therefore a provision which is amenable to any such discriminatory application must be struck-down as unconstitutional. It is however fairly well settled that it is not the possibility of an abuse of a provision which would itself justify the striking down of a provision but actual abuse of such a provision in a given case that may warrant any interference by the Court. Courts do not entertain challenges to the vires of the provisions on mere possibility of the provisions being capable of abuse. Abstract propositions of a possible abuse without the provision being shown to have been actually abused in a given case do not call for any meddling by the Courts. Indeed as and when an application which can be styled as discriminatory or unfair or arbitrary is ruled out on the basis of the regulation in question, the person affected by any such decision or action would be entitled to seek appropriate redress from the Court. As at present, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the actions of which he was accused and held guilty at the enquiry cannot even by stretching the provisions of Regulation 3 to its extreme be held to be a 'misconduct'. That being so, the charge of arbitrariness or abuse of the provisions of Regulation 3 does not call for any pronouncements on its constitutional vires. ( 25 ) IT was next argued by Sri Krishnaiah, that the charge-sheet served upon the petitioner was itself vague and lacked material particulars. Reliance in this connection was placed upon Regulation 6 (3) of the Bank's Disciplinary and appeal Regulations, 1976, which enjoins upon the disciplinary authority to frame, definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations made against the officer-employee. Reliance in this connection was placed upon Regulation 6 (3) of the Bank's Disciplinary and appeal Regulations, 1976, which enjoins upon the disciplinary authority to frame, definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations made against the officer-employee. It was urged that the charge-sheet did not comply with the mandatory requirement of Regulation 6 (3) and therefore caused prejudice to the petitioner at the enquiry. I find no substance in this submission either. The reply which the petitioner has filed to the charge-sheet answers each charge separately and justifies each transaction claimed by the Bank to the irregular in nature. In the reply the petitioner has not even remotely suggested that the charges framed against him were unintelligible or vague in nature. On the contrary, the petitioner has asserted that each one of the transactions cited against him was supported by the approval of the Regional Manager of the Bank. This sufficiently shows that the petitioner had understood the charges clearly and answered them without raising any objection about their alleged vagueness. ( 26 ) THAT apart, the Appeal filed by the petitioner did not make any grievance nor did the Review Petition filed by the petitioner make a murmur about the charges being vague or indefinite. It is therefore too late for the petitioner at this stage to urge that the charges framed against him were incapable of being understood or in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause any prejudice to him let alone vitiate the enquiry. It is well settled that if the parties go to trial without any objection and after understanding each others' cases well, the question of a re-trial on the specious ground of pleadings being vague does not arise. Even otherwise, I do not see how the charges framed against the petitioner were in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause prejudice of the kind that would require interference by this Court. The submission made by Sri Krishnaiah, therefore needs to be noticed only to be rejected. Even otherwise, I do not see how the charges framed against the petitioner were in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause prejudice of the kind that would require interference by this Court. The submission made by Sri Krishnaiah, therefore needs to be noticed only to be rejected. ( 27 ) SRI Krishnaiah, then argued that the charge regarding the petitioner having acted without authority in granting various facilities to the customers could not be said to have been proved as there was no material on record to show that there was any limit ever placed by the Bank on the financial authority of the managers to grant such facilities. This argument, deserves to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place, the petitioner never set up this defence at the enquiry nor was it ever argued that the charge regarding the petitioners having acted without authority was untenable as the petitioner enjoyed financial powers without any limit in the matter of granting facilities. If that was the petitioner's case, there was no reason why he should not have set up the same at the enquiry. On the contrary, the petitioner appears to have accepted that the facilities had been granted in excess of the power enjoyed by him as a Manager of a 'd' Category Branch but urged that the grant of the said facilities had been approved by the Higher Authority namely the regional Manager of the respondent-Bank. It is therefore not open for him to contend that there was no financial limit on his authority to grant such facilities. Secondly, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Managers of different categories of Branches is stated in the booklet marked Ext. M- 140 which clearly prescribes the limits of each Branch in the matter of granting such facilities. There is thus no perversity in the finding returned by the Enquiry Officer and upheld by the Appellate 26. That apart, the Appeal filed by the petitioner did not make any grievance nor did the Review Petition filed by the petitioner make a murmur about the charges being vague or indefinite. It is therefore too late for the petitioner at this stage to urge that the charges framed against him were incapable of being understood or in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause any prejudice to him let alone vitiate the enquiry. It is therefore too late for the petitioner at this stage to urge that the charges framed against him were incapable of being understood or in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause any prejudice to him let alone vitiate the enquiry. It is well settled that if the parties go to trial without any objection and after understanding each others' cases well, the question of a re-trial on the specious ground of pleadings being vague does not arise. Even otherwise, I do not see how the charges framed against the petitioner were in any manner vague or indefinite so as to cause prejudice of the kind that would require interference by this Court. The submission made by Sri Krishnaiah, therefore needs to be noticed only to be rejected. 27. Sri Krishnaiah, then argued that the charge regarding the petitioner having acted without authority in granting various facilities to the customers could not be said to have been proved as there was no material on record to show that there was any limit ever placed by the Bank on the financial authority of the managers to grant such facilities. This argument, deserves to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place, the petitioner never set up this defence at the enquiry nor was it ever argued that the charge regarding the petitioners having acted without authority was untenable as the petitioner enjoyed financial powers without any limit in the matter of granting facilities. If that was the petitioner's case, there was no reason why he should not have set up the same at the enquiry. On the contrary, the petitioner appears to have accepted that the facilities had been granted in excess of the power enjoyed by him as a Manager of a 'd' Category Branch but urged that the grant of the said facilities had been approved by the Higher Authority namely the regional Manager of the respondent-Bank. It is therefore not open for him to contend that there was no financial limit on his authority to grant such facilities. Secondly, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Managers of different categories of Branches is stated in the booklet marked Ext. M - 140 which clearly prescribes the limits of each Branch in the matter of granting such facilities. It is therefore not open for him to contend that there was no financial limit on his authority to grant such facilities. Secondly, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Managers of different categories of Branches is stated in the booklet marked Ext. M - 140 which clearly prescribes the limits of each Branch in the matter of granting such facilities. There is thus no perversity in the finding returned by the Enquiry Officer and upheld by the Appellate authority that the petitioner did actually transgress the limits of his authority while granting the facilities in question. ( 28 ) SRI Krishnaiah, next urged that since the petitioner had claimed that all the transactions cited against him had the approval of the higher authorities, it was obligatory for the Bank to produce the entire record in its possession to show that there was no such approval. There is no substance even in this submission. It was for the petitioner to have proved that he had secured the previous or post-facto approval of the authorities concerned while granting the facilities in question. This he had obviously failed to do. In a case where the delinquent employee asserts the existence of a certain state of affairs in the affirmative, it is for him to prove the same and not the management to prove the non-existence thereof. The Bank could not be expected to prove by reference to the entire record in its custody a fact in the negative namely that there was no approval from the higher officers. It was open to the petitioner to have summoned the relevant record from the Bank to prove that the approval relied upon by him did actually exist. That however is not the same thing as requiring the Bank to prove on its own part that there was no approval granted by any higher Officer of the Bank to the petitioner's action of extending the facilities in question. Sri Krishnaiah could not support the proposition urged by him by reference to any recognised principle of law that the burden to prove the non-existence of the state of affairs or a relevant fact could be shifted to the Management in a situation like the present. The petitioner having asserted the existence of state of affairs, it was for him to affirmatively prove the same which he has clearly failed to do. The petitioner having asserted the existence of state of affairs, it was for him to affirmatively prove the same which he has clearly failed to do. ( 29 ) IT was next urged that the petitioner had not been given a fair opportunity to defend himself at the enquiry. It was argued that the petitioner had submitted a list of documents for being summoned from the Bank which the Investigating Officer did not summon. Reference in this connection was made to a letter dated 8th November, 1981, which according to the petitioner was accompanied by a list of documents relied upon by him in his defence. Sri Kumar learned Counsel for respondent however, produced the original enquiry record and by reference to the original letter dated 8th November, 1981 pointed out that the same did not carry with it any list of documents as claimed by the petitioner. He submitted that if the petitioner had actually submitted such a list, there was no reason why the same should not have formed a part of the record. ( 30 ) THE original letter dated 8th November, 1981 comprises two pages only. The second page whereof is signed at the bottom by the petitioner, and does not give any impression that there was a third page also attached to the same. That apart if the petitioner had actually filed a list of documents along with letter dated 8th November, 1981 in any manner relevant or crucial for his defence, there was no reason why he should not have pursued the demand for the production of the said letters diligently by drawing the attention of the Enquiry Officer towards the said request. The petitioner does not appear to have insisted that a list of documents had actually been submitted by him along with his letter dated 8-11-1981 even when during the course of the enquiry the Enquiry Officer specifically makes an observation that the said letter did not enclose any list of documents. The Enquiry Officer had in the course of the recording of the statement of one of the management's witness observed thus:"i have directed the charged officer on 3-11-1981 to submit a list of witnesses and a list of documents on 4-11-1981 at 2. 00 p. m. in the premises of Indian Bank regional Office, Bangalore at the time of his inspection of the documents produced by the Presenting Officer. 00 p. m. in the premises of Indian Bank regional Office, Bangalore at the time of his inspection of the documents produced by the Presenting Officer. The charged officer did not submit any list of documents for the purpose of the enquiry nor did he submit the list in the letter dated 8-11-1981 addressed to the Inquiring authority. Even in the latest list submitted by him on 18-11-1981 he did not cite these above two documents. At this close of the enquiry the request of the charged Officer is not possible one. Hence I directed the Defence Assistant to proceed with the enquiry". ( 31 ) SO much so, the petitioner does not make any grievance about the non-production of the documents in the memo of appeals that he files nor does he claims any prejudice on account of the same. It is difficult to appreciate how the petitioner could have overlooked such an important feature of the case at the stage of the enquiry or in appeal before the Appellate Authority if he had actually been prejudiced by reason of the non-summoning or production of the documents in question. It is only in the review petition that he filed before the Manager, that such a grievance is made. But the authority disposing of the review petition clearly points out in his order that the petitioner had not made any demand for summoning of any documents. In that view of the matter therefore it is difficult to accept Sri krishnaiah's submission that the petitioner had actually summoned certain documents and that he was prejudiced on account of the non-production of the same. The circumstances attendant upon the case, clearly point-out that there was no such request made by the petitioner and in any case, even if he had made one, the same was not pursued by him and that no prejudice was claimed or caused to him on that account. ( 32 ) SRI Krishnaiah, then submitted that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind properly and had failed to pass a speaking and satisfactory order while disposing of the appeal. Reliance was placed by him upon a Single Bench judgment of this Court in T. Venkatesh v Mysore Electrical industries Limited. ( 32 ) SRI Krishnaiah, then submitted that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind properly and had failed to pass a speaking and satisfactory order while disposing of the appeal. Reliance was placed by him upon a Single Bench judgment of this Court in T. Venkatesh v Mysore Electrical industries Limited. This argument need not detain me for long as a similar point was urged before me in the Case of Nagendra rao v Indian Bank, which I have disposed of today. Relying upon the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in s. N. Mukherjee v Union of India ; Bheru Singh S/o Kalyan singh v State of Rajasthan and Jugal Kishore Patnaik v ratnakar Mohanty. I have held that while passing an order of affirmance the Appellate Authority, is not necessarily required to record independent reasons or reappraise the entire evidence in explicit terms. I have in this regard observed thus:"the legal position is in the above background settled and may be summarised thus; The obligation to record reasons applies more vigorously to authorities whose orders are subject to appeal or revision before a higher authority. In such cases the requirement of recording reasons, not only ensures proper consideration by the authorities concerned of the relevant facts but also introduces clarity in the decision and minimises the chances of arbitrariness in the making of the said decision. Since any such order is appealable before a higher authority, the recording of reasons becomes necessary even to enable the Appellate Authority to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the lower authority has arrived at its conclusions. The obligation to give reasons however, may be dispensed with by the provisions of a statute or the rules either expressly or by necessary implication. If it is so exercised the obligation to record reasons disappears, as in the case of Court Martials exercising their jurisdiction under the provisions of the Army Act and the rules framed thereunder. The obligation to record reasons disappears even in cases where the Appellate Authority passes an order of affirmances in which even it is not necessary for the Appellate Authority to marshal the evidence and record independent conclusions or reasons for the same. Where however the Appellate Authority reverses the findings recorded, it must disclose the reasons for doing so and demonstrate that the reversal is based on proper application of mind. Where however the Appellate Authority reverses the findings recorded, it must disclose the reasons for doing so and demonstrate that the reversal is based on proper application of mind. The reasons recorded required to be record by an authority dealing with the matter need not be elaborate as is usually customary in the judgment delivered by the ordinary Courts. It is enough if what is recorded indicates due and proper application of mind to a matter in controversy". Following the said view I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission also. ( 33 ) IT was then contended that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was totally disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct alleged against him. The question as to whether the high Court can, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution examine the propriety of the punishment imposed upon the delinquent-employee, came up for consideration in V. K. Gopal u H. M. T. Limited. Relying upon the judgment of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of orissa and Others v Bidyabhushan Mahapatra ; Railway Board v Niranjan ; Union of India v Sardar Bahadur ; State of Uttar pradesh v Om Prakash Gupta and Union of India v parmananda , this Court held thus:"a conspectus of the judgments referred to above would, therefore, show that the power of Judicial Review enjoyed by the High Court under Article 226 is directed not against the decision but against the decision making process. If the process adopted for taking the decision is found to be valid and suffering from no infirmity the Court is not concerned with the quantum of punishment which is imposed upon the delinquent on proof of the charge against him. As to what punishment should be imposed upon a delinquent employee is a matter which is primarily within the domain of the employer. To this general proposition of law, there appear, to be two well defined exceptions namely: (1) cases where punishments is imposed otherwise than on the basis of an enquiry namely penalties imposed upon employees on the basis of the convictions by Criminal Courts. In such cases, the power to impose the penalty goes hand in hand with the duty to act fairly and justly. An exception to the general rule has been carved out by the Supreme Court in favour of such cases in Parmananda's case, supra. In such cases, the power to impose the penalty goes hand in hand with the duty to act fairly and justly. An exception to the general rule has been carved out by the Supreme Court in favour of such cases in Parmananda's case, supra. The other exception relates to cases which the punishment imposed is such as may be an outrageous defiance of logic so as to shock the conscience of the Court". Following the above judgment I have no hesitation in holding that this Court cannot except in the two situations identified in v. K. Gopal's case interfere with the quantum of punishment. The present case does not in my opinion fall within any one of the two exceptions to the rule so as to warrant any interference with the same. ( 34 ) THAT brings me to the last limb of Sri Krishnaiah's arguments. He submitted that the suspension order of petitioner had been passed by an authority not competent to do so. The power to suspend an Officer-employee of the Bank is available to the Bank in terms of Regulation 12 of the Indian Bank officers-Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. A plain reading of the said rule shows that the power to place an officer-employee under suspension can be exercised only by the 'competent Authority", the term "competent Authority" is defined by Regulation 3 (f) of the above Regulations thus: "3 (f) "competent Authority" means the authority appointed by the Board for the purposes of these regulations". ( 35 ) IN the instant case, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Joint General Manager of the Bank vide order dated 10-7-1979, Annexure-A to the writ petition. The question therefore is whether the Joint General Manager was the authority competent to have issued the said order within the meaning of Regulation 12 read with Regulation 3 (f) of the aforesaid regulations. It is obvious that the competence of the joint General Manager to issue such an order would depend upon the authorisation by the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank. There is nothing on record before me to show that the Joint General Manager had been appointed by the board of Directors as the Competent Authority for the purposes of the aforesaid regulations so as to be entitled to issue the order of suspension against the petitioner. There is nothing on record before me to show that the Joint General Manager had been appointed by the board of Directors as the Competent Authority for the purposes of the aforesaid regulations so as to be entitled to issue the order of suspension against the petitioner. Sri N. K. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the Bank was given an opportunity to produce a copy of the Resolution of the Board of Directors if any by which the Joint General Manager was appointed as the "competent Authority" under Regulation 3 (f) of the regulations. No such Resolution however was produced despite opportunity given to Sri Kumar. On the contrary he produced along with the memo an office order dated 14th October, 1978 issued by the managing Director of the Bank appointing the Joint General manager as the Chief vigilance officer and disciplinary authority in exercise of the powers under Regulation 5 (i) of the regulations. This order is not admittedly a resolution of the board appointing the Joint General Manager as a "competent authority. Appointment of a disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to impose penalties cannot be equalised with the appointment of a competent authority within the meaning of Regulation 12 read with Regulation 3 (f) of the regulations. While the former can be done by the Managing director the later is exclusively within the powers of the Board of Directors. In the absence of such a Board Resolution there is no gainsay that the order of suspension made by the Joint general Manager was legally incompetent. Sri Krishnaiah however fairly conceded that the illegality of the order of suspension passed against the petitioner did not invalidate the enquiry proceedings or the ultimate orders of punishment imposed upon the petitioner. Both Sri Krishnaiah and Sri Kumar agreed that the only effect which the illegality of the suspension order would have, would be to entitle the petitioner to the payment of full salary and allowances for the period he remained under suspension. ( 36 ) IN the result this petition succeeds but only in part and to the limited extent that the order of suspension issued by the joint General Manager dated 10-7-1979 is held to be illegal, incompetent and non est in the eye of law. ( 36 ) IN the result this petition succeeds but only in part and to the limited extent that the order of suspension issued by the joint General Manager dated 10-7-1979 is held to be illegal, incompetent and non est in the eye of law. Resultantly the petitioner shall be entitled to full salary and allowances otherwise payable to him for the entire period between 10-7-1979 and the date of his dismissal from service. The respondents shall arrange to pay the amount if not already paid within 3 months from today; after making adjustment of what has already been received by the petitioner as subsistence allowances for this period. The parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .