JUDGMENT B.P. Singh & I.P. Singh, JJ. This group of writ petitions involve common issues and have, therefore, been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners in these writ petitions are teachers of Patna University as also of other Universities in the State of Bihar. The Patna University is governed by the Patna University Act, 1976, while other Universities are governed by the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. The Patna University is a residential-cum-teaching University, whereas the other Universities are affiliating Universities. This, perhaps, is the reason why they are governed by two separate enactments, the representative facts of the case are taken from C.W.J.C. No. 12685 of 1992. 3. The petitioners are teachers of the Patna University working against sanctioned posts. Section 64 of the Patna University Act, 1976, provided that the date of retirement of teaching and non-teaching employees other than inferior servants of the University or any College shall be the date on which he attained the age of 60 years. Section 64 of the Patna University Act is as follows : "64. Retirement from Service. - (a) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act the date of retirement of any teaching or non-teaching employee other than inferior servants of the University or any College, shall be the date on which he attains the age of 60 years: Provided that such teachers, who do not opt for the pay scales revised with effect from the first day of January, 1973, and such non-teaching employees, who are in the service of the University from date prior to the commencement of this Act, shall retire after attaining the age of 62 years : Provided further that no University shall extend the period of service or reappoint any teaching or non-teaching employees after his completing the age of 60 or 62 years as the case may be." A similar provision is to be found in Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. It is not in dispute that the petitioners would have retired at the age of 60 in accordance with Section 64 of the Patna University Act or Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, had an Ordinance not been promulgated in the year 1986. It is not in dispute that the petitioners would have retired at the age of 60 in accordance with Section 64 of the Patna University Act or Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, had an Ordinance not been promulgated in the year 1986. The Patna University (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1986 (Bihar Ordinance 34 of 1986) was published in the gazette on 3-12-1986, though it came into effect from 1st April 1986 amending Section 64 of the Patna University Act. Similarly, Bihar Ordinance 35 of 1986 was promulgated, which had the effect of amending Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. The provisions of the two Ordinances are in pari materia. For the sake of convenience the relevant provision of Bihar Ordinance 34 of 1986, which sought to amend the Patna University Act may be noticed. It provided : "3. Amendment of Section 64 of Bihar Act 24 of 1976.-In the said Act for clause (a) to Section 64 the following shall be substituted; namely:- (a) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the University or of a college with effect from the Ist April, 1986 shall be the date on which he attains the age of 62 years. The date of retirement of non-teaching employee (other than inferior servants) shall be the date on which he attains the age of 60 years, but the date of retirement of such non-teaching employees who are in the service of the University prior to the commencement of this Act, shall be the date on which he attains the age of 62 years : Provided that the University shall in no case, extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee or re-appoint him after he attains the age of 60 or 62 years as the case may be." The said Ordinance had the effect of altering the age of superannuation and providing that the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the University, or of a College, with effect from 1st April, 1986, shall be the date on which he attains the age of 62 years. 4. It is not in dispute that successive Ordinances were promulgated from time to time to the same effect, such as Bihar Ordinance 20 of 1987, 11 of 1988 and 17 of 1989. 4. It is not in dispute that successive Ordinances were promulgated from time to time to the same effect, such as Bihar Ordinance 20 of 1987, 11 of 1988 and 17 of 1989. It is also not dispute that the last of such Ordinances, namely, Patna University (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 1989 (Bihar Ordinance 17 of 1989) lapsed in August, 1989, and was not followed by any legislative enactment or repromulgation of an Ordinance. A writ petition was filed before this Court, being C.W.J.C. No. 7784 of 1988, which was disposed of by this Court on 7-11-1989 holding that after lapse of the last Ordinance, and in the absence of any Act having come into force, substituting the original Section 64 of the Patna University Act, the aforesaid Section 64 of the Patna University Act revived and the teaching staff of the University had to retire after attaining the age of 60 years. Faced with this situation, Patna University (Amendment) Third Ordinance, 1990, was promulgated containing the same provisions as in the earlier Ordinances. In view of the fact that there was a time gap between the lapse of the last Ordinance and promulgation of another Ordinance, Section 10 was incorporated in the Third Amendment Ordinance of 1990 providing that between the period the Patna University (Amendment) Second Ordinance 1989, lapsed and the date of promulgation of Patna University (Amendment) Third Ordinance, 1990, the provisions of the Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Obviously, the purpose was to safeguard the interest of the teachers, who may have retired during this interregnum. The benefit of retirement age of 62 was consequently bestowed upon all. Thereafter followed successive Ordinances which were promulgated at different times in the years 1990, 1991 and 1992. The last Ordinance being Bihar Ordinance 15 of 1992 lapsed on 15th August, 1992, and thereafter no Ordinance was promulgated increasing the age of retirement to 62. 5. So far as the other Universities governed by the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 are concerned, after the lapse of the Ordinance in the year 1990 the legislature stepped in the enacted Bihar Act 3 of 1990 by which Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 was amended providing that the retirement age of teachers of the Universities governed by the Act shall be 62 years. A specific provision was incorporated in the Act, so that those persons who may have retired during the period between the lapse of the Ordinance and the enactment of the statute were also given the benefit of the amended Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act. 6. It would thus appear that from the year 1986 till August, 1992 Section 64 of the Patna University Act stood amended by successive Ordinances so as to raise the age of retirement of teachers from 60 to 62. In the case of Universities governed by the Bihar State Universities Act, Section 67 of the Act stood amended by promulgation of Ordinances from 1986 to 1990 and thereafter by enactment of Bihar Act 3 of 1990 so as to raise the age of retirement of teachers of other Universities from 60 to 62. 7. So far as the Patna University is concerned, upon the lapse of Bihar Ordinance 50 of 1992 in August, 1992 in view of the provision of Article 213 (2)(A) of the Constitution, the Vice Chancellor of the Patna University authorised the issuance of a notification declaring that the petitioners and others, had retired from University service with effect from 31-8-1992 in view of the lapse of the Ordinance on 15-8-1992, because in view of the lapse of the Ordinance Section 64 of the Patna University Act revived which provided for 60 as the age of retirement of teachers of Patna University. The notification issued under the authority of the Vice Chancellor was published on 4-12-1992 and is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The instant writ petition was filed on 9-12-1992 challenging the said Notification issued by the Vice Chancellor of the Patna University. The order of the Vice Chancellor was challenged on several grounds, and one of the main grounds urged was that the lapse of such Ordinance did not result in automatic revival of the original Section 64 of the Patna University Act, 1976. The accomplished facts and accrued rights could not be abrogated and snatched by mere lapse of Ordinance. 8. On 9-2-1993 the Patna University (Amendment) Ordinance. 1993 (Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1993) was promulgated. On the same day Bihar State Universities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance 6 of 1993) was also promulgated. The accomplished facts and accrued rights could not be abrogated and snatched by mere lapse of Ordinance. 8. On 9-2-1993 the Patna University (Amendment) Ordinance. 1993 (Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1993) was promulgated. On the same day Bihar State Universities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance 6 of 1993) was also promulgated. These Ordinances had the effect of substituting clause (a) of Section 64 and clause (a) of Section 67 of the Patna University Act and Bihar State Universities Act respectively. Since the provisions are identical, the provision of Section 2 of Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1993 may be noticed which provided as follows :- "(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or any other Act, Ordinance, Rules, or any judgment or decree of a Court, the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the University or of a College shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty years. The date of retirement of non-teaching employee (other than the inferior servants) shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty years : Provided that the date of retirement of such non-teaching employee, who is in the service of the University prior to commencement of the Patna University Act, 1976 (Bihar Act 24, 1976) shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty two years: Provided further that the University shall, in no case, extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee or reappoint him after he attains the age of sixty or sixty two years, as the case may be;" 9. A mere perusal of the provision makes it clear that the effect of the Ordinance was to prescribe the age of 60 to be the age of retirement of teaching employees of the University or of a College. 10. The petitioners filed an amendment petition challenging the validity of Bihar Ordinance No. 5 of 1993. It is not necessary to notice the proceedings before this Court at that stage, but it is not in dispute that two further Ordinance in the same terms were repromulgated on 27-4-1993 being Patna University (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance no. 15 of 1993) and Bihar State Universities (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance no. 14 of 1993). It is not necessary to notice the proceedings before this Court at that stage, but it is not in dispute that two further Ordinance in the same terms were repromulgated on 27-4-1993 being Patna University (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance no. 15 of 1993) and Bihar State Universities (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance no. 14 of 1993). The petitioners again filed a petition praying that they may be granted leave to maintain the challenge of Ordinance no. 15 of 1993 on the ground mentioned in the first amendment petition challenging Bihar Ordinance no. 5 of 1993. They also incorporated other grounds on challenge. Writ petitions were filed by teachers of other Universities challenging the Bihar State Universities (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance No. 14 of 1993). 11. The aforesaid two impugned Ordinances were replaced by the Patna University (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Bihar Act 18 of 1993) and the Bihar State Universities (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Bihar Act 17 of 1993). The legislations substituting the Ordinances contained the same provisions, as contained in the earlier Ordinances. For the sake of convenience, we may notice the relevant provisions of the Patna University (Amendment) Act, 1993, which provided as follows : "14. Amendment of Section 64 of Bihar Act 24 of 1976.-In the said Act for clause (a) of Section 64, the following shall be substituted, namely:- (a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Act, Rules or any judgment or decree of a Court, the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the University or of a College shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty years. The date of retirement of non-teaching employee (other than the inferior servants) shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty years : Provided that the date of retirement of such non-teaching employee, who is in the service of the University prior to the commencement of the Patna University Act, 1976 (Bihar Act 24, 1976) shall be the date on which he attains the age of sixty-two years : Provided further that the University shall, In no case extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee after he attains the age of sixty or sixty-two years as the case may be : Provided further also that re-appointment of teachers after retirement may be made in appropriate cases up to the age of sixty five years in the manner laid down in the Statutes made in this behalf in accordance with the guidelines of the University Grants Commission." It is, therefore, apparent that after August 1993 the Patna University Act as also Bihar State Universities Act were amended, and it was clearly provided by law that the date of retirement of a teaching employee of an University or of a College shall be the date on which he attains the age of 60 years. Section 14 of the Amendment Act which sought to amend Section 64 of the Patna University Act was deemed to have come into force with effect from 16th August, 1990. The date of coming into effect of the said provision is relevant, because Bihar Ordinance No. 15 of 1992 had lapsed on 15th August, 1992, and that was followed by the promulgation of two Ordinances which were ultimately replaced by Bihar Acts 17 and 18 of 1993. The petitioners amended the writ petitions with a view to challenge the aforesaid Bihar Acts 17 and 18 of 1993 amending the provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 and the Patna University Act, 1976 respectively. 12. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the Acts as also the notification issued under the authority of the Vice Chancellor-vide Annexure-1 on several grounds. It is the case of the petitioners that by the promulgation of the Ordinance in the year 1986 and the successive Ordinances which followed, the University Acts stood amended so as to provide 62 as the age of retirement of teachers of the University or of a College. It is the case of the petitioners that by the promulgation of the Ordinance in the year 1986 and the successive Ordinances which followed, the University Acts stood amended so as to provide 62 as the age of retirement of teachers of the University or of a College. Once the Act stood amended, a right accrued in their favour and they could be retired only at the age of 62. Even if the Ordinance lapsed, it did not adversely affect the right accrued in favour of the petitioners. They cannot, therefore, be retired till they attain the age of 62 years. The Acts in so far as they take away the vested rights of the petitioners are violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300 of the Constitution of India. The Act has also been made to operate retrospectively and is, therefore, ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, since it unreasonably deprives the petitioners of their vested rights. It was also submitted that the Acts enacted by the legislature were colourable pieces of legislation, since the real object of those enactments was not what it was projected to be. The real object of the enactments was to retire old teachers so as to create vacancies against which fresh appointments could be made. It was further submitted that the proviso to Section 64 of the Act, as amended, created a right in favour of the petitioners. It vested a power coupled with a duty and, therefore, the proviso was mandatory in nature. The University and its authorities were bound to frame statutes providing for re-employment of retired teachers, but the proviso did not prescribe the period within which the statutes had to be framed. No guideline has been prescribed, and unbridled and unfettered powers were vested in the authorities. It was also submitted that the proviso prescribed a condition precedent without fulfilment of which the main part of Section 64 of the Patna Universities Act, and Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act could not be operated. In any event, the Vice Chancellor could not issue an order for the retirement of the teachers unless the statutes were framed in accordance with the provisions contained in the proviso to Sections 64 and 67 of the Patna University Act and the Bihar State Universities Act respectively. In any event, the Vice Chancellor could not issue an order for the retirement of the teachers unless the statutes were framed in accordance with the provisions contained in the proviso to Sections 64 and 67 of the Patna University Act and the Bihar State Universities Act respectively. It was also urged that if the enactments were enacted with a view to meet the requirement of the scheme framed by the University Grants Commission and approved by the Central Government, a composite scheme should have been framed. Merely by reducing the age of retirement the objective could not be achieved. The enactments were, therefore, a fraud on the Constitution as also a fraud on power. There was no justification for the reduction of the age of retirement of the teachers, when it was once increased to 62 by the Ordinance promulgated in the year 1986 and successive Ordinances promulgated thereafter. 13. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been explained that the Patna University (Amendment) Ordinance 1986, whereby the retirement age of the University teachers was raised from 60 to 62 was promulgated at a time when the Government of India's approval to University Grants Commission recommended pay-scales was not communicated. That came in the year 1987 when a letter was received on 17-6-1987 from the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources Development Department. The U.G.C. scheme of revised pay-scales, inter alia, stipulated that the age of superannuation for teachers should be 60 years, and that thereafter no extension of service should be granted. The payment of central assistance for implementation of the scheme would be subject to the conditions that the entire scheme of revision of pay scales together with all the conditions attached to it were implemented by the State Government as a composite scheme without any modification whatsoever. The Government of Bihar did not immediately accept the U.G.C. recommended pay scales and the Ordinances were repromulgated whereunder the teachers continued to retire at the enhanced age of 62 years. The Government of India took a serious view of the matter, because it appeared to the' Government of India that if the Government of Bihar were to fix the age of retirement at 62 years, it would have wide repercussions in other States. The Government of India took a serious view of the matter, because it appeared to the' Government of India that if the Government of Bihar were to fix the age of retirement at 62 years, it would have wide repercussions in other States. At the same time for non-implementation of the U.G.C. revised by scales and other recommended facilities the University teachers in the State of Bihar went on strike, and with a view to find a solution to the problem the Government announced acceptance and implementation of U.G.C. recommended pay scales and other schemes with certain modifications. Though the Government orders were issued in August 1989, which in sum and substance carried the entire composite scheme including the recommended superannuation age of 60 years, it did not provide for reopening all time bound promotions granted to the teachers from 17-6-1987 to 1-3-1989. It may be noticed that under the U.G.C. scheme there was no provision for grant of time bound promotion. It was under these circumstances that the Patna University (Amendment) Second Ordinance 1989 was permitted to lapse. However, in the hope that the Government of Bihar would be able to prevail upon the Government of India to agree to these deviations, namely, enhancement of age of retirement from 60 to 62 and shifting of promotion date from 17-6-1987 to 1-3-1989 for the purpose of acceptance of new revised U.G.C. scheme, it decided to repromulgate the Ordinance with similar provisions as in the lapsed Ordinance. The Government of Bihar on 30th January, 1991, submitted a detailed statement, claiming reimbursement of Central assistance against introduction of U.G.C. recommended pay scales for University teachers amounting to Rs. 31.18 crores. However, the Government of India was not willing to accept the deviations made by the Government of Bihar with regard to age of retirement and shifting of date of promotion for the reason that such acceptance would have had very wide repercussions on other States. In these circumstances, Bihar Ordinance no. 15 of 1992 was allowed to lapse, because by then it had become clear that the Government of India would not agree to the proposal of the State of Bihar that the age of retirement of University teachers should be 62 years instead of 60 as provided in the U.G.C. scheme. In these circumstances, Bihar Ordinance no. 15 of 1992 was allowed to lapse, because by then it had become clear that the Government of India would not agree to the proposal of the State of Bihar that the age of retirement of University teachers should be 62 years instead of 60 as provided in the U.G.C. scheme. The Ordinance was allowed to lapse so as to enable the State, firstly, to receive the Central assistance and, secondly, to bring the retirement age of University teachers in Bihar on all India pattern. Unless this was done the benefits under the U.G.C. package could not be extended to the Universities of Bihar. 14. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University is also on the same lines. 15. Before adverting to the submissions addressed at the Bar, it would be useful first to notice the amendments brought about to Section 64 of the Patna University Act and Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act, which are in pari materia, with a view to appreciate their true scope and import. Clause (a) of Section 64 as amended begins with a non-obstante clause, so that the provision overrides anything to the contrary contained in any Act, Rules or any judgment or decree of a court. The section then provides that the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the University, or of a College, shall be the date on which he attains the age of 60. We are not in this batch of writ petitions concerned with the age of retirement of non-teaching employees. Section 14 of the Patna University (Amendment) Act, 1993, which brings about this amendment to Section 64 of the parent Act is deemed to have come into force with effect from 16th August, 1992, as provided in Section 1 of the Amendment Act. As noticed earlier, Section 64 (a), as it originally stood, provided for age of superannuation to two different categories of teachers, namely, those who had opted for the new U.G.C. scales, and those who had opted for the old U.G.C. scales. In the instant cases, we are concerned with the petitioners, who had opted for new U.G.C. scales, which were higher than the old U.G.C. scales. Their age of retirement under Section 64 of the Act, as it originally stood, was 60 years. In the instant cases, we are concerned with the petitioners, who had opted for new U.G.C. scales, which were higher than the old U.G.C. scales. Their age of retirement under Section 64 of the Act, as it originally stood, was 60 years. That was amended by subsequent Ordinances, and the age of retirement was 62 when the last Ordinance lapsed on 15th August, 1992. With a view to cover the entire period the amendment to Section 64 of the Act has been brought into force with effect from 16th August, 1992. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the main part of Section 64, as amended, alters the conditions of service of teachers of the University and reduces the age of retirement from 62 to 60. The first proviso does not deal with teachers of the University, but the second proviso in express terms stipulates that the University shall in no case extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee after he attains the age of 60 or 62 years, as the case may be. There is, therefore, a complete prohibition against extension of the period of service of any teacher after he attains the age of 60 years. The third proviso is material, since the petitioners have relied upon the said proviso in support of their case. The third proviso enables reappointment of teachers in appropriate cases upto the age of 65 years, but this is subject to the condition that such reappointment may be granted in the manner laid down in the statutes made in this behalf in accordance with the guidelines of the University Grants Commission. In a nutshell, the main part of Section 64, as amended, reduced the age of retirement from 62 to 60 and thereby alters the conditions of service of the teachers of the University. The second proviso prohibits extension of the period of service of any teacher after attaining the age of 60 years. The third proviso enables the University to re-appoint a teacher after retirement upto the age of 65 years, but in the manner laid down in the Statutes made in this behalf in accordance with the guidelines of the University Grants Commission. The operation of the main part of Section 64 is not made dependent upon the happening of any other event. The operation of the main part of Section 64 is not made dependent upon the happening of any other event. The main part of Section 64 takes effect, as it were, by its own force, and the age of retirement is reduced to 60 from 62, as was provided under the successive Ordinances. The second or third proviso does not control the operation of the main part of the section. The second proviso is really in the nature of a prohibition prohibiting the University from extending the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee after attaining the age of superannuation. This was, perhaps, considered necessary in view of the fact that Section 64 before its amendment provided for extension of service of retired teachers. The third proviso clarifies that prohibition against extension of service of a retired teacher will not preclude the University from reappointing teachers after retirement in appropriate cases upto the age of 65 years in accordance with the Statutes framed in this regard, which must be framed having regard to the guidelines of the University Grants Commission. The third proviso, therefore, is only an enabling provision, and by reason of the third proviso it is open to the University to frame Statutes with regard to reappointment of teachers in appropriate cases, having regard to the guidelines of the University Grants Commission. In one sense the third proviso clarifies and carves out from the scope of extension of service, cases of reappointment in accordance with the Statutes. The two provisos read together differentiate a case of extension of service from a case of reappointment of a teacher. 16. The third proviso, which is in the nature of enabling provision, vests in the University the power of reappointment, but controls the exercise of such power by providing guidelines for its exercise, namely, that such power must be exercised only in appropriate cases upto the age of 65 years, and in the manner laid down by the Statutes made in this behalf in accordance with the guidelines of the University Grants Commission. The power of reappointment, therefore, cannot be exercised unless Statutes are framed, as provided under the third proviso. The power of reappointment, therefore, cannot be exercised unless Statutes are framed, as provided under the third proviso. However, it would be difficult to read into the third proviso a duty cast upon the University to frame Statutes, because it is a matter of policy whether the University will provide for reappointment under its Statutes. The University may or may not provide for reappointment of teachers after retirement, but if it is provided, it must be done in accordance with the third proviso, namely, after framing statutes in the manner laid down in the third proviso. 17. So understood, it appears to us quite clear that the main part of the section takes effect by its own force, and the third proviso does not lay down any condition precedent for operation of the main part of the section. Even if statutes are not framed providing for reappointment of teachers, those teachers who attain the age of 60 years, must retire from University service. There is no obligation mandatorily cast upon the University to frame Statutes. Only in the event it is decided to provide for reappointment the requirement of the proviso must be met. We have equally no doubt that the third proviso does not confer any right upon a retiring teacher of a University to get reappointed. No doubt, if the Statutes are framed, in appropriate cases retiring teachers may be considered for reappointment in accordance with the Statutes, but that is not to say that every retiring teacher can, as a matter of right, seek reappointment. The criticism that the power vested by the third proviso is uncontrolled and unbridled is also not tenable, because the third proviso, which vests the power in the University to reappoint retired teachers, lays down the manner in which that power is to be exercised. The third proviso clearly provides that only in appropriate cases upto the age of 65, reappointment may be granted. Secondly, it must be granted in the manner laid down by the Statutes, and thirdly that the Statutes must be framed in accordance with the guidelines' of the University Grants Commission. The power of reappointment is, therefore, not uncontrolled or unbridled power, but has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the third proviso, which itself lays down clearly the guidelines and the controls. The power of reappointment is, therefore, not uncontrolled or unbridled power, but has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the third proviso, which itself lays down clearly the guidelines and the controls. It is not necessary for us to consider whether reappointment of a retired teacher can be granted without the Statutes being framed, but it is enough to say that even if the Statutes are not framed in this regard, the main part of the section takes effect and a teacher must retire if he attains the age of 60 years, whether Statutes for reappointment are or are not framed. 18. Mr. S.P Mukherjee, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the legislation was a colourable piece of legislation. According to him, the avowed purpose for which the legislation was enacted, was not the real purpose. According to him, the sole purpose for which Section 64 of the Patna University Act, and Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act were amended was to retire old teachers, so that fresh appointments could be made against the vacancies caused by such retirement. He further submitted that the excuses put forward by the State, that with a view to meet the University Grants Commission's requirements the amendments had become necessary, should also not be accepted, because if that was the intention behind the amendments, other conditions laid down by the University Grants Commission must also be complied with. 19. In our view, the argument that the amending Acts are colourable pieces of legislation cannot be accepted, because it is not the case of the petitioners that the legislature had no legislative competence to enact the amending Acts. In fact, the argument proceeds on the basis that the legislature had the necessary competence, but its motive were doubtful. It is by now well-settled that the plenary legislative power of the State legislature to pass laws has no limitation, except those to which the legislative power of the State legislature is subject. Though a law can be invalidated for contravention of constitutional limitations which inhibits upon the power of State legislature to pass laws, it cannot be declared invalid on the ground that it was enacted with improper motives. Though a law can be invalidated for contravention of constitutional limitations which inhibits upon the power of State legislature to pass laws, it cannot be declared invalid on the ground that it was enacted with improper motives. In the case of T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 S.C. 724 ) it was held: "It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the legislature concerned. Dependent upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised. The motives of the legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether the legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the courts." Similarly, in K. Nagaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 SC 551 ) it was held: "... It was also urged by counsel that by reducing the age of retirement to 55 years, the Government employees were deprived of their right to livelihood. There is no substance in this latter argument because, if a rule of retirement can be deemed to deprive a person of his right to livelihood, it will be impermissible to provide for an age of retirement at all. That will be contrary to public interest because the State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its employees to continue in service after they have passed the point of peak performance. Rules of retirement do not take away the right of a person to his livelihood : they limit his right to hold office to a stated number of years." 20. In view of the law well-settled it would not be proper for us to investigate the motives of the legislature in passing the amendment Acts. Rules of retirement do not take away the right of a person to his livelihood : they limit his right to hold office to a stated number of years." 20. In view of the law well-settled it would not be proper for us to investigate the motives of the legislature in passing the amendment Acts. We can only examine whether the legislations have transgressed the constitutional limitations, without enquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. 21. It has not been contended before us that the legislature was not competent to enact the legislation with regard to the retirement age of University employees in fact, the amendment Acts merely amend the laws already in force. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Nagaraj (supra) it cannot be argued that the age of retirement of an employee of the University cannot be reduced by amending the law. In that case the government order reducing the age of superannuation of Government employees, other than in the last Grade Service, from 58 to 55 years was challenged. Two notifications were issued in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitution. Other consequential amendments were also made. By these notifications every government servant, whether ministerial or non-ministerial, but not belonging to the last Grade Service, who had already attained the age of 55 years was to retire from service with effect from February 28, 1983. The challenge to the Government orders and notifications was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held : "On the basis of this data, it is difficult to hold that in reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55, the State Government or the Legislature acted arbitrarily or irrationally. There are precedents within our country itself for fixing the retirement age at 55 or for reducing it from 58 to 55. Either the one or the other of these two stages is regarded generally as acceptable, depending upon the employment policy of the Government of the day. It is not possible to lay down an inflexible rule that 58 years is a reasonable age for retirement and 55 is not. Either the one or the other of these two stages is regarded generally as acceptable, depending upon the employment policy of the Government of the day. It is not possible to lay down an inflexible rule that 58 years is a reasonable age for retirement and 55 is not. If the policy adopted for the time being by the Government or the legislature is shown to violate recognised norms of employment planning, it would be possible to say that the policy is irrational since, in that event, it would not bear reasonable nexus with the object which it seeks to achieve. But such is not the case here. The reports of the various Commissions, from which we have extracted relevant portions, show that the creation of new avenues of employment for the youth is an integral part of any policy governing the fixation of retirement age. Since the impugned policy is actuated and influenced predominantly by that consideration, it cannot be struck clown as arbitrary or irrational." 22. Having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, and the proper approach in such matters indicated in the judgment, we have to examine whether the amendment Acts adopt a policy which is shown to violate recognised norms of economic planning, so that it may be said that the policy is irrational and bears to reasonable nexus with the object which it seeks to achieve. In the instant case, the stand of the State is that with a view to derive the benefit of U.G.C. package, it became necessary for the State to reduce the age of retirement of teachers in Universities from 62 to 60. It is not disputed that with a view to get the benefits under the U.G.C. scheme the conditions laid down by the University Grants Commission, and approved by the Central Government, had to be fulfilled. One such condition was that the age of retirement of teachers of Universities should not be more than 60. It appears from the averments in the counter-affidavit that the State of Bihar tried its very best to retain the age of 62 as the age of retirement of University teachers, but the Government of India did not accede to the request of the State Government, as it thought that doing so would have serious repercussions in other States. It appears from the averments in the counter-affidavit that the State of Bihar tried its very best to retain the age of 62 as the age of retirement of University teachers, but the Government of India did not accede to the request of the State Government, as it thought that doing so would have serious repercussions in other States. This also explains why the amendment Acts were not immediately enacted, and some times elapsed, which were covered by Ordinances successively promulgated to safeguard the interest of the teachers of the University. The events do not disclose an unfavourable approach of the State Government towards the teachers of the University. In fact, it indicates to the contrary. Only as a last resort, when it was felt that the State will be debarred of the sumptuous grants under the University Grants Commission scheme, it was compelled to enact the amending Acts reducing the age of retirement from 62 to 60. There is one other reason disclosed in the counter-affidavit of the State, namely, that the State Government found that in most of the Universities in other States the age of retirement of teachers of the Universities was 60 and, therefore, with a view to bring about unformity, the age of retirement was reduced from 62 to 60. Having regard to these facts it would be difficult to hold that the policy followed by the State Government in reducing the age of retirement was either irrational or unreasonable, or that it had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It was for the State to decide whether it would forego the benefits under the Central scheme or whether it would comply with the requirements of the scheme and fulfil the conditions laid down therein. That was essentially a matter of policy, because it was open to the State not to accept grants from the University Grants Commission, in which case it was not bound to comply with the conditions laid down in the scheme formulated by the University Grants Commission. Having regard to the various advantages which accrued to the teachers as well as the State, if the State decided to implement the U.G.C. scheme, and took such a policy decision, it cannot be characterised as irrational, arbitrary or unreasonable. Having regard to the various advantages which accrued to the teachers as well as the State, if the State decided to implement the U.G.C. scheme, and took such a policy decision, it cannot be characterised as irrational, arbitrary or unreasonable. In fact, it appears from the averments in the counter-affidavit that the teachers of the Universities in the State of Bihar as well were clamouring for U.G.C. scales, and they had resorted to agitational methods for grant of U.G.C. scales. Obviously, therefore, the reduction of age of retirement became a necessity, and therefore amendments Acts were enacted which were perfectly within the legislative competence of the State legislature. 23. The submission, therefore, the impugned Acts are colourable pieces of legislation must be rejected. 24. It was then submitted that the petitioners acquired a right under the lapsed Ordinances to continue in the service of the University till they attained the age of 62. It was, therefore, contended that the legislature could not enact a law retrospectively, so as to divest the petitioners of the rights which had accrued to them. The submission that the right which had accrued to the petitioners could not be divested by enacting a law with retrospective effect must be rejected, for the reasons which we shall hereafter discuss, but before dealing with this aspect of the matter, we shall first consider whether the amending Act which relates to Patna University has retrospective operation in the sense that it purports to divest the accrued rights of the teachers of the University, and secondly, whether any right at all accrued to the petitioners to continue till the age of 62. As to what is the effect of expiry of temporary Statute has been the subject matter of large number of decisions including several decisions of the Supreme Court of India, but the of quoted statement of the law by Park-B in Steavenson vs. Oliver [(1841) 151 ER 1024] has evoked no dissent, and in fact has been approved by several decisions of the Supreme Court. It was there observed "the extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of its provision, are matters of construction" in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar ( AIR 1962 SC 945 ) the Supreme Court held: "The nature of the right and obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and their character, may have to be regarded in determining whether the said right or obligation is enduring or not." The authorities are legion, and the law is well settled that only the rights and obligations resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act which are enduring in nature survive the expiry of the Act. It is always a matter of construction and interpretation as to whether those rights and obligations are, or are not, of an enduring nature. These principles have also been approved by the Supreme Court in T. Venkata Reddy (supra). The question then is whether on the lapse of the Ordinance in the year 1992 the petitioners had acquired a right to retire at the age of 62. In our view, assuming that the Ordinance had the effect of amending the principal Act, at best the petitioners could continue to serve the University till the age of 62, if the law was not amended. No right had accrued to them in the sense in which it is understood in this context that is, in the sense of a right accrued which could not be taken away by retrospective legislation. The principle was succinctly stated in Sakharam vs. Manikchand ( AIR 1963 SC 354 ) thus: "The mere right, existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the statute repealed, is not a right accrued". The aforesaid principle will aptly apply to the facts of this case, because on the date on which the Ordinance lapsed, the petitioner had a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of the Ordinance. Obviously, therefore it cannot be held that a right had accrued in favour of the petitioners which could not be defeated or taken away by subsequent legislation. 25. The amendment introduced by the Amendment Act in so far as it relates to Patna University no doubt is deemed to have come into effect retrospectively from 16th August, 1992, but it may not be correct to characterise the operation of the amended provision as retrospective. 25. The amendment introduced by the Amendment Act in so far as it relates to Patna University no doubt is deemed to have come into effect retrospectively from 16th August, 1992, but it may not be correct to characterise the operation of the amended provision as retrospective. It is not as if all persons who had retired after 16th August, 1992, and before the enactment of the amending Act were affected by the amendment of Section 64. Those who had retired arid were no more in the service of the University were unaffected by the operation of Section 64 as amended. It is not as if the Act authorised, or the University claimed refund of any salary or allowance paid to them after they were deemed to have retired under the provision of the Act. The amended provisions apply only to the persons who remain in service and, therefore, operated prospectively. Those who had attained the age of 60 years on the date on which the amending Act was promulgated were asked to retire, and others who remained in service were to retire on attaining the age of 60 years. In this sense it cannot be said that the operation of the amended provision of the Act was retrospective in character, The Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K vs. Triloki Nath Khosa [ 1974 (1) SCC 19 ] held :- "An argument which found favour with Mufti Bahauddin, J., one of the learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, and which was repeated before us is that the 'retrospective' application of the impugned Rules is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate this argument and impossible to accept it. It is wrong to characterise the operation of a service rule as retrospective for the reason that it applies to existing employees. A rule which classifies such employees for promotional purposes, undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule but it operates in future, in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service, The impugned Rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay scale already granted." In the instant case as well Section 64 as amended applies to existing employees and operates in future. 26. 26. We, therefore, find no substance in the argument urged on behalf of the petitioners that accrued rights are sought to be divested by enactment of a legislation with retrospective effect. 27. Even assuming that the petitioners had a right to retire at the age of 62 years, there is no bar to the legislature enacting a law unilaterally altering the conditions of service of an employee. In the case of State of Gujrat vs. Raman Lal Keshav Lal ( AIR 1984 SC 161 ) upon which petitioners placed reliance, it was held that law, both prospective and retrospective, must satisfy the test of constitutional validity. The legislature has power to legislate retrospectively and to take away or impair any vested right acquired under an existing statute, but if it was shown that the legislation was in breach of a constitutional provision, or offended the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, they could be struck down on that ground. In that particular case it was found by the Court that the petitioners had acquired the status of a Government servant long ago, which were not extinguished either by abolition of the post or termination of service Retrospectivity was sought to be given to the Amending Act so that they could not claim to be Government servants ever, and consequently could not complain that they were singled out for differential treatment. The Court held that the Act was unreasonable and arbitrary inasmuch as it had ignored the march of events and purported to defeat their rights as Government servants by enacting a law retrospectively which had the effect of depriving them the status of a Government servant. The law was found to be unreasonable. Similarly, in Prabhakar Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1986 SC 210 ) the Court held that if the purpose of the Act was to undo the wrong and injustice caused by reduction of age of retirement, the benefit thereof should have been extended to all including those who had retired under the policy of reduction, and those who had retired thereafter, but before passing of the Ordinance. The affected parties hit by reduction of age of superannuation formed a class and there was no reason to pick out a class of persons for differential treatment when others deserved the same treatment. The affected parties hit by reduction of age of superannuation formed a class and there was no reason to pick out a class of persons for differential treatment when others deserved the same treatment. These decisions only highlight the principle that the law which affects the conditions of service has also to be judged on the same touchstone on which any other law is judged for its constitutional validity. If the law transgresses the Constitutional limitations, the law is bad, and if it does not it is good. Retrospectivity by itself is not a vitiating factor, even if the law takes away a right or impairs the right of citizens. Not only the terms and conditions of service can be altered, it is open to the legislature to enact a law abolishing the office itself. In T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 SC 724 ) the Supreme Court was considering an Ordinance which provided for abolition of posts of part-time village officers. The Ordinance declared that every person who held the post of part-time village Officer would cease to hold the post, and that all posts stood abolished and the officers ceased to be employees of the State Government. The Ordinance also provided for creation of village Assistant and for filling up those posts in accordance with law, and it further provided for some payment to the holders of the post. It was held that once the Ordinance was passed, the posts of part-time village Officer stood abolished, and the officers ceased to be the employees of the State Government. These two matters were accomplished facts on the relevant date irrespective of whether the holders of the post were paid as per Section 5 of the Ordinance or new posts of Village Assistant were filled up. It made no difference if no law was passed by the legislature in terms of the Ordinance which lapsed. The effect of the Ordinance was irreversible, except by express legislation. 28. The learned Advocate General in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1277 (State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan). In that case a Member of the Electricity Board continued in office as Member even after attaining the age of 65 years. 28. The learned Advocate General in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1277 (State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan). In that case a Member of the Electricity Board continued in office as Member even after attaining the age of 65 years. The provision was amended and Section 3 prescribed 65 years as the age of superannuation. Section 3 in that case also contained a non-obstante clause. A member of the Board who had crossed the age of 65 was sought to be removed under the said provision, and it was urged on behalf of the said Member that his tenure of office could not be affected by the Ordinance. The contention was negatived. The Court held : "One thing that is significant is it contains a 'non obstante' clause. An appointment of a member of the Board made prior to the commencement to this Act namely, 13.7.90 (giving retrospective operation) when gives a right to continue as a member after attaining the age of 65 years, that appointment is rendered void. Once it is so rendered void, the law deems that he has ceased to hold office of the Member of the Board. By a reading of the Section we are unable to conclude how Section 3 (1) would fail to apply to a person who on the date of the commencement was already more than 65 years. This line of reasoning adopted by the High Court does not appeal to us. The Section nowhere makes a distinction between those on the date of the enactment are "below" or "over" 65 years of age. Such a distinction is totally unwarranted. The crucial question to be asked is whether the particular incumbent is continuing after the attainment of 65 years of age, if that question is answered in the affirmative there is a cessation of office, in view of the terms of that Section. The contrary conclusion would lead to strange results. Such a distinction is totally unwarranted. The crucial question to be asked is whether the particular incumbent is continuing after the attainment of 65 years of age, if that question is answered in the affirmative there is a cessation of office, in view of the terms of that Section. The contrary conclusion would lead to strange results. Those who are appointed prior to the Act and on the attainment of 65 years on 13-7-90, would vacate the office while a person already 65 on that date and after the passing of the Act notwithstanding the policy of prescribing the age of superannuation of 65 years would continue in the office The object of introducing an age of superannuation itself is to weed out the older elements and infuse fresh blood so that the administration could function with vigour" In the instant case as well the amended provisions contain a non-obstante clause - and the same principles would apply. Obviously, therefore, after the law was amended those teachers who had attained the age of 60 had to retire notwithstanding the fact that under the earlier Ordinance their age of retirement was 62. The right acquired under an Ordinance cannot be treated to be a right superior to one created by law enacted by legislature. In fact, the right created, whether by an Ordinance or by legislation, stand on the same footing. Once the law under which the right was claimed was amended the right ceased to exist and only such rights could be sustained as were either conferred or saved under the amended law. 29. It was next argued that the petitioners right to livelihood guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and their right guaranteed under Article 300 of the Constitution have been violated. It is alleged that as a result of the amended statute, the petitioners, who had expected to serve the University till they attained the age of 62 years, have been retired. They have been deprived of their right of livelihood for the remaining period, and consequently deprived of the pay and allowances, which they would have earned had they continued till they attained the age of 62 years. The question is not res integra and is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court (See AIR 1985 SC 551 ). They have been deprived of their right of livelihood for the remaining period, and consequently deprived of the pay and allowances, which they would have earned had they continued till they attained the age of 62 years. The question is not res integra and is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court (See AIR 1985 SC 551 ). Dealing with the same submission urged in that case where the age of retirement had been lowered, the Court held : “….It was also urged by counsel that by reducing the age of retirement to 55 years, the Government employees were deprived of their right to livelihood. There is no substance in this latter argument because, if a rule of retirement can be deemed to deprive a person of his right to livelihood, it will be impermissible to provide for an age of retirement at all. That will be contrary to public interest because the State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its employees to continue in service after they have passed the point of peak performance. Rules of retirement do not take away the right of a person to his livelihood they limit his right to hold office to a stated number of years. Besides, the ordinance-making power being a legislative power, the argument of malafides is misconceived. The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Its reasons for passing a law are those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons and if, none are so stated, as appear from the provisions enacted by it. Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot render the passing of the law malafide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is unknown in the field of legislation." If it is held that the petitioners had no right to continue till the age of 62 in view of tile amendment of the law, the question of their receiving pay and allowances for the remaining period does not arise, as right to receive pay and allowances is a consequence of the petitioners holding the office. Since they had no right to hold office after attaining the age of 60 as the law was amended, they cannot claim pay and allowances for the remaining period. 30. Mr. Since they had no right to hold office after attaining the age of 60 as the law was amended, they cannot claim pay and allowances for the remaining period. 30. Mr. Mukherjee then urged relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1985 SC 582 (S. Sundaram vs. V.A. Pattabhiraman) that a proviso may serve four different purposes, as held by the Supreme Court. He relies upon the passage in the judgment which reads thus: “We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes: (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment ; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable ; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as on optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. No exception can be taken to the broad submission urged by counsel for the petitioners, but his further contention that the proviso in question, namely, third proviso of Section 64 of the Patna University Act lays down a condition precedent for the application of the main part of the section, cannot be accepted. We have already held that the third proviso is only an enabling provision and to some extent it also clarifies that re-appointment shall not be treated on the same footing as extension of service. Whereas extension of service is prohibited, re-appointment is permissible, subject to the fulfilment of conditions under the third proviso. No doubt, a proviso may serve four different purposes, but if we may add with respect, the same proviso may serve more than one purpose. As we have held earlier, the third proviso is of composite nature serving more than one purpose. It lays down an exception to the rule against extension of service of teachers. It also enables the University to re-employ teachers and also lays down the conditions for the exercise of that power. As we have held earlier, the third proviso is of composite nature serving more than one purpose. It lays down an exception to the rule against extension of service of teachers. It also enables the University to re-employ teachers and also lays down the conditions for the exercise of that power. We have negatived the contention that the main part of the section will not operate unless the third proviso is complied with. We have already held that the third proviso only enables the appropriate authority to frame statutes in conformity with the U.G.C. guidelines for re-appointment of teachers till they attained the age of 65 years. It does not confer any right on a teacher to claim re-appointment as a matter of right. It is equally open to the authority not to frame statutes for re-employment, because that is a matter of policy. In fact, the third proviso does not deal with the subject with which the main part of the section is concerned, namely, reduction of age of retirement of teachers and, therefore, it cannot be said that it provides for a condition precedent to the exercise of authority under the main provision. Indeed the main part operates by its own force as law, and is not dependent upon the doing of anything by anyone. The third proviso does not, therefore, control the operation of the main part of the section. 31. We have also held that no rights accrued to the petitioners under the earlier Ordinances, whereby they could as a matter of right continue in service till they attained the age of 62 years. It is no doubt true that the earlier Ordinances permitted the teachers to superannuate at the age of 62, but no right had accrued to the petitioners, and the right which they could claim under the earlier Ordinances continued only as long as the said Ordinances were not substituted by an Act or by subsequent Ordinances. We have earlier referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sakha Ram vs. Manik Chand ( AIR 1963 SC 354 ) in which it is held that the mere right, existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of the provision of the statute repealed, is not a right accrued. 32. We have earlier referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sakha Ram vs. Manik Chand ( AIR 1963 SC 354 ) in which it is held that the mere right, existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of the provision of the statute repealed, is not a right accrued. 32. Equally futile is the submission urged by him that the third proviso vests unbridled power in the University in the sense that no time limit has been prescribed for framing of the statute. If the framing of the statute is delayed, many teachers who may retire in the meantime may be deprived of the benefit under the third proviso. The submission proceeds on the basis that the retired teachers of the Universities have a right of re-employment, when there is no such right. It also proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the competent authority is bound to frame statutes for re-employment. Since that is a matter of policy, statutes may not be framed at all, if as a matter of a policy the University decides that it shall not reemploy teachers after retirement. However, if as a matter of policy a decision is taken that re-employment should be allowed, it must act in accordance with the third proviso by framing statutes in conformity with the UGC guidelines. For the exercise of the power to re-employ, sufficient guidelines have been incorporated in the proviso itself. 33. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad appearing on behalf of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 13131 of 1992 relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1992 SC 165 , submitted that the type of work done by teachers of the University are somewhat similar to the duties performed by Judges. Their life expectancy is more having regard to the nature of job performed by them. Their work is of intellectual nature, and therefore, should be treated differently as was done in the case of Judges. In our view, the submission cannot be accepted, because even if all that is said by Mr. Prasad is accepted, the fact remains that while other employees of the Government retire at the age of 58, even under the amended statute the teachers of the University and Colleges shall retire at the age of 60. In our view, the submission cannot be accepted, because even if all that is said by Mr. Prasad is accepted, the fact remains that while other employees of the Government retire at the age of 58, even under the amended statute the teachers of the University and Colleges shall retire at the age of 60. Even with regard to members of Judicial service the Supreme Court granted the benefit of extension of service only to such of them as were found suitable for grant of such extension so that they could serve till they attained the age of 60. The judicial officers to whom such benefit is granted are first subjected to screening by a Special Committee appointed by the Chief Justice of the High Court having regard to their continued utility and other considerations enumerated in the decision, and extension of two years service can be granted only to those judicial officers who are found worthy of such extension. So far as teachers are concerned, their age of superannuation has been fixed at 60, and they cannot, therefore, claim anything more. 34. Counsel for the petitioners in the other writ petitions adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Mukherjee. 35. Counsel for the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 440/93 submitted that the power of Syndicate with regard to appointment etc. of teachers was vested in the Vice Chancellor by the Ordinance which had lapsed. He could not, therefore, exercise powers to remove a teacher of the University. The submission is misconceived, because the Vice Chancellor did not purport to remove anyone from service, but only issued an order declaring that the teachers in question had retired in view of the provision of law. In C.W.J.C. No. 2286 of 1993 it was urged by counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that even if the amended Act purported to reduce the age of retirement, the Act must not apply to persons who were in service as per the agreement so reached between the teachers and the Government. He further submitted that those whose services had been abruptly terminated by retirement should be suitably compensated in public interest. Both the submissions have no force. The amended Sections 64 and 67, as the case may be, do not make any distinction between the teachers appointed after a particular date and those appointed before that date. He further submitted that those whose services had been abruptly terminated by retirement should be suitably compensated in public interest. Both the submissions have no force. The amended Sections 64 and 67, as the case may be, do not make any distinction between the teachers appointed after a particular date and those appointed before that date. The law applies to all teachers in the service of the University and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to make further classification by Judicial determination. That is not permissible. This conclusion is also supported by the principles laid down in AIR 1992 SC 1277 . So far as the claim for compensation is concerned, there is no question of any compensation being paid to the teachers, who retire from service as a result of reduction of age of retirement. They will be entitled to such post retirement benefits as they are entitled in law. 36. So far as the challenge to the order of the Vice Chancellor is concerned, in C.W.J.C. No. 12685/92 it was contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the Vice Chancellor had issued a notification retiring the teachers by issuance of a notification dated 9-12-1992 on the ground that the Ordinance having lapsed on 15 August, 1992, the original Section 64 of the Patna University Act, 1976, became automatically operative. The question is only academic having regard to the fact that the legislature passed a law with effect from 16th August, 1992, fixing the age of retirement of University and College teachers at 60. Since the law is deemed to have come into effect on 16th August, 1992, We must imagine that the law existed when the Vice Chancellor issued a notification on 9-12-1992. We have held the amendments to be valid and, therefore, they operated against the teachers of the Universities and Colleges, who were in service on the date on which the Acts came into force. The Acts, however, only operated against those in service and did not purport to affect the completed transactions so as to deprive the teachers of the benefits which had already accrued to them under the lapsed Ordinances. In this sense the amending Acts are not retrospective in their operation. 37. Having considered all the submissions urged before us on behalf of the petitioners, we are of the view that none of them can be accepted. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. In this sense the amending Acts are not retrospective in their operation. 37. Having considered all the submissions urged before us on behalf of the petitioners, we are of the view that none of them can be accepted. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.