TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) OF his compulsory retirement from the service of the respondent-Bank consequent upon the conduct of two disciplinary Enquiries in which he was found guilty of the charges framed against him. He also assails order dated 27th january, 1983 passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal against the punishment imposed upon him. A few facts need he stated at this stage. ( 2 ) PETITIONER was posted as Manager of the respondent-Bank's Virajpet Branch. He was served with a charge-sheet dated 1-6-1981 accusing him of different acts of omission and commission set out in the statement of imputations of misconduct accompanying the same. Briefly stated the charges framed were as under: (I) That he had drawn from the Sundries Receiveable account, advance T. A. without adjustment or proper submission of Bills, in the process committing temporary mis-appropriation of the amount drawn; (II) That he had without powers or in excess thereof granted temporary overdraft facilities in about 64 accounts which was far in excess of the limits fixed for his branch; (III) That he had without powers purchased, self drawn cheques and S. B. pay orders on other branches situated around 18 kilometres from his Branch and had taken no steps for recovery of the amounts detailed in the statement of imputations; (IV) That he had committed other acts of misconduct such as preparation of debit vouchers without any instrument cheque therefor, grant of O. C. C. facility to Sri m. E. Hassan, in excess of his powers and grant of hypothecation loans, without obtaining securities for the same. ( 3 ) THE petitioner submitted a reply to the charges where after a formal enquiry was conducted into the same by an Enquiry officer appointed for the purpose. The report submitted by the enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty, and the charges proved against him. ( 4 ) IN the meantime, another charge-sheet dated 2nd of July, 1981 was also issued to the petitioner framing a few more charges against him which were also subjected to an enquiry resulting in a finding adverse to the petitioner in the same. Based upon the two enquiry reports mentioned above, the disciplinary Authority by his order dated 17th August, 1982 imposed upon the petitioner a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect. Based upon the two enquiry reports mentioned above, the disciplinary Authority by his order dated 17th August, 1982 imposed upon the petitioner a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED the petitioner filed an appeal before the General Manager the Appellate Authority, who rejected the same. A review petition filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid two orders, also met with the same fate and was dismissed. ( 6 ) DISSATISFIED with the orders aforesaid, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari quashing the said orders and for such directions as this Court may deem fit and proper. ( 7 ) APPEARING for the petitioner Sri Vijayashankar, Senior Advocate and Sri Rajgopal argued that the impugned orders of punishment were unsustainable as the charges levelled against the petitioner even if treated to have been proved could not amount to misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24 of the Conduct and Discipline Regulations of the Bank. It was urged that Regulation 3 of the aforesaid regulations for the violation whereof the petitioner has been found guilty and punished, was a general provision which did not enumerate the acts of omission and commission alleged against the petitioner as tantamounting to commission of misconduct by an Employee- officer of the Bank. In the absence of such an enumeration, contended the learned Counsel an employee-Officer could not be accused or held guilty of the misconduct and punished on that account. Reliance was placed by them upon the judgments of the supreme Court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Limited v presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others and in A. L. Kalra v The Project and Equipment Corporation of India limited. ( 8 ) SRI N. K. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand placed reliance upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v hindustan Motors Limited and Others and in State of Punjab and Others v Ram Singh, Ex. Constable, to contend that it was not necessary for an act of omission or commission to constitute misconduct that it should be specifically enumerated, as such by the relevant service rules. He urged that the two judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner, were clearly distinguishable, and had no application to the instant case. Constable, to contend that it was not necessary for an act of omission or commission to constitute misconduct that it should be specifically enumerated, as such by the relevant service rules. He urged that the two judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner, were clearly distinguishable, and had no application to the instant case. ( 9 ) THE question as to whether specific enumeration of an act of omission or commission, as misconduct was necessary before an employee could be proceeded against for the same fell for consideration in S. R. Subramanya v Chairman and Managing director (Reviewing Authority), Indian Bank, Head Office, madras and Others. Relying upon judgments in Mahendra singh's case, supra, in Ram Singh's case, supra, in sharadaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari and Others v Central railway (Divisional Superintendent ), Nagpur , in Jagmohandas jagjivandas Mody v State of Bombay , in S. Govinda Menon v union of India , in P. H. Kalyani v Air France, Calcutta , in M. Kasi v Indian Bank, this Court has held thus:"it is therefore apparent that even when the regulations do not give a precise definition to the term 'misconduct'. The said term has to be understood as meaning transgression and violation of some established and defined rule of action, a dereliction of duty or a behaviour which is improper or unlawful. Any action that an officer-employee of the Bank takes in discharge of the duties of his Office, which action the holder of the Office had no right to perform or which he performs improperly would amount to misconduct. The conduct must be wilful in character and must be fobidden forit is only the forbidden quality of the act which renders the same an act of 'misconduct'. In other words, conduct which jeopardize the interest of the Bank or its reputation or an act which the employee was not authorised to perform or performed it without due diligence and caution, would expose the employee to a charge of misconduct. It therefore follows that even when there may be no specific enumeration of the various acts of omission and commission which would constitute misconduct, the- employer may be entitled to charge an employee with such misconduct and prove the same by reference to the nature of the duties and the office held by him if the said conduct was forbidden, improper or unbecoming on his part. So proved, any such act of omission or commission would constitute misconduct no matter the same is not specifically enumerated as an act of misconduct". ( 10 ) THE two judgments relied upon by Sri Rajgopal, namely: M/s. Glaxo Laboratories case, supra, and in A. L. Kalra's case, supra, was found to be distinguishable and inapplicable to the provisions of the conduct regulations applicable to the employees of the respondent-Bank. It was held that the obligation to enumerate with precision the acts of omission or commission amounting to misconduct was referable only to the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act and not to any other recognised principle of law. Similarly the judgment in kalra's case, supra, was found to be distinguishable as unlike the regulations being considered in the said case Regulation 24 of the respondent-Bank's regulations specifically provides that the violation of any of the conduct regulations would constitute misconduct which expression was wide enough to include within its fold even Regulation 3 no matter the same is placed under the caption 'general'. The judgment in Rasiklal Vaghahbhai patil v Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Another , was also found to be inapplicable for the reason that the same entirely relied upon the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Glaxo Laboratories case, supra, which was itself distinguishable from the case in hand. ( 11 ) IN the light of the view taken by me in the above case I have no hesitation in rejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the violation of the provisions of Regulation 3 could not amount to misconduct in the absence of a specific enumeration of the acts committed by the petitioner as acts of misconduct such. I may at this stage add that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner if accepted would even otherwise lead to anomalous results as numerous acts of misconduct that can be conceived of in relation to the business affairs of a Bank such as acts of misappropriation or defalcation of accounts and acts of fraud and forgeries are not enumerated as misconduct. The regulations do not even provide that if a person is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude of whatsoever gravity can be removed from service. The regulations do not even provide that if a person is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude of whatsoever gravity can be removed from service. Would it then mean that an employee-Officer of the Bank even if he is guilty of any one of such serious offence or all of them together, cannot be proceeded against or removed from service simply because the regulations do not specifically enumerate such grave acts of misconduct as misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. My answer obviously is in the negative. All such acts of omission and commission which can by a reasonable standard be said to be in violation of any fundamental obligation cast upon the employee or is found to be inconsistent or incompitable with the faithful discharge of his duties must amount to 'misconduct' no matter the same are not specifically enumerated as such. Suffice it to say that for the reasons stated by me in the aforesaid judgment I have no difficulty in repelling the contention so forcefully urged on behalf of the petitioner. ( 12 ) THIS holds good even in regard to the other argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner namely that the provisions of Regulation 3 are ultra vires of the Constitution as the same is capable of abuse by giving different interpretations to the expressions occurring therein at different times in respect of the different employees. While examining a similar argument in Subramanya's case supra, I have held that the provision is not liable to be struck down as unconstitutional as the Constitutional validity of the provisions are not examined by the Courts in abstract nor are they struck down on the mere possibility of an abuse in certain situations. In the instant case also it is not as though the petitioner has made out a case of a discriminatory or arbitrary application of the provisions of regulation 3 to him. The challenge to the vires of Regulation 3 also fails. ( 13 ) SRI Rajgopal then argued that the clubbing of the two enquiry reports for the purpose of issuing a common order of punishment was illegal and violative to Regulation 7 of the regulations. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a Single Bench judgment of High Court of Madras in M. V. Balu v Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Another. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a Single Bench judgment of High Court of Madras in M. V. Balu v Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Another. ( 14 ) REGULATION 7 upon which Sri Rajgopal places reliance reads thus:"regulation 7: (1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Regulation 6 as far as may be; (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 should be imposed on the Officer-employee. It shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 8, make an order imposing such penalty. (4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the Officer-employee concerned". ( 15 ) A plaln reading of the Regulation 7 shows that the same does not expressly or by necessary implication prohibit the passing of a common order of punishment based on two separate enquiries conducted against an employee-Officer of the Bank. The very fact therefore that the Disciplinary Authority while passing the final order of punishment had done so on the basis of two enquiry reports received by him, would not vitiate the order of punishment on the ground that the same is in any manner contrary to Regulation 7 (supra ). ( 16 ) IN the Madras case relied upon by Sri Rajgopal it is no doubt true that the clubbing of the two enquiries at the stage of issuing the second show-cause notice has been held to be improper, but a reading of the judgment does not indicate the principle of law on which the Court has placed reliance while taking the said view. It is not clear as to whether the clubbing of two enquiry reports at the stage of issue of final order was held to be bad on account of the relevant regulations forbidding such a clubbing or the same was so because of a possible prejudice which the delinquent Officer could suffer by reason of the passing of a common order. In the absence of a clear statement on the principle underlying the view expressed in the judgment and with utmost respect to the Hon'ble Judge who decided the said case, I am unable to fall in line. ( 17 ) SRI Rajgopal however urged that clubbing of two enquiry reports for the purpose of a common order of punishment should be deemed to be prejudicial to the delinquent employee and therefore held illegal. He contended that if the Disciplinary authority had taken a decision separately on each one of the reports, the quantum of punishment imposed by him may has been much lighter than what has been imposed by clubbing the two reports together. I am not impressed by this argument either. Assuming that the Disciplinary Authority would have on the basis of the first report taken a less serious view of the matter, yet nothing prevented the Disciplinary Authority from taking a more serious view on being convinced that the employee having already been held guilty of misconduct once was incorrigible in his conduct warranting a heavier dose of punishment in the second case. That apart, as to what would have been the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary Authority upon the petitioner even if the two enquiries conducted against him had culminated in two different orders of punishment is in the realm of speculation. This Court cannot based only on a mere possibility of a lesser punishment having been imposed upon the petitioner if the two enquiries were dealt with separately interfere with the common order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority, particularly when after the common order is quashed and the matter remitted back for fresh orders nothing would prevent the disciplinary Authority from passing the same order of punishment once again. ( 18 ) SRI Rajgopal then argued that the Enquiry Officer and so also the Disciplinary Authority had placed reliance upon the report submitted by Sri Syed Saifulla for holding the petitioner guilty. ( 18 ) SRI Rajgopal then argued that the Enquiry Officer and so also the Disciplinary Authority had placed reliance upon the report submitted by Sri Syed Saifulla for holding the petitioner guilty. This reliance contended the learned Counsel, without tendering Sri Saifulla as a witness for cross-examination, was legally impermissible and vitiated the enquiry as also the final order passed on the basis thereof. Reliance in support was placed by Sri Rajgopal on the judgments of the Supreme Court in central Bank of India Limited v Prakash Chand Jain and State of Punjab v Dewan Chuni Lal. The argument even though attractive at its face value, does not survive a closer look. I say so for two reasons. In the first place, the report submitted by Syed saifulla was not a document which the petitioner disputed. In the course of the enquiry when the petitioner was asked to state whether the report could be admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit the petitioner consented to the admission of the document in evidence and its being duly marked as an exhibit. It was accordingly marked by the Enquiry Officer as Exhibit M89. The inference is that the petitioner did not dispute the existence of the report so as to require its formal proof assuming that the procedure and the formalities required for the formal proof of document in a Civil or Criminal trial applied even to domestic enquiries like the one conducted against the petitioner. Secondly, the settled legal position is that strict and technical rules of evidence have no application to domestic enquiries. It was so held in State of Haryana and Another v Rattan Singh. That was a case where a bus conductor was charged with the misconduct of not collecting fares from some passengers and consequent upon the proof of his guilt, his services had been terminated. Challenging the order of termination, it was urged on behalf of the employee that since the statement of the passengers travelling in the vehicle had not been recorded, the termination of the services of the petitioner was illegal as the finding of guilt was based on no evidence whatsoever. Rejecting the argument, the Court held that strict and sophisticated rules under the Indian Evidence Act have no application to domestic enquiries and that all the material which is logically probative for a prudent man is admissible. Rejecting the argument, the Court held that strict and sophisticated rules under the Indian Evidence Act have no application to domestic enquiries and that all the material which is logically probative for a prudent man is admissible. Even hearsay evidence could furnish a basis for a finding if it had a reasonable nexus and credibility. It was held that so long as there was some evidence to support the finding, the Court was unconcerned with the sufficiency thereof. It is only where there was no evidence to support the charge, that the Court could interfere for in that case, it may amount to an error of law apparent on the face of record. Upholding the order of termination, the Court observed that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of Crime Squad who had detected the commission of misconduct by the employee in the said case, did provide a basis for sustaining the charge, no matter the passengers who had come and gone out of the vehicle were not chased and brought before the Tribunal in support of the charge. ( 19 ) THE report submitted by Syed Saifulla whatever be its probative value was produced as a document of reliance on behalf of the management before the Enquiry Officer. Copy of that report was admittedly furnished to the petitioner. He was also asked as to whether the same could be admitted into evidence and marked as an exhibit. It was so marked only after the petitioner has consented in writing to the same. That being so, it is difficult to accept the argument now advanced that saifulla's testimony alone could have let in the report prepared by him or that reliance upon the said report in the absence of his oral testimony was impermissible. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner in Prakash Chand Jain and Dewan Chuni Lal cases, supra, do not in my opinion lend any assistance to him, as the legal position is stated with a fair amount of certainty in the latter judgment of the Supreme Court in Rattan Singh's case referred to above. ( 20 ) IT was next argued that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was unsustainable as the copy of the second enquiry report which ought to have been supplied in terms of Regulation 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation of the Bank had not actually been supplied to the petitioner. ( 20 ) IT was next argued that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was unsustainable as the copy of the second enquiry report which ought to have been supplied in terms of Regulation 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation of the Bank had not actually been supplied to the petitioner. It was contended that inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority had failed in its duty to furnish a copy of the report, the final order passed by it was rendered illegal. I find no merit even in this submission. The requirement of furnishing a copy of the report in terms of Regulation 9 arises only after the passing of the final order by the Disciplinary Authority. Regulation 9 reads thus:"orders made by the Disciplinary Authority under regulation 7 or Regulation 8 shall be communicated to the officer-employee concerned, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of inquiry, if any". ( 21 ) IT is apparent that the requirement of furnishing a copy of the report is meant to enable the delinquent employee to exercise his right of appeal against the final order of punishment in an effective manner. The furnishing of such a report after the passing of the Disciplinary Authorities order is obviously meant to benefit the employee for the future stages of the proceedings only. The question however is whether the non-furnishing of a copy of the report in terms of Regulation 9 had in any manner prejudiced the petitioner in exercise of his right of appeal against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The answer to this question has in my opinion to be only in the negative for more than one reasons. In the first place, if the petitioner had not actually received a copy of the report as contended by him, he ought to have applied for and demanded the same before filing an appeal, against the order. The fact that no such demand was made by the petitioner to an extent probabilises the version of the respondent-Management that a copy of each one of the reports had in fact been made available to the petitioner in terms of Regulation 9. Secondly, the petitioner did not in the appeal filed by him clalm any prejudice or make any grievance on account of the alleged non-supply of a copy of the report. Secondly, the petitioner did not in the appeal filed by him clalm any prejudice or make any grievance on account of the alleged non-supply of a copy of the report. It is difficult to appreciate as to why the petitioner could not have made a specific grievance about the non-supplying of the copy to him and the consequent prejudice, if he had actually suffered any on that account. The absence of any grievance either in the memo of appeal or otherwise before the appellate Authority as to the non-supply of the copy of the report as also the absence of any demand from the petitioner for such a copy are suggestive of the fact that the petitioner had either received the copies of the reports as contended by the respondents or had suffered no prejudice on account of the alleged non-supply. I have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the submission of Sri Rajgopal on this account. ( 22 ) THAT take me to yet another argument advanced in support of the petition that the Enquiry Officer had not supplied to the petitioner certain documents which Were demanded by him, thereby causing prejudice to the petitioner in his defence. Reliance was placed upon the averments made in para 12 of the writ petition in support of this submission. Sri Kumar on the other hand submitted that no documents had been actually demanded by the petitioner and that the grievance now being made was totally afterthought. In support of his submission the learned Counsel produced an additional affidavit sworn by Sri S. Arun Salman, Senior Manager, Law, The affidavit specifically denies the petitioner's allegation that in the course of enquiry into the second charge-sheet, the petitioner had demanded production of 165 documents out of which only 85 documents were produced. The affidavit states that the total documents marked in defence in the course of the second enquiry were only 21, and the question of the petitioner demanding 165 documents and the respondent producing only 85 did not arise and stood belied by the record, ( 23 ) THE averments made in para 12 of the writ petition are vague. It is not indicated by the petitioner as to when were the documents in question actually demanded by him nor has any such demand if made in writing been placed on record. It is not indicated by the petitioner as to when were the documents in question actually demanded by him nor has any such demand if made in writing been placed on record. It is also not clear as to which out of the 165 documents allegedly demanded were not produced and as to whether the petitioner made any efforts to pursue his demand for production of the documents allegedly withheld. Suffice it to say that the averments made in para 12 of the writ petition are much too vague to be capable of furnishing a sound basis for this Court to return a finding with a reasonable degree of certainty that the documents had actually been demanded and if so the same had been denied. A vague and generalised type of an averment like the one made in para 12 of the writ petition can therefore hardly provide an acceptable basis for upsetting the result of the domestic enquiry otherwise validly held. This is so particularly when I find that the official record pertaining to the enquiry does not support the averment of the petitioner as also the fact that there is no allegation that the record has been tampered with or that the same has not been faithfully maintained. The petitioner's challenge to the ultimate result of the enquiry even on this account therefore fails. ( 24 ) SRI Rajgopal then argued that the enquiry and it sultimate result were vitiated on account of the fact that the witnesses had been asked leading questions in the course of their examination. He drew my attention to certain portions of the statements of the witnesses to buttress his plea, and argued that the infirmity pointed out was fatal to the enquiry. He placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in C. Nagaraja Bhat v canara Bank and Others. I am not impressed by this submission either. It is not the petitioner's case that any leading questions were asked by the Enquiry Officer himself or that after the said question had been asked, the petitioner had been given no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. His grievance appears to be that the presenting Officer had while examining the witnesses asked certain leading questions. This does not in my opinion invalidate or vitiate the enquiry. His grievance appears to be that the presenting Officer had while examining the witnesses asked certain leading questions. This does not in my opinion invalidate or vitiate the enquiry. If a leading question was asked at the enquiry by the presenting officer the petitioner or his defence assistant ought to have objected to the same immediately and prevented such questions being asked. Having failed to do so thereby allowing the evidence to be let in, the petitioner cannot at this belated stage assail the finding or the ultimate result of the enquiry on the tenuous plea that the same are vitiated on account of certain questions being leading in nature. Reliance upon the judgment in C. Nagaraja bhat's case, supra, is misplaced. That was a case in which the enquiry Officer combined in himself the roles of a Judge and prosecutor both. It was in that background that this Court had found the Inquiry Officer's conduct to be blame worthy in asking leading questions from the witness. The result of the enquiry was therefore held to be vitiated by bias. There is no charge in the present case against the fairness of the enquiry nor is the enquiry Officer accused of having asked any such questions as could demonstrate either actual bias or a reasonable likelihood of bias against the petitioner. The mere fact that certain questions said to be leading in nature were asked without any objection on behalf of the petitioner to the same, is not by itself sufficient to invalidate the enquiry or vitiate the order passed on the basis thereof. ( 25 ) IT was next argued that the petitioner had been prejudiced on account of the non-furnishing of a copy of the report said to have been submitted by Sri Mohan, C. B. I. Officer who had held some investigation into the matter. I find no merit even in this submission. Sri Mohan had in his testimony recorded by the inquiry Officer clearly stated that the report had been submitted by him to his superiors in the C. B. I, and not the respondent-Bank. No request appears to have been made to the enquiry Officer either in writing or orally for summoning the report submitted by the witness for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration. No request appears to have been made to the enquiry Officer either in writing or orally for summoning the report submitted by the witness for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration. In the absence of any such demand forthcoming from the record, the petitioner's grievance about the alleged non-supply of the same does not appear to be well founded and needs notice only to be rejected. ( 26 ) IT was next contended by Sri Rajgopal that the enquiryp roceedings ought to have been held at Virajpet and that by reason of the same having been conducted at Bangalore, the petitioner had been prevented from producing his evidence in defence. I find no substance in this submission either. Holding of the enquiry at Bangalore instead of Virajpet as demanded by the petitioner cannot by itself be said to have invalidated either the enquiry or the orders eventually passed on the basis thereon. The petitioner's grievance that he could not produce evidence only because the enquiry was conducted at Bangalore does not appear to be well-founded for the reason that the petitioner had not admittedly furnished any list of witness in defence or cited any witnesses from Virajpet. Sri Rajgopal submitted that the witnesses whom the petitioner wanted to produce in defence were not inclined to come to Bangalore for being examined at the enquiry. There is nothing before me to support this submission. The question of any witness declining to come to Bangalore for being examined could arise only if the petitioner had actually cited him as a witness. Since no list of witnesses in defence was ever filed by the petitioner, the question of any witness declining to come to Bangalore thereby causing any prejudice to the petitioner did not arise. The petitioner's grievance on this account also therefore appears to be more imaginary than real. ( 27 ) THAT brings me to Sri Rajgopal's next submission viz. , that the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer as to the temporary misappropriation of the amounts drawn by the petitioner on account of advance T. A. were perverse. In support, Sri Rajgopal drew my attention to the dates given in list-A to the statement of witnesses and argued that one of the said dates was on the face of it erroneously mentioned. In support, Sri Rajgopal drew my attention to the dates given in list-A to the statement of witnesses and argued that one of the said dates was on the face of it erroneously mentioned. Sri Kumar on the other hand urged that there was no perversity in the findings returned by the enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority and that the date referred to by the petitioner in respect of one of the amounts drawn by the petitioner was erroneously mentioned as 21-1-1977 instead of 21-1-1978. This typographical error contended by Sri kumar would not vitiate the enquiry or the result thereof. ( 28 ) IN the reply filed by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, the fact that he had drawn advance T. A. mentioned in list-A amounting to Rs. 1,865 and Rs. 6,650/- has not been disputed. It is not the petitioner's case that no such amounts had actually been drawn by him on the dates shown in the charge-sheet or that the amount drawn was not to the extent indicated therein. His defence, on the other hand was that the amounts were drawn validly and the same did not amount to misappropriation. That being so, it is difficult to appreciate how a mere typographical error in one of the dates mentioned in the charge-sheet would possibly render illegal either the enquiry or the final order passed by the authority. It is well-settled that when parties go to trial properly understanding each other's case the result of any such trial is not vitiated on account merely of any imperfection in the pleadings filed by them. What is important is that the parties should have understood their respective cases. This appears to be true in the present case for it is not the case of the petitioner that the error pointed out by him even though belatedly, in the description of one of the dates neither mislead the petitioner in his defence nor otherwise prejudiced him at the enquiry. ( 29 ) THAT brings me to yet another argument urged on behalf of the petitioner viz. , the use of the statement made before Sri v. A. Mohan, C. B. I. Officer by one Sri K. Nagappa. ( 29 ) THAT brings me to yet another argument urged on behalf of the petitioner viz. , the use of the statement made before Sri v. A. Mohan, C. B. I. Officer by one Sri K. Nagappa. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority had while passing the impugned order relied upon the statement of sri K. Nagappa made to Sri V. A. Mohan in the course of the enquiry conducted by the latter. The use of such a statement against the petitioner, it was argued without tendering Sri nanjappa, the maker of such a statement for cross-examination vitiated the order. ( 30 ) SRI Kumar, on the other hand urged that the statement of Sri K. Nagappa recorded by Sri V. A. Mohan was not utilised against the petitioner, without disclosing the same to him. He urged that the copy of the said statement had been furnished to the petitioner and was marked as Ex. 21 in the proceedings, after the petitioner had consented to the said document, being so marked and admitted into evidence. He further submitted that the petitioner had never disputed the correctness of the statement made by Sri K. Nanjappa as was apparent from the tenor of the cross-examination of the witnesses produced by the management. He particularly referred to the cross-examination of M. W. 1 to demonstrate that the petitioner's consistent case was that the version given by Sri M. K. Nanjappa was the correct version insofar as the grant of certain loan facilities advanced to him, was concerned. He also referred to the written arguments submitted by the petitioner to show that the petitioner had all along accepted the version given by Sri M. K. Nanjappa to be the correct version insofar as the grant of the said facilities was concerned. He contended, that in the above background a reference to the statement of Sri M. K. Nanjappa made to Sri v. A. Mohan did not amount to using the testimony adverse to the petitioner against his interest without giving the petitioner an opportunity of assailing his evidence. ( 31 ) ONE of the questions that arose for consideration in the course of the enquiry was whether the loan facility extended by the petitioner to one Sri M. K, Nanjappa was an act of impropriety on his part. ( 31 ) ONE of the questions that arose for consideration in the course of the enquiry was whether the loan facility extended by the petitioner to one Sri M. K, Nanjappa was an act of impropriety on his part. The management's case was that on one by name K. M. Manjappa was in existence and that the transaction was in fact fraudulent meant to benefit some one else. While dealing with this aspect of the case against the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority has in its order under challenges referred to the petitioner's version in defence and recorded thus:"sri M. K. Nanjappa who remitted a sum of Rs. 3,370/- to the Bank on 15-4-1981 allegedly towards repayment of the loan outstanding in the name of KM. Nanjappa in his statement recorded by Sri V. A. Mohan/cbi on 3-6-1981 stated: "i have received the money from the Bank through Sri muthanna". It is obvious that Sri M. K, Nanjappa did not avail any loan. Sri M. K. Nanjappa later coming forward to square up the loan outstanding in the name of K. M. Nanjappa does not mitigate the offence committed by you". ( 32 ) A plaln reading of the above passage from the impugned order shows that even though the statement made by M. K. Nagappa has been referred to by the Disciplinary Authority yet, it is difficult to say that the same has been made a basis for the finding recorded against the petitioner. That apart the petitioner's case appears to be that the loan in question was actually given to Sri M. K. Nagappa and that M. K. Nagappa and k. M. Nagappa is one and the same person. The tenor of the cross-examination and the submissions made in the written arguments also shown that the statement made by Sri M. K. Nagappa is being relied upon by the petitioner to prove that the loan had actually been availed of by him. In that background therefore a reference to the statement which according to the petitioner gives the truthful account of what had actually transferred can hardly be held to be illegal or prejudicial to the petitioner, so as to vitiate the enquiry and the final orders passed by the respondents, even assuming that the reference was not a mere reference but meant to be a reliance in support of the finding. ( 33 ) THAT brings me to the last of the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that the order passed by the Appellate Authority, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner was non-speaking and did not record the reasons satisfactorily. Reliance in support was placed upon a Single bench decision of this Court in T. Venkatesh and Another v mysore Electrical Industries Limited. ( 34 ) THE legal position regarding the obligation of the Appellate Authority to record reasons in support of the conclusions drawn by it is well settled. In Tara Chand Khatri v municipal Corporation, Delhi and Others , a similar argument, was repelled by the Apex Court holding that while it may be necessary for a Disciplinary or Administrative Authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order or for an Appellate Authority if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the Enquiring Officer, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of affirmance passed by the Appellate Authority must be supported by reasons. Reliance in support was placed by the Court upon an earlier judgment in State of Madras v A. R. Srinivasan , where a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had ruled that if the state Government agreed with the finding of the Tribunal recorded against the delinquent Officer it could not on a matter of law, be said that the Government was incompetent to impose a penalty unless it gave reasons to show why the said findings were being accepted by it. ( 35 ) IN Ram Chander v Union of India , the Court was dealing with the disposal of an appeal in terms of Rule 22 of the Railway service (Discipline and Appeals) Rules. It was found that the railway Board had without marshalling the evidence on record, and without proper application of mind to the question as to whether the act of misconduct with which the Railway servant was charged was such, that he should have been visited with the extreme penalty of removal, dismissed the appeal. The Court found that this amounted to non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 22 of the rules aforesaid which required the Appellate Authority to take a decision having regard to the factors indicated in the rule itself. The Court found that this amounted to non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 22 of the rules aforesaid which required the Appellate Authority to take a decision having regard to the factors indicated in the rule itself. Summing up the position, as to the obligation of the Appellate Authority, to record reasons in support of its order, the Court held that in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there was no duty cast on an Appellate Authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance. Applying the said test, the Court found that Rule 22 of the Railway Servants Rules, required the Board to record its finding on the three aspects stated therein, and that the failure of the Board address itself to the said aspects vitiated the order passed by it. The view taken in Tara Chand's case, supra, was thus reaffirmed. ( 36 ) THE question arose once again in S. N. Mukherjee v Union of India, where reiterating the view taken in the earlier cases, the Court held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice was simply to prevent miscarriage of justice and to secure fairplay in action. The requirement that an authority exercising quasi-judicial function, must record reasons for its decision irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review was meant to exclude arbitrariness and ensure fairness in the process of decision making having regard to the principles of natural justice. Such a requirement was a part and parcel of the principles of natural justice unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication excluded the application thereof. The Court held that the provisions of the army Act and the Rules, did not require reasons to be recorded by the Court martials and therefore the duty to record reasons was dispensed with in such cases. ( 37 ) IN State Bank of India, Bhopal v S. S. Koshal , the dismissal of an appeal filed by a Bank employee under the relevant Discipline and Appeal Rules, was challenged on the ground that the order of dismissal was a non-speaking order and did not record the reasons in support of the conclusion. The High court had while accepting the plea held that the Appellate authority was under an obligation to record reasons even if the order was one of affirmness. The High court had while accepting the plea held that the Appellate authority was under an obligation to record reasons even if the order was one of affirmness. Reversing the view taken by the high Court, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate authority's observations contained in the order passed by it, that it had considered the relevant grounds of appeal and the facts of the case and come to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal, was a proper disposal of the appeal keeping in view the fact that the order was one of affirmness. The following passage from the judgment is instructive in this regard:"the High Court has taken the view that the rule requires the Appellate Authority to pass a speaking order even if it is an order of affirmance. For the purpose of this case, we shall assume the said view to be the correct one. Even so we are not satisfied that the appellate order is not a speaking order. We have already extracted the appellate order in full herein before, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate Authority (sic Disciplinary Authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The Appellate Authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the" opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate Authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterised as a non-speaking order". ( 38 ) THE legal position is in the above background settled and may be summarised thus. The obligation to record reasons applies more vigorously to authorities whose orders are subject to appeal or revision before a higher authority. In such cases the requirement of recording reasons, not only ensures proper consideration by the authorities concerned of the relevant facts but also introduces clarity in the decision and minimises the chances of arbitrariness in the making of the said decision. In such cases the requirement of recording reasons, not only ensures proper consideration by the authorities concerned of the relevant facts but also introduces clarity in the decision and minimises the chances of arbitrariness in the making of the said decision. Since any such order is appealable before a higher authority, the recording of reasons becomes necessary even to enable the appellate Authority to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the lower Authority has arrived at its conclusions. The obligation to give reasons however, may be dispensed with by the provisions of a statute or the rules either expressly or by necessary implication. If it is so excluded the obligation to record reasons disappears, as in the case of Court Martials exercising their jurisdiction under the provisions of the Army Act and the rules framed thereunder. The obligation to record reasons disappears even in cases where the Appellate Authority passes an order of affirmances in which event it is not necessary for the appellate Authority to marshal the evidence and record independent conclusions or reasons for the same. Where however the Appellate Authority reverses the findings recorded, it must disclose the reasons for doing so and demonstrate that the reversal is based on proper application of mind. The reasons recorded required to be recorded by an authority dealing with the matter need not be elaborate as is usually customary in the judgments delivered by the ordinary Courts. It is enough if what is recorded indicates due and proper application of mind to a matter in controversy. ( 39 ) APPLYING the above tests to the instant case, it is obvious that the order passed by the Appellate Authority cannot be said to be non-speaking or otherwise unsatisfactory so as to warrant any interference with the same. A reading of the order passed by the. Appellate Authority does indicate that it has applied its mind to the points urged and taken a conscious decision affirming the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. A reading of the order passed by the. Appellate Authority does indicate that it has applied its mind to the points urged and taken a conscious decision affirming the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. As a matter of fact, the language of the rule providing for an appeal in the present case is exactly the same as Rule 51 (2) with which the Supreme Court was dealing in S. S. Koshal's case, supra, yet the Court felt that the resolution passed by the Board which spread over not more than eight lines, and simply recorded that the Board had considered the appeal and other relevant papers and had applied its mind but found no merit in the same was, a proper disposal of the appeal calling for any interference not only because the Board was affirming the view taken by the disciplinary Authority but also because the Appellate Authority was not required to say more than what it had actually said. ( 40 ) RELIANCE placed by the learned Counsel for petitioner upon the judgment of this Court in T. Venkatesh's case, supra, appears to me in the circumstances to be futile. In the said judgment the distinction between cases where the Appellate Authority's order affirms the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and others where it reverses the same, does not appear to have been noticed. This distinction actually makes the whole difference. The obligation to give reasons and pass a proper order in appeal exists with the same rigors as indicated in the said judgment only in cases where the order passed by the Appellate Authority is one reversing the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. The ratio of the said judgment however, would have no application to cases where the Appellate Authority decides to affirm the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. This flows from the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to earlier which I say with great respect do not appear to have been noticed by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the above case. ( 41 ) IN the result, this writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .