TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THAT transfer is an incident of service is fairly well-settled. Courts have seldom interfered with such orders except in cases where the same are vitiated by mala fides or are opposed to any mandatory, statutory rule. The legal position is no longer resintegra having been authoritatively stated by the apex court in B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and others; Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others and Union of India and others v. S. L. Abbas. In the last mentioned judgment, the Supreme Court went a step further and held that guidelines issued by the employer regulating transfer of the employees did not create any legally enforceable right in the employees and even when such guidelines were not followed while issuing orders of transfers, the courts cannot interfere. ( 2 ) THE position is no different when it comes to employees of the public sector banks like the respondent herein. Even there the matters stand concluded by the apex court by its judgments in Canara Banking Corporation Limited v. U. Vittal and The Management of the Syndicate Bank Limited v. The Workmen. In both these cases, the view taken is that the management of a bank is in the best position to decide as to how it should distribute its man power and whether a particular transfer can or cannot be avoided. Interference with such orders of transfers by courts and industrial tribunals has been held permissible only in case the orders are made mala fide or for some ulterior purpose, like punishing the employee for his trade union activities, etc. Courts have been cautioned that a finding of mala fides should be returned, only if there is sufficient and proper evidence to support such a finding and not otherwise. There is thus no conceptual difference between the tests governing transfers of public servants on the one hand and those applicable to the employees of banking companies like the respondents. The legal position applicable is uniform to both. ( 3 ) THE present writ petitions filed by the employees of the respondent-bank have a common refrain. There is thus no conceptual difference between the tests governing transfers of public servants on the one hand and those applicable to the employees of banking companies like the respondents. The legal position applicable is uniform to both. ( 3 ) THE present writ petitions filed by the employees of the respondent-bank have a common refrain. They allege that the orders of transfer shifting the petitioners from their respective places of posting in bangalore, where they have served for periods ranging from 10 to 20 years, are illegal as they violate what has come to be known as "deployment transfer policy" of the respondent-bank. This policy it may be'noticed at this stage was first formulated by the respondent-bank in the year 1991 on the basis of a certain broad understanding arrived at between the management and the majority union of the employees. The policy envisages deputation of clerical staff from areas which were surplus in terms of such staff to those which were deficit. The intention apparently was to enable the bank to tied-over difficulties caused by the shortage of the staff on account of a ban on fresh recruitment of staff for banks. Several persons appear to have been transferred in pursuance of the said policy, who were in terms of the scheme evolved by the bank entitled to be transferred back to their parents' districts after having served for a period of 3 years in the deficit areas. Three years later the bank felt the need for having a second look at the policy ostensibly because those deployed had become eligible for being retransferred to their parent districts and after discussions with the majority unions revised the same as per a circular dated 4th of april, 1994. ( 4 ) THE revised policy of deployment may at this stage be extracted in extenso. "deployment transfers in Karnataka state : in accordance with the decision taken in the joint meeting held on 21st and 22nd december, 1993, a meeting was held between the representatives of the management of the bank and the representatives of the syndicate bank employees' union, wherein the above issue was discussed in a cordial atmosphere and the following understanding has been reached. (I) those who had come within the ambit of redeployment scheme of 1991, but had not gone on transfer or who were retransferred will be deployed first to the branches in deficit districts within the zone. (II) senior most employees with reference to the date of entry to the district, where there is surplus staff would be identified and posted to the branches in districts where there is deficit within the zone. (III} following categories of employees are exempted : (a) designated sportsmen who are participating in international, national and state events at present. (b) office-bearers of the unions who are treated as protected workmen under Section 33 (4) of the i. d. act. (c) employees who have completed 50 years of age as on 31-3-1994. (d) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx. (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx. (f) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx. ' (IV) employees so deployed have to work in the transferee branch for a period of 3 years of active service. They will be transferred back on completion of 3 years active service. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx". ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the revised policy three writ petitions came tobe filed in this court namely ; by the syndicate bank's staff association and the workmen of the syndicate bank, a registered trade union of the employees of the respondent-bank. The petitions raised three distinct contentions against the policy and its implementations, viz. , (i) that the policy being a settlement arrived at between the, management and the majority union otherwise than in the course of conciliation could bind only the parties to the said settlement and not other employees who are not parties to the same ; (ii) the policy was arbitrary and meant to benefit the members of the majority union while at the same time subjecting the members of the other unions to a hostile discrimination; (iii) the transfers effected in pursuance of the policy were hit by Section 20 of the industrial disputes Act, as the same had been effected even before the conclusion of the conciliation proceedings. ( 6 ) RAVEENDRAN, j. , before whom these petitions came up for hearing repelled each one of the aforesaid three grounds of attack raised by the petitioners. ( 6 ) RAVEENDRAN, j. , before whom these petitions came up for hearing repelled each one of the aforesaid three grounds of attack raised by the petitioners. His lordship held that the deployment transfer policy contained in the circular dated 4th april, 1994 was not a settlement between the management and the employees and that the said circular contained only a policy decision to which the concurrence of the majority union had been taken in the interest of employee-employer relationship. Upholding the policy his lordship held that the same was fair and uniform and that the apprehension expressed by the petitioner associations that only the minority union employees will be transferred leaving out those owing allegiance to the majority unions was held to be without any basis and far-fetched. Similarly the third and the only other contention assailing the orders of transfer was also rejected. ( 7 ) TWO separate appeals were filed against the aforesaid judgment of brother raveendran, j. , one of which has since been dismissed by the division bench, while the other is reportedly awaiting disposal. ( 8 ) APPEARING on behalf of the petitioners M/s. Narasimhan and h. Subramanya jois, senior counsel, mounted a two pronged attack of the impugned orders of transfer. They contended that the said orders were contrary to the transfer policy in question and that the respondent-bank had created an imaginary surplus in some areas and deficit in others only with a view to hand-pick some of its employees for being sent out from bangalore. They urged that the respondent had resorted to a colourable exercise of power of transfer, and that the impugned orders amounted to committing a fraud upon the same. According to the learned counsel, since the bank had not reserved any power to transfer an employee from the so-called deficit areas to surplus areas or from one zone to the other, such a power was not available to it and the exercise of the same de hors the policy formulated, was illegal and unsustainable. Alternatively it was urged that the orders in question were mala fide in nature and hence liable to be quashed. Alternatively it was urged that the orders in question were mala fide in nature and hence liable to be quashed. ( 9 ) M/s. Radhesh prabhu and ramadas, learned counsel for respondents relying upon the averments made in the counter filed by them, submitted that there were no mala fides behind the impugned orders of transfer which had been passed for transparent reasons stated by the respondents in the reply. They urged that the allegations of mala fides were extremely cryptic in nature and unsupported by any particulars or material whatsoever. They argued that 7 out of the 12 petitioners in writ petition nos. 23808 to 23819 of 1995 had been deployed as substitutes in place of staff members who had been earlier deployed to the deficit areas in terms of 1991 deployment policy of the bank and who had in terms of the said policy to be transferred back to their parent districts after three years. As regards the remaining five petitioners, they urged that their deployment to deficit areas was made in view of the transfer out of the said areas of an equal number of employees who had either served in the said areas for more than 12 years or being lady employee had made a request for transfer for the first time after getting married or were promotee attenders who had served in the said areas since the year 1990. Reference was made by them to the seniority list enclosed with the counter to demonstrate that the respondent had not violated the deployment transfer policy in any manner so as to warrant any interference from this court. In the alternative, it was urged that even if there was any departure from the policy in question, the same did not entitle the petitioners to question the validity of the impugned Order of transfer as the said policy did not create an enforceable right in the petitioner-employee. ( 10 ) THREE questions fall for consideration namely : (i) does the transfer policy evolved by the respondent- bank create any enforceable legal right in the petitioner-employees entitling them to question the orders of transfer on the ground that the same are in violation of the said policy ; (ii) is there any violation of the policy in question as alleged by the petitioners, if so what is its effect? And (iii) are the impugned orders of transfer vitiated by any mala fides or other extraneous considerations so as to justify any interference with the same? I propose to deal with these questions seriatum. Re: question 1: insofar as the first question is concerned, an answer to the same is squarely provided by the judgment of the Supreme Court in s. l. abbas's case, supra, in which a similar contention advanced was repelled by their lordships in the following words : "who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the Order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guidelines however does not confer upon the government employee a legally enforceable right. (emphasis provided) ( 11 ) RESPECTFULLY following the above judgment I have no difficulty in holding that the mere formulation or promulgation of a policy regulating transfers of the employees of an organisation does not create any legally enforceable right in the employees to question the orders of their transfers simply because the same are in any manner violative of the guidelines or the policy so formulated. As observed by their lordships in the above case, and the other two cases, referred to the earlier part of this judgment orders of transfer can be assailed only if they are found to be mala fide in nature or in violation of any mandatory rules. Mere violation of a transfer policy, I am afraid, does not give any cause of action, to an employee to challenge the validity of Order of transfer issued by the employer. ( 12 ) MR. Mere violation of a transfer policy, I am afraid, does not give any cause of action, to an employee to challenge the validity of Order of transfer issued by the employer. ( 12 ) MR. Krishnaiah, however placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of brother raveendran, j. , in the writ petitions mentioned earlier to urge that according to the view taken in the said case a mere violation of the transfer policy would entitle the petitioner employees to make a grievance and have the same annulled. In particular Mr. Krishnaiah referred to the following passage appearing in the aforesaid judgment to buttrees his submission. "there is no basis for the apprehension that the representatives of the majority union are likely to be involved in the decision making relating to transfer. It is the bank that will decide and issue the orders of transfer. Hence the contention that persons belonging to minority unions will only be transferred and the members of the majority unions will not be affected, is far-fetched and is not based on facts. If while giving effect to the deployment policy, the bank acts contrary to its own policy in the case of any particular individual employees, because he belongs to a particular union, he may have a separate cause of action for challenge. But there is no ground for the entire policy being challenged as being detrimental to the interests of the members of any minority union. Hence the second contention also has no merit". ( 13 ) A careful reading of the passage does not in my opinion support the submission made by the learned counsel. The observation made by this court simply means that if while giving effect to the deployment policy, the bank acts contrary to the same by transferring any one of its employees only because he / she belongs to a particular union such a transfer may give to the employee concerned an independent cause of action to challenge the same. The observations made do not propound the view that a mere breach of the policy would in itself be sufficient for the court to interfere and set aside the Order of transfer. The observations made do not propound the view that a mere breach of the policy would in itself be sufficient for the court to interfere and set aside the Order of transfer. Indeed, if while following the policy some employee not otherwise liable to be transferred is picked out and transferred only because of his association with any particular union or for any other similar consideration which is not germane to a proper administration of the affairs of the bank or amounts to victimization of the employee concerned, such a transfer may be legitimately termed as mala fide, entitling the court to interfere. That however does not mean that a breach of the policy of transfer would by itself entitle the employee concerned to make a grievance or have the management's action reversed, without proof of any other circumstances suggesting that the action was taken mala fide. The observations made by my learned brother have to be understood only in the extent in which they appears in judgment. The context it is clear, was the apprehension expressed by the petitioner association that the management may resort to transfer only of the minority union members leaving out those associated with the majority union, with a view victimise or harass the former. It was in that connection that the observation extracted above has been made and has to be understood, instead of understanding the same to be laying down a uniform Rule of general application. When seen thus I have no difficulty in answering the first question in the negative. Re: question 2: ( 14 ) INSOFAR as the second question is concerned, a reference to the deployment transfer policy extracted earlier would show that the same postulates deployment of such of the staff members as had come within the ambit of the redeployment scheme of 1991, but had not gone on transfer or were retransferred. Those falling in the above categories had to be deployed first to the deficit areas within the zone. The other facet of the policy was that the senior most employees from the surplus areas would be deployed to the deficit areas, the seniority being determined by reference to the date of entry into the district concerned. Those falling in the above categories had to be deployed first to the deficit areas within the zone. The other facet of the policy was that the senior most employees from the surplus areas would be deployed to the deficit areas, the seniority being determined by reference to the date of entry into the district concerned. In Order to succeed in their attempt to show that the impugned orders of transfer are in any way contrary to the deployment policy in question, it was obligatory for the petitioners not only to assert in the writ petition but demonstrably prove that the deployment was in any manner violative of any one of the two features indicated above- this the petitioners have failed to do. There is no averment made in the writ petition nor is any material placed on record to show that the petitioners have been hand-picked for deployment without first deploying those who fell within para 1 of the redeployment policy and were liable to be deployed first. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the Rule of seniority as contained in para 2 of the policy had been violated by the respondent-bank while issuing the impugned orders of deployment. Suffice it to say that neither is there any allegation nor any material to show that the respondent-bank had in any manner breached any one of the two features of the deployment policy mentioned above. On the contrary, the respondents have in the reply to the rejoinder filed by the petitioners specifically stated by reference to the relevant particulars contained in the annexures to the said reply that the Rule of seniority has been meticulously adhered to by them while issuing the impugned orders of transfer. It is not as though the petitioners have been singled out for deployment to a deficit area while retaining any employee senior to them in the surplus areas. Indeed, if there was any such case where a senior employee had been retained in the surplus area and a junior picked up for a transfer, outside the said area, it may have been open to this court to draw an adverse inference as to the bona fides of such an action but that is not the position in the present cases. The petitioners have not controverted the statements made in the reply filed by the respondents nor has the seniority position as set out in the enclosures to the said reply been disputed. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that the respondent-bank has while making the impugned orders of transfer adhered to the deployment policy of posting out the senior most employees by determining the seniority of the employees on the basis of the date of their entry into the district concerned. ( 15 ) MR. Krishnaiah, however urged that according to the respondents, the transfer out of the deficit areas has been induced by four considerations, namely : (I) transfer of lady employees on their making the first request after marriage; (II) transfer on request of such of the employees as have served in the deficit areas for 12 years; and (III) transfer of 50% of the sub-staff cadre promotee to clerical cadre, who have remained posted in the deficit areas since the year 1990; and (IV) transfer of employees who had been deployed in terms of 1991 policy after they have completed four years service in the deficit areas. ( 16 ) ACCORDING to M/s. Krishnaiah and subramanya jois, the deployment policy permits transfer of only such employees out of the deficit area as fall in the 4th category mentioned above. In other words, it is only an employee who has been deployed from a surplus to a deficit area and has served in the said areas for four years who can be transferred out from the said area and none else. Inasmuch as the transfer of 5 out of the 12 petitioners, contended the learned counsel, was because of the transfer of employees covered by categories (i) to (iii) above, from deficit to surplus area the said orders were illegal and contrary to the policy. I find no substance even in this submission. The deployment transfer policy has to be given a rational meaning to avoid anomalous results. I find no substance even in this submission. The deployment transfer policy has to be given a rational meaning to avoid anomalous results. The interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner if accepted would imply that once an employee of the bank is transferred to a deficit area otherwise than by way of deployment, he can never be rescued out of the said areas however compelling the reasons for transferring him out of the same may be and whatever be the length of service rendered by him in such areas. There is nothing in the deployment policy to suggest that transfers under the said policy can be made only if no employee of the bank is transferred out of the deficit areas. All that the policy envisages is that the bank can transfer an employee beyond the 26 kilometres distance prescribed by it for the transfer of its employees, only by way of deployment in areas which are deficit in staff. The policy does not go further to state that such a deployment is possible only if no employee otherwise posted in the said areas is transferred out. ( 17 ) THAT apart, the transfer of employees from out of deficit areas, cannot in the present case be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory or irrational. Those who have completed 12 years of service in a deficit area, could upon a request, have been considered for transfer out of the said area. Similarly, if requests made by the lady employees working in such areas made for the first time after their marriage, is considered by the bank, it cannot be said that such a consideration is arbitrary or fanciful. So also, is the case with the sub-staff promotees who have served for nearly 5 years in such areas. Suffice it to say that it is difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the deployment of the petitioners to deficit areas is rendered illegal merely because other employees who were earlier posted in such areas have been transferred out of the same. ( 18 ) MR. Krishnaiah, next argued that certain employees have been transferred from mangalore zone to bangalore zone, which according to him is impermissible and shows that bangalore zone is not actually a surplus area. There is no merit even in this submission. ( 18 ) MR. Krishnaiah, next argued that certain employees have been transferred from mangalore zone to bangalore zone, which according to him is impermissible and shows that bangalore zone is not actually a surplus area. There is no merit even in this submission. The transfer of employees out of the zone may give a cause of action to those who are so transferred but would not give any occasion to the petitioners to make any such grievance. According to the respondents the transfer of employees from mangalore zone to bangalore zone, has also been guided by the primary consideration of posting of such employees from the surplus areas in mangalore zone to the deficit areas in bangalore zone. This position has not been controverted by the petitioners, which means that while making transfers from surplus to deficit areas, the bank has transferred employees from one zone to the other. The underlying policy of making such deployment transfer has therefore been kept in view even in matters of such inter-zone transfers. Merely because the transfers are inter-zone, also cannot lead to the inference that the districts to which the employees have been transferred are not deficit areas. Re: question 3: ( 19 ) THAT bring me to the third and the last question that arises for consideration namely : ( 20 ) WHETHER the transfers in question are vitiated by mala fides? ( 21 ) ALLEGATIONS of bias and mala fides are more easily made than proved. In Order however the court can be called upon to return a finding on any such allegation; there must be a clear and specific case set up by the party alleging mala fides; which must be duly supported by the requisite particulars. The burden to allege and prove mala fides is heavy and falls squarely on the person banking upon such allegations. In Tara Ckand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, the Supreme Court while refusing to investigate allegations of mala fides observed thus :"we are unable to accept this contention. It has been held time and again by this. Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegations of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. It has been held time and again by this. Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegations of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well-established Rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant thereto, we do not think that they could be considered sufficient to establish mains animus. The High Court was therefore, not wrong in dismissing the petition in limine on seeing that a prima facie case requiring investigation had not made out". ( 22 ) IN the instant case, there is no proper and specific averment in the writ petition let alone supported by any particulars to enable this court to hold that the impugned orders are in any manner mala fide. A cryptic statements that the orders are mala fide in nature, does not suffice nor can a bare violation of the policy in question assuming such a violation is made out amount to the action being mala fide. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have been victimized on account of their trade union or other activities. No allegations of any unfair trade practice, victimization, or extraneous considerations have been levelled. There is therefore neither any proper assertion nor any supporting evidence for holding that the impugned orders are in any way mala fide in nature. The challenge to the orders on the ground of mala fide must therefore fail with my answer to question No. 3 also going in the negative. ( 23 ) IN the result these petitions fail and are dismissed, but without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .