Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE present appellant is the original plaintiff and the respondents are original defendant nos. 1 and 2 respectively, in the civil suit wherein the trial court passed a money decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. ( 2 ) THIS decree was challenged by filing a Civil Appeal No. 185/81 before the District court by the second defendant. It is pertinent to note that the first defendant had not filed any independent appeal challenging the decree, nor had he joined himself as co-appellant in the said appeal filed by the second defendant. Even in this appeal no issue has been raised as to the validity of the decree as regards defendant no. 1, nor has the first defendant sought to have such an issue raised before the lower appellate court. ( 3 ) THE lower appellate. court allowed the appeal filed by the second defendant, but according to the present appellant-original plaintiff, the entire decree passed by the trial court was set aside i. e. , it was set aside both against defendant no. 1 and also against defendant no. 2. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the first defendant had not challenged the decree passed against him and that therefore in an appeal filed by the second defendant, the entire decree including the decree against the first defendant could. nof have been set aside. This contention is obviously required to be upheld inasmuch as, firstly the first defendant had not filed any independent and/or cognate appeal challenging the decree passed against him neither had he joined as co-appellant in the appeal filed by the second defendant. It also appears from a perusal of the judgment of the tower appellate court that no submission was made on behalf of the first defendant that the decree passed by the trial court as against himself was bad and is, therefore, required to be set aside. Thus, while allowing the appeal of the second defendant, the lower appellate court was clearly in error in setting aside the entire decree i. e. in setting aside the decree against defendant no. 1 as well. ( 5 ) IN this context it is pertinent to note that the first defendant was the original debtor, whereas the second defendant was a surety. 1 as well. ( 5 ) IN this context it is pertinent to note that the first defendant was the original debtor, whereas the second defendant was a surety. Thus, while their interest may be to some extent common, in defending themselves against the suit claim, the decree passed against each of them is based on different obligations and different liabilities incurred by each of them in their separate, independent and distinctly individual capacity. Thus, it cannot be said that the decree was of such a nature or character where it could not be severed as between defendant nos. 1 and 2. ( 6 ) THUS, so far as the lower appellate court has set aside the trial court decree as against defendant no. 1, the same is clearly an error of fact as well as an error of law and consequently the same is required to be rectified. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has also sought to contend that while setting aside the said decree, the lower appellate court has remanded the matter back to the trial court to enable the defendant no. 2 to adduce evidence in the matter etc. , and that this order of remand is also illegal and unsustainable. Although the learned counsel for the appellant has raised this contention, the same is not seriously pressed in view of my finding that the lower appellate court could not have set aside the trial court decree as against defendant no. 1. Consequently once the trial court decree is set aside as regards defendant no. 2, the only course open to the lower court was to remand the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision on the merits of the plaintiffs suit as regards defendant no. 2. The order of remand is, therefore, justified both on fact and in law so far as it pertains to the second defendant. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant next contended that the lower appellate court while issuing directions to the trial court consequential to the order of remand, has directed that the second defendant shall be permitted to adduce evidence in the matter, but has not clarified that the plaintiff shall also be at liberty to adduce evidence in rebuttal of such evidence as may be led by the second defendant. In my opinion, it goes without saying that once the matter is remanded back to the trial court for decision of the entire suit on merits qua the second defendant, it is open to all concerned parties to adduce evidence in the matter. Therefore, the lower appellate court was not required to specifically state that the plaintiff could also adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence that may be led by the second defendant However, this is to be read into the impugned order. In any case it is hereby clarified that the trial court while trying the suit against second defendant on merits, shall permit the second defendant to lead evidence in the matter, and shall also permit the plaintiff to lead evidence in rebuttal of the same. It is also clarified, though it is not strictly speaking necessary to do, that the evidence already on record of the suit shall remain as evidence, and shall be read as such as part of the record. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY the order impugned in the present appeal is modified to the extent that the judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside only as regards defendant no. 2, whereas the decree passed by the trial court as against defendant no. 1 shall remain unaffected. The present appeal is, therefore, partly allowed with no order as to costs. ( 10 ) IN view of the fact that the suit is of the year 1979, the trial court is directed to give it ncccsssary priority and to dispose of the same as cxpcditiously as possible. .