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1995 DIGILAW 38 (HP)

MOM RAJ THAKUR v. THE DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE

1995-06-22

KAMLESH SHARMA, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

body1995
JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—In this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner Mom Raj Thakur has challenged the order dated 21-6-1991 (Annexure P-16) passed by the Disciplinary Authority (District Judge), Mandi, whereby he was dismissed from service and order dated 10 2-1992 (Annexure P-17) passed by the Appellate Authority (High Court), rejecting his service appeal and also subsequent memo dated 18-2-1992 (Annexure P-18) issued by the Disciplinary Authority informing him about the rejection of his appeal. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Naib-Nazir on 27-5-1985 in the Court of Sub Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sundernagar. He was promoted to the post of Reader and posted as such in the Court of Sub-Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate (Court No. 1), Mandi. He was subjected to a disciplinary enquiry. A charge memo was issued against him framing six charges. The charges read as follows : "Charge I That Shri Mom Raj while working as such in the said Court did not hand over the complete charge of articles as entered in the stock register (perishable and non-perishable), office copies of Establishment i. e. TA bills for staff and the Presiding Officer, livery articles bills, medical reimbursement bills and Treasury pass book of Sheriff Petty Account of his successor on his transfer from the said Court to the Court of Sub-Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Mandi. Charge II That Sh. Mom Raj while working as such in the said Court did not make payment of Rs 1,651 to S. Kumar, Tailor, Bhojpur, Sundernagar on account of stitching charges though he has shown this sum paid in cash to the Tailor Master concerned on 31-3-1987. Charge III That Sh Mom Raj while working as such in the aforesaid Court did not make the payment of the sum of Rs. 1,996 only to S/Shri Devki Nandan, Bailliff, Nidhi Singh, Netra Singh, Parkash Chand, Kanshi Ram, Ashwani Kumar, Process-servers and Smt. Kanta Devi, Peon as per their respective share on account of stitching charges of winter uniforms for the year 1986 as the aforesaid officials had themselves got stitched the uniforms and as such Sh. Mom Raj mis-appropriated the same. Charge IV That Sh. Mom Raj while posted as such in the aforesaid Court has received his pay for the month of March 1987 amounting to Rs. 816 on 18-6-1987 but has denied this payment to him to malign the name of Sh J. 6. Mom Raj mis-appropriated the same. Charge IV That Sh. Mom Raj while posted as such in the aforesaid Court has received his pay for the month of March 1987 amounting to Rs. 816 on 18-6-1987 but has denied this payment to him to malign the name of Sh J. 6. Mahantan, the then 6ub-Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sundernagar who had made the payment of (he salary and said Sh. Mom Raj had acknowledged having received the pay before Sh. Man Singh, Civil Ahlmad and Sh. Narotam Ram, Process-server in leave vacancy. Charge V That Sh. Mom Raj while functioning as a Naib-Nazir in the aforesaid Court had received a sum of Rs 900 against receipt on 20-6-1987 as Road and Diet Money paid by Sh. Narpat Ram in cash in case Narpat v. Maltu9 in order to carry out the execution of decree by lodging JDs in Civil imprison but he did not deposit the said amount in the Government Treasury nor entered the same in the relevant register and thus mis-appropriated the same. Charge VI That as a result of the above acts of omission and commission on the part of Sh. Mom Raj during his tenure when he was posted as a Naib-Nazir in the Court of Sub-Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sundernagar, he was negligent in the discharge of his duties and has failed to main lain devotion to duty and conducted himself in such a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant and therefore in the result has contravened the provisions of Rule 3 (1) (i) (ii) (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964." The petitioner submitted his reply on 3-8-1990 and thereafter the Inquiry Officer was appointed (Senior Sub-Judge, Mandi) by the Disciplinary Authority. After taking evidence, the Inquiry Officer gave his report on 16 4-1991 giving the findings that the charges 1 and 3 were not proved and the other four charges had been proved The Disciplinary Authority perused the entire material and agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. He issued office order dated 24-4-1991 (Annexure P-14) calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed his detailed reply on 15-5-1991 (Annexure P-5). The Disciplinary Authority ultimately passed the penalty of dismissal on the petitioner. He issued office order dated 24-4-1991 (Annexure P-14) calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed his detailed reply on 15-5-1991 (Annexure P-5). The Disciplinary Authority ultimately passed the penalty of dismissal on the petitioner. The petitioner filed statutory appeal on 26-7-1991 before the Appellate Authority (Chief Justice), which was considered and rejected by order dated 10-2-1992 (Annexure P-17) by the learned Single Judge on Administrative side. On these facts, the petitioner has filed this writ petition, challenging the impugned orders. 3. The written statement has been filed by District Judge, Mandi on the affidavit of Shri Surjit Singh, District and Sessions Judge, Civil and Sessions Division at Mandi, to contend that the petitioner has been punished for his misconduct after holding enquiry in accordance with law and the rules as also the principles of natural justice. The petitioner remained wilfully absent from duty from 20-6-1987 to April 1988 for which separate enquiry was conducted and he was found guilty and removed from service. It is also submitted that the explanation of the petitioner was considered in the light of the evidence on record and rejected by a speaking order. The petitioner was holding the post of Naib-Nazir and had to deal with cash and deposit and disbursement of the expenses of witnesses and that since he had embezzled the amount, he could not be retained in service and further that the man without integrity cannot be retained in service in the public interest In nut shell, he has supported the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. The petitioner has not filed replication to the written statement. 4. Shri H. M. Sharma learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the impugned order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority is not sustainable since the same is against the evidence on record and as such is based on no evidence. This submission raised deserves to be rejected. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity by the Inquiry Officer and thirteen witnesses were examined by the department to prove the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner has also examined four witnesses in his defence besides the documentary evidence was also perused by the Inquiry Officer. 5. This submission raised deserves to be rejected. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity by the Inquiry Officer and thirteen witnesses were examined by the department to prove the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner has also examined four witnesses in his defence besides the documentary evidence was also perused by the Inquiry Officer. 5. So far as charge No. 2 is concerned, the petitioners defence before the Inquiry Officer was that he made requisite payment of Rs 1,651 to S. Kumar Tailor Master and produced receipt on the reverse of the bill Ex. PW 12/B. To prove this charge, department examined Shri J. S. Mahanta, Presiding Officer (PW 2) and Bal Dev Chand (PW 12) proprietor of M/s. S. Kumar Tailor On consideration of their evidence by the Inquiry Officer, the conclusion arrived at cannot be said to be perverse. Sh. D. D, Sharma (DW 4) the then Presiding Officer also has not proved due payment to the Tailor Master by the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer has elaborately discussed the evidence on record in his report and recorded his findings on the basis of the same. 6. To prove charge No. 4, PW J. S. Mahantan, the then Presiding Officer has made statement that on 18-6-1987, the salary amowrit of Rs. 816 for the month of March 1987 was made by him in his chambers in the presence of Narotam Ram, Peon-cum-Leave Reserve Process-server (PW 4) and the delinquent was asked by him to put his acquaintance on the pay bill but he declined to do so. PW Narotam Ram has also corroborated the statement of Shri J. S. Mahantan. In his defence, the delinquent examined DW Thakur Dass who during his cross-examination has stated that he did not know whether the Presiding Officer made payment in his chambers to the delinquent or not. The delinquent produced photostat copy of the order dated 6-6-1987 of the then Presiding Officer Shri J. S. Mahantan to prove that his salary which was lying undisbursed be deposited in the bank forthwith. The delinquent produced photostat copy of the order dated 6-6-1987 of the then Presiding Officer Shri J. S. Mahantan to prove that his salary which was lying undisbursed be deposited in the bank forthwith. The Inquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence has held that it was for the delinquent to have put acquaintance on the pay bill after affixing revenue stamp but he did not do so and, therefore, the matter was reported to the Sessions Judge, Mandi The evidence adduced by the department would go to show that the disbursement of the salary of the delinquent had also been shown in the cash book. 7. Charge No. 5 relates to mis-appropriation of Rs. 900 by the delinquent having received this amount on 20-6-1987 against a receipt from one Narpat as Road and Diet Money to carry out the execution of a decree by lodging JDs in Civil imprisonment The defence of the delinquent before the Inquiry Officer was that he received the above amount from Sh. Narpat in his private capacity and not in the official capacity and had returned the said amount to Sh Narpat Ram lateron. He produced the receipt of Sh. Narpat Ram which was found neither dated nor attested by the Inquiry Officer According to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the receipt Ex. DD was not duly proved nor Sh. Narpat was examined by the delinquent in support of his defence. The department has produced photostat copy of an application dated 12-9-1987 presented by Sh. Narpat Ram allowing him to deposit the said amount. The delinquent being Naib-Nazir accepted the amount on 20-6-1987 which fact finds incorporated on the reverse of the said application. According to the version of Shri Mahantan, the then Presiding Officer, the delinquent did not account for the said amount in the account of the Court despite acknowledgement He has stated that he called the explanation of the delinquent on 7-4-1988 through letter, copy of which was produced as Ex. PC but the delinquent did not give any reply. On the basis of this evidence, the Inquiry Officer found the delinquent guilty of the charge. PC but the delinquent did not give any reply. On the basis of this evidence, the Inquiry Officer found the delinquent guilty of the charge. Finally the Inquiry Officer has found on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence that the delinquent had not only misappropriated Government money but also made false entry of the payment thereof in the cash book and thus found him guilty of the charge. 8. On a careful consideration of the material on record, we are of the view that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority is not supported by any evidence nor it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such findings. Hence, the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority should prevail 9. The matter has again received consideration of learned Judge of this Court sitting on the administrative side in appeal The learned Judge considered the entire material on record and held that the Disciplinary Authority was fully justified in accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer. The appeal was consequently dismissed. Thus, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned orders in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In sup port of our conclusion, we with advantage refer the judgment of the apex Court in State of A. P. v S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR ly63 SC 1723, in that judgment their Lordships held that :—- “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant ; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reason able person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding .....under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. The next contention of the learned Counsel is that the petitioner was not supplied copy of the Inquiry Report in order to meet the findings of the Inquiry Officer before the impugned order (Annexure P-16) was served upon him This submission deserves to by rejected In office order (Annexure P-14), the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and he was apprised about the charges having been proved by the Inquiry Officer and was also required to file representation against the proposed penalty. The petitioner filed a detailed representation (Annexure P-15), therefore, this submission is not open to the petitioner when he was given full opportunity by the Disciplinary Authority. 11. The third contention of the learned Counsel that before the petitioner was allowed to produce his oral as well as documentary evidence, provisions of sub-rules (16) and (1?) of Rule 14 of the C C S. (CCA) Rules, 1965 were not adhered to, resulting thereby a serious prejudice to his defence. 12. We have thoroughly gone through the evidence on record produced before the Inquiry Officer and find that the statement of the petitioner was recorded in the form of questions and all the articles of charges were put to him in detail which he answered by giving full explanation. 12. We have thoroughly gone through the evidence on record produced before the Inquiry Officer and find that the statement of the petitioner was recorded in the form of questions and all the articles of charges were put to him in detail which he answered by giving full explanation. The petitioner has also filed a detailed reply (Annexure P-6) to the memorandum of charges stating therein his defence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any illegality or irregularity committed by the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority in conducting the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. 13. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority and also the Appellate Authority have summarily rejected the explanation/appeal of the petitioner without any application of mind and without recording reasons A perusal of the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority would go to show that it contains detailed reasons after dealing meticulously the material on record. Similarly, the learned Administrative Judge has recorded a reasoned order in appeal and dismissed the same after due consideration. This contention is also not sustainable and is rejected. 14. Lastly, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is harsh and dis-proportionate to the charges levelled against him. 15. Shri Shrawan Dogra learned Counsel for the respondents has seriously contended that the penalty can lawfully be imposed upon the petitioner by the competent authority and is imposed on the proved misconduct, this Court has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 In this case, K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. observed in paras 18, 26 and 27, thus : "The Tribunal thus could exercise only such powers which the Civil Court or the High Court could have exercised by way of judicial review It is neither less nor more. Because, the Tribunal is just a substitute to the civil court and High Court. The Administrative Tribunal therefore cannot interfere with the penalty imposed on a delinquent employee by the competent authority on ground that the penalty is not commensurate with the delinquency of the employer. Because, the Tribunal is just a substitute to the civil court and High Court. The Administrative Tribunal therefore cannot interfere with the penalty imposed on a delinquent employee by the competent authority on ground that the penalty is not commensurate with the delinquency of the employer. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter," 16. A Constitution Bench in State of Orissa v, Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, dealing with the power of the Court exercising judicial review to interfere on the question of penalty held thus : "But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable : nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable : nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were *unassailable, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the inquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make put a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice." This principle was reiterated in Railway Board, Delhi v Niranjan Singh. AIR 1969 SC 966 ; Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 and State Bank of India v, Samarendra Kishore Endow and another (1994) 2 SCC 537 17. In the light of the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority supported by reasons, we hold in the light of the discussion made above and judgments referred to above, no case is made out for interference. No other point has been raised or argued before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly, dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Writ petition dismissed.