Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 381 (MAD)

The Union of India, Represented by Union Territory of Pondicherry, rep. by Commissioner of Excise, Pondicherry v. Radhamani

1995-03-31

K.A.SWAMI, RAJU

body1995
Judgment :- 1. This Writ Appeal is preferred against the order dt. 7.10.1994 passed by the learned single judge in W.P. No. 16610 of 1994. 2. Learned single judge has allowed the Writ Petition and has directed that the security be reduced to Rs. 90,000/- instead of Rs. 3.35 lakhs and has further, directed that the security already given be directed to be released with regard to the balance. 3. The petitioner is an excise contractor. For the purpose of excise contract, she has offered the property in question as security as required by Rule 153 read with Rule 156(c) of the Pondicherry Excise Rules, 1970. The grievance of the Writ Petitioner is that the arrears payable by her are far less than the value of the property offered as security, therefore the, security proportionate to the arrears should be retained and the rest of the property should be released. 4. Learned single judge has followed the earlier decisions and allowed the writ petition in the aforesaid terms. These earlier decisions were rendered in Mrs. Senthamarai v. The Union of India (W.P. 7891 of 1989 date 29-6-89) R. Ravikumar v. The Union of India (W.P. 10521 of 1980 dt. 12-9-80). H. Mugunda Raman v. The Union of India (W.P. 3146 of 1991 dt. 3-4-1991) K. Manoranjitham v. The Union of India (W.P. No. 10257 of 1994 etc. dt. 24-6-1994) and T. Subramaniam v. The Union of India (W.P. No. 10996 of 1994 dt. 29-6-94). True copies of the same have been produced by learned senior counsel Shri. Gopalan to facilitate consideration of the same by the Court. 5. We have gone through all the orders which have been rendered by various learned single judges of this Court. It is noticed that in none of the eases, the order is passed on merits. The order is passed on the submission made by learned Government Pleader agreeing for reducing the quantum of security. An order of decision of a Court can be a precedent for the principle it lays down or decides. When no such principle or decision is contained in an order of the Court, it cannot be construed as a precedent much less a binding precedent. Therefore, those decisions cannot be of any avail to the respondent who is a contractor. 6. The case is one of pure contract governed by the Rules. When no such principle or decision is contained in an order of the Court, it cannot be construed as a precedent much less a binding precedent. Therefore, those decisions cannot be of any avail to the respondent who is a contractor. 6. The case is one of pure contract governed by the Rules. Rule 153 of the Rules provides for deposit of title deeds before the Deputy Commissioner as security and described in the solvency certificate issued by the Tahsildar or the Deputy Tahsildar as the case may be. If such a security is not furnished according to Rule 153 it is open to the Deputy Commissioner to select as provisional lessee the next highest bidder producing the aforesaid document if he has given a reasonable offer. Rule 1.56 relates t o lease and mortgage to be executed which reads thus:— “156 — Lease and Mortgage to be executed: The person whose tender, offer or bid is confirmed under rule 155 shall, within seven days from the date of communication of the order, (a) remit into the State Bank of India or the Government Treasury or open a term deposit or fixed deposit in the name of the Deputy Commissioner in any Scheduled Bank in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, a security deposit equal to one fourth of the knocking down price deduction being made of the earnest money deposited earlier. Provided that the Excise Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner (Excise) shall have powers to accept or reject such securities of the non nationalised scheduled banks for the reasons to be recorded in writing. (b) execute and register (at his expense) an agreement of lease in Form L.A. with the Government incorporating the terms and conditions under which the right of retail vendors is leased in his favour. (c) mortgage at his expense in Form D.M. the property offered as security towards the lease amount to be paid by him, the property being free from all encumbrances and its value being not less than 1-1/3 of the lease amount”. (c) mortgage at his expense in Form D.M. the property offered as security towards the lease amount to be paid by him, the property being free from all encumbrances and its value being not less than 1-1/3 of the lease amount”. From clause (c) of Rule 156, it is clear that the person whose tender, offer or bid is confirmed under Rule 155 shall, within 7 days from the date of communication of the order, mortgage at his expense in Form D.M. the property offered as security towards the lease amount to be paid by him, the property being free from all encumbrances and its value being not less than 1-1/3 of the lease amount. It is pursuant to these Rules, while obtaining the contract as the Highest bidder, the petitioner has offered the property in question as security. It is also not disputed that the petitioner has not paid all the arrears. It cannot also be disputed that this security is to ensure the payment of excise arrears and monthly list. That being the position, it is not all possible for the Court to hold that the appellants are liable to reduce the security by reason of the reduction in excise arrears. Of course, on their own accord, it is open to the appellants to do so. It that event, it would be modification of the contract between the parties. But, the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot direct the parties to modify their contract or enter into fresh contract or substitute a new contract in the place of the old one. Whatever may be the power of this Court under Article 226, it cannot be held to extend to make a contract for the parties. Therefore, we find it very difficult to agree with the view expressed by, the learned single judge and also the view expressed in the other decisions referred to above. As such, the aforesaid decisions are over-ruled. 7. Accordingly, we allow the writ appeal, set aside the order dt. 7-10-94 and dismiss the writ petition. The C.M.P. is disposed of. However, there will be no order as to costs.