Honble JAIN, J. — Since all these writ petitions raise a common question of law and fact, they are being disposed of by this common order. (2). By these writ petitions, the petitioners seek to quash the judgment of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer dt. 21.9.1992 and pray that the assessment orders Anxs. 1 & 2 and the demand notices Anx. 3 & 4 may kindly be declared non-est and void. (3). For convenient disposal of these writ petitions, the facts of S.B.C.Writ petition No. 1495/94 are taken into consideration. Briefly stated the facts of the case as alleged by the petitioner are that the petitioner Dinesh Kumar Nagpal who is the Director of M/s. Nagpal Agro System Pvt. Ltd., Delhi is carrying on the business of pesticides and seeds of cereals and pulses at Sri Ganganagar and the firm is registered under the provisions of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act having registration certificate no. 1508/43. The petitioner has alleged that he sold Sorghum Sudan Grass properly known Jowar Seeds worth Rs. 1,72,587.85 during the year 1990-91 and worth Rs. 2,43,900.00 during the year 1991-92 and collected tax @ 2.5% on these sales. It is alleged that the respondent no. 2 had assessed the tax @ 10% on the sales of Jowar seeds following the judgment of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer dt. 21.9.92 rendered in C.T.O. Vs. M/s Brijmohan Vedprakash, Sri Ganganagar, vide assessment orders Amxs. 1 & 2 for the year 1990-91 and 1991-92 respectively and also issued demand notices Anxs. 3 & 4. Being aggrieved with the assessment orders and demand notices issued by the respondents, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. (4). This writ petition has been filed on 21.3.1994. On 24.3.94, while issuing notice, this Court stayed further proceedings in pursuance of demand notices. In pursuance to the notice, the respondents have filed reply on 7.12.1994. (5). Mr. Garg learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the Jowar covers the edible as well as non-edible varities of Jowar and, therefore, Jowar seeds sold by the petitioners are taxable at the rate of 2.5% and not @ 10%. He has contended that as per the Circular dt. 2.12.1989 issued by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan, the Jowar seeds are taxable at the same rate of tax as applicable to Jowar cereals i.e. 2.5%. He has contended that as per the Circular dt. 2.12.1989 issued by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan, the Jowar seeds are taxable at the same rate of tax as applicable to Jowar cereals i.e. 2.5%. He has further contended that the assessing authorities cannot depart from the well established practice of assessing the said Jowar at 2.5% and not in the residuary entry, under the principle of Contemporanea expositio", therefore, the order of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. He has relied on M/s Bharat Forge & Press Ind. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Collector & Central Excise (1), Chiranjeet Lal Anand Vs. State of Assam (2) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Raj. (3), and (1988) 70 STC-97(SC) (4). (6). So far as the principle laid down in above decisions is concerned, Mr. Mehta has not disputed the same. He has contended that the petitioner has not sold the Jowar seeds or certified seeds but the petitioner has effected the sale of Hybrid Seeds i.e. Sorgum Sudan Grass which does not fall under Entry No. 5 of Government Notification 4(5) FD/Gr.IV/88-13 dt. 8.3.88 or under Entry No. 6 of Government Notification No. F 4(37)FD/Gr.IV/90-15 dated 27.6.90. He has also contended that the said Sorgum Sudan Grass produced is neither Jowar/Milo nor its form and the said Grass is a different kind of seeds. He has further contended that the judgment dt. 21.9.1992 of the learned Tribunal given in the case of C.T.O. Vs. Brij Mohan Vedprakash is legal and perfect which has been passed keeping in view of the common use or common parlance of the said commodity. (7). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as the case law cited at Bar. (8). So far as the maintainability of the writ petitions is concerned, the petitioners have directly approached this Court against the assessment orders & demand notices and better course was to file appeal but in the facts and circumstances of the given case when the Tribunal has already taken a view in identical matter, the writ petition cannot be thrown out on the sole ground of availability of alternative remedy, which has not been disputed by Mr. Mehta also. Therefore, I proceed to examine the merits of the case. The relevant notifications dl. Mehta also. Therefore, I proceed to examine the merits of the case. The relevant notifications dl. 23.3.89 & 27.6.90 read as under: "5 Bazra, Barley, Jowar, or Milo, Maize ragi kadon, kulki, and moth in all their form including atta(flour), Dal and bran thereof but excluding cornflakes.....(rate of tax)...2.5%." "6. Moth and its dal, bazra, barley, jowar or milo and maize including atta (flour) dal, bran thereof but excluding cornflakes...(rate of tax)..2.5%" (9). The question which arises for determination in these cases is as to whether Sorgum Sudan Grass is taxable at the rale of 2.5% under the entry No. 6 in the Notification dt. 23.3.89 and 27.6.90being Jowar as alleged by the petitioner or the same falls under the residuary entry as claimed by the Department to make the petitioners liable to pay sales tax at general rate of 10%. (10). It may be stated that taxation statute must be construed strictly. Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act being restriction upon the plenary powers of the State Legislature to levy tax on sale/purchase of goods must be construed strictly. In other words the restriction must be limited to the goods expressly mentioned and nothing more must be read into it except what it says clearly. It is no doubt true that the nature of the goods cannot be determined by the test of its use to which they are capable of being put and the user test, may be logical but is not conclusive. In other words unless the Department establishes that the goods in question can by no conceivable process of reasoning be brought under any of the tariff items, resort cannot be made to the residuary item. The general rule of construction demands that if a commodity is covered by a general entry of common genre and a specific entry for the purpose of such schedule, the commodity must be held to be falling under the specific entry. It is well settled that in interpreting items in Statutes like the Sales Tax Act whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances, resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms of expressions used but to their popular i.e. the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined. But in the absence of any definition being given in the enactment, the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted. Applying the same principle, a Division Bench of this Court in Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association Vs. State (5) has observed that in taxing matters one has ultimately to take a common sense view of the matter. The term as understood in the commercial sense and with reference to their use must be kept in mind in order that a correct conclusion may be reached. The Court should keep in mind whether one going to market to buy a commodity will purchase some different commodity offered to him. (11). In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position, applying the similar test in the case in hand, there remains no room of doubt that the view taken by the authorities below is not illegal. It may be stated that in common parlance or commercial parlance the commodity with which we are concerned presently is known as S.S.G. The petitioners themselves effected the sale Of disputed article i.e. Sorgum Sudan Grass Seeds, showing in the respective bill as a SSG Seeds. The petitioners have bot come out with a case that they are effecting the sale of commodity calling it as a Mowar or the same is known as Jowar in commercial parlance. According to him the commodity is taxable under the specific entry of the notifications dt. 8.3.1989 and 23.3.89 but in the absence of any material produced before came to show that the disputed commodity is known as Jowar in common parlance, the petitioners cannot claim the benefit of specific entry of Jowar made in the notifications particularly when the Department has specifically pleaded that if one goes to the market to purchase Sorgum Sudan Grass, he will not opt for Jowar or vice versa. It is pertinent to note that the Tribunal while arriving at the finding in C.T.O. Vs. Brij Mohan has taken a illustration that if we sow the seeds in question, we do not get Jowar but a special type of grass. Undoubtedly, by virtue of the entry no. 5 and 6 of the notifications dt. It is pertinent to note that the Tribunal while arriving at the finding in C.T.O. Vs. Brij Mohan has taken a illustration that if we sow the seeds in question, we do not get Jowar but a special type of grass. Undoubtedly, by virtue of the entry no. 5 and 6 of the notifications dt. 8.3.89 and 23.3.89 Jowar/Milo or Jowar Seeds or its form is taxable @ 2.5%. The respondents have come out with a case that the said SSG seeds does not fall within the aforesaid entries No. 5 & 6 as the commodity in question is neither Jowar seeds or certified seeds nor a form of Jowar or Milo. The learned Tribunal by a detailed and considered judgment has come to the conclusion that the said Sorgum Sudan Grass Seeds is not a cattle feed and being treated with insecticides does not remain fit for human consumption as such cannot be food grain and held that the said commodity is liable to tax at the residuary rate i.e. 10%. The petitioner has not been able to show that the SSG Seeds are Jowar seeds or its form and thus there is no basis to treat the SSG Seeds as seeds of Jowar. Therefore, as discussed above, when the SSG seeds are not known in common parlance as Jowar nor it is covered by the specific entry i.e. entries no. 5 & 6 of the notifications, the petitioners cannot lake advantage of the said entries of the notifications dt. 23.3.89 and 27.6.90. (12). So far as the contention of Mr. Garg that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to draw distinction between eatable and non- eatable commodity on the basis of scientific approach is concerned, to this extent counsel for the petitioners is right but that will not be of any help. The Tribunal had applied the scientific test but that has been considered incidentally merely to prove that the said Hybrid Seeds are not Jowar because they cannot be used for human consumption and, therefore, he cannot take any advantage out of it. In this regard the cases cited by the counsel for the petitioners are not of any help. In Jain Exports(P) Ltd. V. UOI (6) while interpreting the term Coconut Oil, it has been held that when no classification of coconut oil is given all varities of coconut oil covered by the item. In this regard the cases cited by the counsel for the petitioners are not of any help. In Jain Exports(P) Ltd. V. UOI (6) while interpreting the term Coconut Oil, it has been held that when no classification of coconut oil is given all varities of coconut oil covered by the item. In Yarana Feeds & Farms V. Asstt. Comm of Commercial Taxes (7) their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court have observed that if an exemption is given to the fish generally one should not distinguish the fish from the point of view of their eatability on account of it being fresh or dried fish. In this connection suffice it to say that the petitioner having failed to prove that SSG Seeds, and Jowar are same thing or are only a species of Jowar, cannot take any advantage of aforesaid cases. (13). No other point was pressed before me. (14). In view of what I a have discussed bove, I am not inclined to interfere in the writ jurisdiction and no relief can be granted to the petitioners. A copy of this order be placed in each file. (15). Accordingly, these seven writ petitions have no force and the same are hereby dismissed.