JUDGMENT - Manoharan L., J.:—This criminal application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is for quashing the complaint and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4299 of 1994, pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha. The complainant, who is the non-applicant No. 1 here, as well as the applicant are businessmen. The applicant had purchased pulses from the complainant and had issued post-dated cheques dated 18-5-1995, 2-6-1994 and 5-6-1994 in favour of the complainant - non-applicant No. 1 which were drawn on Punjab National Bank, Lakadganj, Nagpur. When the cheques were sent for collection, the bank dishonoured the same on 29-6-1994. Notice of dishonour was received from the bank by the non-applicant No. 1 on 1-7-1994 at Nagpur. On receipt of the same, the non-applicant No. 1 issued the notice of dishonour to the applicant on 15-7-1994. The applicant refused to accept the said notice on 22-7-1994. The allegation in the complaint is that after the expiry of the period fixed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the complaint filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha, for having committed the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act. 2. Now the case of the learned Counsel for the applicant - Shri S. S. Joshi, is that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha and, therefore, the complaint as well as the proceedings there under are liable to be quashed. 3. The non-applicant No. 1 has filed a reply denying the allegations made by the applicant. The main point urged by the learned Counsel Shri S.S. Joshi on behalf of the applicant is that the cheque was drawn at Nagpur, it was drawn on Punjab National Bank, Lakadganj, Nagpur, it was deposited for collection by the non-applicant No. 1 at Nagpur in his Bank, namely, Bank of Maharashtra, Nagpur, the dishonour was at Nagpur and the intimation of dishonour was at Nagpur. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Joshi, the whole part of the successive causes of action arose within Nagpur. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Joshi, the whole part of the successive causes of action arose within Nagpur. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the non-applicant No. 1, Shri V.M. Deshpande, on behalf of Shri V.C. Daga, contended that the offence under section 138 of the Act would be complete only on the failure of the drawer to pay the amount on receipt of the notice of dishonour within the time stipulated under section 138 of the Act. Therefore, if, in a given circumstance, the payment as per the notice of dishonour had to be made at the place where the complainant is carrying on business and the drawer fails to make the payment, then cause of action would also arise on such failure to make the payment at that place. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the complainant on the decision of this Court in (Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar and another)1, 1994(3) Bom.C.R. 355 . In that decision, the decision of the Kerala High Court in (P.K. Muraleedharan v. C.K. Pareed and another)2 reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. 1965 is relied on by the learned Judges of this Court who have observed that : “…..It would be perfectly valid and reasonable to hold, therefore, that the aggrieved party, viz., the complainant is fully justified in approaching the local Court having jurisdiction over the area where the payment was to be made to him in the final instance. Having defaulted in the first instance, the law casts a special obligation on the drawer of the cheque to make amends by tendering the payment to the payee and the correct approach in such a situation would be to construe the offence having been complete at the place where the payment ought to have been tendered to the drawee but was wrongfully not done….” Therefore, it is clear that the offence is complete only on failure to tender the amount in response to the notice of dishonour within the stipulated time and the Court within whose jurisdiction the said tender had to be made will also get the jurisdiction to try the case. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicant Mr. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicant Mr. S.S. Joshi vehemently contended that there being no statement even in the notice or even in the complaint that the payment had to be made at Wardha, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha will not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. On behalf of the non-applicant No. 1, it was argued that since section 138 of the Act does not require or enjoin the drawee who issues a notice of dishonour to specify the place where the payment is to be made, the learned Counsel for the applicant cannot make such an argument against the complainant 5. The fact that a notice was issued from Wardha is alleged in the complaint. The complainant as described at page 16 of the paper book is “Bhanwarlal son of Ramchandraji Chandak, Proprietor of Vijay Traders, Wardha.” Once it is admitted that the notice was issued from Wardha by the aforesaid complainant, the inevitable inference is that the tender of the amount should be at Wardha. When so looked at and understood, I do not find any reason to accept the contentions of Mr. S.S. Joshi that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha. When that is the position, the conclusion is inevitable that the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha, also has got jurisdiction to try the said complaint. The criminal application is, therefore, not sustainable and is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the criminal application fails and the same is dismissed. Application dismissed. -----