S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-landlady, instituted Civil Suit No. 242 of 1983 in the Court of Addl. Judge, Small Causes Court, at Rajkot against the respondent-tenant to recover possession of suit premises being one room, one kitchen, Osri and store room situated in the building known as "ambika Bhuvan" at Junction Plot, street No. 6 at Rajkot. Monthly rent of suit premises was stated to be Rs. 250/ - p. m. and it was alleged that the respondent-tenant was in arrears of rent and was also liable to pay house tax, education cess, sanitation charges, electricity charges, etc. , It was alleged that the defendant-tenant was in arrears of rent amounting to rs. 2,590/- and therefore, rent was demanded by notice, dated July 8, 1983 while the defendant failed to pay up arrears and therefore, he was liable to be evicted being a tenant who has neglected to make payment of arrears of rent despite service of notice. Second ground on which eviction was sought was to the effect that the tenant has shifted from Rajkot to Jamnagar along with his family since last more than 12 months and that he was not using the suit premises continuously over a period of more than 6 months from the date of suit and therefore, eviction was sought on the ground of non-user under Sec. 13 (1) (k) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The third ground on which the possession was sought was that the defendant-tenant has after coming into operation of the act built and acquired vacant possession of suitable residence. In this connection it was contended that the defendant-tenant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation in the city of Rajkot for his residence on Kalawad Road, Near St. Marys School. The eviction, therefore, was sought under Sec. 13 (1) (L) of the said act. Fourthly, it was alleged that the respondent-landlady reasonably and bona fide required for occupation by herself and members of her family the suit premises and that if a decree for possession is passed in favour of the landlady no hardship will be caused to respondent-tenant. In short, the possession was sought under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the said Act. ( 2 ) ON service of summons the respondent-tenant appeared and filed written statement Exh. 13. He disputed amount of rent being Rs. 250. In short, the possession was sought under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the said Act. ( 2 ) ON service of summons the respondent-tenant appeared and filed written statement Exh. 13. He disputed amount of rent being Rs. 250. 00 p. m. and contended that he was occupying one room, one kitchen, Osri and one store room at the rate of Rs. 131. 00 p. m. and that over and above the rent he was paying Rs. 2. 50 ps. for water charges, Rs. 4. 00 for education cess and thus in all he was paying Rs. 137. 50 ps. per month. He contended that Rs. 250. 00 p. m. was not standard rent and that said demand was unreasonable and excessive. He further submitted that he has also sent M. O. to the plaintiff on 16th May 1982 and it was for Rs. 687. 50 ps. beginning from January 1983 to May 1983 which was refused by the plantiff and therefore, the rent was deposited in the Court after 1st June 1984. He submitted that he has also replied to the notice and has pointed out that he was ready and willing to pay the rent and was not in arrears of rent. As regards ground of non-user under Sec. 13 (1) (k) he submitted that he was transferred to Jamnagar since last more than 12 months and therefore, it was not correct to state that he was not using the said premises without any reasonable cause for more than 6 months. He further submitted that the members of his family were residing at Rajkot and suit premises were being used as it was not correct to state that there was non-user. As against the ground of acquisition of suitable residential accommodation he submitted that he has acquired residential accommodation of his ownership, but firstly it was outside the limits of municipal Corporation of Rajkot and therefore, it cannot be said to be alternative accommodation and secondly he contended that since he was serving in railway, the suit premises being nearer to Railway station was more suitable and convenient to his job while the premises acquired by him was situated far away and was not suitable. Thirdly, he contended that the premises acquired by him were not suitable as they were smaller in area. Thirdly, he contended that the premises acquired by him were not suitable as they were smaller in area. As against the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of the landlady he denied that the landlady was in need of the suit premises for personal and bona fide requirement. He submitted that the number of members in the family of the landlady has remained same and therefore, ground of personal and bona fide requirement was got up one and false and no decree for possession should be passed on that ground. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decrees of the two Courts below the petitioner-landlady has preferred this revision application under Sec. 29 (2) of the said Act and at the hearing of this revision application, has pressed for decree of eviction of the tenant and for possession of suit premises solely on the ground of acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by the respondent-tenant under sec. 13 (1) (L) of the said Act. It may be stated that with respect to other findings reached by the two Courts below concurrently no challenge is made before this Court and therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to refer to and rely upon concurrent findings reached by the two Courts below. ( 4 ) BEFORE this Court proceeds to deal with the rival submissions of the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it is necessary for this Court to set out clearly the limits of its jurisdiction which are in clear and undoubted terms stated by the apex Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1782 : [1987 (2) GLR 960 (SC)]. In the context of revisional power of the High Court under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as His lordship then was) speaking in the context of Sec. 29 (2) of the Act made following pertinent observations :"as we read the power, the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all relevant and material facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all relevant and material facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. " ( 5 ) KEEPING the aforesaid observations in mind, this Court shall have to see as to whether two Courts below have applied the principles of law correctly to the established facts. Secondly, the Court shall have to see as to whether the facts have been properly appreciated after taking into consideration all material and relevant facts. Thirdly, if it finds that the decision rendered by the two Courts below is one which no reasonable man could have arrived at, it can interfere with the same. Lastly, if the Court finds that the decision rendered by the two Courts below leads to miscarriage of justice, it can interfere under Sec. 29 (2) of the Act. However, it is not permissible for this Court to substitute its own view with the views expressed by the two Courts below. If the view expressed by the Courts below is a possible view, the High Court is not justified in lightly interfering with such view simply because it would have taken a different view of the matter. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the challenge of the petitioner-landlady to the concurrent findings reached by two Courts and to the denial of decree of eviction in her favour on the ground of acquisition of vacant possesion of suitable residence by the opponent after coming into operation of the Bombay Rent Act, it will be necessary to set out the provision of Sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Act hereunder :"13. When landlord may recover possession.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, [but subject to the provisions of Sec. 15], a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied - (1) that the tenant after coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. " ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid provision it becomes clear that position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that this ingredient must be pleaded by the landlord/landlady who seeks eviction but after it is proved that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not are within the knowledge of the tenant. Ordinarily, it is for the tenant, therefore, to establish the suitability of the accommodation. ( 8 ) IN the present case, the trial Court has while answering the issue No. 4 recorded a positive finding that the tenant has acquired residential accommodation, namely, a flat near St. Marys School. The trial Court has, however, further found that it is for the plaintiff-landlady to prove that such flat acquired by the tenant is suitable for his residence. The trial Court has found that the landlady has not given the exact area of the flat, the nature of accommodation available and the place where the flat is located. The trial Court has, thereafter proceeded to consider following reasons given by the tenant to establish that such acquisition of flat by the tenant was not suitable : (i) The flat was purchased far away in a village Nana Mahuva which was at a distance of 7/8 Kms. from the Municipal limits of Rajkot Municipal Corporation. (ii) Because of the distance it was not possible for the tenant to go and stay there because he was serving in the Railway department and he had to serve in different shifts. Therefore, looking to the nature of his duty the said premises purchased by him were not suitable. (iii) The said area of village Nana Mahuva was not developed sufficiently. Therefore, looking to the nature of his duty the said premises purchased by him were not suitable. (iii) The said area of village Nana Mahuva was not developed sufficiently. (iv) The said flat was smaller in size/area as it was admeasuring 270 sq. ft. consisting of one room, one small kitchen and a lavatory and bathroom while the area of rented premises was double the area than the premises acquired. Therefore, looking to the size/area of the premises that the said flat acquired by the tenant was not a suitable accommodation as it was smaller in size. ( 9 ) SO stating the reasons the trial Court has found that the plaintiff-landady has undoubtedly proved that the defendant-tenant has acquired alternative accommodation but she has failed to prove that such accommodation was suitable. The trial Court thereafter proceeded to record its finding as under :"now according to law in order to get decree for eviction on the ground of defendant acquired alternative suitable accommodation the plaintiff has to prove two things. Firstly, he has to prove that defendant has acquired alternative accommodation and secondly, he has to prove that the said accommodation is suitable one. Now the plaintiff has proved that defendant had acquired alternative accommodation in village Nana Mahuva. No doubt Nana Mahuva is at a distance of 8 or 9 Kms. from municipal Corporation limit. But from the examination of the defendant it can be safely said that the said portion of Nana Mahuva village can be treated as the suburb of Rajkot because practically the whole City of Rajkot is extended to that place also. City buses are plying between that place and Rajkot City and they can get city buses also often and often. There are number of schools, number of other institutions nearby. Nearby the locality of his flat there are some other societies also and therefore, that area has been developed and that fact has come in from the evidence during the crossexamination of the defendant and therefore, it can be easily inferred that this area in which the flat of the defendant is existing can be treated as a suburb of Rajkot or it can be said that it is on the outskirts of Rajkot. Therefore, the principles laid down in a decision reported in 16 GLR 404 can be applied to the facts of the present case and it can be said that the premises acquired by the defendant away from the corporation limit can be treated as premises acquired within Corporation limit even though it is away. But said area can be considered to be suburb of city of Rajkot. The principles laid down in a decision reported in 16 GLR 404 can be easily applied and therefore, one can say that the defendant had acquired alternative accommodation according to the provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (L) of Bombay Rent Act. But according to that provision the plaintiff has to prove not only that he had acquired alternative accommodation but he had also acquired suitable accommodation. Now as regards the suitability of the accommodation the plaintiff has not led any evidence. The plaintiff has not put any plan or any map or he did not get even the panchnama prepared through the Commissioner of the Court regarding the area of the said alternative accommodation and locality and facility of the said alternative accommodation and except his bare words there is no evidence on record to show that the accommodation acquired by the defendant in that area is suitable to the family of the defendant and at the most it can be said the defendant had acquired altenative accommodation in the said area and that area can be treated as suburb of rajkot and as per the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision the said provision of Sec. 13 (1) (L) should be made applicable to the said premises in such case. But so long as the suitability of accommodation is not proved the decree for eviction against the defendant cannot be passed. " ( 10 ) FROM the aforesaid findings and more particularly the observations made in para 12 of the judgment of the trial Court it becomes clear that the trial Court has placed burden of proof on the plaintiff-landlady to establish that the accommodation acquired by the tenant was suitable to the tenant. ( 11 ) ). Similarly, the lower appellate Court, i. e. , the Jt. Dist. ( 11 ) ). Similarly, the lower appellate Court, i. e. , the Jt. Dist. Judge, Rajkot while deciding the question of suitability of the residential accommodation has observed as under in para 11 of the judgment :"now it be said that it is for the plaintiff to prove that alternative accommodation acquired by the defendant is a suitable accommodation. As stated earlier the defendant has in his deposition stated that the accommodation acquired by him is not suitable for his residence and it is far away from Rajkot City and it is in undeveloped area. Now it be said that where burden is on the plaintiff, the plaintiff should bring on record believable evidence to show that the accommodation acquired by the defendant is a suitable one for the needs of the defendant. The trial court has rightly observed that the plaintiff has not got prepared any panchnama through a Commissioner of the Court about the area of the alternative accommodation and about the locality and the facility of the alternative accommodation in support of his version that the defendants accommodation is suitable for the needs of the defendant and the trial Court has further observed that except bare words of the plaintiff there is no other evidence on record to show that the defendants accommodation is suitable to the defendant. Even the plaintiff has in his cross-examination admitted that he has no personal knowledge about the premises acquired by the defendant in the building of Bhavani builders. The plaintiff has further admitted that he does not know how many people reside in the said alternative accommodation of the defendant. So the plaintiff appears to have no personal knowledge about the area of the alternative accommodation and about the facilities available at the alternative accommodation of the defendant. So the evidence on record is only the oral version of both the sides and admittedly the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the accommodation acquired by the defendant is suitable one. Admittedly the accommodation acquired is away from Rajkot City. Besides this there is no serious challenge by the plaintiff to the version of the defendant that the suit premises is of double area than area of the premises acquired by the defendant at Nana Mahuva. Admittedly the accommodation acquired is away from Rajkot City. Besides this there is no serious challenge by the plaintiff to the version of the defendant that the suit premises is of double area than area of the premises acquired by the defendant at Nana Mahuva. Besides this it is the version of the defendant that he is serving in Railway and that suit premises is only at a distance of 5 minutes run from the Railway station and accordingly his premises at Nana Mahuva is far away from Railway station and in that way also the premises acquired by him is not suitable for him. This version of the defendant is also not seriously challenged by the plaintiff. No doubt during the pendency of third appeal the plaintiff-appellant has got produced at Mark 9/1 the xerox copy of a judgment alleging that the defendant is now no longer in service of Railway, but the said xerox copy is not given Exhibit and the plaintiff has failed to prove by cogent evidence that at present the defendant is no longer in service of the Railway. So on the whole in my view it has been rightly held by the learned trial Judge that there is no clear proof to show that the alternative accommodation acquired by the defendant is a suitable for the defendant and his family, and for these reasons, I decide point No. 4 in the negative. " ( 12 ) FROM the aforesaid two quotations, from the judgment of the trial Court as well as Joint District Judge, Rajkot, in appeal, it becomes clear that the two Courts have found that it was for the plaintiff-landlady to establish by necessary evidence that the alternative accommodation acquired by the defendant-tenant was suitable for his needs and since plaintiff-landlady has failed to lead any evidence in this behalf, it was not proved that the accommodation acquired by the defendant-tenant was suitable. The appellate Court has even clearly observed that admittedly burden was on the plaintiff to prove, that the accommodation acquired by the defendant was suitable one. ( 13 ) THE position of law on the subject is no longer res-integra and is finally settled by the apex Court in the case of Ganpatram Varma v. Smt. Gayatridevi, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2016 . ( 13 ) THE position of law on the subject is no longer res-integra and is finally settled by the apex Court in the case of Ganpatram Varma v. Smt. Gayatridevi, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2016 . The apex Court in the context of identical provision under Delhi Rent Control Act was concerned with the question as to on whom the burden lies to prove that the alternative accommodation is available to the tenant. The apex Court found that undoubtedly the burden was on the landlord to prove that the alternative accommodation was available to the tenant. However, it further found that once it is proved that the alternative accommodation is acquired or was available to the tenant, it was for the tenant to prove that such accommodation was not suitable. In this connection the apex Court made following pertinent observations :"before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above indicate that the position of law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. " ( 14 ) FROM the aforesaid observations made by the apex Court it is more than clear that it is for the tenant to prove that accommodation acquired by him is not suitable because the facts as to how and in what respect the accommodation is not suitable are within the special knoweldge of the tenant and the landlord cannot be called upon to prove such requirement by positive evidence. Something which is within the special knowledge of the tenant is to be proved by him. It is for him to establish by leading necessary evidence as to how the premises acquired by him are not suitable to his need. Something which is within the special knowledge of the tenant is to be proved by him. It is for him to establish by leading necessary evidence as to how the premises acquired by him are not suitable to his need. ( 15 ) BASED on the aforesaid position of law, as concluded by the apex Court, mr. V. S. Mehta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-landlady is right in submitting before this Court that two Courts below, unfortunately, non-suited the landlady by wrongly placing burden of proof on the plaintiff-landlady and by holding that since she has not led any evidence to prove that the premises acquired by the tenant were suitable to the tenant, no decree of eviction could be passed. To the aforesaid extent, two Courts below erred in placing the burden of proof on the landlady to prove that premises acquired by the tenant were suitable to him. The burden to prove suitability of the residence ought to have been placed on the tenant and not on the landlady and on that ground alone she cannot be denied the decree of eviction. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, wrong casting of burden of proof on the landlady would not make any material difference in the present case and would not require trial or remand of the case to the trial Court. The plaintiff-landlady has not led sufficient evidence to establish that the premises acquired by the tenant were suitable to him because she was not expected to establish or prove that fact. In law, she was not required to lead any evidence because it was for the tenant to lead evidence and establish that the premises acquired by him were not suitable to his need. In the present case, the tenant has already led evidence and has tried to demonstrate before the Court that the premises admittedly acquired by him were not suitable for his need. The tenant in this connection has relied upon the following factors to establish that the premises admittedly acquired by him were not suitable to his need : (i) The tenanted premises were bigger in size, i. e. , to say that they were double in area than the premises which are acquired by him at village Nana Mahuva. In other words, according to him the area of the rented premises was between 50 to 60 sq. mtrs. In other words, according to him the area of the rented premises was between 50 to 60 sq. mtrs. while that of the newly acquired premises was only 27 sq. mtrs. In the newly acquired premises there is one room, one kitchen, bath-room and latrine. In the tenanted premises there is one room, kitchen, bath-room, latrine and Osri. The premises acquired by him were, therefore, smaller in size and were not suitable to the needs of his family. (ii) The family of the defendant consisted of defendant himself, his wife, two sons and one daughter, i. e. , in all 5 members. This was the position at the time when the evidence of the parties was recorded. On the other hand, the family of the plaintiff-landlady consisted of herself, her husband and one son, his wife and one daughter of the son. (iii) The tenanted premises were nearer to the railway station and since the tenant was at the relevant time serving in railway it was hardly at a distance of 5 minutes from railway station, and therefore, from the point of view of nature of duty of the tenant, it was convenient to the tenant while the premises acquired by the tenant were situated at a distance of about 8 Kms. from the railway station, and therefore, he would find it difficult to go to his duty from the premises acquired by him. It was, therefore, not suitable residential accommodation. (iv) The premises acquired by the tenant were situated outside the limits of Rajkot town and therefore, such an acquisition cannot be taken into consideration as the premises were acquired in a small village. The area of small village was not sufficiently developed and therefore, also the premises were not suitable. ( 17 ) OUT of the aforesaid factors which are relied upon by the tenant for the purpose of establishing that the premises acquired by him were not suitable, the trial Court as well as lower appellate Court has rejected factors (iii) and (iv) as irrelevant, namely, that the newly acquired premises were not within the limits of rajkot, and that they were situated far away at a distance of about 8 Kms. from municipal limits. In this connection both the Courts have found that the tenant has admittedly acquired alternative accommodation at village Nana Mahuva. Said village is at a distance of 8/9 Kms. from municipal limits. In this connection both the Courts have found that the tenant has admittedly acquired alternative accommodation at village Nana Mahuva. Said village is at a distance of 8/9 Kms. but from the cross-examination of the defendant it was established that said Nana Mahuva was treated as suburb of Rajkot. Practically, the entire City of Rajkot was getting extended even beyond Nana Mahuva. It was also established that city buses were plying between Nana Mahuva and Rajkot. It was also established that there were number of schools and number of educational institutions. It was also established that number of residential societies and tenaments have come up at Nana Mahuva and it was, for all practical purposes, considered to be part and parcel of Rajkot or suburb of Rajkot. Therefore, relying upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Dahyabhai Motiram v. Nathubhai Bhimbhai Naik, reported in (1975) XVI GLR 404 the Court held that the premises acquired by the defendant-tenant can be treated as premises acquired within the limits of Rajkot City. The said factors, therefore, cannot come to the help to the tenant and it cannot be held based on said factors alone that the premises acquired by the tenant were not suitable to his need. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS ( 18 ) NOW the question is as to whether rest of the three factors pressed into service by the tenant are now available to him to resist the decree of eviction. Subsequent to dismissal of suit of the landlady by the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court, some events have taken place which are pressed into service by the plaintiff-landlady by tendering an additional affidavit in this revision application with a view to bringing on record the subsequent events which have taken place. The respondent-tenant has also filed affidavit-in-reply and has tried to urge as to why the subsequent events should not make any change and as to why no decree of eviction could be passed against him. The respondent-tenant has also filed affidavit-in-reply and has tried to urge as to why the subsequent events should not make any change and as to why no decree of eviction could be passed against him. Since the affidavits were tendered in the revision application before this Court and since affidavit-evidence alone would not be sufficient as assertions made therein were not subjected to cross-examination and since remanding the matter to the trial Court for recording further evidence would consume more time, with the consent of learned Advocates for parties as well as with consent of the parties who were present in the Court, order was passed on April 25, 1995 directing the parties to lead evidence as regards subsequent events which have taken place after the judgment and decree of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. Reference in this connection was made by both the parties to the binding precedent of the apex Court in the case of Pasupati Venkateswarlum v. Motor and General Traders, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409 wherein V. R. Krishna iyer, J. speaking for the apex Court has made following pertinent observations :"it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief of the manner of moulding it, if brought diligently to the notice of the Tribunal it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision of fair- play is not violated with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this points are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myraid. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this points are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. " ( 19 ) IT was not at all disputed before this Court by either of the parties that the subsequent events either entitling or disentitling the party to a relief can be taken into account in appropriate case by the Court without causing prejudice to the rights of the parties. In the case of Champaben v. Gopinath Gangadhar, reported in (1980) xxi GLR 709 his Lordship Justice Mr. S. B. Majmudar (as His Lordship then was) while dealing with an application to amend the plaint in an eviction suit filed by the landlord against the tenant took the view that in a suit for possession between the landlord and the tenant cause of action arises on service of notice terminating the tenancy. The rest are only grounds for possession as required by Secs. 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Adding one more ground to the same cause of action cannot be said to be a change of cause of action. It is now well settled that pending suit between a landlord and tenant for possession after the notice terminating tenancy, any number of grounds can be added if they are based on subsequent events which had occurred after the filing of the suit. ( 20 ) IT is settled law that subsequent events can be taken note of and the relief could be moulded suitably vide Hasmatrai v. Raghunath Pratap, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 and M/s. Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohmed Ibrahim, reported in AIR 1985 SC 207 . ( 20 ) IT is settled law that subsequent events can be taken note of and the relief could be moulded suitably vide Hasmatrai v. Raghunath Pratap, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 and M/s. Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohmed Ibrahim, reported in AIR 1985 SC 207 . In yet recent decision in the case of Shadi Singh v. Rakha, reported in AIR 1994 SC 800 the subsequent events were taken into consideration for the purpose of refusing decree of eviction in favour of landlord. In the case before the Supreme Court the rented premises became unsafe and unfit for human habitation. The landlord instituted suit under Sec. 13 (3) (a) (iii) for ejectment of the tenant alleging that the building was required for reconstruction since it became unsafe and unfit for human habitation as the roof had fallen down. In the meanwhile, the tenant replaced the roof, but without obtaining permission of the landlord. In such circumstances, it was found that the tenant effected repairs by replacing the fallen roof and made it safe and fit for habitation and therefore, the requirement of the building for reconstruction no longer subsisted. The Court thus took into consideration the subsequent event of tenant himself repairing the premises and denied the decree of possession even though the tenant did not follow the procedure of Sec. 12 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. . ( 21 ) FROM the aforesaid oral evidence at Exhs. 25a and 35a recorded by this court as regards happening of subsequent events, following factors clearly emerge : (i) The respondent-tenant is no longer in service of railway since last seven years and the fact that rented premises were convenient to him for the purpose of attending his duty as railway employee would pale into insignificance. Admittedly, he was out of employment and nearness of rented premises to the place of service, as such, would not assume any importance. Even otherwise also, the premises acquired by the respondent-tenant is hardly at a distance of 8 Kms. in the same town and very easy means of conveyance were available to him and therefore, it cannot be said that the premises acquired by him were not suitable to him for the purpose of attending his duties. Even otherwise also, the premises acquired by the respondent-tenant is hardly at a distance of 8 Kms. in the same town and very easy means of conveyance were available to him and therefore, it cannot be said that the premises acquired by him were not suitable to him for the purpose of attending his duties. In fastly developing towns or cities there is expansion and large number of residential complexes with all other facilities and amenities have come into existence. Slowly and gradually the Municipal limits are extended and the facilities and amenities such as bus services are already extended to such areas. In the present case even the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have found that the area of village Nana Mahuva was part and parcel of Rajkot town or as good as suburb of Rajkot to which facilities and amenities like bus services were extended and therefore, the respondent-defendant cannot justifiably state that the premises acquired by him were not suitable to his needs. One of the factors, therefore, pressed into service by the respondent-tenant would not be available. ( 22 ) THE question now is as to whether the newly acquired premises by the respondent-tenant is otherwise suitable looking to the area of the flat and number of members of his family. It is true that when the suit was instituted there were five members in the family of the tenant. But, subsequently, his elder son has got married and is employed in Indian Oil Corporation and is residing at Gandhinagar in Sector 20 with his family. The daughter has also got married and gone to her matrimonial home at Baroda. Therefore, there are three members only in his family, namely, tenant himself, his wife and his son. One room, one kitchen and attached bathroom and latrine were available to him in his newly acquired premises. The fact that he has subsequently rented out the said premises and that it was not available to him should not make any difference because the legislature has advisedly used the words "has acquired suitable residential accommodation". Once suitable residential accommodation is acquired liability of eviction is incurred. The fact that he has subsequently rented out the said premises and that it was not available to him should not make any difference because the legislature has advisedly used the words "has acquired suitable residential accommodation". Once suitable residential accommodation is acquired liability of eviction is incurred. It is now well settled law by the decision of the apex Court that subsequent disposal of the property or renting out the property would not make any difference and the liability of eviction incurred by the tenant would continue. In this connection very pertinent observations made by J. S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Rama Gopal v. Shantilal, reported in 1977 0 Allrcj 372 are apposite, the landlord sued the tenant for his eviction under Sec. 12 (1) (i) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961 on the ground that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of an accommodation suitable for his residence. It was admitted by the tenant that he obtained vacant possession of his own house. His case, however, was that of his own volition he sold his house by registered sale deed subsequently before the suit was filed. He, therefore, contended that he was not having the vacant possession of alternative accommodation on the date on which the suit came to be filed. Answering the aforesaid contention His Lordship made following pertinent observations :"a plain construction of the provisions shows that there is nothing therein to require that the tenant should continue to have the vacant possession on the date of the suit, he having acquired it once so as to fulfil all the conditions of this clause. The plain meaning is that the tenant becomes disentitled to the protection available to him under the Act, the moment he acquires vacant possession of an accommodation suitable for his residence. This ground for eviction becomes available to the landlord immediately on the happening of that event and the process of obtaining a decree for eviction by institution of a suit, of necessity, requiring some time, that right having accrued to the landlord cannot be defeated by a voluntary act of the tenant parting with the possession of that accommodation. This ground for eviction becomes available to the landlord immediately on the happening of that event and the process of obtaining a decree for eviction by institution of a suit, of necessity, requiring some time, that right having accrued to the landlord cannot be defeated by a voluntary act of the tenant parting with the possession of that accommodation. A literal construction admits of no ambiguity and the provision is wholly workable on its plain construction so that there is no reason to strain the natural meaning of the words used in the clause to either introduce therein ambiguity when there is none or thereto give an opportunity to a tenant to needlessly harass a landlord, if he be so minded when the need of the tenant for protection given by the act has come to an end. The use of the word "has" in the clause is sufficient to show that the clause includes within its ambit even a past event with reference to the date of suit and does not require the continuance of that situation on the date of the suit. In my opinion, there is nothing in the relevant provision to control this plain and unambiguous meaning of clause (i)". ( 23 ) THE language employed in Sec. 13 (1) (L) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 is almost identical to the language employed in Sec. 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The aforesaid observations, therefore, apply squarely to the fact-situation obtaining before this Court. The fact that the respondent-tenant has subsequently rented out the premises acquired by him to another tenant and the vacant possession of the premises is not available to him, therefore, would pale into insignificance as he has already incurred liability of eviction. The only reason, namely, of small area of the premises acquired by him compared to the size of his family will not now survive because admittedly as per his own affidavit and his deposition at Exh. 35a it becomes clear that the size of his family is reduced from 5 to 3 members. In his own premises he has one room, kitchen and toilet and bathroom facilities. 35a it becomes clear that the size of his family is reduced from 5 to 3 members. In his own premises he has one room, kitchen and toilet and bathroom facilities. The very facilities were available to him in the rented premises, but he was using Osri portion also which he would not be in a position to use in case a decree of eviction is passed. The premises acquired by him have become suitable in every respect to his family. It is also required to be noted that from the date of suit or from the date he has rented out his own premises to another tenant he is earning the monthly rent of Rs. 175. 00 as against which he is paying to the present landlady the rent of Rs. 131. 00 and taxes. In view of the aforesaid, in my opinion, it shall have to be held that premises admittedly acquired by the respondent-tenant are suitable and the twin requirements of Sec. 13 (1) (L) of Bombay Rent Act are, therefore, satisfied. It is admitted by the tenant that he has acquired residential accommodation after Sec. 13 (1) (L) of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 came into force. It is also established now from the evidence of respondenttenant himself that such premises are suitable for his residence. The subsequent events which have taken place, namely, decrease in the size of the family of the tenant have rendered the premises acquired by him in every respect suitable for his family. The so-called inconvenience of attending his office from his newly acquired premises has also disappeared in view of the fact that he is dismissed from service since last seven years and he is, therefore, not required to attend his office at the railway station. ( 24 ) IN view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the petitioner-landlady has become entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground that the respondent-tenant has acquired suitable residential accommodation after coming into force of the said act of 1947. ( 24 ) IN view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the petitioner-landlady has become entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground that the respondent-tenant has acquired suitable residential accommodation after coming into force of the said act of 1947. ( 25 ) IN the result, this C. R. A. is required to be allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower Courts dismissing the suit of the landlady are required to be quashed and set aside and they are hereby quashed and set aside and decree of eviction is passed against the respondent-tenant and in favour of plaintiff-landlady requiring the respondent-tenant to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff-landlady by December 31, 1995. Rule is made absolute accordingly. There shall be no costs. .