Judgement THOMAS, Actg. C.J. :- This appeal is by the Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd., (who will be referred to as the appellant-Corporation) which is a company whose shares are owned by the Government of Kerala. A writ petition has been filed by M/s. PL Agro Technologies Ltd. (who will be hereinafter referred to as the petitioner-Company) for quashing the decision adopted by the appellant-Corporation as per which a contract work was awarded to M/s. Malhotra Helicopters Limited (which would be referred to as the 4th respondent) for carrying out the work of aerial spraying over the plantations of the appellant-Corporation located in certain parts of the State. Petitioner Company has also prayed for a writ of mandamus to the appellant-Corporation to award the contract work to the petitioner-Company being the most eligible tenderer. 2. Learned single Judge expressed strong disapproval of the action of the appellant- Corporation in not awarding the contract work to the petitioner-Company. But without setting aside the said action directed the appellant-Corporation to pay Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to the petitioner Company. 3. Following facts are not in dispute: Appellant-Corporation invited tenders on 22-9-1994 from contractors to do the aforesaid aerial spraying work. Last date of tender was 10-10-1994. On the next day the tenders were opened and it was found that petitioner-Company had quoted Rs. 310/- per hectare while another company (M/s. Matsons Agricultural Services Pvt. Ltd.) had also quoted the same rate while a third company (M/s. Trade and Services Ltd.) quoted only Rs. 229/- per hectare. (None of those companies had a helicopter which is the most indispensable equipment for carrying out aerial spraying work. Therefore, whoever among them is chosen has to depend upon some other company for using helicopter for this work). In the meanwhile, appellant-Corporation received a letter from 4th respondent stating that they are prepared to lease a helicopter to the appellant-Corporation to do this work. The rates quoted by the three tenderers appeared very high and hence the appellant-Corporation decided to make efforts to have the spraying work done at a far less cost. Pursuant to it, tenderers were asked whether they could revise the rates tendered. Petitioner-Company brought his rate down to Rs.210/- per hectare while the other two tenderers offered Rs. 191/- and Rs. 197/- respectively per hectare. Subsequently, the petitioner-Company again reduced the rate to Rs. 186/- per hectare. 4. Pursuant to it, tenderers were asked whether they could revise the rates tendered. Petitioner-Company brought his rate down to Rs.210/- per hectare while the other two tenderers offered Rs. 191/- and Rs. 197/- respectively per hectare. Subsequently, the petitioner-Company again reduced the rate to Rs. 186/- per hectare. 4. According to the appellant-Corporation, non-availability of helicopter with tenderers was causing concern to them as past experience has shown that delay in procuring helicopter would cause delay in commencing spraying work and that would in turn cause damage to the crop in the planatation. Considering the above odds particularly in the light of high rates quoted by the tenderers, appellant-Corporation was persuaded to consider the offer made by 4th respondent because 4th respondent owned a helicopter. When 4th respondent agreed to do the work at Rs. 183/- per hectare, Purchase Committee of appellant-Corporation met on 14-11-1993 and after considering all pros and cons it was decided to accept the offer made by 4th respondent. 5. Learned single Judge doubted the bona fides of the appellant-Corporation on the ground that "if the Corporation has actually and bona fide intended to have the lease arrangement with the fourth respondent, I do not see any reason for inviting tenders from others". The said observation was made on the premise that "the offer given by the fourth respondent for lease arrangement as per Ext.R1(a) was pending with the Corporation from 20-9-1994". Learned Judge further observed that "it is arduous for this Court to believe that the idea of lease arrangement was born to the Corporation only after the third round of negotiation in the matter of fixing rate by the tenderers." 6. Learned single Judge posed a question like this: "When it was clearly found that the tenderers had no helicopters of their own why should they ask them to submit revised rates and appear for negotiation?" In the said consideration learned Judge felt that the petitioner-Company had been "eliminated impolitely from obtaining the contract". According to the learned Judge "Corporation cannot confer a benefit on anyone it pleases but it could be seen that some sort of disproportionate favour was shown to the fourth respondent". According to the learned Judge "Corporation cannot confer a benefit on anyone it pleases but it could be seen that some sort of disproportionate favour was shown to the fourth respondent". Despite such findings learned single Judge has stated that "I do not propose to set aside the award of contract to the fourth respondent though I disapproved the action of the Corporation as observed hereinbefore." It was then that learned single Judge proceeded to direct the appellant-Corporation to pay the amount of Rupees 25,000/- as compensation to the petitioner-Company. 7. Shri Joseph Kodianthara, learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation submitted that the approach made by the learned single Judge was based on the premise that Ext. R1(a) offer (given by the 4th respondent) was pending with appellant-Corporation on 20-9-1994. If so, why should appellant-Corporation proceed to invite tenders on 22-9-1994 was the concern entertained by the learned single Judge. According to the learned counsel, Ext.R1(a) was dated 20-9-1994, but it reached the appellant-Corporation only on 29-9-1994. A perusal of Ext.R1(a) will convince anyone that appellant-Corporation got it oniy on 29-9-94. A note has been made on it like this: "Keep it wait for the tenders" because the tenders were already invited in the meanwhile. 8-A. Learned counsel made a bid to convince us that the tenders made by all the three tenderers originally quoted fancy and highly inflated rates. The very fact that during negotiations petitioner-Company slashed down the rate to such a low as Rs. 210/- per hectare even at the first stroke itself and later to Rs. 186/- would prima facie show that the original tender made by him was grossly inflated. 9. In such a situation what should be the approach which a public Corporation, dealing with the public funds, should have adopted? Had this been a private company the work have been given to a person who could perform it effciently and at the same time at the lowest cost possible. The ideal course which a public instrumentality should adopt should be the same because maximum advantage at the lowest cost is a laudable policy for any enterprise, whether private or public. No contract work is expected to confer a argesse on any contractor under the guise of assuming their work. Here appellant-Corporation entered into negotiation with the tenderers in an attempt to have their rates brought down as less as possible. No contract work is expected to confer a argesse on any contractor under the guise of assuming their work. Here appellant-Corporation entered into negotiation with the tenderers in an attempt to have their rates brought down as less as possible. Between the lowest rate quoted by the petitioner-company at Rs. 186/- and the offer made by ourth respondent (Rs. 183/ -) it is a judicious decision to give the work to 4th respondent. Why should there be any concern for appellant- Corporation that the work should be entrusted only to one of the tenderers? Is it the law that once tenders are invited the public authority is nailed to one option i.e., selection of one of the tenderers to entrust with the work? 10-A. Learned counsel for the petitioner- company contended that the legal position is now well-nigh settled in Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628, that the public authority is bound to make a choice without any fetter. Their Lordships considered the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in C.K. Achutan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1959 SC 490, in which the Bench held, thus (at page 492) : "When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Art.14 because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left to the Government. Similarly, a contract which is held from Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as is contemplated by Art.19(1)(g)". . Of course, in the decision in Airport Authority's case (cited supra) Supreme Court has observed that "obviously what Court meant to say was that merely because one person is preferred to another, it does not follow that there is a violation of Art.14, because the Government must necessarily be entitled to make a choice. But that does not mean that the choice be arbitrary or fanciful. But that does not mean that the choice be arbitrary or fanciful. The choice must be dictated by public interest and must not be unreasoned or unprincipled." Those observations cannot be treated as effectively overruling the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in C.K. Achutan's case. 11. Position is clear from two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court (vide State of V.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1234 : (1982 All LJ 582) and Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Food Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601. In the former their Lordships have observed that "the Government had the right, for good and sufficient reason, we may say, not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder..... There may be a variety of good and sufficient reasons, apart from inadequacy of bids, which may impel the Government not to accept the highest bid - Again the Government may change or refuse its policy from time to time and we see no reason why change of policy by the Government subsequent to the auction but before its confirmation, may not be a sufficient justification for the refusal to accept the highest bid." In' the latter decision Supreme Court has observed that "a public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fair play in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities." 12. The above discussion leads to the conclusion that legal position remains unaltered that the public authority should act fairly in granting assignment of its work, and unjust preference for entrusting me worK is unsupportable in law. But public authority is not nailed to the option of choosing one of the tenderers merely because tenders were once invited. The authority has the right to entrust it to anyone if that is found to be necessary to serve the best interest of it. Public interest should be the guiding principle. 13. We have not come across any material to doubt that appellant-Corporation was influenced by any extraneous consideration in preferring the 4th respondent. The authority has the right to entrust it to anyone if that is found to be necessary to serve the best interest of it. Public interest should be the guiding principle. 13. We have not come across any material to doubt that appellant-Corporation was influenced by any extraneous consideration in preferring the 4th respondent. We have no doubt that by choosing 4th respondent, appellant-Corporation has only acted in public interest to save public fund. 14. We are, therefore, of the opinion that appellant-Corporation was not conferring any benefit on the 4th respondent at the cost of public fund. 15. The question whether petitioner-company has sustained any loss can be decided only if a claim is made under that head. Even if it is found that they sustained loss, the same has to be quantified with the help of data. That need be considered only if a suit is filed for compensation. Subject to the above observations, we set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge, and dismiss the Original Petition. Writ Appeal is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly.