SHANTABEN HARSHADBHAI CHAUDHARY v. STATE — 1995 DIGILAW 388 (GUJ)

S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ). Leave to amend is granted. The Superintendent, Central Prison, sabarmati, is permitted to be added as party respondent No. 4. ( 2 ) ). The petitioner is the wife of one Harshadbhai Rajeshbhai Chaudhary who is ordered to be detained vide order of detention dated 14th May, 1995 passed by the District Magistrate, Mehsana, on his being satisfied that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, it was necessary to detain the detenu. Along with the order of detention, the grounds of detention duly formulated and of even date are supplied to the detenu in the language known to him. ( 3 ) ). From the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu, it becomes clear that vide Notification dated 24th of August, 1981, the petroleum products, i. e. , High speed Diesel and Petrol are declared to be essential commodities. It is also clear that there is one petrol pump being run at village Dhinoj in the name and style of "m/s. Tejash Petroleum, Dhinoj. " The owner of the said petrol pump has obtained wholesale licence No. 240 of 1994 and retail licence No. 322 of 1994. It is the case of the detenu that his brother Tejaskumar R. Chaudhary applied for the dealership in respect of M. S. (Motor Spirit) and H. S. D. (High Speed Diesel) retail outlet to i. B. P. Co. Ltd. , which is a Government of India enterprise. It is his further case that by letter dated 1st December, 1994 request of Tejaskumar R. Chaudhary for grant of dealership was accepted by the Company and thereafter on 9th December, 1994 agreement was entered into between Tejaskumar R. Chaudhari and I. B. P. Co. Ltd. , appointing his brother as dealer with respect to M. S. and H. S. D. It is his further case that since he was unemployed, his brother Tejaskumar R. Chaudhari engaged him to look after the affairs of "tejas Petroleum Pump", at a monthly salary of Rs. 2,000. 00. The grounds of detention served on the detenu state that on 12th of May, 1995 Officer of the District Civil Supplies Office of Mehsana inspected the Petrol Pump and statement of the detenu who was present on the spot was recorded. 2,000. 00. The grounds of detention served on the detenu state that on 12th of May, 1995 Officer of the District Civil Supplies Office of Mehsana inspected the Petrol Pump and statement of the detenu who was present on the spot was recorded. The panchnama was also prepared. The detailed inspection carried out by the team reveals that large scale irregularities were committed in the purchase and sale of High Speed Diesel and that there was adulteration of some substance in High speed Diesel. In the grounds of detention starting from Para 5 to Para 8, irregularities of enormous magnitude have come to light. As per stock book of 12th of May, 1995, the opening stock of High Speed Diesel was 9,838 litres. There is no receipt of further High Speed Diesel till the time of inspection. As per the meter on the pump, upto the time of inspection, 3,642. 8 litres High Speed Diesel is sold. Therefore, as per stock book, if the quantity of diesel sold is reduced from the opening stock of High Speed Diesel, there should be stock of 6,195. 2 litres. However, it was found at the time of inspection and preparation of panchnama that in the tank of High Speed Diesel, there was 13,866 litres of High Speed Diesel. It was thus noticed that 7,670. 8 litres High Speed Diesel was in excess. How such excess stock was obtained by the dealer is not explained except stating that the diesel tank was not in level. While examining the density of High Speed Diesel, it was found that there was difference in the density recorded in the morning as well as one recorded at the time of inspection. It was found that such difference was above permissible difference under Clause-2 (a) of the appropriate order of 1990 issued under Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was also found that over and above the bill book maintained for the purpose of sale of High Speed Diesel, there were other cash memo books by which large quantity of High Speed Diesel was sold on 26th of April, 1995, 27th of April, 1995, 11th of May 1995 and that such sale of High speed Diesel by cash memo bills is not reflected in the stock book. It was thus found that even duplicate sale bills or cash memo bills were prepared and adulterated high Speed Diesel was being sold without reflecting such sale in the stock book and the large scale profiteering was done by selling adulterated High Speed Diesel. It was also noticed that per sale of every 5 litres of High Speed Diesel, 170 ml. was given less and for every 5 litres of petrol, 300 ml. of petrol was given less. For all such irregularities which are of very serious nature, the order of detention is passed by the District Magistrate with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. ( 4 ) ). At the hearing of this petition, Mr. Prakash Jani, learned Counsel appearing for the detenu has assailed the continued detention of the detenu on the ground that the representaion made by the detenu to the Central Government dated 15th June, 1995 is till date not considered by the Central Government. From the grounds of detention, it becomes clear that the detenu is informed of his constitutional right of making representation to the authorities set out in the grounds of detention and one of such authority is Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies Department, Krushi Bhavan, Sachivalaya, New Delhi. It appears that the detenu has initially made representation to (1) the District Magistrate, Mehsana, (2) Additional Chief Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies Department, Gandhinagar as well as to (3) the Advisory Board on 29th May, 1995. The petitioner subsequently made representation to the Secretary, food and Civil Supplies Department, Krushi Bhavan, Sachivalaya, New Delhi, i. e. , to the Central Government. The said representation dated 15th June, 1995 is admittedly received by the Central Government on 17th June, 1995 as is clear from the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Union of India by Dr. K. V. Jacob, Under Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Supplies. In such affidavit, it is clearly stated that the representation was received from the Superintendent of Central Jail, Ahmedabad on 17th of June, 1995. Thereafter, it is stated that the Ministry has called for the para-wise remarks on the same from the Government of Gujarat on 19th of June, 1995. It is further stated that para-wise remarks are thereafter awaited and they were not received by the Central Government. Thereafter, it is stated that the Ministry has called for the para-wise remarks on the same from the Government of Gujarat on 19th of June, 1995. It is further stated that para-wise remarks are thereafter awaited and they were not received by the Central Government. The affidavit-in-reply is sworn on 20th July, 1995. Admittedly, therefore, the para-wise comments must not have been received by the Central Government till 20th July, 1995. It appears that the communication from the Central Government calling for the para-wise comments was received by the State Government on 21st June, 1995. The State Government has thereafter failed to send the para-wise comments. Mr. R. P. Solanki, learned A. P. P. has submitted before the Court that no para-wise comments could be sent because copy of the representation received by the Central Government was not forwarded to the State Government. In absence of copy of the representation, no para-wise comments could be sent. He has further submitted that the State Government has vide its communication dated 23rd of June, 1995 informed the Central government that in absence of copy of representation, no para-wise comments could be sent and that the Central Government should send the copy of the representation immediately. It is the case of the State Government that till today copy of the representation of the detenu is not received from the Central Government. The resultant effect is that no para-wise comments are sent by the State Government to the Central Government and, therefore, Central Government has till today, i. e. , 7th of August, 1995 not considered the representation of the detenu. It is thus clear that the representation of the detenu dated 15th June, 1995 is not considered by the central Government till 7th of August, 1995, i. e. , for a period of one month and 21 days. No sufficient convincing and reasonable explanation is forthcoming either from the affidavit-in-reply filed by Dr. K. V. Jacob, Under Secretary, in the ministry of Civil Supplies, nor is any explanation given by the State Government. The only reason given by the Central Government for non-consideration of representation is that it has called for para-wise remarks from the Government of gujarat on 19th of June, 1995, which were awaited. How long the Union of India would wait for receipt of para-wise comments is not known to this Court. The only reason given by the Central Government for non-consideration of representation is that it has called for para-wise remarks from the Government of gujarat on 19th of June, 1995, which were awaited. How long the Union of India would wait for receipt of para-wise comments is not known to this Court. Whether it has sent any reminder to the State Government or whether by any telephonic talk or by fax message the Government of Gujarat is requested to urgently send the parawise remarks subsequently is also not known to the Court. From the tenor of the affidavit-in-reply it becomes clear that in fact after 19th of June, 1995, the Ministry of Civil Supplies, Union of India, has not cared to know as to why no para-wise comments were received by it and as to why no expedition or reasonable dispatch was shown by the State Government in sending the para-wise comments. It has not thought it necessary either to send the reminder or to ascertain by fax message as to why the para-wise comments on representation made by the detenu were not being sent by the Government of Gujarat. ( 5 ) ). On the other hand, from the facts stated before this Court by Mr. R. P. Solanki, learned A. P. P. appearing on behalf of the Government of Gujarat it becomes clear that immediately on receiving the communication from the Central Government on 21st of June, 1995, the Government of Gujarat has on 23rd of June, 1995 addressed the communication to the Central Government informing the Central government that the copy of the representation of the detenu dated 15th June, 1995 was not sent to them and in absence of such copy, it was impossible for them to send the para-wise comments. They have, therefore, by their letter dated 23rd of june, 1995 requested the Central Government to immediately forward the copy of the representation so that para-wise comments could be sent. The copy of such communication dated 23rd of June, 1995 is shown to the Court and it is also shown to the Court that such letter is dispatched to the Central Government at the correct address. There is no reason for this Court to doubt the statement made at the Bar by the learned A. P. P. on behalf of the State Government based on the original files received from the State Government. There is no reason for this Court to doubt the statement made at the Bar by the learned A. P. P. on behalf of the State Government based on the original files received from the State Government. Whether such communication is received by the Central Government or not and as to what action the Central Government has taken on such communication, is not known to this Court because Dr. K. V. Jacob, under Secretary, in the Ministry of Civil Supplies, is totally silent in his affidavitin- reply about communication dated 23rd of June, 1995 sent by the State Government to the Central Government. The affidavit is sworn by the Officer on 20th July, 1995. It shall, therefore, be assumed that either he has not received the communication from the State Government or he has not cared to see the files and to locate the reply sent by the State Government. It is practically impossible for the State government to send the para-wise comments in absence of the copy of the representation. The Officer calling for the para-wise comments on the representation could ordinarily send the copy of the representation along with the communication calling for para-wise comments on representation. In the present case, admittedly, copy of such representation is not sent. With the result that the representation has not received any attention since 19th of June 1995. It may be incidentally stated at this stage that representation dated 15th June, 1995 made by the detenu to the central Government is in English language. The Court is also informed that the central Government has already received the order of detention and the grounds of detention in English language. However, this Court would assume that para-wise comments on the representation were not casually called for and that the Officer might have genuinely felt need of para-wise comments. ( 6 ) ). The Court is also informed that the central Government has already received the order of detention and the grounds of detention in English language. However, this Court would assume that para-wise comments on the representation were not casually called for and that the Officer might have genuinely felt need of para-wise comments. ( 6 ) ). The law on the subject dealing with delay in considering the representation is stated and re-stated by this Court as well as by the Apex Court and in the recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bachhraji Biharilal pitaliya v. District Magistrate, Surat, reported in 1994 (1) GLR 843 after exhaustive reference to various pronouncements of the Apex Court, this Court deduced the following principles (at Page No. 854 of GLR) :" (A) The use of the words "as soon as may be" in Art. 22 (5) is important. It reflects the anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu to know the grounds on which the order of his detention has been made so that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. The words "earliest opportunity" contemplate the opportunity to make a representation against a detention order to the Government. The ultimate objective of this provision can only be most speedy consideration of the representation by the authority concerned, for, without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic purpose of affording the earliest opportunity of making the representation is likely to be defeated. The representation must, therefore, be considered with due promptitude or expedition and without avoidable delay, in other words, with reasonable despatch. This right to represent and to have the representation considered at the earliest flows from the Constitutional guarantee of the right to personal liberty - the right which is highly cherished in our republic and its protection against arbitrary and unlawful invasion (vide rashid, S. K. v. State of W. B. , AIR 1973 SC 824 and Durga Prasad Ghosh v. State of W. B. , AIR 1972 SC 2420 ). (B) The law does not prescribe what time after the grounds are furnished, the representation could be made. It is equally not provided as to within what time the representation should be considered. (B) The law does not prescribe what time after the grounds are furnished, the representation could be made. It is equally not provided as to within what time the representation should be considered. The time in each case appears deliberately unprovided for expressly, because circumstances vary in each case and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the exercise of each of these two rights (vide State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, AIR 1951 SC 157 ). (C) The reason for immediate consideration of the representation is too obvious to be stressed. The personal liberty of a person is at stake. Any delay would not only be an irresponsible act on the part of the appropriate authority but would also be unconstitutional because the Constitution enshrines the fundamental right of a detenu to have his representation considered and it is imperative that when the liberty of a person is in peril, immediate action should be taken by the relevant authorities (vide Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W. B. , AIR 1970 sc 675 ). (D) Where delay in consideration of the representation is alleged, it is for the authority to explain the reasons which caused the delay preferably by filing a counter-affidavit, stating, as far as possible, the facts and circumstances, which caused delay. In appropriate cases the Court may also permit resort to files or record which caused delay. (E) Whether or not the concerned authority has in a given case considered the representation made by the detenu with reasonable despatch, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it being neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases. The Court has in each case to consider judicially on the available material if the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the concerned authority is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay offered by the concerned authority so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal. [vide Rasid, S. K. v. State of w. B. (supra)]. [vide Rasid, S. K. v. State of w. B. (supra)]. Very recently in the case of Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaikh v. Union of india, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1403 Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian speaking for the Court laid down the law on the subject in the following words :"it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases within which period the representation of a detenu has to be disposed of with reasonable expedition but it must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Since a representation should be considered with reasonable expedition, it is imperative on the part of every authority, whether in merely transmitting or dealing with it, to discharge that obligation with all reasonable promptness and diligence without giving room for any complaint of remissness, indifference or avoidable delay because the delay caused by slackness on the part of any authority will ultimately result in the delay of the disposal of the representation which in turn may invalidate the order of detention as having infringed the mandate of Art. 22 (5) of the constitution of India. " (F) The delay caused in transmitting the representation to the appropriate authority may also assume importance inasmuch as such delay also deprives the detenu of his right of his representation being considered expeditiously by the appropriate authority. The position of law on this aspect of delay is summarised in the following words by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaykumar v. State of J and K, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1023 and the said quotation is further approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Ahmed (supra ). The following observations of the Court provide necessary guidance :"the jail authority is merely a communicating channel because the representation has to reach the Government which enjoys the power of revoking the detention order. The intermediary authorities who are communicating authorities have also to move with an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earlier opportunity of making representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. If the government enacts a law like the present Act empowering certain authorities to make the detention order and also simultaneously makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make his representation against his detention, to the Government and not the detaining authority of necessity the State Government must gear up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. Any slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the protection conferred by the Statute and would result in invalidation of the order. " (G) The question whether the representation submitted by a detenu has been dealt with all reasonable promptness and diligence is to be decided not by the application of any rigid or inflexible rule or set formula nor by a mere arithmetical counting of dates, but by a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of each case. If on such examination, it is found that there was any remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the concerned authority in dealing with the representation, the Court will undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating the continued detention of the detenu. On the other hand, if the Court is satisfied that the delay was occasioned due to unavoidable circumstances or reasons entirely beyond his control, such delay will not be treated as furnishing a ground for the grant of relief to the detenu against his continued detention (vide rasiuddin v. State of U. P. , 1983 (4) SCC 537 : AIR 1984 SC 46 ). (H) However, the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive and there has to be lee-way, depending upon the necessities of the case (not the circumstances of the case ). Not no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference or needless procrastination, though allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The burden of explaining the necessity for the slighest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority (vide Franciss Coralic Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, 1980 (2) SCC 275 ). The burden of explaining the necessity for the slighest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority (vide Franciss Coralic Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, 1980 (2) SCC 275 ). In the aforesaid case the representation was made to the detaining authority on 22-12-1979 and the same was received by the authority on 26-12-1979. Without any loss of time the representation was sent to the Customs Authorities for their remarks as they had led the information leading to the order of detention. The comments of the Customs Authorities were received on 4-1-1980. Thereafter legal opinion of the Secretary (Law and Justice) was also obtained as the representation posed many a legal and Constitutional questions. It is in this context that the Court made aforesaid observations. The supreme Court also relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Nagendranath jain v. State of W. B. , reported in 1972 (1) SCC 498 . the Court upheld the time consumed by the Government by observing that the Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time, especially in a case where another authority (like D. M.) has passed the questioned order. The Court held that the Government might have to make enquiries as to the circumstances under which the detention was found necessary, previous history of the person detained etc. The consultations, therefore, with the Sponsoring Authority is an exercise which is held to be not unnecessary and time consumed in calling for such comments is excluded. Similarly, in the case of Harish Pahwa v. State of U. P. , reported in AIR 1981 sc 1126 the Court ruled that the representation must be taken for consideration by the concerned authority as soon as it is received and unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance, it must be dealt with continuously until final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. (I) When the representation is in vernacular and is to be considered by authority like Central Govt. or its authorised officer who is not conversant with the language of the representation he is justified in calling for translation of the representation either in English or in Hindi. It is a matter of absolute necessity. (I) When the representation is in vernacular and is to be considered by authority like Central Govt. or its authorised officer who is not conversant with the language of the representation he is justified in calling for translation of the representation either in English or in Hindi. It is a matter of absolute necessity. Such a decision should be taken by the concerned authority itself or some responsible officer on his behalf, but if under general instructions requiring calling of translations in cases where representations are in languages other than hindi and English, i. e. , local or regional languages, translation is called for by subordinate officer, it would still fall in the area of "absolute necessity" for proper consideration of representation and time consumed in such process must be excused. (J) Similarly, necessary consultation is held permissible where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. Calling for comments of sponsoring authority is a step towards necessary consultation. The authority can wait for reasonable period for necessary assistance. It is in conformity of this principle that the supreme Court of India has in the case of L. M. S. Immu Saleema v. B. B. Gujral, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1191 observed that time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The occasional observations made by the Supreme Court that each days delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Accepting this principle the supreme Court did not find period of four to five days consumed by Customs authorities in furnishing their para-wise comments on the representation to be unreasonable so as to invalidate continued detention in the case of Hasuma v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1753 . " ( 7 ) ). The aforesaid summary of statement of Law makes it clear that the representation submitted by the detenu is to be dealt with reasonable promptness and diligence. In appropriate cases, it is permissible for the authorised officer even to call for para-wise comments for proper consideration of representation. The authority is not absolved of its obligation to consider the representaion speedily and expeditiously. In appropriate cases, it is permissible for the authorised officer even to call for para-wise comments for proper consideration of representation. The authority is not absolved of its obligation to consider the representaion speedily and expeditiously. If it calls for such para-wise comments, it must pursue the matter and must find out as to why either no para-wise comments are received or as to why more time is being consumed either by the detaining authority or by sponsoring authority in sending the para-wise comments. The authority on whom lies the obligation to consider the representation expeditiously, cannot exhibit callousness, remissness, inaction and indifference in discharge of its constitutional obligation. Such authority could have avoided delay in considering the representation. It has not taken any step expected of it to dispose of the representation speedily and expeditiously. It could have pursued the matter with the State Government by sending reminders, telephonic messages or fax messages. It could immediately come to know that there was genuine difficultly on the part of the State Government in not sending the para-wise comments in absence of copy of the representation. Unfortunately, the Under Secretary or the Secretary, who was in-charge of considering the representation were totally blind and oblivious of their constitutional obligation. The delay caused is avoidable delay and it could have been avoided by exercise of reasonable diligence. While it is true that the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive and there has to be lee-way, no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference or needless procrastination. In the present case, bureaucracy both at the Central Government as well as the State level has acted in the spirit of "no concern" with the result that a person who has been prima facie found to be involved in blackmarketing activity is required to be released by this Court on the technical plea that his representation has not been considered expeditiously and with reasonable dispatch. In my opinion, the Secretary or the Officer of the Central Government acted with total remissness and indifference when he called for para-wise comments on the representation without sending copy of such representation to the State government. The State Government has as back as 23rd of June, 1995 informed the Central Governemnt that they should send the copy of the representation, so that para-wise comments could be sent. The State Government has as back as 23rd of June, 1995 informed the Central Governemnt that they should send the copy of the representation, so that para-wise comments could be sent. The affidavit which is signed as back as 20th July, 1995 is silent about this fact. The deponent of the affidavit has either suppressed this fact from this Court or he has not cared to look into the file and to find out as to why no copy of the representation is sent to the State Government. Conduct of the State Government is equally irresponsible and deserves to be deprecated. The State Government and its officers ought to have kept in mind that it was their order of detention which was subject-matter of consideration by the central Government. It was their duty and obligation to see that they extend every co-operation to the Central Government needed by it in the process of consideration of representation. Its officers were not justified simply in sending the letter dated 23rd of June, 1995 informing the Central Government that the copy of the representation was not received by them and in absence of copy of representation, they cannot send para-wise comments. They ought to have pursued the matter and reminded the Central Government time and again by telephonic talk or by appropriate fax messages that copy of representation was not received by them. They ought to have known that delay in considering the representation would result into release of a rank blackmarketeer. However, having addressed communication dated 23rd of June, 1995, they have gone into deep slumber and have not pursued the matter at all with the result that representation of the detenu, whose detention is for a period of six months, remained undecided on the file of the Central Government till the judgment was delivered by this Court. Obvious procrastination and lethargy shown by the officers of the State Government also deserves condemnation more particularly because State Government ought to have been more vigilant and alert in sending the para-wise comments to the Central Government. They ought to have realised that there was some omission on the part of the Central Government in not sending the copy of the representation and, therefore, they ought to have by reminders tried to get the copy of the representation from the Central Government at the earliest. They ought to have realised that there was some omission on the part of the Central Government in not sending the copy of the representation and, therefore, they ought to have by reminders tried to get the copy of the representation from the Central Government at the earliest. However, they adopted the attitude of no concern despite the fact that it was their order of detention for which there should be desire on their part to see that it is upheld. The duty or obligation to strictly implement the detention law and to see to it that the order of detetion of a rank blackmarketeer is properly defended was primarily that of the State Government, but in my opinion, it miserably failed in its obligation. The present case is one where detailed enquiry is required to be made both by the Civil Supplies Minister of the State of Gujarat as well as Civil Supplies minister of the Union Government. There is no manner of doubt in the mind of this Court that officers are responsible for not dealing with the representation expeditiously and for tossing the representation from one table to another table, so that the blackmarketeers get released from the Court. ( 8 ) ). In view of the aforesaid it becomes clear that representation of the detenu dated 15th of June, 1995 is not considered till date by the Central Government. No sufficient and reasonable explanation is forthcoming from the Central Government to explain such delay. The delay in considering the representation is nearly of 50 days. Till the date of this judgment, the representation is not considered. It is not likely to be considered at all because the State Government has not sent para-wise comments on the representation as it has not received the copy of the representation. The Central Government has till the date of this judgment not cared to send the copy of the representation to the State Government. Under these circumstances, the delay in considering the representation was avoidable and such delay could not be excused. With feeling of frustration and total helplessness, this Court is left with no other option but to declare that the continued detention of the detenu is illegal and null and void as right of the detenu guaranteed by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India is violated. With feeling of frustration and total helplessness, this Court is left with no other option but to declare that the continued detention of the detenu is illegal and null and void as right of the detenu guaranteed by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India is violated. This Court is sure that but for deliberate inaction on the part of the highest officials of the Central Civil Supplies Department and of the State Government, such rank blackmarketeers could not have been out of prison cell on such technical but constitutional plea. In the result, the petition succeeds. The continued detention of the detenu is declared to be illegal and null and void. The fourth respondent is directed to release the detenu forthwith unless his presence is required in connection with any other offence. Rule is accordingly made absolute. ( 9 ) ). The copy of this judgment is directed to be sent by Registrar with notice of the Court to the Honble Civil Supplies Minister of the State of Gujarat and the Honble Civil Supplies Minister and Secretary, Ministry of Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi with request to them to personally look into the matter and to inform this Court even by letter of request as to why in cases of blackmarketing special sympathies are shown by the bureaucrats to the blackmarketeers. .