HARILAL GORDHANBHAI v. RAMNIKLAL D. RATNESHWAR — 1995 DIGILAW 389 (GUJ)

J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) SHOULD the second application for fixation of standard rent after dismissal of the first application for non-prosecution upon receipt of notice of demand of rent of more than six months, under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rents, hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Rent Act for short) give protection to the tenant from an ejectment decree, is the theme of the present revision. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the original defendent-tenant and the respondents are the original plaintiff-landlods in respect of demised premises consisting of one room, Osri and kitchen on the ground floor situated in Vaniawadi Sheri No. 2 at Rajkot. The parties are hereinafter addressed to as the landlords and tenant for the sake of convenience and brevity. The demised premises were let to the tenant at the monthly agreed rent of Rs. 60. 00 inclusive of taxes. ( 3 ) THE landlords filed Regular Civil Suit No. 6 of 1980 in the Small Cause court at Rajkot for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent and also on the ground of nuisance and annoyance. The tenant resisted the suit by filing a written statement. On the basis of the pleadings, issues were settled at Exh. 30. The trial court on appreciation of the facts and circumstances, decreed the suit for possession only on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. The suit for possession and Civil Misc. Application No. 22 of 1980 which was pending for fixation of standard rent came to be consolidated and decided by the trial Court by a common judgment on 23-2-1981. The unsuccessful tenant carried the matter before the District Court at Rajkot by filing Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1981 and lost in the second inning also as his appeal came to be dismissed on 25-7-1983. The tenant has, therefore, challenged the legality and validity of the eviction decree passed by the Courts below on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act by filing this revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. The tenant has, therefore, challenged the legality and validity of the eviction decree passed by the Courts below on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act by filing this revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. Shah while appearing for the petitioner-tenant has raised the following contentions : (1) That the Courts below have committed error of law in not fixing the standard rent by dismissing the second application for fixation of standard rent. (2) That the decree for possession against the tenant on the ground of nonpayment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) is illegal as time for payment of arrears of rent after fixing standard rent is not given. ( 5 ) THE aforesaid two contentions are interconnected and, therefore, it would be desirable and expedient to deal with them simultaneously. ( 6 ) THE tenant had filed an application for fixation of standard rent under sec. 11 earlier. The first application for fixation of standard rent No. 818 of 1976 came to be dismissed for default on 30-6-1979. There is no dispute about the fact that no application for restoration or review had been made by the tenant. There is also no dispute about the fact that the rent was in arrears from 1-7-1976. The landlords served the tenant with a notice Exh. 21 dated 3-12-1979 demanding arrears of rent from 1-7-1976 to 30-11-1979. Thus, the tenant was served with a notice under Sec. 12 (2) wherein demand of rent of 41 months was made at the rate of rs. 60/- per month, totalling to Rs. 2,460. 00. The tenant received the notice. The acknowledgement receipt is produced at Exh. 22. The suit came to be filed on 4- 1-1980 and the second application for fixation of standard rent No. 22 of 1980 was filed by the tenant on 11-1-1980. ( 7 ) ON appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record, the trial Court held that the tenant was in arrears of rent of more than six months and he is liable for eviction under Sec. 12 (3) (b ). The trial Court found that the second application for fixation of standard rent is not maintainable as the first application for fixation of standard rent was dismissed for default. The trial Court found that the second application for fixation of standard rent is not maintainable as the first application for fixation of standard rent was dismissed for default. In the opinion of the trial court, the issue of standard rent cannot be re-agitated, relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Barkatali v. Sohiniben, (1977) XVIII GLR 913. He was of the opinion that it was not necessary to determine the standard rent of the demised premises. As there was demand of permitted increases, the trial Court found that provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) will be attracted. There was no dispute about the permitted increases. There was no payment of rent on the first date of hearing. No payment of arrears of rent was made on the first date of hearing and rent was not regularly paid during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, a decree came to be passed by the trial Court under Sec. 12 (3) (b ). The ground of nuisance and annoyance was decided against the landlords. On appeal by the unsuccessful tenant, the appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree recorded by the trial Court. ( 8 ) AN interesting question which has been raised in this revision is, as to whether dismissal of the application for fixation of standard rent for non-prosecution would bar a second application for fixation of standard rent and would debar the tenant from seeking protection of the Rent Act. After having examined the entire scheme of the Rent Act and the purpose and object of provisions of Secs. 11 and 12 of the Rent Act and considering the latest proposition of law, this Court has no hesitation in finding that the decree for possession of demised premises on the ground of nonpayment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) recorded by the Courts below consistently and concurrently is legal and valid. ( 9 ) IT is true that the finding of the Courts below that the second application for fixation of standard rent is not maintainable, relying on the decision of this Court in Barkatalis case (supra) is improper and erroneous. Dismissal of application under sec. 11 for default would not bar a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. ( 9 ) IT is true that the finding of the Courts below that the second application for fixation of standard rent is not maintainable, relying on the decision of this Court in Barkatalis case (supra) is improper and erroneous. Dismissal of application under sec. 11 for default would not bar a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. It is not correct to say that once an application under Sec. 11 comes to be dismissed, it would preclude the tenant from re-agitating the question of standard rent. The second application for fixation of standard rent by the tenant cannot be said to be incompetent under the provisions of Sec. 11 of the Rent Act. The view taken by both the Courts below relying on the decision of this Court in Barkatalis case (supra) is not sustainable in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mangaldas nenumal v. Hasumati [1983 (2)] XXIV (2) GLR 1364. The view taken by this Court in Barkatalis case (supra) is departed from by this Court in the aforesaid Division bench decision in Mangaldas case. ( 10 ) THUS, the entire scheme of the Rent Act clearly goes to show that the standard rent should be fixed in accordance with law and the landlord cannot be allowed to recover more than the standard rent. In Mangaldas case (supra), this Court has held that the substantive provision in this connection, viz. , right of a tenant to get standard rent fixed cannot be set at naught by the provisions such as Order 9, Rule 9, C. P. Code. As per the ratio of this decision, if an application for standard rent comes to be dismissed for default and if it were to be held that such dismissal would permanently bar the right of tenant to get the standard rent of his premises fixed for all time to come, then it would be against the spirit of the Rent Act and, therefore, fresh application for fixation of standard rent on the same cause of action is not barred. In the circumstances, the view of the Courts below that the second application for fixation of standard rent is barred and is not maintainable, is not legal. In the circumstances, the view of the Courts below that the second application for fixation of standard rent is barred and is not maintainable, is not legal. The Courts below ought to have held that fresh application for fixation of standard rent on the same cause of action was not barred and maintainable and, therefore, standard rent ought to have been fixed. ( 11 ) TWO alternatives are open for this Court due to the failure on the part of the Courts below to fix the standard rent : (i) one way is to remand the matter to the trial Court with the direction to reconsider and fix the standard rent, and (ii) to examine the evidence on record and fix the standard rent in the revision itself. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the intervening time-spell, the latter option is not only expedient but is absolutely necessary to follow at this stage. The dispute between the warring landlords and the tenant is going on since more than almost two decades. Admittedly, rent had been in arrears from 1-7-1976. Remand of the matter will again consume time and money for both and again on the basis of the record, this Court is in a position to determine the dispute of standard rent. It is not the case that the parties were not allowed to lead evidence. On the contrary, evidence is led by both the parties. Since the litigation between the parties has passed through long legal conduit pipe for almost of a spell of two decades, this Court thinks it appropriate to resolve and determine the dispute of standard rent in this revision itself and adopt the second alternative. ( 12 ) THE agreed rent between the parties is Rs. 60. 00 per month in respect of the demised premises. The contention of the defendant-tenant that agreed rent is excessive is required to be established by him. The tenant has not been able to prove that the agreed rent in respect of the demised premises is excessive. There is no any material worth the candle on record to indicate that the agreed rent of rs. 60/- per month is in any way excessive or exorbitant. The onus is on the tenant in a dispute of standard rent to show that the contractual rent is excessive. It is found from the evidence that agreed rent of Rs. 60. There is no any material worth the candle on record to indicate that the agreed rent of rs. 60/- per month is in any way excessive or exorbitant. The onus is on the tenant in a dispute of standard rent to show that the contractual rent is excessive. It is found from the evidence that agreed rent of Rs. 60. 00 in respect of the demised premises is not shown to be exorbitant or excessive. The tenant has not produced any documentary evidence in support of his contention that the agreed rent is excessive. No witness is examined by the tenant. excessive expression employed means immoderate, inordinate, extravagant as per the plain dictionary meaning. excessive is not the same thing as not reasonable. There is always a gap between what is reasonable and what is excessive; what is excessive does not begin where what is reasonable necessarily ends. If the rent is within this gap between what is excessive and what is reasonable, the Court will not exercise powers under Sec. 11 saying that the rent is excessive. When the tenant fails to show that the rent is excessive or any evidence regarding the rent on 1-9-1940 or prevailing rates of rent in the neighbourhood for similar premises let for similar purposes, the tenants application is required to be dismissed. The application for fixation of standard rent no. 22 of 1980 which came to be dismissed by the Courts below on the ground that such fresh application under Sec. 11 (3) is not maintainable, is not correct. Therefore, that part of the finding is required to be reversed. However, at the same time, dismissal of the application is warranted on the ground that no evidence is led by the tenant to show that the contractual rent is excessive. In other words, agreed rent of Rs. 60. 00 is required to be fixed as standard rent with regard to the demised premises. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation in fixing the standard rent of the demised premises at Rs. 60. 00 per month. ( 13 ) ANOTHER important question which emerges for appreciation and adjudication is - As to whether the tenant is entitled to statutory umbrella of the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b ). Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation in fixing the standard rent of the demised premises at Rs. 60. 00 per month. ( 13 ) ANOTHER important question which emerges for appreciation and adjudication is - As to whether the tenant is entitled to statutory umbrella of the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b ). It may be recalled that there is no dispute about the fact that the case is governed by Sec. 12 (3) (b) as the landlord had demanded the arrears of rent for more than six months alongwith demand of permitted increases in the notice under Sec. 12 (2 ). A question, therefore, would arise as to whether the tenant is entitled to protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). A contention is raised that since fresh application for fixation of standard rent was preferred within one month after receipt of the notice under Sec. 12 (2) and the dispute of standard rent was not resolved earlier, an ejection decree cannot be passed under Sec. 12 (3) (b) without giving an opportunity to pay or tender the arrears of rent as per the standard rent. This submission may appear to be captivating but not convincing, subtle but not sustainable in view of the underlying purport and scheme of the provisions of Secs. 11 and 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. Though a second application or fresh application for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 11 (3) is not barred as there was no fixation of standard rent on merits as contemplated by the scheme of the Rent Act, the tenant is debarred from seeking the protection as he cannot be said to be ready and willing to pay or tender the rent. The very fact that the tenant did not pay or tender the rent as per the agreed rent within one month after service of the notice under sec. 12 (2), while making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent under sec. 11 (3) and without getting interim rent fixed, is a pointer and indicative of the fact that he was not ready and willing to pay rent for claiming eligibility of protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). A tenant has to fulfil the material conditions of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Sec. 12 (3) (b) reads as under :-"12. A tenant has to fulfil the material conditions of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Sec. 12 (3) (b) reads as under :-"12. x x x (3) x x x (a) x x x (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit, if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter. ( 14 ) IT can very well be seen from the aforesaid provisions that in order to qualify oneself for protection of provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b), a tenant has to comply with the following three conditions : (1) tenant must pay or tender in Court the rent on the first date of hearing or before such other date as the Court may fix ; (ii) he must continue to pay or tender in Court the rent till the suit is finally decided, and (iii) if the Court directs that he should pay costs of the suit, he must also pay the same. ( 15 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the amendment made to Sec. 12 (3) (b) by Gujarat Act VII of 1985 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is a settled proposition of law that amendment in Sec. 12 (3) (b) which came into force on 5-12-1984 is not given retrospective effect. Therefore, the expression regularly incorporated by virtue of the amendment is not required to be considered in the present case and there is no dispute about this aspect. ( 16 ) CAN it be said that fresh application for fixation of standard rent is maintainable and, therefore, the dispute of standard rent can be said to have been raised as contemplated by Sec. 12 (3) (b) ? It may be noticed in this connection that if application for fixation of standard rent once made and is dismissed for default or non-prosecution and the tenant does not get it reviewed or restored, then the tenant would obviously disentitle himself to enjoy the protection of Sec. 12. It may be noticed in this connection that if application for fixation of standard rent once made and is dismissed for default or non-prosecution and the tenant does not get it reviewed or restored, then the tenant would obviously disentitle himself to enjoy the protection of Sec. 12. The mere fact that the tenant whose application for determination of standard rent is dismissed for want of prosecution or default was able to file a fresh application for fixation of standard rent, would not mean that he still enjoys the protection of sec. 12. The contention that dispute of standard rent raised in the fresh application under Sec. 11 (3) is a dispute under Sec. 12 is accepted, then a position may emerge wherein the tenant would go on filing successive applications for fixation of standard rent on the same cause of action after dismissal of the previous applications for default. Thus, the position of the landlord would be adversely affected and it would cause serious legal prejudice to the landlord. Dismissal for default though not a full stop or an estoppel on the part of the tenant, the protection contemplated by the provisions of Sec. 12 will not be available to such an erring tenant as the gist and genesis of provisions of Sec. 12 is to see whether a tenant is ready and willing to pay or tender rent within time or not. If the tenant is allowed to seek protection from eviction on the ground of dispute of standard rent in a fresh application, then a situation will be created in which the landlord would be seriously prejudiced. In view of the conjoint reading of the provisions of Secs. 11 and 12 and the policy of the legislature, it can safely be concluded that though a tenant is entitled to raise dispute of standard rent by filing fresh application after dismissal of his previous application for standard rent, he will not be entitled to protection of provisions of Sec. 12. Needless to mention that the legislature insisted that the tenant who is sought to be jealously guarded against exploitation must atleast be fair to the landlord and not to create a situation in which the landlord would be deprived of his legitimate right to get rent in fair return of his property. Needless to mention that the legislature insisted that the tenant who is sought to be jealously guarded against exploitation must atleast be fair to the landlord and not to create a situation in which the landlord would be deprived of his legitimate right to get rent in fair return of his property. If the tenant is not willing to act fairly, the legislature would have no sympathy for such a person. A tenant who is negligent and persistent defaulter cannot seek immunity from protection on the ground that dispute is raised in the fresh application. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that raising of dispute by filing a fresh application under sec. 11 (3) after dismissal of the previous application of the tenant, the tenant is disentitled to seek protection of provisions of Sec. 12. ( 17 ) THE object and the underlying scheme of the provisions of Secs. 11 and 12 of the Rent Act is to provide umbrella to the tenant against eviction so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases. Section 12 places restriction on the free and unfettered right of the landlord to seek eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent from the tenant during the period the Act remains in force. A tenant who pays and who is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases is protected from eviction. Section 12 (1) thus provides a statutory protection to the tenant so long as the tenant pays and is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases and observes the terms of his tenancy. Section 12 (2) entitles further protection that a landlord cannot file a suit for eviction unless he has made a demand in notice in writing of the arrears of standard rent or permitted increases. As soon as the tenant receives notice of demand he has either to pay the same within one month or if he raises a dispute with regard to standard rent or permitted increases, he has to file an application for fixation of standard rent or permitted increases, as the case may be within a period of one month in light of provisions of Section 11 (3 ). Failure to do so would obviously disentitle the tenant to protection and will entitle the landlord to eviction decree under Sec. 12 (3) (a) or 12 (3) (b), as the case may be. If the tenant makes an application under Sec. 11 (3) and if such application is dismissed for non-prosecution or default without payment of rent as per the demand in the notice under Sec. 12 (2) and does not get it restored or reviewed, the tenant cannot be said to be ready and willing to pay the rent. It cannot also be said that there is dispute of standard rent once an application for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 11 (3) is dismissed for default. Therefore, the first safeguard under Sec. 12 (1) is lost. ( 18 ) NOW the question which requires to be determined is, as to whether the tenant is entitled to protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) in the present case as provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are attracted and not Sec. 12 (3) (a ). The contention that dispute of standard rent is decided by this Court, time may be given to avail the statutory protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) is not sustainable. The fact that the tenant whose application for fixation of standard rent is dismissed for non-prosecution will be able to file a fresh application for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 11 does not mean that the tenant will enjoy protection of Sec. 12. It is true that right to file a fresh application for fixation of standard rent if the previous or first application is dismissed for default, is not taken away by the provisions of the Rent Act and order 9, Rule 9, C. P. Code cannot be held to have taken away the said statutory substantive right. However, once application for standard rent is dismissed for default and the same is not got restored, then, the tenant would be deprived of the protection of provisions of Sec. 12, though he has a right to file a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. Therefore, the mere fact of a fresh application by the tenant does not mean that there is a dispute of standard rent and the tenant should be given time to seek protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) as the standard rent is fixed alongwith the decision on merits. Therefore, the mere fact of a fresh application by the tenant does not mean that there is a dispute of standard rent and the tenant should be given time to seek protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) as the standard rent is fixed alongwith the decision on merits. After determining the standard rent by the Court by order or judgment, ordinarily, the Court has to fix date for payment of all arrears of standard rent and permitted increases so as to enable the tenant to avail of benefit of provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). The said principle will not be available in the present case as the dispute of standard rent raised in the fresh application for standard rent under Sec. 11 (3) after dismissal of the previous application cannot be said to be a dispute requiring the Court to fix the date for payment of the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases. ( 19 ) IN the present case, it is an admitted fact that on the first date of hearing of the suit, the tenant had not tendered or deposited full arrears of rent. It is a settled proposition of law that the first date of hearing of the suit is the date when the court applies its mind or latest when the Court frames issues. The issues were framed by the trial Court on 4-12-1980. The tenant was in arrears of rent of rs. 3,240/ -. He had deposited only Rs. 3,000. 00. Thus, the payment was short of rs. 240/- on the first date of hearing of the suit. Therefore, the first condition to avail protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) was not complied with. The tenant had admittedly not paid full arrears of rent as then due on the first date of hearing, i. e. , on the date on which issues were framed on 4-12-1980. Not only that, again on the date of the judgment of the trial Court, on 23-2-1981, the tenant was in arrears of rent. It is an admitted position that he had not tendered or deposited full arrears of rent as then due on the date of the judgment. Rent due on the date of the judgment came to Rs. 3,300. 00 and the tenant deposited Rs. 3,214. 00. Thus, there was short of an amount of Rs. 86. 00 towards the arrears of rent. Rent due on the date of the judgment came to Rs. 3,300. 00 and the tenant deposited Rs. 3,214. 00. Thus, there was short of an amount of Rs. 86. 00 towards the arrears of rent. Apart from that, rent was not regularly paid during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, the tenant had failed to comply with the second condition of Sec. 12 (3) (b) as the tenant was not regular in payment of rent during the pendency of the suit. Nothing is brought on record as to whether he was regular during the course of the appeal. However, both the conditions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are not complied with and, therefore, the tenant would not be entitled to protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Section 12 (3) (b) is a provision debarring the Court from passing a decree for eviction if the tenant satisfies the conditions laid down therein. The first condition that tenant must pay or tender in court the rent on the first date of hearing of the suit or before such other date as the Court may fix, was not satisfied. Again, the second condition that he must continue to pay or tender in Court rent till the suit is finally decided is also not complied with. Therefore, according to the settled proposition of law, the tenant is liable for eviction decree under Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are mandatory. In Ganpat v. Sashikant, AIR 1978 SC 955 , the appex Court has held that Sec. 12 (3) (b) does not create any discretionary jurisdiction in Court. It provides a protection to the tenant on certain conditions and these conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant who seeks benefit of the said section. Therefore, in view of the settled proposition of law, it is very clear that provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are mandatory and are required to be strictly complied with by the tenant. ( 20 ) IT may also be mentioned that the Apex Court in Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai, (1977) XVIII GLR 790 (SC), has held that readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay could be found only if he had complied with the provisions of the Act. ( 20 ) IT may also be mentioned that the Apex Court in Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai, (1977) XVIII GLR 790 (SC), has held that readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay could be found only if he had complied with the provisions of the Act. The Act does not cover a case of a person who is unable to pay rent owing to want of money but otherwise ready and willing. It is also further held in the said decision that non-prosecution of application for standard rent indicated that there was no real dispute regarding standard rent or permitted increases. It is very clear from the said decision that the tenant who seeks protection of Sec. 12 (3) (a) or 12 (3) (b) is obliged to comply with the material conditions so as to determine a case in which decree for eviction is passed. . ( 21 ) IN Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mangaldas Nenumal v. Hasumati, [ (1983 (2)] XXIV (2) GLR 1364, it is held that though fresh application for fixation of standard rent is not barred, if previous application is dismissed for default, but if first such application is not got restored the protection will not be available to the tenant against eviction. Thus, ratio of this decision fully reinforces the view of this Court. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the fact and circumstances enumerated hereinabove and the catalogue of events and the material text of the entire scheme of the Rent Act and aforesaid case law, this Court has no hesitation in finding that the petitionertenant is not entitled to statutory umbrella of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) and, therefore, the respondents-landlords are eligible and qualified for an ejectment decree on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b ). With the result, while fixing the standard rent at Rs. 60. 00 per month which is incidentally contractual rate of rent and in the facts and circumstances, the tenant is not required to be given time for payment of arrears of rent as the tenant is not eligible to claim the statutory umbrella of provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Consequently, the present revision under sec. 60. 00 per month which is incidentally contractual rate of rent and in the facts and circumstances, the tenant is not required to be given time for payment of arrears of rent as the tenant is not eligible to claim the statutory umbrella of provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Consequently, the present revision under sec. 29 (2) is dismissed while confirming the decree for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 12 (3) (b) and fixing standard rent of Rs. 60/ - per month. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The tenant is given time to vacate the demised premises till 31st March 1996 on usual terms and conditions and on giving an undertaking inter alia incorporating the condition that he shall not transfer, assign or sub-let the demised premises and he shall hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the demised premises to the landlords and that he shall pay arrears of rent and will go on paying rent regularly till 31st March 1996. Accordingly, this revision application against the decree for eviction and rent shall stand dismissed. Rule is discharged .