Judgment N.Pandey, J. 1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code) for quashing an order dated 24-3-1995 passed by the learned Maistrate, taking cognizance for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471, 474, 120-B and 114 of the India Penal Code against the petitioner. 2. Before going to the main question, which|has been raised in this case, it would be appropriate to have a brief survey of some of the facts The complainant (opposite party No. 2) approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, by filing a petition of complaint alleging that the petitioner in collusion with the Revenue Authorities forged certain Revenue receipts and records to obtain an order in his favour from the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Patna (D.C.L.R.), Jamabandi Cancellation Case No. 1 of 1994-95. 3. From the relevant facts as alleged by the parties there is no dispute that different litigations are going on with respect to the pronerty which was purchased in the year 1974. 4. The question raised in the present case relates to the scone and effect of Section 195(1)(a) and (b) of the Code and applicability of these provisions to the case where forged documents are produced as evidence in a judicial proceeding by a party thereto and prosecution for such party is sought for the offence under those provisions noticed above. 5. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended since the alleged offence was committed at a time when the fproceeding was pending before the D.C.L.R., the complaint was not entitled in law to lodge a complaint for taking action. For such offence, the jcourt alone is clothed with the power to make a complaint because it has a reasonnable nexus with the proceeding before the D.C.R.L. 6. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel for the complainant, submitted that from a bare reference to the facts averred in the complaint petition as the order of the D.C.L.R. dated 19-11-1994, it would appear that the alleged offence was committed much before the initiation of the jamabandi cancellation case. There is no allegation that such offence was committed during the pendency of the proceeding before the D.C.L.R. 7. Having noticed rival contentions of the parties I also perused the complaint petition as well as the order of the D.C.L.R. dated 19-11-1994. There is no allegation that such offence was committed during the pendency of the proceeding before the D.C.L.R. 7. Having noticed rival contentions of the parties I also perused the complaint petition as well as the order of the D.C.L.R. dated 19-11-1994. The alleged forgery is with respect two rent receipts having been granted on 31-3-1993, as well as tauzi register being Jamabandi No. 25 showing entry of the petitioner in the register of the year 1955-56. According to the D.C.L.R. these documents were forged in collusion with the Revenu Karmchari. There is no allegation that these documents were forged while the proceeding was pending before the D.C.L.R. nor there is any allegation that any record of the proceeding was foreged. 8. In the case of Patel Laljibhai Somabhai V/s. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1935 : 1971 (2) SCC 376 , the Supreme Court held that a court is clothed with power to make complaint only with regard to such offences which are committed by a party to a proceeding in that court. In other words, the commission of such offence has reasonably close nexus with the proceeding of that Court. It would be appropriate to notice the relevant passage of the judgment herein : "7. * * * * * * * The offence about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to complaint may, therefore, be oppropriately considered to be only those offence committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can without embarking upon a commpletely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party........" The Supreme Court then referred to various provisions of the Code on the subject and held thus : "7. * * * * * * All these sections read together indicate that the Legislature could not have intended to extent the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party. * * * * * * All these sections read together indicate that the Legislature could not have intended to extent the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party. It is no doubt true that quite of ten if not almost invariably the documents are forged for being used or produced in evidence in court before the proceedings are started. But that in our opinion cannot be the controlling factor, because to adopt that construction, documents forged long before the commencement of a proceeding in which they may happen to be actually used or produced in evidence, years later by some other party would also be subject to Sections 195 and 476, Cr.P.C. This, in our opinion would unreasonably restrict the right possessed by a person, and recognised by Section 190, Cr.P.C. without promoting the real purpose and object underlying these two sections. The court in such a case may not be in a position to satisfactorily determine the question of expediency of making a complaint." 9. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Raghunath and other V/s. State of V. P. and others, AIR 1973 SC 1100 , and it was held that a prohibition against complaint by appropriate authority in Section 195(1)(a)(b) applies only if offence mentioned in section has been committed by a party to the proceeding. 10. Yet a reference can also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan and another V/s. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Cri LJ 1389, it was held thus : "3. ****** Regarding the offence committed before the start of the proceedings, the High Court in our view, has rightly held that no complaint is necessary by the court concerned either in the old Code or in the new Code. Therefore, the contention that the absence of a complaint by the Revenue Court was a bar for taking cognizance by the Criminal Court in respect of these offences which were committed even before the Revenue Court cannot be sustained. 11. Therefore, the contention that the absence of a complaint by the Revenue Court was a bar for taking cognizance by the Criminal Court in respect of these offences which were committed even before the Revenue Court cannot be sustained. 11. In my view, the purpose and object of the Legislature in creating a bar against cognizance by a private complainant (sic) for the offence as disclosed under Secton 195(1)(a), (b) is to save the accused from vexatious prosecution, as also to avoid conflicts, if any, between the findings of the courts. As per decision of the Supreme Court as held in the case of Patel Laljibhai Sombhai (supra), this was the only reason the Legislature have empowered that court whose proceeding had been target of the offences of perjury, to consider the expediency in the larger public interest of the criminal trial of the guilty person. In my view, since the offence alleged, therefore, has been committed before the start of the proceeding, there was no bar in taking cognizance by the Learned Magistrate in respet of such offences. However with respect to any other grievance, the petitioner can avail his remedies at appropriate stage before the Court below itself. 12. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in this application. Therefore, the same is accordingly dismissed.