JUDGMENT : B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J. 1. These two Writ Petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India arise out of the same set of circumstances and raise identical issues for consideration of this Court. Hence, they can both be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The Petitioner in both the Writ Petitions is a Co-operative Bank carrying on business in the Cooperative Banking Industry. The 1st Respondent in both Writ Petitions hereinafter referred to as 'the employees') were working as Cashiers in the Dehu Road Branch during different periods. The two employees and another employee working as Agent of the Dehu Road Branch at the material time were charge-sheeted for serious misconducts, such as, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the bank's business and defalcation of monies belonging to the bank. After holding of domestic inquiries, the 1st Respondent in Writ Petition Nos. 1254 of 1993 and 1261 of 1993 were dismissed from service. The said employees challenged their dismissal from service by filing applications under Sections 78 and 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. In the meanwhile, the Petitioner, which is a Co-operative Bank covered by the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, had filed disputes before the Co-operative Court for recovery of the amount defalcated by the two employees. Original documents of the banks, such as, ledgers, cash books, scrolls and so on, were filed as evidence, before the concerned Co-operative Court. In the meanwhile, the two employees herein, had filed applications before the Labour Court for interim relief by way of a mandatory order to the Petitioner to reinstate them pending the hearing, and disposal of their applications before the Labour Court. Though, in the first instance, the Labour Court refused to grant such relief, the Industrial Court in Revision granted the said relief and the two employees are now continued in service pending the hearing and disposal of the applications before the Labour Court. 3. The 1st Respondent in Writ Petition No. 1254 of 1993 had filed Application (BIR) No. 14 of 1986 and the 1st Respondent in writ petition No. 1261 of 1993 had filed Application (BIR) No. 15 of 1986. When the said applications were taken up for trial, the learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent employees insisted that the original documents on which the charges were based be made available to the Labour Court. When the said applications were taken up for trial, the learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent employees insisted that the original documents on which the charges were based be made available to the Labour Court. A criminal case had also been instituted against the concerned employees and some of the documents had been filed before the Court of J.M.F.C. Vadgaon, in the criminal case. An application was made in the co-operative Court to summon the original documents from the Court of J.M.F.C. Vadgaon. This was done and the documents were transmitted to the Co-operative Court by the Criminal Court. When a similar application was made before the Labour Court for summoning the original documents from the Co-operative Court to the Labour Court, the application was disposed of by a cryptic order which said "Documents be withdrawn from the said Court and filed in this Court, as if the summons is issued, it will take time and as the matter is fixed for hearing on April 8, 1992." An application made subsequently for framing issues does not appear to have been properly disposed of except with a direction that the matter would be set down for evidence of the Applicant in the matter. 4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner moved Revision Application (IC) No. 11 of 1992 and Revision Application (IC) No 10 of 1992 before the Industrial Court impugning the said order made by the Labour Court disposing of the request for summoning the relevant documents. The Industrial Court went on to consider whether such a Revision Application could be made at all under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and then held that, the order being an appealable order, no Revision was tenable. It then went on to express the opinion that even the Revision Application was barred by limitation. Finding no substance in the Revision Applications, the Industrial Court dismissed both the Revision Applications by orders made separately on January 22, 1993. 5. In my view, the impugned orders of the Industrial Court amount more to shadow boxing, without any attempt to deal with the substance of the matter. In the first place, it is not possible to accept the conclusion of the Industrial Court that the orders impugned in the Revision Applications were appealable orders. 5. In my view, the impugned orders of the Industrial Court amount more to shadow boxing, without any attempt to deal with the substance of the matter. In the first place, it is not possible to accept the conclusion of the Industrial Court that the orders impugned in the Revision Applications were appealable orders. An appeal can lie u/s 84 of the Act only against orders specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the said Section. The orders impugned by the petitioner were obviously not orders not falling under Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 84 of the Act, and therefore, no appeal could have been entertained against them. Though the petitioner had styled its applications as Revision Applications, the Industrial Court could have exercised its powers of judicial superintendence u/s 85 of the Act and dealt with the matter or merits. It is unfortunate that, instead of doing so, the Industrial Court chased the form, missing the substance in the bargain. 6. Even on merits, the Industrial Court lost sight of the provisions of Section 118(c) of the Act which invests the Industrial Court with the same power as is available under the CPC to the Civil Court. Order XIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides for such situations, wherein a Court may, on its own motion and, in its discretion, on the application of a party to a suit, send for the record of any other suit, pending in any other Court and inspect the same. This provision has been sufficiently explained by Courts as necessary for doing justice between the parties. It has also been held that erroneous rejection of such application is good ground for appeal or revision. (See in this connection AIR 1966 (Ass) 48 : 1882 (7) Cal. 560 : 1909 (2) Ind. Cas. 953 : AIR 1918 (All) 375 : 1907 11 Cal. 112. It is unfortunate that, neither the parties, nor the Industrial Court, adverted mind to this important provision of law. In the bargain, the matter remained pending in this Court for two years, to no purpose. 7. In the result, the impugned orders of the Industrial Court dated January 22, 1993 made in Revision Application (IC) No. 10 of 1992 and Revision Application (IC) No. 11 of 1992 are hereby quashed and set aside. In the bargain, the matter remained pending in this Court for two years, to no purpose. 7. In the result, the impugned orders of the Industrial Court dated January 22, 1993 made in Revision Application (IC) No. 10 of 1992 and Revision Application (IC) No. 11 of 1992 are hereby quashed and set aside. The said Revision Applications are remanded to the Industrial Court with the following directions: (1) The Industrial Court shall treat the said Revision Applications as applications made for exercise of its powers u/s 85 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. (2) The Industrial Court shall dispose of the said applications in the light of the provisions of Section 118(c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and Order XIII, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 8. Since the matter has been pending for quite some time, the Industrial Court will dispose of the said Revision Applications within two months from the receipt of the writ of this Court, after due notice to the parties. 9. Writ to go down immediately. 10. With the above directions, both the writ petitions are disposed of. Rule in each of the petitions is made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. 11. Issuance of certified copy of this judgment is expedited.