JUDGMENT Satya Brata Sinha, J.: Both the applications involve a common question as to whether ownership or exclusive possession of a vehicle is a condition precedent of grant of a permit in favour of an applicant in terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') and the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said rules') and as such they are taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In Sankar Dey's case, [C.O. No. 10249 (W)/95] the fact of the matter is as follows:- The petitioners filed art application for grant of permanent stage carriage permit for the routes Siliguri-to-Asansole via Durgapur-Raniganj before the State Transport Authority in form 1-A which is contained in Annexure-A to the writ application. The said application was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that he has no ready vehicle and moreover the route Siliguri-Asansole overlaps with the routes of Calcutta-Raniganj and thus the petitioners' application for grant of permanent permit was rejected under s. 104 of the said Act. In C.O. No. 10965(W)/95 the petitioner Binay Kumar Biswas filed an application for grant of temporary permit before the Regional Transport Authority for plying his vehicle on the Route No. 85 along with the requisite fees on 16.2.95 in form IX a copy whereof is contained in Annexure-A to the writ application. The said application was taken up for consideration by the Regional Transport Authority on 22.3.95 and a resolution rejecting the same was passed as he possessed no vehicle for the purpose of grant of permit and there was no vacancy in reference to approve fleet strength. A copy of the said resolution is contained in Annexure-B to the writ application. 3. The learned Counsels for the petitioners have taken me through the provision of Ss. 70, 71, 72(1), 71 (3)(D); first proviso to s. 80(2) and s. 104 of the said Act; Rules 113, 114, 121, 122, 133 and 141 of the said Rules as also the forms prescribed for filing such applications and submitted on the basis thereof that there is no provision either in the said Act and/or the rules which empowers the transport authorities to reject an application for permit on the ground that he does not possess any vehicle on the date of consideration of the said application. it was submitted that the ownership or possession of a vehicle is not a sine quo non for consideration of an application for grant of permit and in support of the aforementioned contentions reliance has been placed on A. Narayan Kamath vs. State Transport Authority & Ors, reported in Ai R 1960 Mys page 33 and Jadumani Pradhan vs. Srinibash Sahu & Ors., reported in AIR 1974 Ori page 202. The learned Counsel would submit that the forms which have been prescribed in terms of Rule 123 of the said Rules does not provide for ownership or possession of vehicle as a condition precedent and in fact Clauses 10A and 13 of the said Form would clearly show that possession or ownership of a vehicle is not required for consideration for grant of a permit. The learned Counsels submitted that a distinction has to be made between the grant and issue of a permit. According to the learned Counsel possession of a vehicle is not necessary for the purpose of a grant of a permit and at the time of such grant an offer letter may be issued in terms of Rule 141 where-after the petitioners may procure a vehicle and produce the same before issuance of the permit. It has been submitted that although there is no provision for grant of such offer letter in the said Act, the said provision is not ultra vires the provisions of the Act in view of various rules making power conferred upon the State thereunder. 4. Mr. Khan the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, submitted that in C.O. No. 10249(W)/95 the petitioner contended that he has a ready vehicle and thus no illegality can be said to have committed if he has failed to produce the documents in support of his aforementioned contention. The learned Counsel submits that in Binay Kumar Biswas's case the form has not been filled up in its entirety and as the requirement for grant of a permit was not fulfilled by disclosing the particulars required therefor, the said application was not maintainable at all. According to the learned Counsel an offer letter is issued with a view to provide an opportunity to the applicant to produce all documents to show that he possesses the vehicle which can be operated on the route applied for. According to the learned Counsel an offer letter is issued with a view to provide an opportunity to the applicant to produce all documents to show that he possesses the vehicle which can be operated on the route applied for. The learned Counsel urged that possession of a vehicle is a pre-condition for grant of a permit as would appear from the provisions of s. 70 of the said Act as well as different provisions of the said Rules. 5-6. The said Act was enacted to consolidate or and amend the law relating to the Motor Vehicles. Owner has been defined in s. 2(30) of the said Act in the following terms:- 'Owner' means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." Section 2(31) defines 'permit' in the following terms:- " 'Permit' means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorising the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle". Section 2(32) defines 'prescribed' as meaning prescribed by Rules made under the Act. The word 'State Carriage' has been defined in s. 2(40) which is in the following terms: " 'Stage Carriage' means a motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey." 7. Chapter-V of the said Act deals with control of transport vehicles. Section 66 of the said Act puts an embargo on any owner of a motor vehicle to use the same as a transport vehicle without any permit. Section. Chapter-V of the said Act deals with control of transport vehicles. Section 66 of the said Act puts an embargo on any owner of a motor vehicle to use the same as a transport vehicle without any permit. Section. 70 provides for application for grant of stage carriage permit or as a reserve stage carriage where for, inter alia, the following particulars are necessary:- (a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates; (b) the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle; (c) the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided and the time-table of the normal trips; (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions; (e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing, maintenance and repair of the vehicles, for the comfort and convenience of passengers and for the storage and safe custody of luggage; (f) such other matters as may be prescribed. 8. Sub-section (2) of s. 70 provides that an application referred to in subs. (1) would be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed. Section 71 (1) envisages that a Regional Transport Authority while considering an application for grant of stage carriage permit shall have regards to the object of the said Act. Sub-section (2) of s. 71 empowers the authority to refuse to grant a stage carriage permit, if it appears from any time-table furnished that the provision of the said Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened. Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government, if so directed by the Central Government limit the number of stage carriage generally or of any specified type having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters. Section 72 provides for grant of stage carriage permit subject to the provisions of s. 71 in accordance with the application or with such modification as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Such a permit may be granted for a stage carriage of a specified descriptions and may, subject to rules on one or the other conditions specified in sub-so (2). 9. Section 80 of the said Act lays down the procedures in applying for and grant of such permits. Such a permit may be granted for a stage carriage of a specified descriptions and may, subject to rules on one or the other conditions specified in sub-so (2). 9. Section 80 of the said Act lays down the procedures in applying for and grant of such permits. Sub-section (2) of S. 80 provides that the Transport Authorities shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the said Act. However, application may summarily be refused if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriage as fixed and specified in a notification published in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-so (3) of S. 71. 10. Second proviso appended to sub-so (2) of s. 80 provides that an application for grant of permit may be refused by recording the reasons in writing for such refusal and upon an opportunity of being heard in the matter. Section 104 provides for restriction on grant of permits in respect of notified area or notified route. 11. From the aforementioned provisions of the said Act it appears that applications for grant of permit and refusal thereof are not only governed by the provisions of the said Act but also under the Rules. Section 96 of the said Act provide for the Rules making power. Sub-section (1) of the said provision empowers the State to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the said chapter. Sub-section (2) of the said provisions which is illustrative in nature empowers the State without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred under sub-s. (1) to make rules with respect to all or any of the matters specified therein including the forms to be used for the purpose of the said chapter as also the forms of permits and any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. 12. In exercise of the aforementioned powers the State has framed the said Rules. Rule 2(c) defines 'form' to mean a form set forth in the Act or appended to the Rules. The word 'prescribed' has been defined to mean prescribed under the said Rules or under Central Motor Vehicles Rules. 13. 12. In exercise of the aforementioned powers the State has framed the said Rules. Rule 2(c) defines 'form' to mean a form set forth in the Act or appended to the Rules. The word 'prescribed' has been defined to mean prescribed under the said Rules or under Central Motor Vehicles Rules. 13. Rule 122(1) provides that where the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit and the applicant is not on the date of application the registered owner of the vehicle, then, the applicant shall, within one month of the sanction of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, or by such longer period as such Transport Authority may specify to produce before that Authority the certificate of registration of the vehicle registered in his name in order that particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit. 14. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 122 of the said rules prohibits issuance of any permit until registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has been, if the form of permit so requires, entered therein and in the event of any applicant's falling to produce the certificate for registration within the prescribed period, the Regional Transport Authority may withdraw its sanction of the application. 15. In terms of Rule 123(1)(A) an application for a permit in respect of a transport vehicle and in respect of a particular stage carriage of any form would be in Forms I and IA respectively. 16. 15. In terms of Rule 123(1)(A) an application for a permit in respect of a transport vehicle and in respect of a particular stage carriage of any form would be in Forms I and IA respectively. 16. Rule 141 of the said Rules thus :- "Every permit must contain the Registration Mark(s) of the vehicle(s) which shall ply by virtue of the permit granted and during the period prescribed by the Transport Authority granting the permit in the offer letter which shall not normally exceed one month from the date on which the offer letter is issued, the grantee must produce the documents in respect of the vehicle(s) showing that he is in possession of the vehicle(s) as owner thereof and that the change of address of vehicle(s) concerned has been effected within this State, if previously registered outside this State and that the vehicle(s) is/are not covered by any kind of permit(s): Provided that the Transport Authority granting the permit may allow time up to a limit of four months in respect of a grantee under the Additional Employment Programme or an Ex-serviceman : Provided further that the Transport Authority granting the permit may for reasons to be recorded in writing relax the condition as to possession by ownership for such period as it might consider reasonable but in any case not beyond six months from the date on which the permit is granted. In such contingency, also, the condition as regards transfer or change of address shall not be relaxable." 17. Form-1 prescribes application for a permit in respect of stage carriage permit. Clauses 10A and 13 thereof reads as follow:- "10A. Particulars of vehicle/vehicles owned by the applicant or in his control for which permit is sought. 13. I am/We are in possession of the vehicle, the certificate of registration of which is enclosed. I/We have not yet obtained possession of the vehicle and I/We understand that the permit will not be issued until I/We have done so and have produced the certificate of registration." 18. Form IA prescribes application for a permit in respect of a service of Stage Carriage. Clause 14 thereof reads as follows:- "14. I/We are at present in possession of ... ... ... vehicles available for use under the permit applied for." 19. Form IA prescribes application for a permit in respect of a service of Stage Carriage. Clause 14 thereof reads as follows:- "14. I/We are at present in possession of ... ... ... vehicles available for use under the permit applied for." 19. Before entering into the question involved in this application it has to be borne in mind that the object of the said Act is to liberalise the scheme for granting permits in favour of the private operators. With regard to grant of a permit, the provisions which were required to be followed in terms of Ss. 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 have been given a complete go-bye in the said Act. 20. An application filed by an applicant cannot be rejected summararily, unless it is contrary to any notification issued by the State Government in terms of s. 71 (3)(A) of the said Act. However, it is a common ground that no such direction has been issued by the Central Government nor the State Government has issued any notification in this regard. While considering any application for grant of a stage carriage permit the respondents are required to have regard to the object of the said Act. Second proviso appended to sub-so (2) of s. 80 enjoins a duty upon the transport authorities to record reasons and to give an opportunity of hearing before a permit can be refused. 21. It may also be noticed that where in terms of proviso appended to sub-s. (1) of s. 72 no permit could be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application, no such provision exists in relation to other requirements specified in S. 70 of the said Act, 22. In Mithilesh Garg etc. etc. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 443 , the Apex Court held:- "A comparative reading of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the old Motor Vehicles Act makes it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the new Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for making irrespective of the number of operators already in the field. The scheme envisaged under SS. 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the new Act. The scheme envisaged under SS. 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the new Act. The right of existing operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of s.47 and s. 57 under the new Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permits." 23. But the relevant question in this regard is as to what is the extent of liberalisation? Does it mean that an applicant for grant a permit has to be given all facilities for grant thereof including sufficient time to purchase a vehicle by issuing an offer letter at the first instance. In my opinion, the answer to the said question must be rendered in negative. The liberaisation policy for grant of permit as engrafted in the Act, although must be allowed to have full play, no further liberalisation is contemplated under the Rules. The said Rules have to be construed in the light of the provision of the said Act. It has to be borne in mind that the said Act does not envisage any order by way of grant of sanction order or issuance of offer letter. In this application, it is not necessary to advert to the question as to whether Rule 122 or Rule 141 of the said Rules are ultra vires the said Act; but there cannot be any doubt that the said Rules have to be interpreted keeping in view the provision of the said Act. Mithilesh Garg's case (supra) does not envisage that the concerned authority while considering an application for grant of stage carriage permit should invariably allow the same irrespective of the fact as to whether the petitioner is in a position to fulfil all the requirements of the law or not. 24. Mithilesh Garg's case (supra) dealt with the provisions of the said Act vis-a-vis the provisions of the old Act, including the question that in the new Act there does not exist any provision of the nature of s. 47 and s. 57 of the old Act. 24. Mithilesh Garg's case (supra) dealt with the provisions of the said Act vis-a-vis the provisions of the old Act, including the question that in the new Act there does not exist any provision of the nature of s. 47 and s. 57 of the old Act. It would bear repition to state that by reason of the said Act, a liberalised policy relating to grant of permit has come into being, but I am unable to accept that before issuing the permit, it is obligatory on the part of the transport authorities to invariably grant an opportunity to procure a vehicle whether old or new and such an endeavour would be made by the applicant only after such permit has been issued. 25. Rules 122 and 141 of the said Rules operate in limited field. It is really difficult to comprehend as to why such different terminologies like 'sanction order' and 'offer letter' had to be used although in effect and substance, both the provisions seek to achieve the same object viz. to grant an opportunity to the applicants to enable them to produce documents that the vehicle in question which is to ply on the route for which application for grant of permit had been filed is registered in the name of the applicant. It is interesting to note that the State has used the word 'the' before the word 'vehicle' in Rule 122(1) and not the word 'a'. Second proviso appended to Rule 141 also speaks of 'possession by ownership.' The said pharseologies used in the rules appear to playa significant role. It is interesting to note that the second sub-clause of clause 13 of Form I, “I/We have not yet obtained possession" which clearly shows that the applicant is supposed to have taken steps for obtaining possession, but for some reasons he could not. In my opinion the word 'yet' is very significant. 26. Having regard to the Scheme of Chapter-V of the said Act, I am of the view that both Rules 122 and 141 apply in exceptional circumstances and are not of wide amplitude. The said provisions may come into play only when the applicant fulfils other terms and conditions for grant of permit. 27. 26. Having regard to the Scheme of Chapter-V of the said Act, I am of the view that both Rules 122 and 141 apply in exceptional circumstances and are not of wide amplitude. The said provisions may come into play only when the applicant fulfils other terms and conditions for grant of permit. 27. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the transport authorities are creature of the Statutes and thus the impugned order passed by them have to be construed in the light of the provision of the said Statute. It is also now well known that when a Rule has been framed validly and the forms have been prescribed therein, the said Rules and the forms prescribed in the Rule form a part of the Statute unless this effect or control the section or derogate from it. [See 1995 (4) SCC 182 , para 9]. In the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Goverdhan Regular Motor Service Warora & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1926 the Supreme Court upon considering the provisions of the 1939 Act and the Rules framed thereunder held that an application for a permit, apart from containing the particulars referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of s. 46 must also contain other particulars as required under clause (f) i.e. such other matters as may be prescribed. 28. As indicated hereinbefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon a decision of the Mysore High Court in A. Narayana Kamath vs. State Transport Authority & Ors., reported in AIR 1960 Mys page 33, wherein one of the questions which arose for consideration was whether any application for permission under the Act can be considered to be defective when it did not deal with certain matters provided in a form prescribed under rule 156 of the Rules. The High Court held that conditional matters for which columns were provided in the form prescribed by it cannot merely for that reasons claim status of the particulars prescribed under the Act and cannot thus be regarded as particulars referred to in s. 146(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation's case overruled the said finding holding that the form prescribed by the State Government under the Rules become part of the Rule itself which the State Government is competent to frame. The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation's case overruled the said finding holding that the form prescribed by the State Government under the Rules become part of the Rule itself which the State Government is competent to frame. The Supreme Court, therefore, rejected the contention that a form prescribed required further information on the various particulars and matters referred to therein is beyond the rule making power of the Government. 'The Supreme Court held:- "In our opinion, the matter has to be approached from a slightly different angle, viz., whether the authorities have got the power to reject an application summarily if it does not contain information on any matter or particulars referred to in the form. We are unable to find any provision in the statute giving a power to the transport authorities to reject an application summarily on that ground, but, we have already emphasised that the application must give the necessary information on the various particulars and matters enumerated in the form prescribed for such purpose. It is to the interest of the applicant himself to give full and clear information because he stands the risk of the permit not being granted to him for lack of information on certain matters. But this is quite a different thing from the power of the authority to reject an application forthwith on the ground that the application is defective. The only provision where such a power to reject summarily is given is under the proviso to s. 57(3), Under this proviso, the Regional Transport Authority, without following the procedure of publishing an application and inviting objections can summarily refuse the application in the circumstances mentioned therein. No doubt it may be asked that if an application lacks information on very vital matters, the whole object of publishing the same and inviting objections could not be achieved because the parties entitled to make objections and representations cannot effectively make the same." 29. In this view of the matter and more so keeping in view the fact that in terms of the said Act there may not be any competition for grant of any permit which was under the old Scheme, the application cannot be dismissed summarily. It is also beyond any doubt that before refusing to grant such permit, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted and reasons should therefore are to be recorded. It is also beyond any doubt that before refusing to grant such permit, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted and reasons should therefore are to be recorded. Thus except under such provisions expressly providing for summary rejection of a permit, no application for grant of permit can be summarily dismissed. 30. The provisions of the said Act have to be read along with the said Rules as also forms prescribed thereunder. Items 10-A and 13 of Form No. 1 in no unmistakable term provides for a situation where an applicant can apply for a provision without having been in possession of a vehicle although he must be aware that a permit shall not be issued unless he obtains possession of a vehicle and produces certificate of registration in respect thereof. Possession of a vehicle, thus, cannot be said to be mandatory requirement in order to enable an applicant to file an application for grant of a permit. 31. In Jadumani Pradhan vs. Srinibash Sahu & Ors. reported in AIR 1974 Ori., page 202, R.N. Misra, J, (as the learned Chief Justice of India then was) speaking for the Division Bench even while considering the provisions of 1939 Act held that under the Act and the Rules made thereunder ownership or possession of the stage carriage is not a condition precedent to making an application for grant of a permit and the applicant is entitled to say that if he granted a permit, he may procure a vehicle to use under it. 32. However, it may be noticed that in S. Veerappa Pillai, Sathi Vilas Bus Service vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. reported in AIR 1952 SC page 192 [which has not been noticed in Jadumani Pradhan (supra)], the Apex Court held:- "An examination of the relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act does not support the view that the issue of a permit for a bus which falls with the definition of a 'stage carriage' is necessarily dependent on the ownership of the vehicle. All that is required for obtaining a permit is possession of the bus. All that is required for obtaining a permit is possession of the bus. As ownership is not a condition precedent for the grant of permits and as a person can get a permit provided he is in possession of a vehicle which satisfies the requirements of the statute or the Rules farmed thereunder, we have to hold that the parties and the authorities were labouring under a misconception if they entertained a contrary view." 33. The aforementioned decision has been followed by the Apex Court in K.M. Viswanath Pillai vs. K. M. Shanmugam Pillai reported in 1969(1) SCC 188 , wherein the Apex Court while construing s. 42(1) of 1939 Act (which is equivalent to s. 66 of 1988 Act) observed:- "The section does not in our view, as the language requires that the owner himself should obtain the permit, it only requires that the transport vehicles should not be used except in accordance with the conditions of the permit." 34. But, it should be taken note of the fact that the definition of 'owner' has undergone a change under the 1988 Act. I shall assume as was submitted by Mr. Dutt that there exists a distinction between grant of a permit and issue of a permit, although the Act does not envisage such a situation but the said Rules do. 35. Keeping in view the Form-I as appended to the Rules there cannot be any doubt that possession of a vehicle is not a condition precedent for consideration for grant of a permit. After sanction of the permit but before issuance thereof the applicant may be directed to produce before the authority the certificate of registration of the vehicle registered in his name or pass an order so that particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit within one month or by such longer period as such transport authorities may specify. Rule 141 of the said Rules provides that every permit must contain the registration marks of vehicle which would ply by virtue of the permission granted and during the period prescribed by the transport authority granting the permit in the offer letter which was not normally exceed one month from the date on which the offer letter is issued, the grantee must produce the document in support of the vehicle showing that he is in possession thereof as owner. Rule 122(1) also as stated hereinbefore seeks to achieve the same purpose. 36. A copy of an offer letter granted in another case has been produced before me to show that an applicant is ordinarily selected for grant of permit and an offer letter is issued to him subject to the conditions mentioned therein. In this view of the matter there cannot be any doubt that in a case where the applicant has filed an application for grant of a permit in Form I and has categorically stated that he is not in possession of any vehicle, his application for grant of permit cannot be rejected on that ground and it is presumably for the concerned authority to act in terms of Rule 122 and/or 141 thereof. The permit can be issued only upon production of documents by the applicant so as to enable the authorities to arrive at a conclusion that he is in possession of the vehicle as owner thereof and he is ready and wiling to accept the permit on the conditions mentioned therein. It will n0t, however, be correct to contend that an offer letter is issued only with the purpose of enabling the applicant to own a vehicle either by entering into a hire purchase agreement of applying before the State under other schemes. The scheme of the Act and the Rules suggests that the applicant mayor may not be in possession of the vehicle as an owner thereof at the time of filing such an application in Form-I but he is merely granted time to produce the documents and/or complete the same in terms of Rule 122 or 141 of the said Rules. The said provisions do not confer any right upon the applicant to obtain an order of sanction or an offer letter autometically. He has to satisfy the authorities that he is in a position to fulfil all the conditions for grant of a permit including production of all documents showing his ownership entered in the registration book in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act. The time prescribed for fulfilling the said obligation is also significant. The applicant has to satisfy the authorities about his ability in relation thereto at the time of consideration of his application for grant of the permit. 37. The matter may be viewed from another angle. The time prescribed for fulfilling the said obligation is also significant. The applicant has to satisfy the authorities about his ability in relation thereto at the time of consideration of his application for grant of the permit. 37. The matter may be viewed from another angle. Rule 143 provides that no temporary permit shall be granted unless the applicant is in possession of the vehicle registered in the State or is brought to the State on change of address and also when the vehicle is covered by a permit of any description on the date on which the application is made. 38. Upon comparison of the expressions used in Rules 122 and 141 on the one hand and 143 on the other it would be evident that the requirements with regard to ownership of the vehicle is different in case of a permanent stage carriage permit and a temporary permit at the time of the filing such application. But once the applicant in his application states that he is owner of a vehicle, the question of taking recourse to Rule 122 or 141 would not arise. Rules 122 and 141 of the Rules are to some extent overlapping. The said Rules to some extent are also confusing in nature. It is not at all understood as to why different expressions viz. 'sanction' and 'offer letter' had been used, although both the provisions seek to achieve the self-same purpose.' It must be clarified that in terms of the said rules, the applicant must be the owner of the vehicle. Possession of a vehicle is not enough. Rule 122 has to be read along with the requirements of a valid permit as prescribed in Form V. Rule 141 also mandates that before issuance of the permit, the applicant must be the registered owner of the vehicle. Only for the purpose of completing the formalities of getting the ownership of the vehicles registered in his name, time is granted under the said Rules. The said Rules are enabling provisions. They do not confer any right on the applicants to have a 'sanction' or 'offer letters', which may be issued in the event they satisfy the Transport Authorities about the fulfilment of the other conditions for grant of permit. In fact, the said Rules impose obligations upon the applicants for grant of a permit to fulfil the conditions laid down therein. 39. In fact, the said Rules impose obligations upon the applicants for grant of a permit to fulfil the conditions laid down therein. 39. The position may, however, be different if an application is filed under Form-IA there is no such column like the second part of column 13 in Form I. Column 14 of Form IA clearly specifies that the applicant must be in possession of a number of vehicles available for use under the permit applied for as such an application has to be filed in respect of a service of stage carriage. 40. In the case of Sankar Dey and Ors., it appears, the applicants did not state as to whether they are in possession of the vehicles or not. They, however, were given notice for their appearance on 17.2.94 at 11. 30 A. M. for hearing and disposal of his application for grant of permanent permit. An offer letter is to be issued in terms of Rule 141 if they were otherwise entitled to produce the documents showing registration of the vehicle meaning thereby if he is selected therefor. 41. Clause 14 of Form-IA uses the expression at present in possession of such and such number of vehicles. The words at present in the said form are very significant, which clearly indicates possession of a number of vehicles at the time of filing application for grant of permit is a condition precedent. 42. Permits in Form-V. in respect of particular stage carriage permit is issued which requires the registration mark and other details of vehicles are also to be filled in. Form-VA, however, is issued in respect of service of stage carriage service. Form IA and Form VA clearly shows that the applicant must be in a position to ply a number of vehicles. Although the said Act provides for liberalised scheme but the same does not mean that a permit can be granted although the requirement of law is that the applicant should be in possession of a vehicle at the time of filing of an application. 43. A distinction thus has to be made in cases of application filed for grant of a particular stage carriage permit and for grant of service of stage carriage permit. 43. A distinction thus has to be made in cases of application filed for grant of a particular stage carriage permit and for grant of service of stage carriage permit. While in the former case, an opportunity may be given in a given case to the applicant for production of his documents showing ownership of a vehicle, no such obligation is bestowed upon the authorities to grant such an opportunity in the later case, Even those who filed an application in Form IA may be given an opportunity to produce the certificate of registration of vehicle registered in his name where he on the date of application was not the owner thereof, which clearly implies that although on the date of such application he was in possession thereof. It is now well known that the provisions of the Act the Rule and the forms prescribed thereunder should be read harmoniously. If any other construction is made with regard to Rule 122, the requirement of clause 14 of Form IA shall become otiose. I have come to the aforementioned findings as I am of the view that endeavour should be made to give effect to both to Rule 122 and Clause 14 on Form IA. 44. In a case where an applicant is in possession of the vehicles but is not the owner thereof, but at the time of hearing he satisfies the authorities that he may produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle registered in his name within such time as is specified under the rules, sanction of the permit by the Regional Transport Authority may be accorded. But if he was not in possession of the vehicle on the date of filing of the application, the question of giving him any such relief does not arise. 45. In this case the petitioners admittedly were not in possession of a vehicle. They were given an opportunity of hearing. In their letter which was undated but as contained in Annexure to the writ application, they merely stated that they are entitled to be given an offer letter and whereupon they may place their stage carriage under the said rules within the time as prescribed by Rule 141 of West Bengal Motor Vehicle Rules. Mr. Samanta, however, submitted that unless an offer letter is issued, the registering authority would not register the vehicle. Mr. Samanta, however, submitted that unless an offer letter is issued, the registering authority would not register the vehicle. Such Act on the part of the registering authority, if at all, may be an illegal act but that by itself would not be a ground to construe Rules 122, 141 and Form IA differently. No. case, therefore, has been made out in Sankar Dey & Another's case. 46. However, so far as Binay Kumar Biswas's case is concerned the same stands on different footing. He filed an application in Form-I. He was not given an opportunity of hearing nor was he allowed time to produce the documents of the vehicle in terms of the Rules 122 and/or 141 of the Motor Vehicles Rules. The impugned order in the said writ application cannot, therefore, be sustained. 47. In the result, C. O No. 10965(W)/95 is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.3.1995 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondent authority for consideration of the petitioner's application afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made hereinbefore whereas the C.O. No. 10249/(W)/95 is dismissed. It, however, goes without saying that the writ petitioners may file any other application in Form-I which may be considered on its own merits. 48. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs. C. O. No. 10249(W) dismissed. C. O. No. 10965(W) allowed. Impugned order set aside.