JUDGMENT S. N. Jha, J. - In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of his removal from service as contained in Annexure-11 dated 24.1.87. He had come to this Court earlier challenging the said order in C.W.J.C. No. 810 of 1988. This Court by order dated 17.2.88 directed the respondents to reconsider the quantum of penalty. By order as contained in Annexure-16 dated 25.4.94 the respondents however, reiterated the previous order of removal. The petitioner has challenged the correctness of the said order as well. 2. The petitioner was subjected to a departmental proceeding on charges relating to transfer order. He was found guilty of the charges and awarded the impugned penalty. This Court in its order dated 17.2.88 did not find any error in the order. The Court observed:- "It is indeed a case in which the petitioner exhibited arrogance and it seems that the order transferring him was not liked by him and so he tried to avoid it for which, according to the respondent-Company, he even tried to bring outside influence. These no doubt were acts which could not but be viewed with concern." After making the said observations the learned Judges added- "yet extreme punishment of dismissal from service may be too harsh. In every case where rights and interests are determined it is necessary to apply rules of law with compassion. A little compassion may save the petitioner from the extreme punishment of dismissal. On the facts of this case, we are inclined to suggest that petitioner deserves reconsideration by the respondent-Company whether extreme punishment of dismissal would be awarded to the petitioner or not. We accordingly direct the respondents to give a further hearing to the petitioner on the penalty (even though not required under the law) and reconsider to reduce the punishment." 3. The Board of Directors of the respondent-Company in its impugned order dated 25.4.94 has observed:- "Board thereafter considered all the documents and papers relating to the case and oral submission made by Sri S.N. Singh as well as the written submission dated 15.3.94, Corroborating whatever he told orally. After that Board is of the opinion that Sri S.N. Singh has committed serious offence and it will be neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of organisation to reinstate Sri Singh in the service of the Company. Therefore the Board rejected his appeal. After that Board is of the opinion that Sri S.N. Singh has committed serious offence and it will be neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of organisation to reinstate Sri Singh in the service of the Company. Therefore the Board rejected his appeal. Board further confirms the decision of the disciplinary authority with respect to punishment of removal from the services of the Company imposed on Mr. S.N. Singh." 4. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned counsel for the petitioner firstly tried to impugn the validity of the order of penalty on merits. But in view of the fact that this Court in the previous writ petition did not find any infirmity in the order, it is simply not possible to go into the facts so as to examine as to whether the proceeding was conducted according to law, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are corrector the order of the disciplinary authority is valid or not. It may be stated here that the petitioner had gone upto the Supreme Court challenging the order of this Court aforesaid in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 7099 of 1988 which was "dismissed on merits" on 28.1.91. 5. Mr. Mahto then contended that the punishment of removal is excessive and disproportionate to the charges and, therefore, should be set aside. He submitted that in view of the order of the High Court the respondents had no option but to reduce the penalty. He submitted that where the High Court directs reconsideration (of quantum of penalty) but the authorities fail to consider as to why any alternative punishment would not be sufficient, its action must be struck down not only as being improper but also verging on contempt. When he was reminded of the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters arising out of disciplinary proceeding and told that this Court cannot substitute a penalty of its own and can only direct reconsideration by the disciplinary authority, which was already done earlier, counsel urged that imposition of any penalty disproportionate to the nature of the misconduct is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and, therefore, there is no fetter on the power of this Court to pass an appropriate final order in the matter. Counsel submitted that in the facts of the case no useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter for fresh consideration for the second time and, therefore, this Court should consider awarding an appropriate penalty to the petitioner. Counsel placed reliance on Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454 and Jibachch Jha Vs. State ( 1991 (2) PLJR 677 ). He also referred to the case of State Bank of India v. Samrendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 . 6. Mr. Amla Kant Choudhary, learned counsel for the respondent-Company contended that this Court is not competent to interfere with the quantum of punishment. He submitted that in the previous writ petition there was no specific direction to the Company to reduce the sentence. However, the Company considered the matter on merit afresh and has found it difficult to reinstate the petitioner in the service. Regarding jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of interference with quantum of punishment reliance was placed on Union of India vs. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 and Krishna Chandra Pallai vs. Union of India, AIR 1992 Orissa 261. 7. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 , the Constitution. Bench of the Apex Court stated the law as to the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 in matters arising out of disciplinary proceeding in these words, "but the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour aspect. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there have been enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules are not justiciable, nor is the penalty open to the review by the Court." In the case of Bhagat Ram (supra), however, a somewhat different note was struck by the Supreme Court when it stated, "the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct could be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution". That was a case in which a Forest Guard had been removed from service on charges of illicitly felling of trees, negligence in performance of government duty and doubtful honesty. That was a case in which a Forest Guard had been removed from service on charges of illicitly felling of trees, negligence in performance of government duty and doubtful honesty. The Court in the facts and circumstances of the case found that the appellant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and, therefore, the order of removal from service was vitiated. However, instead of remitting the matter to the authority for fresh enquiry, it decided to award a minor penalty. It was observed, "after all what" is the purpose of holding a fresh enquiry? Obviously, it must be to impose some penalty". Then after making observation to the effect that penalty must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct (already quoted above) it was stated that in the facts of the case no useful purpose would be arrived at by a fresh enquiry and in the ends of justice awarded the penalty of stoppage of two annual increments. The aforesaid order of the Supreme Court in later decisions has been held to be one passed under Article 136 of the Constitution. But that is not only the case on the point. 8. In Shankardas Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1985 SC 772 , the person concerned had been found guilty of misappropriation of sum of Rs. 500/- in a criminal came but let off under the provision of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in the peculiar facts of the case. The Government, however, passed an order of dismissal from service on the basis of the conviction under Clause (a) of the 2nd proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution without holding enquiry. The Supreme Court observed that while the Government has power to dismiss a person from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction in criminal charge, "that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably, Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a Government servant who is 'convicted for parking his scooter in a non-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since Cl. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since Cl. (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) makes the provision of that Article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on criminal charge, But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly". In the case of Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 2386, the person concerned, an Army Personnel, had been dismissed from service apart from other penalty, for disobeying the command of his superior officer to eat his food. The Court while considering the efficacy of the punishment awarded to him observed, "the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence, and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence should not be immune from correction". In the facts of the case, the Court set aside the proceeding of the Court Martial, the impugned order of punishment and sentence and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with all monetary and service benefits. AIR 1992 SC 417 (Ex-Naik Sardar Singh vs. Union of India) was also a case of dismissal of an Army Personnel on charge of carrying extra seven bottles of Rum. The Court noticed the previous decision in Bhagat Ram (supra), Ranjit Thakur (supra) amongst others and held on facts that the punishment of dismissal was arbitrary. The matter was remitted to the Court Martial to award any of the lesser punishment having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. The Court noticed the previous decision in Bhagat Ram (supra), Ranjit Thakur (supra) amongst others and held on facts that the punishment of dismissal was arbitrary. The matter was remitted to the Court Martial to award any of the lesser punishment having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. In the recent case of Samrendra Kishore Endow (supra), after survey of the case law on the point, the Supreme Court has held that while it may be open to it (Supreme Court) to impose lesser penalty substituting the one already awarded, under Article 136 of the Constitution (perhaps, also Article 142), the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has no such jurisdiction and, therefore, in appropriate cases where the punishment imposed upon the person is found to be excessive or harsh, the proper course to be adopted in such situation would be to send the matter either to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment. 9. The legal position as to power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the penalty awarded in disciplinary proceeding is well settled. Shortly stated, the High Court cannot interfere with the order of penalty where the same has been awarded after enquiry in accordance with the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice, except on the ground of malafide. Position will be different where penalty is awarded without enquiry under proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. But where the penalty, in the facts of the case, appears to be excessive, harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct, the Court can direct reconsideration of the quantum. 10. It is true that in the instant case this Court had earlier remitted the question of quantum of punishment for reconsideration but the consideration does not seem to be in accordance with the laid-down principles of law. 11. As noticed above, this Court in its order had observed, "yet, extreme punishment of dismissal from service may be too harsh ... on the facts of this case we are inclined to suggest that the petitioner deserves reconsideration by respondent-company whether extreme punishment of dismissal would be awarded to the petitioner or not ... we accordingly direct the respondents to give further hearing and reconsider to reduce the punishment". on the facts of this case we are inclined to suggest that the petitioner deserves reconsideration by respondent-company whether extreme punishment of dismissal would be awarded to the petitioner or not ... we accordingly direct the respondents to give further hearing and reconsider to reduce the punishment". The aforesaid observations have been noticed by the Board of Directors in the impugned order. The order, however, does not indicate any reason why lesser punishment could not be awarded. What the authorities were required to do, in my opinion, was to consider why a lesser punishment would not serve the ends of justice. While not undermining the need to maintain all round discipline including in the matter of carrying out of transfer orders, I would like to observe that there may be more serious instances of misconduct, verging on criminal offences such as misappropriation of money etc. which may justify the extreme punishment of dismissal or removal from service. Would it be proper to treat an act of disobedience of an employee to carry out transfer order or an act of misappropriation of money or the like on the same footing? If the misconduct is not the same or of similar type, certainly it would not be proper to award the same punishment for those types of misconduct. The final orders which may affect the livelihood of a person are not supposed to be passed in a casual or whimsical manner. 12. In the facts of the case, the Board of Directors does not appear to have considered the question of quantum of punishment in the correct perspectives and, in my opinion, the matter deserves further consideration. The petitioner is said to have already crossed the age of superannuation and, therefore, even if a lesser punishment is ultimately awarded to him all that he will get is some monetary benefit. 13. In the result, this application is allowed. The order as contained in Annexure-16 dated 25.4.94 is set aside. The respondent-Company is directed to reconsider the quantum of punishment in the light of the observations made hereinabove and, indeed, the judgments of the Supreme Court quoted above, within three months of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.