JUDGMENT : P. Ray, J. - The plaintiff-opposite party Mohammed Parvej filed a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge (now Civil Judge, Senior Division), Rourkela, for pre-emption of a sale of a shop room in favour of the defendant-petitioner by a registered sale deed dated November 16,1988. From the pleadings of the parties it appears that the shop room originally belonged to Md. Umer and the defendant-petitioner was a tenant in respect of the said shop room. It also appears that the relevant sale deed was executed on November 16, 1983. The same was copied out and delivered on March 29, 1990. The pre-emptor-plaintiff has also alleged that on the date of execution of the deed, i. e. November 16, 1988, he advanced his claim of right of pre-emption and demanded re-sale of the property to him and again on March 29, 1990, i.e. the date of delivery of the registered document, he demanded the resale of the property affirming his previous demand. The suit for pre-emption was filed on June 24, 1991. 2. The pre-emptee defendant raised an objection that the suit was barred by limitation as the same was filed beyond the period prescribed by Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said issue, whether the suit was barred by limitation was tried as a preliminary issue. By the impugned order, the trial Court has held that the suit is not governed by Article 97, but by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and accordingly it is not barred by the law of limitation. The pre-emptee defendant has moved this Court in its revisional jurisdiction against the said order of the trial Court. 3. The trial Court has given its verdict mainly upon two grounds. Firstly, it has held that the purchaser being already in possession of the shop room as a tenant before the date of sale, there was no question of taking the physical possession of the suit property and thus First Part of Article 97 of the Limitation Act was not attracted. Secondly, it has taken the view that the right for pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law does not automatically accrue on the date when the sale is completed inasmuch as under the Mahommedan Law the plaintiff is to declare his intention (Talab-i-mowasibat) to assert his tight of pre-emption after the completion of the sale. Secondly, it has taken the view that the right for pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law does not automatically accrue on the date when the sale is completed inasmuch as under the Mahommedan Law the plaintiff is to declare his intention (Talab-i-mowasibat) to assert his tight of pre-emption after the completion of the sale. The trial Court his further taken the view that there is great difficulty in applying Article 97 of the Limitation Act to a case where information of sale is received by the pre-emptor long after the sale is completed and there is (sic) in putting forward the required demands, namely, 'Talab-i-mowasibat' and 'Talab-i-ishhad'. 4. Mr. A. Mohapatra, learned Advocate for the pre-emptee petitioner has urged that the claim for pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law being a right founded on law, is governed by Article 97 of the Limitation Act and the trial Court has committed error in holding that Article 97 of the Limitation, Act is not applicable. 5. Mr. D. K. Mohapatra, learned Advocate appearing for the pre-emptar opposite party, has supported the impugned order and has urged that where the disputed property does not admit of physical possession, Second Part of Article 97 cannot be made applicable to a suit for preemption under the Mahommedan Law because right of pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law does not accrue on the date when the sale deed is registered, but only after the demands for pre-emption, as required under the rules of the Mahommedan Law are made after completion of the sale. He has submitted that the vendor being already in possession of the shop room as a tenant, the property did not admit of physical possession. 6. For the purpose of appreciation of the questions raised, it is necessary to reproduce Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 97 of the Limitation Act is quoted below for reference : "97. To enforce a right One year when the purchaser of pre-emption takes under the sale whether the right sought to be impeached, is founded on law physical possession or general usage of the whole or or on special part of the property contract. sold, or, where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered." 7. sold, or, where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered." 7. The contention raised on behalf of the pre-emptor opposite party appears to be first of its kind and the learned counsel has not been able to cite any authority in support of his contention that the Second Part of the Third Column of Article 97 cannot apply to pre-emption under Mahommedan Law. 8. The submission of the learned counsel that cause of action in case of pre-emption under Mahommedan Law does not accrue with the registration of the sale deed is founded upon non-appreciation of distinction between the accrual of right and acts required to be performed in exercise of that accrued right.' The right to pre-empt arises as soon as the sale is complete in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act. 'Talab-i-mowasibat' and 'Taiab-i-ishhad' are steps in exercise of the right of pre-emption accrued on the completion of sale. Unless the right of pre-emption accrues there cannot be any question of demanding pre-emption through "Talab-i-mowasibat", the first step in the process, 9. Right of pre-emption is independent of the formalities necessary for taking the final step of filing suit for pre-emption. The contention that Second Part of Third Column of Article 97 of the Limitation Act cannot apply to pre-emption under Mahommedan Law cannot be accepted. 10. Whether a particular property admits of physical possession or not depends upon the nature of the property and the ability of the vendor to put the vendee in "personal and immediate possession" of the property on the completion of sale. There was divergence of opinion on this point. Some Courts held that if the property by nature admits physical possession, the temporary inability of the vendor to put the vendee in possession is of no consequence. However the Supreme Court in Sukhnandan Singh, etc. Vs. Jamiat Singh and Others has upheld the view that "physical possession" means "personal and immediate possession". Therefore, even where the property by nature admits of physical possession, of the vendor is not in a position to give possession to the vendee immediately upon the sale, the property will be regarded as one which does not admit of physical possession. Vs. Jamiat Singh and Others has upheld the view that "physical possession" means "personal and immediate possession". Therefore, even where the property by nature admits of physical possession, of the vendor is not in a position to give possession to the vendee immediately upon the sale, the property will be regarded as one which does not admit of physical possession. In such cases, the First Part of Article 97 will not apply and terminus a quo will be the date of registration of the sale deed as provided in the Second Part of Column 3 of Article 97. If the vendor is in a position to hand over immediate possession to the vendee or his authorised person, the property will be a property which admits of physical possession. In such cases First Part of Column 3 of Article 97 will apply and terminus a quo will be the date when actual possession is handed over after the sale. 11. There is no difficulty in applying the aforesaid test when the concerned property is in possession of a party other than the vendor or the vendee or is in possession of the vendor. But where the vendee was already in possession of the property as a tenant whether the property can be said to admit of physical possession or not. The Punjab High Court in Bai Chander Mani Vs. Bhagirath Ahir and Others accepted the view of the Lahore High Court and held that if the vendee is already in possession before the sale is effected, the property does not admit of physical possession and First Part of Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponding to present Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963) would not apply. The logic behind such view is difficult to appreciate. Firstly, the previous possession of the vendee under an agreement for sale or in other capacity as a tenant or a mortgagee is not a possession under the sale and accordingly, there is no question of running of limitation from the date of such possession. Such previous possession of the vendee becomes a possession under the sale only when the sale is effected and limitation even under the First Part of Article 97 can only start running from the date of sale. Such previous possession of the vendee becomes a possession under the sale only when the sale is effected and limitation even under the First Part of Article 97 can only start running from the date of sale. Secondly, the knowledge of an act is not a material consideration for the purpose of limitation unless the Limitation Act expressly makes it terminus a quo. It may not be possible for a pre-emptor to know that a sale has been effected, but still under the Second Part of Article 97, terminus a quo will be date of registration irrespective of the knowledge of the pre-emptor about the registration of the sale deed. Whether the pre-emptor has notice of taking of possession under the sale or not, limitation will start running from the date of taking physical possession under the sale if the property admits of physical possession. Thus, it cannot be accepted that a tangible immovable property does not admit of physical possession merely because it may not be possible for the pre-emptor to know the date of taking possession. Where the vendee was already in possession of the property in the capacity of a tenant, he should be deemed to have taken physical possession of the property under the sale on the date when he obtains valid title to the property as an owner upon completion of sole, it cannot be said that a property already in possession of the vendee in the capacity of a tenant does not admit of physical possession meaning "personal and immediate possession". Accordingly, the First Part of Column 3 of Article 97 is applicable to such case as the present one. 12. Under the Mahommedan Law the first step in exercise of tie right of pre-emption is the 'Talab-i-mowasibat', second step is 'Talab-i-ishhad' and the third and final step is suit. 'Talab-i-mowasibat' can be made only after the sale is completed and it is of no effect if it is made before the completion of the sale (vide. Explanation-1 of Section 236, Mulla's Principles of Mahommedan Law, 13th Edition. page-273), 13. Thus, taking of physical possession of the property for the purpose of pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law can be on the date of completion of sale or thereafter. Explanation-1 of Section 236, Mulla's Principles of Mahommedan Law, 13th Edition. page-273), 13. Thus, taking of physical possession of the property for the purpose of pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law can be on the date of completion of sale or thereafter. It appears that after the Supreme Court's decision in Sukhnandan's case (supra) that 'physical possession' means 'personal and immediate possession' there remains practically no difference between First Part and Second Part of Article 97 for pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law. In cases where the sale can be effected only by a registered sale deed and the vendee is already in possession of the property. In either case terminus a quo will be the date when the sale deed is registered. 14. In the present case admittedly the pre-emptor had the knowledge of sale on the very date of execution of the sale deed and he was also aware when the sale deed was registered and the sale was completed in accordance with Sections 60 and 61 of the Registration Act. The plaintiff himself has stated that he first demanded pre-emption on the date of execution of sale deed and again confirmed his earlier demand on March 29, 1990, when the sale deed was copied out and delivered to the vendee. Thus, in the present case, it does not make any material difference whether the First Part or the Second Part of Article 97 applies. 15. It is thus held that Article 97 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the present case and opposite party's suit for pre-emption having been filed beyond the time prescribed by Article 97 of the Limitation Act is barred by limitation. 16. For reasons aforesaid, the revisional application is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order are set aside. The suit for pre-emption is held to be barred by limitation. I make no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed