H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has got a chequered history of remand after remand which has been done in this case and the litigation in this case has continued for more than a quarter of century. This second appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 9-1-1987, delivered by the district judge, bellary, in civil regular appeal no, 48 of 1974, dismissing the defendant's appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 16th june, 1971, passed by munsiff, hadagalli, in o. s. no. 174 of 1969, whereby, the learned munsiff had decreed the plaintiffs claim in the suit. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in nutshell are that the plaintiff-respondent had filed the suit for a declaration and permanent injunction alleging that plaintiff-respondent was the owner of survey nos, 67, 68a and 69a/1 and that the defendant-appellant had been the owner of 68bc, 68d, 68e and a portion of survey nos. 69a/1 and 69b of ittige village. According to the plaintiff's contention, the plaintiffs land has been situated to the west of the land belonging to the defendant. That in between the land belonging to the plaintiff and the defendant-appellant, there has been a stone bund in the land of the plaintiff and it was erected to prevent erosion of soil. Further, the plaintiffs case is that the defendant had purchased the land from different persons belonging to the family of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that defendant began to form a road along his land on the northern end turning towards south breaking the bund and then turning towards east to reach his land. That this ACT of the defendant was without any legal right and so, it was illegal. That the defendant had no right of way over the plaintiffs land. That this attempt to form a road or passage on the part of the defendant over the plaintiffs land has been the recent one and so, it gave a cause of action to file the suit in question. That there is a route marked 'a' in the sketch which leads to the land of the defendant and this is an old way available to the defendant for his land. That there is a route marked 'a' in the sketch which leads to the land of the defendant and this is an old way available to the defendant for his land. The plaintiffs case is that when the plaintiff tried to prevent the defendant from crossing over his land along the route 'b', he was threatened by the defendant and his men of dire consequences if the plaintiff-respondent created obstruction in defendant or defendant's agents or servants, defendant's user of the land belonging to the plaintiff along with route 'b' and so, cause of action having accrued to the plaintiff in july, 1969. Plaintiff filed this suit claiming decree declaring that defendant has no right of way to go to his land referred in relief clause through the plaintiffs land bearing nos. 67, 68a, 69a/1, along route 'b', as per the sketch. The plaintiff further claimed the decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-appellant, his servants, assignees, agents and relatives restraining them from passing through the plaintiffs land along route 'b', ( 3 ) THE defendant contested the plaintiffs claim in the suit. according to the defendant's case, the land belonging to plaintiff-respondent are adjoining the defendant's land and the defendant's predecessors-in-title had purchased those lands from the ancestors of the plaintiff. It was further asserted by the defendant that defendant purchased his land as mentioned above from the father of the plaintiff. The defendant denied the plaintiffs case that the defendant had no right of way from the plaintiffs land. That defendant did not dispute the existence of kottur road. But, the defendant pleaded that allegation that the defendant has been using the way of kottur road to reach to his land since long but now avoids since it is longer is false and is known to be false to the plaintiff. It is alleged in written statement that on the northern side of the plaintiffs land, there is a road or passage which passes through the northern portion of the lands of harijan guddappa, bannihalli kenchanna goud, khyatanahalli basalingappa and of the plaintiff and takes a turn towards the south after going some distance and turns to east and reaches defendant's land. That defendant and his predecessors in title were exercising the right of way as easement of necessity without obstruction and hindrance from any one and none objected to the same. That defendant and his predecessors in title were exercising the right of way as easement of necessity without obstruction and hindrance from any one and none objected to the same. Lastly, the defendant asserted that plaintiff had no right, title or interest to obstruct the user of plaintiffs land by the defendant by way of passage. The pleadings in the written statement per se show that defendant has claimed the right of easement of passage or right of way of easement of necessity. The written statement does not indicate that defendant had been claiming the right of easement by prescription nor any particulars of right of prescription has been given or stated in the written statement. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial courtframed the following issues: 1. Does the plaintiff prove that the defendant has no right of way to reach his lands through the plaintiffs lands along the northern bund? 2. Does the plaintiff prove that the kottur road is the ancient way which is used by the defendant to reach his lands? 3. Does the plaintiff prove that the defendant tried to establish new right of way through the lands of the plaintiff? 4. Does the defendant prove that the way which passes on the northern boundry of the plaintiffs lands is in existence since time immemorials has used the same as easement of necessity? ( 5 ) WHETHER there was any cause of action for the suit? ( 6 ) TO what Order or relief?5. The trial court answered issue nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the affirmative. Issue No. 4, has been answered in the negative and issue No. 5, has been answered in the affirmatative. In other words, trial court held that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant has no right of way to reach his land, through the land belonging to the plaintiff-respondent along the northern boundary and further, that the plaintiff has proved that kottur road has been in existence from long time and was used as such by defendant. That defendant had tried to establish a new right of way through the land of the plaintiff. That defendant had tried to establish a new right of way through the land of the plaintiff. That the defendant-appellant has failed to prove that the passage or way alleged to be passing from the northern boundary of the land has been in existence from time immemorial, and no such existence is there as easement of necessity in respect thereof. Having felt aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 16-6-1971, the defendant preferred civil regular appeal No. R. a. 51 of 1971, which had been dismissed by the lower appellate court on 19-3-1975 and from that judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the defendant preferred second appeal No. 652 of 1975, which had been allowed by this court by its judgment and decree dated 31-3-1978, remanding the case to the lower appellate court for decision of the appeal afresh after taking the additional evidence sought to be adduced by the defendant-appellant before it and after providing the plaintiff-respondent an opportunity to file evidence in rebuttal. 6. In compliance with the remand Order, the lower appellate court heard the first appeal, after entertaining the additional evidence produced by the defendant-appellant and after considering the entire matter on record, dismissed the defendant's civil first appeal by a judgment and decree dated 16-3-1979. Having felt aggrieved from the judgment and decree dated 16-3-1979, defendant again preferred second appeal No. 777 of 1979. This court again by its judgment and decree dated 13-9-1983, allowed the defendant's second appeal, remanded the first appeal for decision afresh after taking into consideration the provisions of Section 133 of the Karnataka land revenue act. After this remand, the lower appellate court again considered the whole matter and decided the civil first appeal and dismissed it by its judgment and decree dated 9-1-1987. Thus, this is the third inning which is going on in this litigation and more than a quarter of a century has passed, as having been aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 9-1-1987, delivered in the first civil appeal, whereby, the civil appeal had been dismissed, the defendant-appellant has come up in his second appeal before this court. ( 7 ) I have heard Sri Subash B. Adi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. G. Bhagavan, assisted by Sri S. B. Suman, an Advocate of this court for the respondent. ( 7 ) I have heard Sri Subash B. Adi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. G. Bhagavan, assisted by Sri S. B. Suman, an Advocate of this court for the respondent. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the decision of the court below, i. e. , the lower appellate court in contrary to the directions issued by this court under the remand orders and that the lower appellate court has not followed the directions given by this court in remand orders while giving decision and findings. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that in the matter of easement of necessity, it is not necessary that there should be an absolute necessity, factor of convenience or the factor of the passage in dispute being more beneficial than the other one need be considered to determine the right of an easement of necessity, as the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the passage demarcated in the sketch as route 'b' has been more convenient and beneficial for the purpose of reaching to the land which he had purchased from the plaintiffs ancestors and their members of their family and therefore, the right of easement of necessity is there and the courts below have wrongly held that there is no easement of necessity of passage through the plaintiffs land. That the passage over which the appellant says, it is subservient to reach and claims the right for reaching his own land belongs to the plaintiff, as the right of easement of necessity is available to him. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate court had not applied its mind to the impact of law under Section 133 in the context of revenue record entries exs. Dl (a) to dl (b) and the presumption 'under Section 133, should have been raised by the courts below and on the basis of those entries it was urged that the defendant-appellant had got a right of way of passage through route 'b' over the land belonging to the plaintiff in Order to reach his own (appellant) land. Sri Subash B. Adi, said that there is no question of absolute necessity and so, he made reference to a decision of the uttar pradesh High Court (allahabad high court) in Smt. Narayani Devi v. Phool Chand and another. Sri Subash B. Adi, said that there is no question of absolute necessity and so, he made reference to a decision of the uttar pradesh High Court (allahabad high court) in Smt. Narayani Devi v. Phool Chand and another. He (Sri Subash B. Adi counsel for the appellant) also made reference to the decision of this court in the case of Andanappa Irasangappa Mlakasetti and Another v. Basappa Kamalappa Kolhar. ( 8 ) ON behalf of respondents, Sri Bhagavan, learned counsel submitted that the defendant-appellant has got an alternative way marked in the sketch as 'a', that is, at kottur road which goes to the land or which is available to go to his land, the appellant. When alternative way is available, then, this cannot be said to be a case of necessity. Further, Sri Bhagavan submitted that in case of easement of necessity under Section 13 (1) (a), what has to be shown and established is that for enjoyment of his own property or the land, the claimant has got no other way or passage to reach and to make use, but, in case, he has got alternative passage, then, the right of easement of necessity does not arise. In support of his contention, Sri Bhagavan, made reference to the decision of the calcutta High Court in the case of Kali Pada Bose and others v. Fani Bhushan Roy and others. He further, made reference to the decision of Madras High Court in Mariyayi Ammal and others v. Arunachala Pandaram, as well as to the decision of the gujarat High Court in the case of Rameshchandra Bhikhabhai Patel v. Maneklal Maganlal Patel and another. Whereas also, Sri Bhagavan, had attempted to seek support from certain observations of this court in the case of andanappa, supra. Sri Bhagavan, further submitted that so far as question of prescription is concerned, firstly, the court below has rightly held that presumption stands rebutted and is not available, because, the entries do not appear to have been made in accordance with Rule 59 of the rules framed under Karnataka revenue act. That as admitted by D. W. 9, the entries do not bear any signature, though, certificate appears to have been signed by the superintendent. He invited my attention to the statement of D. W. 9 the village accountant which is to the effect that no officer has signed exs. That as admitted by D. W. 9, the entries do not bear any signature, though, certificate appears to have been signed by the superintendent. He invited my attention to the statement of D. W. 9 the village accountant which is to the effect that no officer has signed exs. D-1 (a) to (e) and also to the passage in the last page of ex. D-1, is a certificate by the assistant superintendent, land records. That the entries do not indicate that any easement had been agreed upon between the parties. The entry does not indicate that any right agreed upon between the parties had been recorded. That in accordance with Rule 59, the entries with respect to agreed easement or agreed rights are to be made in record of rights, entries must show that right has been recorded as per agreement between the parties, because, where, there is a dispute, the authorities have no right to record or make that entry and the matters as to disputed entries have to be decided by the competent court. The entries per se also do not indicate that any easementary right of the defendant-appellant had been agreed upon and entered in the record of rights as per agreement. That the entry has to be to the effect that easement of right of passage in favour of defendant has been agreed upon and it exists over the land in dispute, then, presumption could be there, though, presumption would have been a rebuttal one, but here, the presumption if any could be that it could be of the plaintiff was using, but, no question of easement or like nor presumption of law could be there as in creating a right or favour to the defendant. That entry did come into existence during the pendency of the present litigation. That the litigation commenced in 1969 and the entries had come into existence in december, 1971. So, these entries could not be admissible piece of evidence for the purpose. That lastly, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present matter is really concluded of findings of fact, that so far as passage or way to appellant's field is concerned that an alternative passage exists and that the defendant-appellant has no right of easement of necessity over the land belonging to the plaintiffs-respondents. That lastly, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present matter is really concluded of findings of fact, that so far as passage or way to appellant's field is concerned that an alternative passage exists and that the defendant-appellant has no right of easement of necessity over the land belonging to the plaintiffs-respondents. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment and decree of court below did not suffer from error of law. ( 10 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned counsels for both the sides. I may mention that so far as the easement by prescription is concerned, though the appellant has got a question of law to be framed at the appellate stage, but, no case appears to have been pleaded in written statement claiming a right of easement of way by prescription. So, if a person wants to claim acquisition of easementary right of user as passage of land by prescription, he has to allege that he has been making use of the land as passage for more than 20 years and in such a case it was the duty of the defendant to have stated clearly when and in which year property, for the beneficial enjoyment of which the defendant was claiming right of easement of prescription, had been purchased and if he was using as of prescription, then, the year atleast should have been indicated, so as to indicate whether it had been used for the prescriptive period of 20 years, but, in the written statement, no such averment has been made. Really, averment has been made that there has been a passage existing on the land in dispute for long times and thereafter, it is stated that he had purchased the land from the plaintiffs and has been using suit land as passage as of necessity, but, no such case has been asserted by defendant that defendant-appellant had acquired right of easement of way by prescription. No issue had been pressed in the trial court. No arguments appears to have been advanced in the trial court or the lower appellate court. That being the position, in law, it has to be taken that the defendant-appellant has waived his claim of right of way as easement of prescription. No issue had been pressed in the trial court. No arguments appears to have been advanced in the trial court or the lower appellate court. That being the position, in law, it has to be taken that the defendant-appellant has waived his claim of right of way as easement of prescription. The present is a case in which there is neither pleading nor issue, nor argument has been pressed as regards acquisition of right of way by easement by prescription, so, applying the principles laid down in the case of Mudanna Virayya v. Mudanna Adenna and others, by their lordships of the privy council as under which the defendant-appellant waived the plea. Their lordships of the privy council laid it down:"it is true that the Limitation ACT was mentioned in adenna's written statement and in his grounds of appeal, but, before the trial judge, no issue was directed to bear upon the question, nor does the point appear to have been taken at the bar during the trial. In these circumstances their lordships do not think the point was open on appeal". in the present case, the point had not been taken at any stage during trial or the first civil appeal or any other earlier stages. Now at this stage, when the litigation has passed more than a quarter of century, this plea on which question has sought to be formulated cannot be allowed to be urged. As regards easement of necessity, Section 13 of the easement ACT is material. As the learned counsel for the appellant had made reference to Section 13 of the easement act. Section 13 of the easement Act, 1882 reads as under:" 13. As regards easement of necessity, Section 13 of the easement ACT is material. As the learned counsel for the appellant had made reference to Section 13 of the easement act. Section 13 of the easement Act, 1882 reads as under:" 13. Where one person transfers or bequeaths immovable property to another, (a) if an easement in other immovable property of the transferor or testator is necessary for enjoying the subject of the transfer or bequest, the transferee or legatee shall be entitled to such easement; or (B) if such an easement is apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the said subject as it was enjoyed when the transfer or bequest took effect, the transferee or legatee shall, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, be entitled to such easement; or (C) if an easement in the subject of the transfer or bequest is necessary for enjoying other immovable property of the transferor or testator, the transferor or the legal representative of the testator shall be entitled to such easement; or (D) if such an easement is apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the said property as it was enjoyed when the transfer or bequest took effect, the transferor, or the legal representative of the testator, shall, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, be entitled to such easement". that the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on clause (a) of Section 13. The necessary ingredients of Section 13 (a) are that the person claiming easement of necessity must be a person, who has got the property by transfer or bequeath from someone, and to enjoy that easement in other property of transferor or testator is necessary, then, the transferee according to Section 13 (a) will be entitled to such easement. The Section provides that the easement on the other immovable property of the transferor should be by way of necessity. The question is what is meant by necessity. In other words, necessity means absolute necessity and not as a matter mere convenience, i. e. , in the sense that the claimant cannot enjoy his own property by any other mode. The Section provides that the easement on the other immovable property of the transferor should be by way of necessity. The question is what is meant by necessity. In other words, necessity means absolute necessity and not as a matter mere convenience, i. e. , in the sense that the claimant cannot enjoy his own property by any other mode. If the right of passage by easement of necessity is claimed, then, it must be shown that the claimant cannot reasonably make use of his property or cannot reach his property, except without an easement of passage being provided over other property of the transferor. In other words, if in the normal course, if other passage is available for reaching his property by the claimant, then, the claimant may not be entitled to claim the right of easement of necessity with respect to the other property of the transferor. In the present case, it is admitted between the parties that there is alternative passage available to the defendant-appellant in the form of kottur road. By using that the defendant can reach his field or land and, can make use of his land. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no doubt, that road is there, but, the passage through route 'b', that is, through the land of the plaintiffs-respondents is more convenient and has been enjoyed by the plaintiff as well as by him (defendant), so, he (defendant) is entitled to that. The basic thing is that whether enjoyment of easement over other property of vendor is necessary for beneficial enjoyment of land or property transferred to him by vendor, and if passage or way over the land of the respondent is not necessary for the appellant to reach his land he has got alternative ways, then, the appellant is not entitled to claim easement under Section 13 (a ). I am of the opinion that in the present case, the appellant has got alternative passage through the road, so no case of easement of necessity has been made out. I find support for my above view from the decision of the division bench of the calcutta High Court in the case of kali pada bose's case, supra, in which case, the division bench has observed:"it is perfectly true that the general Rule is that there cannot be an easement of necessity if there is alternative route or way. I find support for my above view from the decision of the division bench of the calcutta High Court in the case of kali pada bose's case, supra, in which case, the division bench has observed:"it is perfectly true that the general Rule is that there cannot be an easement of necessity if there is alternative route or way. But where, the finding is that the alternative route is extremely impassable, it amounts to this that the way which is claimed by the plaintiff and which is claimed by them was a way of necessity, to be the only way available to them". in the present case, it has not been shown that the alternative route or passage is impassable. I further find support from the decision of the Madras High Court in mariyayi ammal's case, supra, in which dealing with the case of easement of necessity, Mr. Justice krishnaswami naidu, has been pleased to observe as under:"necessity in the sense of being indispensable must be established and without which the property could not be enjoyed at all or without which there can be no access to the southern lane. Such is not the case here. It may be inconvenient to proceed to the north, go to the public road, then enter the main road on the west and then reach the southern lane. But, that is no consideration why the defendants should be allowed to put the plaintiff to inconvenience and annoyance, when the right which the defendants claim has not been acquired by prescription. The necessity must be an absolute necessity and not a convenient mode of enjoyment of the property and that is also the view taken in (Saripella) Venkatapathiraju and others v. (Saripella) Subbaraju and another, where it was observed that an easement of necessity is an easement without which the property cannot be used at all and not merely one for reasonable enjoyment of the property and that in considering questions of easements of necessity, convenience is not the test, but, absolute necessity". Section 13 of the easement ACT contemplates that easement which has been claimed as an easement of necessity can be claimed as only possible mode of enjoyment of right claimed having regard to the normal way of life of persons, who claim and of person belonging to that category. In andanappa's case, the Hon'ble Mr. Section 13 of the easement ACT contemplates that easement which has been claimed as an easement of necessity can be claimed as only possible mode of enjoyment of right claimed having regard to the normal way of life of persons, who claim and of person belonging to that category. In andanappa's case, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice somnath iyer, of this court has been pleased to observe and lay down as under:"it is, of course, a well known Rule that an easement of necessity could be claimed only when it is necessary for the plaintiff to exercise that right for the reasonable enjoyment of his own property which cannot be otherwise enjoyed. It is also an equally well known Rule that if the right claimed by way of an easement of necessity is the right of way and there are more ways than one from which the plaintiff could reach his own property, he would not be entitled, if he could reach his property by the other way, to claim a right of way over the defendants' land". That same view has been laid by this court in the case of Mujoor Govinda Bhatta v. Mujoor Krishna Bhatta and Baburao Yashvantrao Jadhav v. Shamarao Khandi Jadhav, as well as by other high courts. The Allahabad High Court in the case of narayani, supra. These cases clearly lay down the principle that if a person, claiming easement of necessity, has got more than one ways to reach his property and to enjoy thereby, then, there will be no such thing as right of easement of necessity being available to the claimant. This being the settled principle of law as laid down in the above decisions including of this court it does boil out that when the appellant has got another way marked 'a' in the plan, he can reach his field by user of that way, he is not entitled to claim or got any right of easement of necessity under Section 13 of the easement ACT to have a passage or to pass through route 'b' running through the land of the plaintiff and as such, in my opinion, the courts below have rightly recorded the finding that defendant had failed to prove easement of necessity. As I have mentioned earlier, in this case, no case of easement of prescription has been set up or made out, and that the easement of necessity has not been established. In view of my finding to the above effect, even if for a moment it is taken that revenue entries indicate existence of passage or any passage through the plot of the plaintiff, the case of the defendant-appellant will not stand proved, though, in my opinion, the entry per se is not to the effect that right of ease- ment has been agreed upon and recorded as per agreement be- tween the parties. When that is not the entry, the presumption relied and insisted upon by the appellant will enure no benefit to the defendant-appellant. That no other point has been urged. Thus considered, in my opinion, the defendant-appellant's appeal is as such devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed, as such, I do hereby dismiss the second appeal and confirm the judgment and decree of the courts below. No Order as to costs. --- *** --- .