JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by S. H. A. RAZA, J. - The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the action of the Chairman, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA Complex, Ghaziabad (Convenor, Divisional Level Committee under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act) respondent No. 2 in granting exemption from payment of sales tax to the petitioner for a period of four years instead of six years. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of the order dated April 15, 1988, passed by the Area Development Officer, NOIDA, by means of which, the review application of the petitioner was rejected. The factual matrix as set out in writ petition in short compass is that the petitioner is a private limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at N-2 Cannaught Place, New Delhi, while its factory is situate at D-100, Sector-2 NOIDA, District Ghaziabad. The petitioner is registered both under the U.P. as well as the Central Sales Tax Act. The petitioner has taken factory premises including the land on lease and thereafter installed various machineries. It was alleged that it established and expanded its industry with the sole view to get exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years, from the date of its first sale in terms of notification dated August 27, 1984, as superseded/amended by notification dated January 29, 1985 and December 26, 1985. The petitioner has made all efforts and has invested huge amounts with the sole purpose of getting exemption from payment of sales tax. It was averred that the petitioner been aware that the petitioner would not get the full benefit of sales tax exemption, then the petitioner would not have established and expanded its factory. It was averred that the petitioner had fulfilled all the requirement for the grant of eligibility/exemption certificate from payment of sales tax under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as "the Act"). The petitioner applied for registration with the Director of Industries as a small scale industry. In the said registration certificate, May 23, 1984, was mentioned as the date of the commencement of the production. The petitioner applied for registration with the Director of Industries as a small scale industry. In the said registration certificate, May 23, 1984, was mentioned as the date of the commencement of the production. The petitioner also applied for registration under the Factories Act and the requisite was granted to the petitioner under the Factories Act with effect from April 2, 1984. The petitioner is also registered withe Central excise authorities vide Excise Licence No. L-4 No. 1/37 BB/NOIDA/85 and L-4 No. 1/12/33A/NOIDA/85. The petitioner is also registered under the Employee's State Insurance Act and Employee`s Provident Fund Act. It was submitted that after completing all the formalities as required under the Act, the petitioner applied for exemption form payment of sales tax in the prescribed pro forms under section 4-A of the Act before the Area Development officer, NOIDA. The petitioner application was considered by the District Level Committee and therefore the case was recommended to the Chairman, NOIDA. The Chairman, NOIDA, respondent No. 2, after considering the petitioner`s application for exempting, on August 31, 1987, granted the eligibility certificate to the petitioner, exempting the petitioner-uint form payment of sales tax for a period of four years with effect from April 21, 1984 to April 20, 1988. As the petitioner staked his claim for exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years instead of four years, he preferred a representation/review application before the Chairman, NOIDA. On April 15, 1988, the petitioner was informed that his review application was rejected on the ground that the investment of the petitioner-unit was below three lacs as on the date of starting production, hence the said unit entitled for exemption only for a period of four years. It was stated that since the notification dated August 27, 1984, covered all new units established in the State of U.P. between the period from October 1, 1982 to March 31, 1990, the units which were in production prior to August 27, 1984 an which had increased the investment to over Rs. 3 lacs subsequently were also entitled to exemption for the full period in terms of the said notification. 3 lacs subsequently were also entitled to exemption for the full period in terms of the said notification. It was urged that the notification dated August 27, 1984, did not provide as to at what point of time the investment in the unit should be rupees three lacs or more and hence, the respondent No. 2 was not justified in law in taking the view that the investment in the new unit of rupees three lacs should be completed on the date of starting production. The different of exemption relatable to investment came for the first time on August 27, 1984, with the issuance of notification dated August 27, 1984 and so the unit already in production required certain time to complete the investment to the tune of rupees three lacs or more, hence by no stretch of imagination, the investment of rupees three lacs could be taken to be complete on the date of starting production, especially in respect of the units which had dated August 27, 1984. As the notification dated August 27, 1984, for the first time provided for different period of exemption according to investment, hence the petitioner immediately took steps for increasing investment on machineries, etc., in the unit and that was subsequently enhanced to well over to rupees three lacs, and remained so for a very substantial period of exemption. It was submitted that respondent No. 2 acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in not considering the case of the petitioner from that aspect of the matter. On May 12, 1988, Dr. Ravindra Sharma, Sales Tax Officer, filed a counter-affidavit, in which he stated that for the unit established after October 1, 2982, for the first time, rules with regard to exemption were framed under notification dated September 30, 1982, in accordance with which exemption was to be granted to the units had capital investment of more than Rs. 3 lacs and for the units which had capital investment of more than rupees three lacs were be granted exemption as per notification issued on August 27, 1984. The date on which the unit is installed and for the first time started production on that date, the capital investment made up to the date of production by the unit, has to be taken into account while considering exemption application, but it would not apply if the investment increased subsequently to three lacs or more. The date on which the unit is installed and for the first time started production on that date, the capital investment made up to the date of production by the unit, has to be taken into account while considering exemption application, but it would not apply if the investment increased subsequently to three lacs or more. Since on the date of starting petitioner`s unit, the petitioner`s unit had capital investment of less than rupees three lacs and as such was not entitled for exemption and was entitled for exemption only four years as per notification dated 27, 1984. In the counter-affidavit dated July 29, 1988, filed Sri R. P. Sings Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax, Ghaziabad, it have been averred that under Government Order No. 8344 dated September 30, 1982, the units whose capital investment was below rupees three lacs, were not entitled for exemption. However, by notification dated August 27, 1984, even such units whose investment was below rupees three lacs became entitled for exemption on fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in the said notification dated August 27, 1984 and the exemption was to take effect from the date of starting production. In the case of industries established in NOIDA, this exemption was for a period of four years under the notification dated August 27, 1984. According to section 4-A the date of the first purchase of raw material or the date of installation of power connection, whichever is later, would be the date of starting production. However, in pursuance of Act No. 6 of 1985, which was prospective in nature and was enforced with effect from January 19, 1985, the exemption was to be granted from the date of first sale, if the first sale took place within six months from the date of staring production. In pursuance to the said Act, notifications dated January 29, 1985 and December 26, 1985. Which contemplated exemption from the date of first sale, if the sale took place with in six months from the date of starting production, were issued. Notification dated January 29, 1985 and December 26, 1985, will apply only to those units which were established form January 29, 1985 to December 26, 1985. It will not apply to those units, that were established prior to January 29, 1985, which was governed by notification dated August 27, 1984. Notification dated January 29, 1985 and December 26, 1985, will apply only to those units which were established form January 29, 1985 to December 26, 1985. It will not apply to those units, that were established prior to January 29, 1985, which was governed by notification dated August 27, 1984. The petitioner was therefore, granted exemption for a period of four years from the date of starting production, which in the instant case was April 21, 1984, under notification dated August 27, 1984, hence the application of the petitioner for granting exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years, was rightly rejected by the Chairman, NOIDA. In the rejoinder-affedevit dated August 17, 1988, of Mr. R. K. Suri, Managing Director of the petitioner's company, it was averred that the State Government by G.O. No. 8244 dated September 30, 1983, has provided for exemption from payment of sales tax to all the units, which were situated in different districts as mentioned with reference to the district in which the unit is established with out any reference whatever to the investment in he said unit. In para 2 of the said Government order dated September 30, 1982, various districts and the corresponding period of exemption of the said districts have been mentioned. It was provided in para 2 that the industrial units set up in the State of Uttar Pradesh which were small, medium or large units, shall be entitled to exemption from sales tax under section 4-A for different periods based on districts in which they are set up. According to the said para, the units set up in NOIDA, Tehsil Dadri District Ghaziabad, were entitled to exemption for six years. It was specifically explained under the said para that for the purpose of this scheme industrial units would mean the units which are registered either with the Controller of Iron and Steel, D.G.T.D., Director of Industries or under the Factories Act. In the said Government notification, it has nowhere been stated that small-scale units with investment of less than rupees three lacs, would not be entitled to exemption, and consequently the assertion made in the counter-affidavit was totally incorrect and baseless. In the said Government notification, it has nowhere been stated that small-scale units with investment of less than rupees three lacs, would not be entitled to exemption, and consequently the assertion made in the counter-affidavit was totally incorrect and baseless. The assertion was made on the basis of rules framed in pursuance of para 4 of the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, wherein a small-scale unit has been defined as one wherein capital investment in land, building, plant and machinery exceeded rupees three lacs. It was averred that the Government order dated September 30, 1982, under para 4 alone provides for framing of rules, which stated that rules would be prepared shortly pertaining to the scheme for providing exemption to pioneer and prestige units. Consequently, the rules were to be prepared only in relation to such pioneer and prestige units and thus, the extension of scope of such rules to small-scale industries was ultra vires and to that extent the rules dated October 16, 1982, have no bearing and deserve to be ignored. In the rejoinder-affidavit dated August, 18, 1988, filed by the Managing Director, Sri R. K. Suri against the counter-affidavit of Sri Dr. Ravindra Sharma, Sales Tax Officer, Sector-I, NOIDA, respondent No. 3, it was indicated that under Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982, it was announced that all those units, which shall be established in the State of Uttar Pradesh, shall be entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax. Accordingly, the petitioner also established a new unit in pursuance of the Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982 and is entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years as provided in the said Government Order. The petitioner set up and established the industry on the basis of the clear representation made and held out by the State Government that the industry was entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years under G.O. No. 8244 of September 30, 1982. Subsequently, by means of the Notification No. 6468 of August 27, 1984, a condition was introduced for the first time that in case of a new unit in Tehsil Dadri, district Ghaziabad with capital investment not exceeding rupees three lacs, the period of exemption shall be four years from the date of starting production. Subsequently, by means of the Notification No. 6468 of August 27, 1984, a condition was introduced for the first time that in case of a new unit in Tehsil Dadri, district Ghaziabad with capital investment not exceeding rupees three lacs, the period of exemption shall be four years from the date of starting production. The petitioner has set up its new industry on the basis of the representation made by the State Government under earlier notification dated September 30, 1982 and the State Government is estopped from withdrawing the said exemption to the detriment of the petitioner by a subsequent notification. It was further averred that the exemption under section 4-A of the Act was allowed to all the units which were established in the State of Uttar Pradesh after October 1, 1082 and which were register under the Factories Act. In addition to such industries, exemption was also granted to those units, which were not registered under the Factories Act and their investment was more than rupees three lacs. According to various Government orders and circulars which were issued from time, the units which have been established between October 1, 1982 and March 31, 1983, were entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax and were classified in two groups of units : 1. Those units which were registered with the Director of Industries and were also registered under the Factories Act; and 2. All other industries were also entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax which were not registered under the Factories Act, but whose investment was more than rupees 3 lacs. It was also averred that since there was doubt earlier, hence for the removal of the doubt, the Government Order dated March 16, 1983, was issued and it was clearly mentioned in para 1 of the said Government order that all those units which were registered with the Director of Industries as small-scale industry and were also registered under the Factories Act, would be entitled for exemption irrespective of their investment. There was another group of units which were also entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax, whose investment was more than rupees three lacs but were not registered under the Factories Act. There was another group of units which were also entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax, whose investment was more than rupees three lacs but were not registered under the Factories Act. Thus, the registration under the Factories Act was not at all necessary for all the units, rupees three lacs prior to August 27, 1984, which were clarified by means of the Government Order dated September 29, 1986. In the Government Order dated September 26, 1986, a reference has been made to the earlier Government Order dated March 16, 1983 that those units whose investment was more than rupees three lacs, but were not registered under the Factories Act, were entitled for exemption. Government Order dated March 16, 1983 and September 26, 1986, clearly established that all the units which were established between the period October 1, 1982 and March 31, 1985, had been put into two different categories : 1. Whose investment was less than rupees three lacs but were registered under Factories Act apart from being registered with the Director of Industries. 2. The other units whose investment was more than rupees three lacs but were not registered under the Factories Act. On May 9, 1991 Sri A. K. Darbari, Additional Sales Tax Officer, Sector-I NOIDA, District Ghaziabad filed supplementary counter-affidavit, in which he stated that the issue that notification dated August 27, 1984, does not provide at what point of time the investment in the unit should be rupees three lacs or more is settled by the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated April 3, 1991, U.P. Sarkar Vidhi Anubhag-7 No. 682(2)/XVII-V-1-2-(Ka)28. 1991 dated Lacknow April 3, 1991. Clause 8(c), Explanation 1(e), of the above gazette notification clearly provides for fulfilment of all the condition specified in this Act or Rules or notification made thereunder in regard to grant of facility under this section on the date from which such facility may be granted to him. The investment made by the petitioner on or before the date of starting production (May 23, 1984) or on the date of first sale (May 26, 1984) was less than rupees three lacs and as such the petitioner was entitled for sales tax exemption only for four years from the date of starting production, in view of the fact that the petitioner himself admitted that the investment in land, building and machinery exceeded rupees three lacs after October, 1985. In reply to para 2 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Sri A. K. Darbari, Sri Akhil Gupta filed supplementary rejoinder-affidavit on behalf of the petitioner on March 4, 1992, wherein it was indicated that U.P. Ordinance No. 26 of 1991 published in the U.P. Gazette dated April 23, 1991, was replaced by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991. It was submitted dated April 23, 1991 was replaced by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991. It was submitted that section 8(e), Explanation (1)(e), of the Ordinance, only provides for fulfilment of the conditions as were prescribed on the date from which the facility might be granted to the unit. It is erroneous to interpret the said Explanation so as to mean that the conditions have to be necessarily fulfilled as on the date from which the facility is to be granted to the unit. This is clear from the comparison of the wordings of the present Explanation and the wordings of Ordinance No. 10 of 1990 (reported in May, 1990, issue of the UPTC) under section 3 dealing with the amendment of section 4-A, which reads as under : "For the words" and subject to such conditions as may be specified' the following to be substituted : As against the above Explanation referred to in the supplementary counter-affidavit, reads as under : "Fulfilling all the conditions specified in this Act or rules or notification made thereunder, from which such facility may be granted to him." It was averred that a reading of the two would clearly establish that whereas as per the Ordinance No. 10 what was sought was the fulfilment on the date of starting production all conditions as may be specified, what is sought by the present Explanation is that all the conditions which were specified by Act or the Rules or the notification on the date from which the facility of sales tax exemption is to be granted to the unit must be fulfilled for a unit to qualify for the term new unit. In other words the Explanation is merely a clarification of the general law which requires an assessee to actually fulfil the condition which would could have been specified for him at the beginning and not to expect the impossible out of him by requiring him to fulfil the conditions which have been specified later. In other words the Explanation is merely a clarification of the general law which requires an assessee to actually fulfil the condition which would could have been specified for him at the beginning and not to expect the impossible out of him by requiring him to fulfil the conditions which have been specified later. Hence, the emphasis laid down in the counter-affidavit, on any conditions as may be required to be fulfilled on the date from which the facility was granted in view of the Explanation contained in U.P. Ordinance No. 26 of 1991 is incorrect. If is is presumed that the interpretation contained in the counter-affidavit regarding the necessity of the condition to the fulfilled on the date from which the facility may be granted to unit is correct, even then the amendment as per the Explanation has no relevance in the present writ petition. The purpose of the amendment at the best could be that in cases where the condition was specified but no specific date/time for its fulfilment was given in the Act or in the amendment, then, the confusion in this regard was sought to best at rest by clearly specifying the point of time at which such specified condition was to be fulfilled by the unit. In the case of the petitioner, the condition regarding investment being over rupees three lacs as has been mentioned in the counter-affidavit under para 3 was totally non-existent in view of the fact that (i) the unit was set up in April, 1984 and the date of starting production as per the definition contained under section 8(e), Explanation (3), is May 23, 1984. The reason for the date of commencement of production being May 23, 1984, have been given in the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner on April 30, 1991. It was reiterated that as per Government Order dated September 30, 1982, all the small-scale industries set up after October 1, 1982, in the State of U.P., District Ghaziabad, Tehsil Dadri, were entitled for the exemption for a period of six years from the date of commencement of production. The said Government order also provided for framing rules in respect of prestige and pioneer units. The said Government order also provided for framing rules in respect of prestige and pioneer units. However, under niyamawali made under Government Order dated September 30, 1982, it was stated that those units which were established between October 1, 1982 and May 31, 1985 and were either registered under the Factories Act and whose investment on land, plot and machinery and equipment was more than rupees three lacs, would be entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax from the date of starting production. Under paragraph 4(1) of the said niyamawali under heading "Paribhasha" the small-scale industries are defined to be such units whose investment in land and building, machinery and equipment was less than rupees three lacs and more than rupees twenty lacs. As there was a confusion as to the small-scale units, which would be entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax, in view of what was stated in paragraph 1 and paragraph 4(1) of the niyamawali, the confusion was set at rest by letter dated March 16, 1983, issued by the Directorate of Industries wherein it was clarified that all those small-scale units who registered as such with the Directorate of Industries and are also registered under the Factories Act would be entitled to the exemption from payment of sales tax and that in addition to such units, those which were not registered under the Factories Act but whose investment in land and building, machinery and equipment was more than rupees three lacs would also be entitled to same exemption. Main question, which has arisen for consideration before this Court in the instant matter, is that as to whether by subsequent Government notification dated August 27, 1984, the period of exemption could be reduced. The same question cropped up before this Court in the case of Bajaj Packwell v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1990] 76 STC 386 (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49 of 1988 decided on November 24, 1988, by a Division Bench of this Court), wherein the facts were more or less identical. M/s. Packwell, which was a proprietorship concern was registered under the U.P. and Central Sales Tax Acts. In pursuance of Government Order No. 824 dated September 30, 1982 it established a new small-scale industrial unit in the district of Meerut for the manufacture and sale of blended tea. The initial investment of the petitioner was less than rupees three lacs. M/s. Packwell, which was a proprietorship concern was registered under the U.P. and Central Sales Tax Acts. In pursuance of Government Order No. 824 dated September 30, 1982 it established a new small-scale industrial unit in the district of Meerut for the manufacture and sale of blended tea. The initial investment of the petitioner was less than rupees three lacs. The said concern was granted registration certificate by the Directorate of Industries on April 17/21, 1984. The petitioner was also registered under the Factories Act. On its application, the petitioner was granted eligibility certificate on November 9, 1984, for exemption form payment of sales tax for a period of five years with effect from January 1, 1984. On June 20, 1987, the petitioner was served with a notice dated June 20, 1987 to show cause why the period of exemption be not reduced. Petitioner submitted explanation against the said show cause notice. However, on September 10, 1987, the Additional Director of Industries reduced the period of exemption from years to three years on the ground that he petitioner's investment in its industry-unit was less than rupees three lacs. The petitioner was informed that the exemption would be effective from March 20, 1984, the date of its registration under the Factories Act till December 22, 1986. The petitioner being aggrieved invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a writ petition, in which he asserted that the petitioner had established its unit on specific and clear promise made by the State Government for grant of exemption for a period of five years by virtue of Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982 and hence it was not open to the State Government to reduce the period of exemption, subsequently from five years to three years under Notification No. 6468 dated August 27, 1984. Relying upon the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1; AIR 1987 SC 590 , which was affirmed by a larger Bench of he honourable Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. [1987] 65 STC 430, the orders dated September 10, 1987 and December 18, 1987, were quashed and proceedings, if any, for the imposition of any tax for a period of five years with effect from January 1, 1984, were also quashed. It was held that the petitioner was entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of five years with effect from January 1, 1984, as initially granted under eligibility certificate dated November 9, 1984. Considering the effect of the order dated September 30, 1982, read with niyamawali and the clarification dated March 16, 1983, issued by the Directorate of Industries it was held that the tax exemption was available to units as that of the petitioner for a longer period than the period provided under Government notification dated August 27, 1984. It was held that the petitioner established or set up the new unit acting under the representation made by the State Government. accordingly, it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was attracted to the facts of that case on the strength of the principles decided by the honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases. similar observations were made in Padam Polypack v. state of U. P. 1991 UPTC 1327 (All.), Wilson Electronics v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. W.P. No. 48 of 1988 decided on November 24, 1992), Jyotsna Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P., Lucknow (S.T. Revisional No. 1260 of 1988 decided on March 15, 1989) 1989 UPTC 759 (All.). In Jyotsna Industries (S.T.R. No. 1260 of 1988 decided on March 15, 1989 - Allahabad High Court) 1989 UPTC 759 (All.), a revision was filed before the High Court under section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. According to the revisionist the unit was established on October 1, 1982. The Joint Director of Industries granted eligibility certificate on June 13, 1984, for a period of six years with effect from December 16, 1983. Subsequently the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., on enquiry found that since the investment in the new unit was less than rupees three lacs, he reduced the period of exemption from six years to four years and also changed the effectiveness of eligibility certificate from December 16, 1983 to October 27, 1983. Feeling aggrieved against the said order passed by the Commissioner Sales Tax, an appeal was preferred before Sales, Tax Tribunal, which modified the order to the extent that the eligibility certificate dated June 13, 1984, be made effective from December 16, 1983 to December 15, 1987. Therefore M/s. Jyotsna Industries filed revision before this Court. Feeling aggrieved against the said order passed by the Commissioner Sales Tax, an appeal was preferred before Sales, Tax Tribunal, which modified the order to the extent that the eligibility certificate dated June 13, 1984, be made effective from December 16, 1983 to December 15, 1987. Therefore M/s. Jyotsna Industries filed revision before this Court. The honourable single Judge of this Court while allowing the revision held : "The words used in the niyamawali and G.O. dated September 30, 1982, which have been referred to in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court Bajaj Packwell [1990] 76 STC 386 and the clarification dated March 16, 1983, issued by the Director of Industries clearly indicate that either the unit should be registered under the Factories Act or the investment should be more than three lacs and as such if either of the conditions are fulfilled the units will be entitled to the exemption. In the instant case the fact that the unit has been registered under the Factories Act is not disputed and the registration certificate was issued by the Deputy Director of Factories, U.P. Zone, Bareilly, has been filed along with this revision. It is also not dispute that the assessee was registered with the Director of Industries. For the reasons stated above I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and in view of the decision of Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 49 of 1988 (Bajaj packwell v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1990] 76 STC 386), decided on November 24, 1988 the period of six years could not be curtailed to four years." Commissioner of Sales Tax there after filed a special leave petition bearing No. 16689 of 1990 before the honourable Supreme Court. On January 29, 1990, a Division Bench of the honourable Supreme court consisting of two honourable Judge after hearing the parties, dismissed the special leave petition by indicating that there was no merit in the special leave petition. Mr. On January 29, 1990, a Division Bench of the honourable Supreme court consisting of two honourable Judge after hearing the parties, dismissed the special leave petition by indicating that there was no merit in the special leave petition. Mr. Rakesh Dwevedi, Additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the decisions of this Court in Bajaj Packwell v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1990] 76 STC 386, Accurate Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U. P. 1989 UPTC 118, Jyotsna Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (S.T.R. No. 1260 of 1988 decided on March 15, 1989) 1989 UPTC 759 and Wilson Electronics v. State of U. P. (C.M.W.P. No. 48 of 1988 decided on November 24, 1982) are per incuriam. Hence, they deserve to be ignored. It was also contended that dismissal of the special leave petition by the honourable Supreme Court filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax in Jyotsna Industries (S.T.R. No. 1260 of 1988 decided on March 15, 1989) 1989 UPTC 759 is not on merit, as no reason has been indicated in the said order. Hence, it is not binding precedent under article 141 of the Constitution of India. In that regard he formulated the following questions for consideration : 1. Whether any relief can be granted in absence of specific pleadings and foundation required for promissory estoppel. 2. Government order dated September 30, 1982, has to be read with rules made by the Government. Sales Tax Officers have no right to issue clarificatory letters and on the basis of those clarificatory letters, the petitioner cannot stake his claim for exemption. 3. Section 4-A, since beginning provided grant of exemption by the State Government through notification meaning thereby that as the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, was not notified or published in official gazette, it cannot be relied upon by the petitioner. 4. Notification dated August 27, 1984, was issued in pursuance of the legislative amendment introduced by U.P. Ordinance No. 46 of 1983, which was replaced by U.P. Act No. 22 of 1984, which permits notification to be issued from October 1, 1982. The said notification is retrospective by legislative mode. As far as the contention of Mr. 4. Notification dated August 27, 1984, was issued in pursuance of the legislative amendment introduced by U.P. Ordinance No. 46 of 1983, which was replaced by U.P. Act No. 22 of 1984, which permits notification to be issued from October 1, 1982. The said notification is retrospective by legislative mode. As far as the contention of Mr. Dwevedi regarding the absence of specific pleadings in the writ petition and foundation required for promissory estoppel is concerned, we have to look in to the averments made in the writ petition and the affidavits filed by the petitioners. In para 4 of the writ petition, it has been stated by the petitioner that the unit was established and expanded with the sold view to get exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years. The petitioner has made all efforts and invested huge amount for sole purpose of getting exemption from payment of sales tax. Had the petitioner been aware that the petitioner would not get full benefit of sales tax exemption, then the unit would not have been established and expanded. Nowhere in the writ petition, the petitioner staked its claim for exemption on the basis of Government Order dated September 30, 1982. But, it staked claim for exemption under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for a period of six years from the date of its first sale in terms of notification dated August 27, 1984, as superseded/amended by notification dated January 29, 1985 and December 26, 1985. But in para 3 and 10 of the rejoinder-affidavit and in some other affidavits petitioner claimed exemption on the basis of Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982. Reiterating the contents of para 4 of the writ petition, the petitioner in its rejoinder-affidavit dated August 17, 1988, submitted that he petitioner established and expanded its industry on specific promise of the State Government by its order dated September 30, 1982 and that it would be entitled for exemption for a period of six years. As the petitioner fulfilled all the conditions imposed by Government Order dated September 30, 1982, they are entitled for exemption for a period of six years and accordingly the State Government was not empowered to go back from its promise in this regard. As the petitioner fulfilled all the conditions imposed by Government Order dated September 30, 1982, they are entitled for exemption for a period of six years and accordingly the State Government was not empowered to go back from its promise in this regard. Similar averments have been made in paras 4 and 5 of the rejoinder-affidavit dated August 18, 1988, filed by the Managing Director of the company against the affidavit of the Sales Tax Officer, wherein it was stated that the petitioner established new unit on the basis of clear representation made in Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982, wherein no such condition existed, which was for the first time introduced by Notification No, 6468 dated August 27, 1984 that in the case of a new unit in Tehsil Dadri, district Ghaziabad, the exemption form payment of sales tax will be limited for four years in those units, the investment of which has not exceeded rupees three lacs. Regarding the plea of promissory estoppel raised by the petitioner, in para 4 of the writ petition, the respondents in their counter-affidavit filed by S. R. Singh on July 29, 1980, did not say a words about it. In para 6 of the counter-affidavit a cryptic reply was given that he contents of para 4 of the writ petition needed no comments. In all the counter-affidavits, either filed by Dr. Ravindra Sharma, R. P. Singh or Darbari Lal, the plea of promissory estoppel set up by the petitioner was not denied. It was vehemently argued that the plea, which has not been raised in the writ petition and subsequently raised in the rejoinder-affidivats or supplementary affidavits, cannot be read. This is not a case where the respondents have been taken in surprise by the petitioner by taking a new plea. Rejoinder-affidavits and supplementary affidavits were filed in the years 1988. Writ petition came up for hearing in the month of July, 1994. There was ample time for the respondents to have filed supplementary counter-affidavit, but that was not done. Even during the course of argument either orally or in writing no such prayer was made. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner had not raised the plea of promissory estoppel. There was ample time for the respondents to have filed supplementary counter-affidavit, but that was not done. Even during the course of argument either orally or in writing no such prayer was made. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner had not raised the plea of promissory estoppel. Even when the writ petition was filed, in para 4 of the writ petition, the plea of promissory estoppel was raised, which was not denied by the respondents in any of the counter-affidavits. It may be that in the writ petition, the plea of promissory estoppel on the basis of G.O. No. 2248 dated September 30, 1982 was not raised, which was raised in subsequent affidavits filed by the petitioner, which has gone unrebutted, hence the plea of Additional Advocate-General fails. The next submission on behalf of the respondents that plea of promissory estoppel cannot be taken against law in the present case is grounded upon a legal fiction, that the G.O. dated September 30, 1982, has to be read along with rules framed by the State Government as well as provisions of section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the notification dated August 27, 1988, which was issued in pursuance of the legislative amendment introduced by U.P. Ordinance No. 46 of 1983, which was replaced by Act No. 28 of 1984, which permitted issue of notification with retrospective effect. The aforesaid question are inter linked with the plea of promissory estoppel, which has been raised by the petitioner. Doctrine of promissory estoppel is equitable doctrine, which was first applied by Denning, J., in High Trees case [1947] 1 KB 130 when during the second world war, the people started leaving London owing to bombing and flats were getting empty, the landlord, who had let out the flats on 99 years leases at pound 2,500 a year, agreed to reduce it by half and accept pound 1, 1,250 a year. After the bombing was over, the tenants came back and the landlord sought to recover full pound 2,500 a year. In that circumstance, Lord Denning, J., observed : "There has been a series of decisions over the last 50 years which although, they are said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such. After the bombing was over, the tenants came back and the landlord sought to recover full pound 2,500 a year. In that circumstance, Lord Denning, J., observed : "There has been a series of decisions over the last 50 years which although, they are said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted upon. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. The logical consequence is that a promise to act at a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration, and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better." Subsequently, it was applied to a case where the representation consisted of conduct in Charles Rickwards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim [1950] 1 KB 616. In India v. Anglo-Afhan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718 , the doctrine was applied. It was expanded in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 621 . In the said case a news item was published in certain newspapers in October, 1968 to the effect that the State of U.P. had decided to give exemption from sales tax for a period of three years under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act to all new industrial units in the State of U.P. with a view to enable them to get a firm foothold at the initial stage of their industry. The news item was based upon a statement made by the Secretary to the Industries Department. The appellant-sugar mills addressed a letter to the Director of Industries stating that in view of the said policy announcement, it intended to set up a plant for manufacture of vanaspati and sought confirmation that when Director of Industries confirmed the same. The news item was based upon a statement made by the Secretary to the Industries Department. The appellant-sugar mills addressed a letter to the Director of Industries stating that in view of the said policy announcement, it intended to set up a plant for manufacture of vanaspati and sought confirmation that when Director of Industries confirmed the same. The same was also confirmed by the Chief Secretary to the Government. Thereafter, the applicant placed orders for machinery and set up the plant. U.P. Finance Corporation also granted loan to the appellant being convinced of the said benefit assured to the appellant. However, while the factory was still under process of being set up, the Government had second thoughts, certain discussions took place between the Government and the appellant and the Government did, in fact, go back upon its assurance and decided to disallow the concession to new vanaspati units, including the appellant's unit. Thereupon the appellant approached this Court by the way of writ petition mainly relying upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which was rejected by this Court. Thereafter, the jurisdiction of the honourable Supreme Court was invoked by the petitioner. After considering various English and Indian cases, honourable Bhagwati, J., observed : "The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract required by article 299 of the Constitution ....... It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of 'honesty and good faith' ? ..... Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of 'honesty and good faith' ? ..... There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations, but, let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, that this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies' case [1968] 2 SCR 366; AIR 1968 SC 718 and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government doses not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promise would alter his position relying upon it. But if the government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and to make good such promise like any other private individual." However, it was clarified that since this is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If the government shows that having regard to the facts as they subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold it to its promise, it can be freed from the promise, but this decision must be taken by the court, and not by the Government. The burden would lie upon the Government to establish that the public interest requires that it would should not be bound to its promise. It was also clarified that this doctrine cannot be invoked to prevent the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law and that the doctrine cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It was also explained that doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. In particular, it was stated there can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. It was also explained that doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. In particular, it was stated there can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, vide State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. [1974] 2 SCR 671; AIR 1973 SC 2734 . It was further observed : "that for invoking this doctrine it is not necessary that the promisee should establish that acting in reliance of the promise, he has suffered any detriment. It is sufficient if he shows that he has altered his positions in reliance on the promise." Another statement which is relevant to note, is that the Government cannot plead the doctrine of executive necessity to wriggle out of the plea. Applying the said principle it was held in that case that inasmuch as the appellant had clearly altered its position by borrowing moneys from various financial institutions, purchasing plant and machinery and setting up a vanaspati plant, in the belief induced by the representation of the Government that sales tax exemption would be granted for a period of three years from the commencement of production, the Government was bound to make good promisee." It was further observed : "Had the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 not contained a provision enabling the Government to grant exemption, it was not possible to enforce the said representation, but since such a power was indeed contained in the Act, the Government could legitimately be held bound by its promise. No distinction can be made between the exercise of a sovereign or government function and a trading or business activity of the Government so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned." The doctrine of promissory estoppel received a set back in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 1980 SC 1285 . In the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar AIR 1980 SC 1285 the Municipal Committee decided that Fatehpur Mandi shall remain immune from octroi duty. This was, of course, not within the powers of the committee under the Punjab Municipal Act. The said resolution was, however, confirmed by the State Government of Punjab. In the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar AIR 1980 SC 1285 the Municipal Committee decided that Fatehpur Mandi shall remain immune from octroi duty. This was, of course, not within the powers of the committee under the Punjab Municipal Act. The said resolution was, however, confirmed by the State Government of Punjab. The committee subsequently changed its mind and decided to levy octroi on goods brought into the mandi. That resolution of the committee was annulled by the Government of Punjab. Later on reorganisation of the State of Punjab, the State of Haryana chose to approve the resolution of the committee bringing the mandi within the purview of octroi duty. Thereupon, the committee started charging octroi on goods brought into the Mandi which was challenged before the honourable Supreme Court. In the aforesaid circumstance, it wa held : "That the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available against the State in exercise of its executive or statutory function and the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law." But, in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [1986] 158 ITR 574 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 806 the honourable Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the observations which were made in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar AIR 1980 SC 1285 and relying upon the observations made by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 , the boundaries of the promissory estoppel have been demarcated. It was observed : "Of course, we must make it clear, and that is also laid down the Motilal Sugar Mill's case [1979] 44 STC (SC); AIR 1979 SC 621 , that there can be no promissory estoppel against the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. This aspect has been dealt with fully in Motilal Sugar Mills case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 621 , and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with what has been said in that decision on this point." In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the aforesaid observation were in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [1986] 158 ITR (SC); AIR 1986 SC 806 , in which on a representation made by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, approved and accepted by the Government that the cost of corrugated fibre board containers would not be includible in the value of the cigarettes for the purpose of assessment to excise duty. The company acting upon the said representation, continued the use of corrugated fibre board containers for packing cigarettes and did not recover from the wholesale dealers the amounts of excise duty attributed to the cost of the corrugated fibre board contained during the period in question. In these circumstances, it was held that it would be inequitable to allow the excise authorities to assess excise duty on the basis that the value of cigarette should include the cost of fibre board containers. In these circumstances, it was held that it would be inequitable to allow the excise authorities to assess excise duty on the basis that the value of cigarette should include the cost of fibre board containers. In Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 which also pertains to representation of the State Government for sales tax holiday, the Government of Kerala had issued two notification one dated April 11, 1979 and the second dated 29, 1980 (which was published in the State Gazette on October 21, 1980), granting exemption from payment of sales tax to new industrial units under the small-scale industries. Section 10 of the Kerala General Tax Act empowered the Government to grant exemption with respect to specified goods or specified class of persons, as the case may be, if it considered it necessary in public interest. The first notification/order did not say specifically that it was issued under section 10 but the second notification did say so specifically. The appellants set up an industry and claimed the benefit of the said orders. Their claim was allowed by the Supreme Court by observing : "Under the order dated April 11, 1979, new small-scale units were invited to set up their industries in the State of Kerala and with a view to boosting of industrialisation, exemption from sales tax and purchase tax for a period of five years was extended as a concession and the five-year period was to run from the date of commencement of production. If in response to such an order and in consideration of the concession made available, promoters of any small-scale concern have set up their industries within the State of Kerala, they would certainly be entitled to plead the rule of estoppel in their favour when the State of Kerala purports to act differently." in Pournami Oil Mills case [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 , it was not disputed that the first order, namely, the one dated April 11, 1979, gave more of tax exemption than the second one. The second notification withdrew the exemption relating to purchase tax and confirmed the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso to the notification. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances it was indicated : "..... The second notification withdrew the exemption relating to purchase tax and confirmed the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso to the notification. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances it was indicated : "..... All parties before us who in response to the order of April 11, 1979, set up their industries prior to October 21, 1980, within the State of Kerala would thus be entitled to the exemption extended and/or promised under that order. Such exemption would continue of the full period of five years from the date they started production to that benefit as they had notice of the curtailment in the exemption before they came to set up their industries." The case of Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 is in tune with the decisions of the honourable Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 806 . From the perusal of the precedents mentioned hereinabove, It is evident that the plea of promissory estoppel is available with respect to Government orders and notification if the same has been issued in exercise of powers conferred by statute. In M.P. Sugar Mills' case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 621 the representation of U.P. Government related to the power of exemption as provided by section 1-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 representation of the Government of Kerala related to the power of exemption as provided under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The present case also relates to the power of exemption as provided by section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Hence, the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 and Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1; AIR 1987 SC 590 is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 and Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1; AIR 1987 SC 590 is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The decision of this Court in Bajaj Packwell v. State of Utter Pradesh [1990] 76 STC 386, Accurate Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U. P. 1989 UPTC 118, Joytsna Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (S.T.R. No. 1260 of 1988 decided on March 15, 1989) 1989 UPTC 759 (which was confirmed by the honourable Supreme Court) and Wilson Electronics v. State of U. P. (C.M.W.P. No.48 of 1988 decided on January 24, 1992) were given in the light of the decision of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of Utter Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 , Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1; AIR 1987 SC 590 State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. [1987] 654 STC 430, and it cannot be said that the aforesaid of this Court are per incuriam. As far the contention of Additional Advocate-General with regard to the effect of the subsequent amendment in section 4-A is concerned, the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991, section 4-A was amended with effect from October 12, 1983, by means of which the following amendment was made : (c) For the Explanation, the following Explanation shall be substituted and be deemed to have been substituted on October 12, 1983, namely : "Explanation. - For the purposes of this section - (1) 'new unit' during the period ending with March 31, 1990 means an industrial undertaking set up by dealer on or October 1, 1982 but not later than March 31, 1990, - (a) to (d) ..... (e) fulfilling all the conditions specified in this Act or rules; or notification made therefore in regard to grant of facility under this section on the date from which such facility may be granted to him;" In view of clause (e) of the aforesaid Explanation, an assessee is required to fulfil the conditions which were specified on the date from which the facility of exemption was to be granted. The purpose of the amendment at best could be that in cases where the condition was specified but no specific date time for its fulfilment was given in the Act or in the amendment, then, the confusion in that regard was sought to be set at rest by clearly specifying the point of time at which such specified condition was to be fulfilled by the unit. In the present case the condition regarding investment being over Rs. 3 lacs was totally non-existent in view of the following : (i) The petitioner's unit was set up in April, 1984 and the date of starting production as per the definition contained under section 4-A is May 23, 1984. The reasons for the date of commencement of production being May 23, 1984, have been given in the supplementary affidavit dated April 30, 1991. (ii) That accordingly, the case of the petitioner is covered by G.O. No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982. (iii) That as per the said Government order the small-scale industries set up after October 1, 1982, in the State of U.P., district Ghaziabad, Tehsil Dadri (in which the units set up at NOIDA fall). were entitled for the exemption for a period of six years from the date of commencement of production. The said G.O. dated September 30, 1982, also provided for framing rules in respect of prestige and pioneer units. However under the niyamawali made under the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, though paragraph 1 stated that those units which were established between October 1, 1982 and may 31, 1985 and were either registered under the Factories Act or whose investment in land and building, machinery and equipments is more than Rs. 3 lacs would be entitled to the exemption from payment of sales tax from the date of stating production, under paragraph 4(1) of the said niyamawali under the heading "Paribhasha" the small-scale industries are defined to be such units whose investment in land and building, machinery and equipment was not less than Rs. 3 lacs and more than Rs. 20 lacs, Thus there was some confusion as to the small-scale units which would be entitled to the exemption from payment of sales tax in view of what was stated in paragraph 1 and paragraph 4(1) of the niyamawali. 3 lacs and more than Rs. 20 lacs, Thus there was some confusion as to the small-scale units which would be entitled to the exemption from payment of sales tax in view of what was stated in paragraph 1 and paragraph 4(1) of the niyamawali. This confusion was set at rest by letter dated March 16, 1983, which has been annexed as annexure SA-2, to the supplementary affidavit issue by the Director of Industries wherein it was clarified that all those small-scale units which were registered as such with the Directorate of Industries and are also registered under the Factories Act would be entitled to the exemption from payment of sales tax and that in addition to such units, those which were not registered under Factories Act, but whose investment in land and building, machinery and equipment was more than Rs. 3 lacs would also be entitled to same exemption. (iv) As a result, a question had arisen for consideration of the honourable Allahabad High court in several writ petition including S.T. Revision No. 1260 of 1988, Jyotsna Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1989 UPTC 759 : whether by a subsequent Government notification dated August 27, 1984, the period of exemption could be reduced from 5 years to 3 years to the detriment of the petitioner. It was held by the honourable High Court on the basis of the above mentioned facts as also on principle of promissory estoppel that notification dated August 27, 1984, would not apply to unit set up prior to that date and that on the strength of such notification the exemption could not be curtailed/granted for a period less than what was stipulated in the Government Order No. 8244. That decision has been relied upon by this Court in - (a) Bajaj Packwell v. State of utter Pradesh [1990] 76 STC 386. (b) Accurate Electronics Pvt. v. State of U. P. 1989 UPTC 118. (c) Jyotsna Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1989 UPTC 759. It is significant to note that the special leave petition filed by Commissioner of Sales Tax in the Supreme Court in India in the case of Jyotsna Industries 1989 UPTC 759 filed as annexure RA-4 shows that the same has been dismissed by the honourable Supreme Court vide order dated January 29, 1990. It is significant to note that the special leave petition filed by Commissioner of Sales Tax in the Supreme Court in India in the case of Jyotsna Industries 1989 UPTC 759 filed as annexure RA-4 shows that the same has been dismissed by the honourable Supreme Court vide order dated January 29, 1990. In order words, the decision of the honourable Allahabad High Court has already been affirmed by the honourable Supreme Court of India. It is evident that the units which were set up prior to August 27, 1984, did not carry any condition whatsoever regarding the limitation of its investment, provided the unit was registered under the Factories Act and also under the Directorate of Industries. Since no condition in this regard had ever been prescribed for the units set up prior to August 27, 1984, there can be no question of the unit being required to fulfil such non-existing condition at nay point of time. In fact, this point has been acknowledged and accepted under the amendment Act itself namely, that the investment of Rs. 3 lacs was not a condition necessary for availment of exemption under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act in respect of units which were set up before August 27, 1984, since after the said Explanation referred to in the counter-affidavit the second proviso states that - "In relation to a new unit whose date of starting production falls before August 27, 1984 and the capital investment wherein is not less than Rs. 3 lacs, condition of the registration or application for registration under the Factories Act, 1948, shall not apply." The only interpretation of this proviso can be that units which were registered under Act the Factories Act, 1984 or which had applied for registration under the said Act, were not subjected to the condition of investment being more than Rs. 3 lacs in case units were set up prior to August 27, 1984. In view of this, the said amendment does not in any way affect the case of the petitioner since his unit was set up on April 24, 1984, i.e., prior to August 27, 1984 and it was registered under the Factories Act and with the Directorate of Industries as SSI; facts which are on record and are not disputed by the department. As the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991 only requires the assessee to fulfil the conditions which were provided for and which were specified at the time when the production was started it cannot be said that by means of the aforesaid amendment, the petitioner will not be entitled to the benefits as provided in Government Order No. 8244, dated September 30, 1982. An attempt was made by Mr. Dwevedi, learned Advocate-General to show that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied to the present facts for the reason that promise extended by government order dated September 30, 1982, was not communicated. It is needless to emphasize that the said Government order was published in law books pertaining to sales tax and on the basis of the said Government order exemption from payment of sales tax was granted to innumerable small-scale industrial units. Para 6 of the said Government order itself indicated that the governor asked the official to give wide publicity to the said Government order. Unless proved to the contrary, there existed a presumption that the Government's order must have been given effect to and wide publicity must have been given to the said Government order to attract the person to establish new industrial units in those backward districts. In the present case, in pursuance of the Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982, the petitioner established its industrial unit which provided exemption from payment of sales tax although at the relevant time the petitioner's investment in the industrial unit was less than rupees three lacs. Director of Industrial registered the said small-scale industrial unit on July 24, 1984. In the said registration certificate date of the commencement of production was mentioned as May 23, 1984. The petitioner was also granted registration under the Factories Act with effect from April 2, 1984. As the petitioner has completed formalities, he was entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax for six years in pursuance of Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982. Said Government order was issued in the name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and was signed by the Secretary (Industries), Government of U.P. meaning thereby that it was issued under article 166 of the Constitution and hence, it cannot be called in question on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. Said Government order was issued in the name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and was signed by the Secretary (Industries), Government of U.P. meaning thereby that it was issued under article 166 of the Constitution and hence, it cannot be called in question on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. Under article 162 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State is also extended to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has the power to make laws, meaning thereby that the executive powers of the State are co-terminous with the legislative power of the State, which is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. It was also contended by learned Additional Advocate-General that as section 4-A, since the beginning, has provided for grant of exemption by the State Government through notification no reliance can be placed upon Government Order dated September 30, 1982, as it was notified or published in the official gazette. It is not disputed that the said Government Order dated August 27, 1984, was not notified or published in official gazette. Relying upon several precedents of the honourable Supreme Court mentioned below, it was contended that where no notification was issued for grant of exemption, the Government order being against law, cannot be given effect to and the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be attracted. 1. AIR 1958 SC 296 at page 300 (State of Kerala v. P. J. Joseph). 2. AIR 1965 SC 722 (State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George). 3. AIR 1963 SC 1019 , paras 4 and 5 (Mahendra Lal Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh). 4. AIR 1985 SC 956 , para 7 (K. M. Chikkaputtaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh). 5. [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC) at page 128; AIR 1987 SC 2239 , para 7 (Bakul Cashew Co. v. Sales Tax Officer). Most of the case referred to above to withdrawal of concession in taxing statute which were given earlier by notification, without being notified in the gazette, hence, in those circumstances, the honourable Supreme Court was of the view that where a particular mode has been provided for the exercise of the power, then it should be done according to procedure prescribed. In K. M. Chikkaputtaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1985 SC 956 , the honourable Supreme Court held that the State Government can grant exemption from payment of tax or cancel an exemption already granted only in accordance with section 9(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Act, 1963. It was indicated that it was legislative mandate, and no notification was issued as provided by clause (b) of section 9(1) of the Act either cancelling or withdrawing or varying the exemption granted earlier by the notification issued under section 9(1). The High Court erred in holding that the learned counsel for the appellant had not drawn its attention to any statutory provision or rule which provided that a concession of this nature could be given only under a notification. A mere perusal of the provision of section 9 and the notification which is issued thereunder would have made it very clear that no exemption from the payment of tax due under the Act, could be granted except by the issue of a notification. It is hazardous to depend or one's memory while construing a statutory provision and this case serves as a good illustration of this statement. Having held, that it was not necessary to issue a notification for granting an exemption, the High Court misled itself in to thinking that the issue of a notification for the purpose of withdrawing the concession already granted was also unnecessary. The reason given by the High Court for rejecting this contention of the appellant, is, therefore, wholly untenable. Under section 9(2) of the Act, it was provided : "Any notification issued under sub-section (1) shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is issued, on the table of the Legislative Assembly of the State while it is in session for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions." In the instant case, section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax does not provide that the notification for granting exemption from payment of sales tax should be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly of the State. It is the settled position that article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. It is the settled position that article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Hence, levy of tax can only be done by authority of law and not any executive order unless the executive is specifically empowered by law to give exemption, it cannot say, that it will not enforce the law as against a particular person. In Motilal padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 621 it was observed that had the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, not contained a provision enabling the Government to grant exemption, it was not possible to enforce the said representation but since such a power has indeed contained in the Act, the Government could legitimately be held bound by its promise. Similar observation were made in Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 . Undoubtedly, the State has been vested with a power under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act to grant exemption to new small-scale industrial units from the payment of sales tax. The aforesaid Government Order dated September 30, 1982, was issued by the State Government under section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Although section 4-A provides that the State Government may, by "notification" extend exemption from payment of sales tax for certain units, but, for the reason of fact that since Government order has been issued under the authority of the Government of State by specifically mentioning that the same is being issued in terms of section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, it cannot be said that procedural lapse on the part of the State Government, not to get it notified or published in the official gazette, will nullity the effect of the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, particularly when several small-scale industrial units were benefited by the said Government order and they were granted exemption from payment of sales tax in pursuance of the Government Order dated September 30, 1982. It would be futile effort on the part of the State of deny to the petitioner a benefit of exemption, which has been given and availed of, by numerous small-scale industrial units in the State because such an action would not only be arbitrary but discriminatory too. It would be futile effort on the part of the State of deny to the petitioner a benefit of exemption, which has been given and availed of, by numerous small-scale industrial units in the State because such an action would not only be arbitrary but discriminatory too. In these circumstances, the lapse can at best be termed as procedural lapse, which cannot render the said Government order as invalid, for the reason of the fact that it was given effect to and the benefit was availed by several small-scale industrial units. The said Government order was reiterated and clarified by the letter dated March 16, 1983, issued by the Directorate of Industries in explicit terms that all the industries which were set up in the State prior to August 27, 1984 and which were registered with the Directorate of Industries or other specified authorities and also under the Factories Act, would be entitled for exemption under Government Order No. 8244 dated September 30, 1982, for certain specified period and in the case of the petitioner-unit situate at Dadri, district Ghaziabad, for a period of six years. Due to non-publication of the said Government order in gazette, another view might have been taken that as the exemption as provided in the said Government order was against law, the promissory estoppel would not be applicable, but as we have stated above, it was not only given effect to, but numerous units availed of that benefit and in pursuance of the said Government order, several writ petitioner were allowed and at least in one case the judgment of this Court was affirmed by the honourable Supreme Court, we cannot take a view that the petitioner is not entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of six years because it would amount to discrimination between two in the same class of persons. Only, for the first time by means of the notification dated August 27, 1984, different periods of exemption for industries where capital investment was more than rupees three lacs or less than three lacs, were provided. Prior to the said notification, there existed no condition regarding capital investment, i.e., less than or more than rupees three lacs. Only, for the first time by means of the notification dated August 27, 1984, different periods of exemption for industries where capital investment was more than rupees three lacs or less than three lacs, were provided. Prior to the said notification, there existed no condition regarding capital investment, i.e., less than or more than rupees three lacs. We find from the notification that while mentioning having capital investment of less than or more than rupees three lacs, there is no mention as to the point of time at which such capital investment has been presumed. An attempt on the part of the respondents is to read words "at the time of commencement of production" along with these words in the notification. This would be a clear case of cases amasses, whereby the words which are not there in the Act or Rules are deemed to be present. As has been held by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 at page 540-542, Controller of Estate Duty v. Kanakasabai [1973] 89 ITR 251 at page 257 the law does not permit the reading of the words which are non there in the taxing provisions. This is particularly true that where reading of such words which be detrimental to the interest of the citizens. We fee that in the absence of any specification as to the time at which the said capital investment was to exceed rupees three lacs, a reasonable interpretation would be that if a unit has subsequently increased its investment to more than rupees three lacs and the same exceeded for a substantial period of exemption or where the average capital investment during the entire period for which it could have possibly claimed the exemption was more than Rs. 3 lacs, the same would be entitled for exemption for a larger period. A strict interpretation that the capital investment must have exceeded Rs. 3 lacs on the date of commencement of production would lead to an assured result. It would even entitle a unit which is set up with a capital investment of more than rupees three lacs but which sells its assets shortly thereafter so as to reduce its total investment far below Rs. 3 lacs for exemption for a higher period as per the department. It would even entitle a unit which is set up with a capital investment of more than rupees three lacs but which sells its assets shortly thereafter so as to reduce its total investment far below Rs. 3 lacs for exemption for a higher period as per the department. On the other hand, an entrepreneur, who though having started small, decides to expand his unit by bringing fresh investment or ploughing back the profits so as to increase the capital investment beyond rupees three lacs over a period of time, would be disentitled to exemptions for a higher period. This could not have been the intention of the said Government notification. In the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1992] 196 ITR 188; 1992 UPTC 857, in Civil Appeals Nos. 1211, 1257 to 1260(NT) of 1982, honorable Mr. Justice R. M. Sahai, speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, indicated : "A provision in a taxing statue granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally." In Broach Distt. Co-operative Cotton Sales, Ginning and Pressing Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad [1989] 177 ITR 418 (SC); 1989 UPTC 1222, the assessee a co-operative society claimed that the receipts from the ginning and pressing activities was exempt under section 81 of the Income-tax Act. The question for interpretation was whether the co-operative society which carried on the business of ginning and pressing was a society engaged in "marking" of the agricultural produce of its members. The court held that the object of section 81(1) was no encourage and promote the growth of co-operative societies and consequently a liberal construction must be given to the operation of that provision, and since ginning and pressing was incidental or ancillary to the activities mentioned in section 81(1), the assessee was entitled to exemption and the provision did not stand in the way. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Amritsar v. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1989] 177 ITR 431 (SC); 1989 UPTC 1300, it was held that the law providing for concession for tax purpose to encourage industrial activity should be liberally construed. It was further held that since a provision intended for promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally, the restriction on it, too, has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the section and not to frustrate it. It was further held that since a provision intended for promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally, the restriction on it, too, has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the section and not to frustrate it. But, that turned out to be the unintended consequence of construing the clause liberally, as was done by the High Court for which it cannot be blamed as the provision is susceptible of such construction if the purpose behind its enactment, the objective it sought to achieve and the mischief it intended to control are lost sight of. If cannot be doubted that the object of the provisions contained in section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is meant for promoting industrial and economic growth for industrial backward districts of the State. The exemption from payment of sales tax for a specified period, say four or six years, is just a sort of incentive to the entrepreneurs to set up their industrial units in such backward districts of the State. In pursuance of the said objective, the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, was issued, which did not put a rider that the small-scale industrial units, the investment of which was less than rupees three lacs, would not be entitled for exemption from payment of sales tax. Learned Additional Advocate-General wanted this Court to construe the provision of section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, literally meaning thereby that for want of notification published in the gazette, the Government Order dated September 30, 1982, would be invalid. Such an interpretation, if not construed liberally, would defeat and frustrate the objective behind section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. A similar view was taken by the honourable Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Amritsar v. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (Civil Appeals Nos. 519 to 521 of 1975 decided on April 28, 1989, reported in [1989] 177 ITR 431 (SC); 1989 UPTC 1300, wherein honourable Mr. A similar view was taken by the honourable Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Amritsar v. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (Civil Appeals Nos. 519 to 521 of 1975 decided on April 28, 1989, reported in [1989] 177 ITR 431 (SC); 1989 UPTC 1300, wherein honourable Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak, C.J., (as he then was) speaking for the Bench indicated in para 5 of the report (at page 434 of ITR); "It is necessary to remember that when a provisions made in the context of a law providing for concessional rates of tax for the purpose of encouraging an industrial activity, a liberal construction should be put upon the language of the statute." In view of the aforesaid dictum of the honourable Supreme Court we are of the view that the restriction imposed by section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, that the exemption can be granted by notification, would not come in the way before the executive authority to grant exemption from payment of sales tax to new industrial units in backward areas of the State for specified periods and if such an exemption has been granted by an executive order, which has been acted upon and concessions of exemption were given effect to, that cannot be said to be against law. As the case of the petitioner is identical and similar to the cases, which have been decided by this Court, we are of the view that the period of exemption in the case of the petitioner from payment of sales tax would still be the same, i.e., six years from the date of the production that is April 21, 1984, as stated by the petitioner in para 10 of the writ petition and not from any subsequent date as claimed by the petitioner, in some of the supplementary affidavits. In view of what has been state hereinabove this writ petition succeeds. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the respondent No. 2 to modify the eligibility certificate dated August 31, 1987, issued by respondent No. 2 for grant of eligibility certificate for a period of six years instead of four years with effect from the date of production, this is April 21, 1984. Sales Tax Officer, Sector-I NOIDA - respondent No. 3 is directed to pass provisional assessment order in accordance with the observations made above. Writ petition allowed.