Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. These two analogous appeals (L.P.A. No. 3 of 1991 (R) (hereinafter called as First L.P.A) and L.P.A. No. 4. of 1991 (R) (hereinafter called the Second L.P.A) are directed against the same judgment dated 14.12.1990 of the learned Single Judge of this Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant in the second L.P.A. for a sum of Rs.2,09,605/- as damages refusing the relief for penalty holding it to be time barred, The first L.P.A has been preferred by Defendent whereas Second L.P.A has been preferred by plaintiff. As these Appeals involved similar question for consideration it is convenient to dispose of them by a common judgment. 2. The plaintiff-appellant in the Second L.P.A. has filed a suit against the defendant appellant (in the second L.P.A.) for recovery of Rs.5,91,425.23 on account of penalty and damages for breach of contract as contained in Ext. 8. The suit was brought by the plaintiff with the averments that for construction of 32 numbers of F-Type quarters and 39 numbers of H-Type quarters at panchet under Chirkunda Station of Dhanbad District tenders were invited. The defendant-appellant (in the Second L.P.A) submitted tenders on 19.1.1971 which was finalised on 1st, March, 1973. The tender of Defendant-appellant (in First L.P.A) was accepted and it became an enforceable contract no. 7 of 1972-73 with Rs.8,01,989,39 p, as its value. The work order no 52 was issued on 28.2.1973 but the date of the commencement of the work was agreed upon as 12.1.1973. The work was to be completed within 12 months. The defendant after taking the work did not complete the same as required even though he was appraised of unsatisfactory progress by a number of correspondence by which he was required to make improvement, but he utterly failed. A penalty for a sum of Rs.76, 888.40 was imposed on the defendant under Clause 2 of the contract which was communicated by letter dated 12.9.73. The defendant by letter dated 25.9.73 requested the plaintiff to remit the penalty and enhance the tender rate by 30%. The plaintiff did not accede to the request. Under Clauses 3 of the agreement however the contract was rescinded. The defendant was directed to be present on the spot where final measurement of the work done was to be made. The defendant defaulted there and measurement was done unilaterally. The plaintiff did not accede to the request. Under Clauses 3 of the agreement however the contract was rescinded. The defendant was directed to be present on the spot where final measurement of the work done was to be made. The defendant defaulted there and measurement was done unilaterally. The balance work to be completed was of the value of Rs.7,31,814.00 and that work was assigned to another contractor named and styled as M/s Chhabara Construction Works, who completed it as the value of Rs.14,82,888.83. After calculation the defendant was bound to pay Rs.76,888.40 as penalty and a sum of Rs.7,51.074/- as compensation or damages. 3. The defendant-appellant (in the First L.P.A) contested the suit on the ground that the suit was not maintainable and it was barred by limitation and by the principles of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver. It was denied that there was any concluded contract between the parties. The terms and conditions of the contract were never settled, even though tenders were submitted on 19-1-71 but a letter was enclosed indicating that the rates given in the tenders were valid for a period of 18 months from the date of submission of the tenders. The validity of the tenders expired on 18-7-72 and thereafter the tender lost its force. The plaintiff himself was responsible for the loss of time and committed breach of undertaking by not making payment at higher rates. The imposition of penalty under Clause 2 and damages under Clause 3 Was denied. The suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. Out of 8 issues framed by the trial court issue no. 5 was as to what were the terms of agreement and issue no. 6 was whether the terms of the agreement were binding on the defendant and other issue was whether the suit was time barred. It was held by the trial court that the agreement had no force and was not binding on the defendant and that the suit was barred by limitation. It was further held that defendant has stopped the work on 7.5.73 and it was communicated by letter dated 29th May, 1973. The plaintiff had asked the defendant by letter dated 16.7.73 to return the materials. On that date the contract was broken and the suit was filed in May, 1978 much beyond the period of 3 years, hence barred by limitation. 5. The plaintiff had asked the defendant by letter dated 16.7.73 to return the materials. On that date the contract was broken and the suit was filed in May, 1978 much beyond the period of 3 years, hence barred by limitation. 5. The plaintiff appellant (in the Second L.P.A) preferred a First Appeal before this Court under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was heard by the learned Single Judge and the same was allowed in part to the extent that the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.76,888/- as penalty was barred by limitation whereas the suit for damages for breach of contract was not time barred and hence that part of the relief for recovery of a sum of Rs.2.09.605/-waf. decreed. 6. As the suit has been partly decreed and partly dismissed hence in respect of refusal of the relief for recovery of penalty the plaintiff appellant has filed the Second L.P.A. whereas in respect of the relief being allowed for recovery of compensation the defendant has filed the First L.P.A. 7. The learned counsel for the defendant appellant (in the first L.P.A.) has contended that the suit for recovery of penalty and compensation was barred by limitation, inasmuch as tender was submitted on 19.1.71 by the defendant and it was accepted on 1.3.73, On 28.2.73 the work order was issued (Ext. 2) and the work was to be completed within twelve months from 12.1.73. According to the plaintiff's case the defendant stopped the work on 7.5.73 as was communicated by letter dated 29th May, 1973. The plaintiff asked the defendant by letter dated 16.7.73 to return the materials. That day there was a breach of contract and as the suit was filed much after 3 years in May, 1978 hence the same was barred by limitation inasmuch as Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable. 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant (in the Second L.P.A.) and respondent (in the First L.P.A.) refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the defendant (the appellant in the First L.P.A. and respondent in the Second L.P.A.) It was urged that the suit was not barred by limitation and it was concluded contract and the suit ought to have been decreed for recovery of penalty also. The suit was not barred by limitation and it must have been decreed in toto. 9. The suit was not barred by limitation and it must have been decreed in toto. 9. Having liven thoughtful consideration to the submissions of both sides the moot question for our consideration is whether the suit was barred by limitation. In case it was held that the suit was barred by limitation, in that event there would be no justification to decide other questions but in case suit was held to be within time in that event other submissions would be required to be decided on merits. 10. As it was a suit for recovery of penalty and damages for breach of contract, hence Article 55 of the Limitation Act, (1963) (for short the Act) shall apply. Before proceeding further it appears imperative to state few words about the concept and policy of the limitation. Different courts have given different reasons in support of the statute of limitation. These three reasons are worth mention the first is that if long dormant claims are directed to be revived they would Act, more of cruelty than justice. The second is that the defendant by lapse of time might have lost evidence to disprove the claim of the plaintiff, The third is that the cause of action should be pursued with reasonable diligence. 11. The principles pertaining to the Statute of limitation are based primarily on a Maxim "VIGILANTIBUS ET NON DORMIENTIBUS LEX SUCCURRIT" which connotes that Jaw assists those who are vigilent not those who sleep over their rights. 12. It is not inapt to refer to the statement of law contained in the Halsuburay Laws of England (4th Edition) Vol. 28 para. 605 page 250 as follows: "The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of the statutes of limitation namely I that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them (see. ‘A’ Court v. oss (1825) 3 Bing 329 at 322, R.B. Policies of Lloyd's N Butler, (1950) 1 K.B. 76, at 81, (1949) 2 A.H.E.R. 226 at 230) II that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a state claim (see Jones v. Bellgrove properties Ltd. (1949) 3 K.B. 700 at 704 (3) that persons with good cause of action should pursue them with reason able diligence (see Board of Trade vs. Cayver, Irovine & Co. (1927) A.C. 610 at 628." 13. (1927) A.C. 610 at 628." 13. It is well settled that object of the statute of the limitation is not to create any right but to prescribe period within which legal proceedings or the suit may be instituted for enforcement of right which exists under the substantive law. After expiry of the period of the limitation the remedy to enforce the right comes to an end. After the lapse of the period of limitation there is no remedy to obtain the relief even though the right subsists. Keeping in view these principles that after the expiry of period of limitation remedy is lost, we have to ascertain whether the plaintiff appellant in the second LPA has remedy of suit available or the same has become barred by limitation. 14. The tenders were submitted by the defendant on 19.1.71 and were finally accepted on 1st March, 1973. It became an enforceable contract no. 7 of 1972-73 (Ext. 8) and the valvue of the contract work was Rs.8,01,989.39. The work order (Ext.2) was issued on 28.2.73, but the date of commencement of the work agreed upon between the parties was 12.1.73. The work was to be completed within 12 months. As the progress of the work was not satisfactory hence Clause 2 of the contract providing for penalty was invoked and it was communicated by the plaintiff by letter dated 12.9.73. The defendant by letter dated 25.2.73 requested the plaintiff to remit the penalty and further requested to enhance the tenders by 30% But defendant stopped the work on 7.5.73 as was communicated by letter of the plaintiff dated 29th May, 1973 and the plaintiff asked the respondent by letter dated 16.7.73 to return the materials as the work can not be carried any further. In this way the contract, in our opinion, was broken on 16.7.73 but the suit was filed in May, 1978 after about 5 years, whereas under Article 55 of the Act, the period of limitation was 3 years after breach of contract. 15. In a Division Bench case of this Court in Lakshmi Ram Narain v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1977 Patna 73) His Lordships Hon'ble Mr. Justice L.M. Sharma (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed under para-15 (page 77) that if a suit was brought for compensation for breach of contract after three years, it is time barred. Justice L.M. Sharma (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed under para-15 (page 77) that if a suit was brought for compensation for breach of contract after three years, it is time barred. In that case the breach took place on 16th December, 1959. The suit was filed much after 3 years. As Article 55 of the Act, prescribed 3 years limitation hence the suit was held to be time barred. 16. In a Division Bench case of the Allahabad High Court ((Kedar Nath v. Har Govind) (AIR 1926 Allahabad 605) it was held that in a suit for damages for breach of contract Article 83 of the (Old) Limitation Act, shall apply and the suit if filed within three years from the date of actual injury would be within limitation otherwise it would be time barred. 17. In Karson Agency (India) and another v. Bhajan Singh Hardit Singh and Co. (AIR 1963 Punjab 120) it was held that the suit for compensation for breach of contract was governed by Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and starting point of limitation of 3 years, was the date when the contract was broken. 18. In the instant case it was on 7.5.73 that the defendant stopped the work and on 16.7.73 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant for return of the entire material, as no construction will be possible at the hands of the defendants. 19. It our considered opinion, the contract was broken on 29th May, 1973 or at the best on 16th July, 1973. As the suit was filed on 29th May, 1978 hence it was filed much after 3 years and the suit was barred by limitation. No reasons have been assigned by the learned Single Judge as to how suit for recovery of a sum of penalty was time barred, whereas the suit for recovery of compensation/damages for the breach of the contract has been held within time. 20. In our opinion, the judgment of the learned Single Judge can not be sustained as the suit was time barred. As the appeal could be disposed of on this point alone we need not decide other points pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 21. 20. In our opinion, the judgment of the learned Single Judge can not be sustained as the suit was time barred. As the appeal could be disposed of on this point alone we need not decide other points pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 21. In view of the premises aforesaid the First, Letters Patent Appeal (No.3 of 1991 (R)) succeeds and the same is allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge to that extent is set aside, whereas the Second Letters Patent Appeal (No.4 of 1991 (R)) filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. As an inescapable corollary, the suit of the plaintiff-appellant (in L. P. A. No.4 of 1991 (R)) is dismissed in toto with costs throughout. Appeals disposed accordingly.