K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) ). The short but important question that arises for consideration in this Miscellaneous Criminal Application is, whether the default committed by the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case in the first instance, in not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order in time, that is to say within the prescribed period of limitation, and thereafter, in the second instance, not forwarding his candid opinion whether to file appeal or not to the legal department and thereby allowing the entire period of limitation to expire, can be said to be just and proper circumstance constituting sufficient cause referable to the period prior to the expiry of the limitation for the purposes of condoning the delay ? In other words, whether in a case wherein the entire period of limitation having already been expired, the State can still be permitted to file an appeal more particularly when the Public Prosecutor in charge of the matter was not that prompt and duty conscious enough to apply for the certified copy of the impugned judgment within the time prescribed and also did not propose an acquittal appeal, and/or accordingly, forward even a negative report to the said effect to the Legal department ? ( 2 ) ). To state few relevant facts briefly, as far as they are imminently necessary to decide the question raised above, respondent Mustaq Musa Dungaria, who came to be tried for the alleged offences punishable under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal code read with Sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, by the learned Additional sessions Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No. 93 of 1993, was at the end of the trial, by a judgment dated 30-3-1993 ordered to be acquitted. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the State of Gujarat preferred a Criminal Appeal, the same being criminal Appeal No. 401 of 1994 before this Court, wherein office has raised an objection that the same was beyond time by 110 days, giving rise to the present misc. Criminal Application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia praying for the condoning the delay in question. ( 3 ) ). Making out a case for "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in question, mr. Criminal Application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia praying for the condoning the delay in question. ( 3 ) ). Making out a case for "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in question, mr. R. L. Raval, Legal Assistant, Legal Department, Gandhinagar on affidavit has stated that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal was pronounced on 30-9-1993 and the certified copy of the same was applied quite belatedly as long back as on 5-3-1994 by the Additional Public Prosecutor, Vadodara, that is to say, after the period of limitation had already expired. This copy was ready and made available to the learned Public Prosecutor on 5-4-1994, who in his turn forwarded the Same to the legal Department vide his letter on the very day. Further, according to the deponent Mr. R. L. Raval, Mr. T. S. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the original complainant, on filing the Criminal Revision Application in this court challenging the impugned order of acquittal, also forwarded a copy of the same alongwith his letter dated 29-12-1993, requesting the Secretary, Legal department to file an acquittal appeal in the High Court on behalf of the State. On receipt of a copy of the said Criminal Revision Application by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, High Court, the said office also in its turn addressed a letter to the Legal Department on 10-1-1994 inquiring as to whether the State was inclined to file an acquittal appeal or not. On the basis of this letter, according to the deponent, the Legal Department wrote a letter on 17-1-1994 to the Additional Public prosecutor, Vadodara requesting him to send the case papers to the Legal Department alongwith the copy of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Since this was not responded to, the Legal Department was once again constrained to send reminder telegrams after telegrams on 3-3-1994, and thereafter on 15-3-1994 and 31-3-1994. Since this was not responded to, the Legal Department was once again constrained to send reminder telegrams after telegrams on 3-3-1994, and thereafter on 15-3-1994 and 31-3-1994. This also was quite surprisingly not responded to and as a result whereof the Legal Department was further constrained to file an acquittal appeal on the basis of the memo of Criminal Revision Application and copy of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal supplied by the original complainant, and accordingly the g. R. was forwarded to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, High Court on 16- 4-1994 to file acquittal appeal, which ultimately came to be filed on 18-4-1994 as 17th was a holiday being Sunday. ( 4 ) ). Now, indisputably the acquittal appeal in question is filed beyond 110 days, say quite behind the stipulated period of limitation. Thus, having regard to the aforesaid background of the facts and circumstances of the case, four glaring features bubbles upon surface before us. Firstly, that the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the case, for whatever reasons, did not apply for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, immediately within time and at the earliest, which he was otherwise duty bound to apply irrespective of his personal opinion whether to file an acquittal appeal or not. Secondly, not only that but he further still failed to respond to forward the proposal to file an acquittal appeal at the earliest and in time, to the Legal Department despite repeated letters and telegrams sent to him. Thirdly, as a result of the said default of the Public Prosecutor, there is a resultant delay of as many as 110 days in filing the present appeal. And fourthly, the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order was applied as much late as on 5-3-1994. after the period of limitation had already expired. Now ordinarily once the period of limitation expires and there is a delay in filing the appeal and the certified copy of the same is applied after the expiry of the period of limitation then in that case, delay cannot be condoned. But at the same time, if "sufficient cause" is shown, which is quite referable to the period prior to the expiry of period of the limitation, then in that case, that can certainly legitimately be taken into consideration for condoning the delay. But at the same time, if "sufficient cause" is shown, which is quite referable to the period prior to the expiry of period of the limitation, then in that case, that can certainly legitimately be taken into consideration for condoning the delay. In the instant case, it is abundantly clear that the Public Prosecutor had not applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Not only that but for three months, he maintained a total silence and allowed the period of limitation to expire. In fact, it was only after when the Criminal Revision Application was filed by the private complainant that through the instrumentality of the Legal Department, he was made to woke up to apply for the certified copy and he applied accordingly on 5-3-1994. Now, so far as the question as to whether to file an acquittal appeal or not, the ultimate decision taking authority rests with the State Government that is to say the Secretary, Legal Department. Under the circumstances, when the decision taking authority is totally in dark as regards the impugned order of acquittal, and if it ultimately wants to file an appeal on the basis of some representation, then whatever delay that has taken place at the level of the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case, that by no stretch of imagination, can ever be attributed to the State. The entire burden and accountability of not obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order in time immediately shifts and ultimately rests upon the Public prosecutor, who was in charge of the case. Once this is the point-blank situation, which cannot be disputed, is accepted, then the Legal Department cannot be accused of any inaction or remissness whatsoever in delaying filing of acquittal appeal and yet if indeed delay as found have taken place, this is certainly a "sufficient ground" which can reasonably be taken into consideration for condoning the delay. In this regard, we are indeed quite conscious of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ajit Sinh Thakur v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1981 SC 733 and what we are ultimately holding is consistent with the ratio laid down therein in para-6 of the said judgment. In this regard, we are indeed quite conscious of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ajit Sinh Thakur v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1981 SC 733 and what we are ultimately holding is consistent with the ratio laid down therein in para-6 of the said judgment. In this case of Ajit Sinh Thakur v. State of Gujarat (supra) initially the State Government took the decision not to file acquittal appeal and in that view of the matter, the period of limitation got expired. However, subsequently, on certain observations being made by the High Court while considering the Criminal Revision Application filed by the private complainant that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and pursuant to the same on the notice being issued by the High Court, State Government, reviewing its earlier decision not to file an appeal filed the same. By this time, the period of limitation to file acquittal appeal had already expired. It was in the background of these facts and circumstances that the Supreme Court did not condone the delay. Now, as against this backdrop of the situation, in the instant case since the learned P. P. in charge of the case did neither forward a copy of the impugned judgment and order nor a proposal to file an acquittal appeal to the Legal Department, the State Government had indeed no occasion/opportunity worth the name to take any decision at the earliest possible to file acquittal appeal or not. It was only for the first time that when the private complainant filed Criminal Revision Application before the High Court and a letter of request made by the petitioner came to be received by the Legal department that the decision taking authority of the State came to know about the impugned order of acquittal. Till then, it was in total dark. . Under the circumstances, by no stretch of imagination any inaction or negligence could be attributed to the de6ision taking authority, viz. , the Secretary, Legal Department acting on behalf of the State. In fact, but for the patent negligence and inaction on the part of learned P. P. in charge of the case, the State did not figure at all in picture for any delay. , the Secretary, Legal Department acting on behalf of the State. In fact, but for the patent negligence and inaction on the part of learned P. P. in charge of the case, the State did not figure at all in picture for any delay. Thus, the remissness and inaction of the learned P. P. in the first instance, in not obtaining a certified copy of the impunged judgment and order within the period of limitation prescribed and thereafter in the second instance not to forward his opinion either by way of filing or not filing the acquittal appeal to the Secretary, legal Department, no liability can straightaway be transferred and fastened upon the Legal Department and thereby on the State Government for delay in not filing appeal in time. In fact, if such patent defaults as regard inaction and negligence of the learned P. P. is countenanced lightly and mechanically linked up and straightaway attributed to the State Government, thereby not condoning the delay, it may perhaps open the flood-gate of corruption, a box of Pandora, where in some serious cases, for obvious considerations, once a while, the learned P. P. in charge of the case would be quite tempted to allow the period of limitation to expire ultimately defeating the States concern for the cause of justice. The situation would be all the more serious and worsened where there is no private informant to file Criminal Revision Application and ultimately the Government having any opportunity to know whether in any particular case such an acquittal order was passed. . Under the circumstance, Legal Department gets no opportunity to know about the acquittal. It is with this specific view to subserve the overall ends of justice in mind that according to this Court, the learned P. P. in charge of the case and the decision taking authority of the State, the Legal Department being distinctly different and separate, the default committed by the learned P. P. firstly in not applying for certified copy within the stipulated period of limitation and thereafter, secondly, not forwarding his opinion either way for filing appeal constituted "sufficient cause" unquestionably referable to the period prior to the expiry of limitation, that the delay in question requires to be condoned. Not to take this quite realistic and pragmatic view of the matter would in a way be tantamount to as good as giving idle walk-over in favour of irresponsible Public Prosecutor who many a time what ought we not know was out to subvert, sabotage and destroy the cause of justice. The Court is taking this view applying the "doctrine of caution", in other words the "doctrine of Prudence" only with a view to see that in a given good case, public cause and substantial justice is not got defeated merely because of some lapse advertent or inadvertent on the part of the concerned learned P. P. in charge of the case. Further, by condoning the delay, the Court is certainly not admitting the matter much apart deciding the same on merits against the accused without hearing him. If, there is no merit in the case, the Court ultimately would undoubtedly be dismissing the appeal, even at the admission stage, but to reject the appeal on the threshold of admission merely on some technical ground of limitation and that too because of the patent default committed by none other than the learned p. P. himself in charge of the case, then such an order, may as well result into patent miscarriage of justice at the instance and connivance of the concerned Court. In our opinion, the cause shown by the State Government is indeed quite sufficient enough being referable to the period prior to the period of limitation. Not only that but further having regard to the gravity and seriousness of the offence also, substantial justice warrants that the delay in question requires to be condoned. ( 5 ) ). We are quite conscious of the fact that when this delay condonation application came up for admission on 16-2-1995 before the earlier Bench, Rule was made returnable on 20-3-1995. We have been further informed by Shirastedar Mr. Bhavsar that the notices have not been served. ( 5 ) ). We are quite conscious of the fact that when this delay condonation application came up for admission on 16-2-1995 before the earlier Bench, Rule was made returnable on 20-3-1995. We have been further informed by Shirastedar Mr. Bhavsar that the notices have not been served. However, since the Division Bench of the court has already taken a view that in delay condonation application, it is not always obligatory upon the Court to issue notice to the accused persons, it prima facie appears that at the relevant time the learned A. P. P. in charge of the matter for whatever reasons had failed to draw the attention of the concerned Bench towards the decision of this Court rendered in case of State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Laxmanbhai Chauhan, reported in 1994 (2) GLH 7 : 1993 (2) GLR 1577 and in this view of the matter, with utmost respect to our previous Bench we, without waiting for the notices to be served, hereby condone the delay and dispose of this application accordingly. ( 6 ) ). Having regard to the gross inaction and remissness on the part of the learned public Prosecutor in charge of the case, there is nothing in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State whether any explanation is called for and appropriate action is taken against him. Such lapse is indeed very serious. The Public Prosecutor, in some important cases where there is some merit, if he schemingly sleeps over the matter and because of that, if the accused gets unjust benefit, then it is too serious a thing to be lightly countenanced. It is for the Home and Legal Departments to find out ways and means to control inefficient, irresponsible Public Prosecutor playing truant with the Administration of Justice. It may further be observed for the future guidance that in a given case on this Court reaching the satisfaction that the learned P. P. in charge of the case deliberately allowed the entire period of limitation to expire without applying for the certified copy, with some obvious ulterior motive, then in that case, he can be held accountable for the contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act and may have to face the consequences that may follow. Accordingly, to err on the safer side henceforth it would indeed be quite advisable for the learned P. P. in charge of the case to apply for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order immediately on pronouncement of final order of acquittal, irrespective of his personal opinion whether it was a fit case to challenge the same before the higher forum or not, before it slips out of his mind and memory. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to - (i) The Secretary, Home Department, and (ii) The Secretary, Legal Department, government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar with a direction to bring to the notice of all the Public Prosecutors of the State the aforesaid observations made in regard to their duties to apply for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order in time. ( 7 ) ). In view of the aforesaid discussion, since the sufficient cause is made out the delay in question is condoned and the present application stands disposed of accordingly. .