( 1 ) THE short point that arises for decision in this writ petition is the question as to whether the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner and pending before the trial Court should be quashed on the ground of abnormal delay. The brief facts are that the petitioner was working as an Upper Division Clerk in the Office of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bangalore. It is alleged that between June and December, 1986, he was instrumental in an attempt to cheat the Department of a sum of Rs. 32,548/- by making it appear that one Sri B. A. Achaiah had made an application for final withdrawal of his provident fund accumulations and that the petitioner had got it sanctioned through false nothings and representations. According to the charge-sheet filed, there is a further allegation that a class-IV staff by the name of Chaluvaiah had colluded with the petitioners in some sort of cover up action for purposes of ensuring that the evidence of these crimes was not traceable when the, Department desired to investigate into the matter. Both these persons were placed under suspension. An offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and under various Sections of the I. P. C. was registered against both of them and they are now facing trial before the Special Judge, C. C. H. 6, Bangalore, in C. C. No. 23 of 1989. Apart from an averment to the effect that the petitioner has not committed any illegality and is innocent, what is basically contended is that an abnormally long period of time has elapsed namely over 7 years since the incident, that the charges are not of exceptional gravity in so far as the offences are not punishable either with death or imprisonment for life and that consequently, this is a fit case in which the prosecution should be quashed on the ground of abnormal delay. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate has relied on several decisions, the main one being AIR 1986 Patna 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) in the case of Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar. In this and several other decisions, having regard to the guarantee enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Courts have in appropriate cases quashed the prosecution on the ground that the right to a speedy trial has been infringed. In this and several other decisions, having regard to the guarantee enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Courts have in appropriate cases quashed the prosecution on the ground that the right to a speedy trial has been infringed. The petitioner's learned Advocate submits, that this Court must take cognizance of the fact that the petitioner has been placed under suspension since the year 1986 and that he has undergone abnormal hardships. He submits that having regard to the work load before the trial Court, the chances of the case being disposed of in the near future are bleak and that the petitioner has already been completely ruined and viewed at from any angle, this is a fit case m which the proceedings should be quashed. ( 3 ) IT is true that from time to time, different High Courts and even the Supreme Court had intervened in cases of this type where long delays have taken place and have quashed the proceedings. In the Patna case referred to supra which was Full Bench decision of that Court where the delay was of 20 years, the Court quashed the proceedings and had occasion to observe that a cut-off limit of 7 years would be fair and reasonable that if the trial is not concluded within this period of time and the delay has not been occasioned due to any fault on the part of the accused, that the proceedings was liable to be quashed. It would be extremely dangerous to lay down any arbitrary time limit though one concedes that the right to a speedy trial is one of immense importance. The Courts do come across numerous instances where, even though on record there is nothing to indicate that the delay had been occasioned by the accused, that there are other indirect subtle and involved methods adopted to put off the bad day when the accused are on bail and if a mechanical cut off point were to be fixed, it would only increase such malpractices. A careful examination is, therefore, necessary before the doctrine relating to the right of a speedy trial is given effect to, the most important being that it should never lead to a situation whereby a party who contrives to ensure that the trial does not commence or conclude for many years ends up as the beneficiary thereof. A careful examination is, therefore, necessary before the doctrine relating to the right of a speedy trial is given effect to, the most important being that it should never lead to a situation whereby a party who contrives to ensure that the trial does not commence or conclude for many years ends up as the beneficiary thereof. ( 4 ) IT is unnecessary for me to recount the principles that the Courts have relied upon over the years on the basis of which the right to a speedy trial has been gradually given concrete legal shape and has also been enforced. These decisions may briefly be set out below :-" air 1986 SC 289 : 1986 Cri LJ 255 23, 47, 49 air 1986 Pat 38 : 1985 Cri LJ 1782 (FB) 14, 16, 19, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 53, 54, 56. 1985 Cri LJ 584 (Pat) 1, 13, 16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 53. AIR 1983 SC 361 (2) : 1983 Cri LJ 481 15 air 1981 SC 641 : 1981 Cri LJ 159 23, 46 air 1981 SC 1675 : 1981 Cri LJ 1273 15 air 1979 SC 1360 : 1979 Cri LJ 1036 12, 15 21, 23 air 1979 SC 1369 : 1979 Cri LJ 1045 12, 15, 21, 23, 46 air 1978 SC 597 12, 43 (1972) 33 Law ed 2d 101 : 407 US 514, Barker v. Wingo 11, 50a (1970) 26 Law ed 2d 26 : 398 US 30, Robert Dean Dickey v. State of Florida 10, 22, 26 (1969) 21 Law ed 2d 607 : 393 US 374, Richard M. Smith v. Fred M. Hooey 11, 22 (1967) 18 Law ed 3d 1 : 386 US 213, Peter H. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina 9, 22, 50a (1964) 378 US 478 : 12 Law ed 2d 977, Escobedo v. Illinois 26 (1964) 119 US App DC 83 : 337 F 2d 119, Marshall v. United States 26 (1959) 105 US App DC 193 : 265 F 2d 567, King v. United States 26 (1957) 352 US 352 : 1 Law ed 2d 393, Pollard v. United States 26 air 1955 SC 792 : 1955 Cri LJ 1644 46air 1952 Punj 309 : 1952 Cri LJ 1313 (FB) 41, 43s air 1950 SC 27 : 51 Cri LJ 1383. " ( 5 ) IN sum and substance, while the law recognises the fact that criminal prosecutions have to be time bound, many factors require to be taken into consideration, the most important of them being the handicaps under which the system itself is working. With the number of Judges and the number of Courts being abnormally low and with the present set of procedures being what they are, though one does not at all approve of the state of affairs or sanction it, the fact remains that the first casualty will be the time factor. In these circumstances, it would be impossible to fix an arbitrary time limit but it would still be permissible to apply certain well defined principles in situations. While doing so, one crucial factor which had hitherto not been sufficiently emphasised must be recorded as the underlying reason for the quashing of cases which are abnormally delayed. The right to a speedy trial also recognises the right to a fair trial. What has often been overlooked is that an accused person who is asked to plead a defence in respect of an incident or act that is many years old is severely handicapped in a defence because human memory apart, with the passage of time there is change of circumstances and the aging process which not only affects individuals but all other factors relating to the trial. Correspondingly, on the prosecution side where the requirement of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt still holds good, the first difficulty is in procuring the witnesses at that late point of time as they would either have disappeared, died or if available will have in all probability forgotten the facts of the case or at least the finer points. The quality of the evidence will therefore suffice and will hardly make it good enough for a conviction. Experience has shown that the Investigating Officer has either been transferred or has retired or in many cases has even passed away and the substitute is least interested in somebody else's matter. Practical experience demonstrates that at this late point of time records have some times disappeared or have been misplaced and even if available, are hardly in a condition of any reliability. Practical experience demonstrates that at this late point of time records have some times disappeared or have been misplaced and even if available, are hardly in a condition of any reliability. As far as the exhibits are concerned, if over five years have elapsed, the chances of this being available are not very good and in those of the cases where they are produced, their condition hardly assists the prosecution. The real question arises, therefore, as to whether any purpose is going to be served by mechanically proceedings with a trial which could have ended successfully at an earlier point of time but the outcome of which is almost doomed merely because of the aforesaid factors. It is in this background that the Courts have in appropriate cases quashed the prosecution on the ground that it is worthless proceeding with the same. ( 6 ) IN the present case, the contention advanced on behalf of respondents by the Government Advocate is that the evidence consists essentially of documents, and that the State is in no way responsible for the delay as it was always willing to proceed with the trial whenever the Court is willing to hear it. As far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, I need to record that the chief culprit in this state of affairs is the State in so far as had the Government behaved more responsibly in the matter of setting up the requisite number of Courts ensuring that no vacancies exist and providing the facilities necessary to the Courts for expeditious disposal of the cases, such a state of affairs would never have existed. It is entirely due to the callous disregard for the judicial system by the Government that this unsatisfactory state of affairs has come about and, therefore, the State can never be heard to say that it is not responsible for the delay. ( 7 ) THE charges in the present case are not of utmost seriousness in so far as the petitioner is not charged with offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The pendency of the trial for all these years has taken its toll on the petitioner. ( 7 ) THE charges in the present case are not of utmost seriousness in so far as the petitioner is not charged with offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The pendency of the trial for all these years has taken its toll on the petitioner. In this regard, I need to record another aspect of the matter namely that it would perhaps be a safe rule, while considering cases in this category, for a Court to consider as to what would have been the maximum punishment awardable, had the accused being convicted and if that period of time has elapsed, then to quash the prosecution. The reason for this is that a perusal of the material before the Court dehors the defence would be a safe barometer for the Court to assess as to what is the worst that could have happened. If in a given case, it appears that the accused could have been convicted and awarded a sentence of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment and if there has been delay of more than 5 years, the Court can take cognizance of the fact that the trauma that the accused has undergone during this period being out of employment and having faced the situation of an under-trial, even if on bail, that this itself is more than adequate punishment. It would be wrong in these circumstances to assume that the accused has got away by default because long delays are the worst and most inhuman form of punishment. ( 8 ) ON an assessment of the material before me, I am firmly of the view that on the facts of the present case and on the material before the Court, that the reliefs asked for by the petitioner are liable to be granted. This order is confined only to the criminal proceedings and one of the test, that I have applied is the question as to what would be the maximum punishment had the accused even been convicted and using that standard, and the fact that the prosecution itself would hardly have been able to secure a conviction at this late point of time, I direct that the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner be quashed. ( 9 ) THERE is a maxim in criminal jurisprudence which presupposes that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty and this principle is sacrosanct. ( 9 ) THERE is a maxim in criminal jurisprudence which presupposes that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty and this principle is sacrosanct. The Supreme Court in M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 : (1954 Cri LJ 1019) held that it is imperative that the guilty should be punished when facts are fresh in the public mind. By the same standard, in my opinion, the accused should be afforded an opportunity of vindicating himself or herself when facts are still fresh in the public mind, if the charge is baseless or unsustainable. This is a corresponding duty that the law enjoins which must be borne in mind by Courts when deciding the time period within which criminal trials must be concluded. ( 10 ) THE petition accordingly succeeds. Rule is made absolute to this extent. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .