C. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THIS order shall also dispose of Cri. Revision No. 14/95 (Dr. Yeshwant KWathekar v. Economic Offences Wing) Cri. Revision No. 15/95 (Dr. Yeshwant Kawathekar v. Economic: Offence Wing) and Cri Revision No. 142/95 (Dr. Yeshwant Kawathekar v. Economic Offences Wing) as common questions of law and facts arc involved for consideration in all these cases. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has challenged in this application order dated 22. 12. 1994 passed by the First A. S. J. Indore in Special Case No. 36/93 whereby the objection raised by the petitioner that the trial cannot proceed without sanction of the Government has been rejected. ( 3 ) SHORT facts giving rise to the applications are that the petitioner during the relevant time was convener of Veterinary Product Institution (Jewik Utpadan Sansthan, Mhow ). It is alleged that he with connivance of other accused persons defaulcated large sum of money. In view of the points raised in the application it is not necessary to give details about it. The Investigating Agency submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner. While submitting the charge-sheet u/ss. 409, 120-B I. P. C. , 5 (1) (c) (d) (ii) (iii) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1986, it has been stated that as the petitioner has superannuated from service, it is not necessary to obtain sanction of prosecution of the petitioner from the State Government. ( 4 ) WHEN the matter was pending before the learned Magistrate, the petitioner made an objection that as the State Government has not accorded sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the trial cannot proceed. ( 5 ) SHRI H. S. Oberai, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the alleged act of the petitioner which constituted the crime was done while he was in service and irrespective of the fact that now he has superannuated, sanction is sine qua non for his prosecution for offence u/ss. 409 and 120-B I. P. C. and 5 (1) (c) (d), 5 (2 ). of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13 (1) (c) (d) (ii) (iii) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra v. Dr: Budhikota Subharao. ( 6 ) SHRI Desai, Govt. of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13 (1) (c) (d) (ii) (iii) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra v. Dr: Budhikota Subharao. ( 6 ) SHRI Desai, Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has, however, submitted that as the petitioner has already superannuated from the service, sanction from the State Government for his prosecution is not necessary. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Habibulla Khan v. State of Orissa and Anr. ; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and Ors. and in case of S. A. Venkatraman v. The State. ( 7 ) HAVING considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view1. 1993 (I) Crimes 1124. 2. (1995 (2) J. T. 1. 3. (1991 (3) S. C. C. 655. 4. 1988 S. C. R. 1037. that no sanction is necessary for prosecution of the petitioner in view of his superannuation from the service. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subharao (Supra) relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner the question which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was regarding prosecution of a public servant for an offence under the official Secrets Act and for that sanction u/s. 197 of the Cr. P. C. was found necessary. It is not disputed that for prosecution of an accused under the Official Secrets Act sanction u/s. 197 Cr. P. C. is necessary. However, Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, specifically deal with the prosecution under these Acts. In my opinion, the requirement or otherwise of the sanction under these Acts have to be decided with reference to Section 19 and Section 6 respectively, provided in the Act itself. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure use the expression is or was in service and while interpreting the said provision, in relation to a superannuated public servant, the Apex Court held that s. lllction by the Government was necessary. Thus, the authority relied on by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure use the expression is or was in service and while interpreting the said provision, in relation to a superannuated public servant, the Apex Court held that s. lllction by the Government was necessary. Thus, the authority relied on by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable. ( 8 ) IN the present case the petitioner is being prosecuted for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 anc11988 and Sections 6 and 19 respectively of the aforesaid Acts do not contemplate that sanction is necessary for prosecution of a public servant who has superannuated from the service. This view find supports from the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Habibulla Khan v. State of Orissa and Anr. (Supra) The second question is whether the appellants could be prosecuted for the offence which they arc alleged to have committed during their tenure as ministers after they ceased to be the ministers. This question has also been answered by two decisions of this Court. In S. A. Venkataraman v. The State (1958 S. C. R. 1040), it is held while construing similar provision of section 6 of the predecessor or the present Act which provision was similar to the provisions of Section 19 of the present Act that no sanction wasnecessary for the prosecution of the appellant in that case, as he was not a public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of the offence. The Court there observed as follows :- In construing the provisions of a statute it is essention for a Court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Where a general power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be confined to the terms of the prohibition. The words in 5. 6 (1) are of the authority competent to remove him from his office. A public servant is not a person removable from any office by competent authority. The words in 5. 6 (1) are of the authority competent to remove him from his office. A public servant is not a person removable from any office by competent authority. The conclusion is inevitable that at the time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only must the offence have been committed by a public servant but the person accused must still be a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of 5. 6 can apply. Similarly, a Constitution Bench in Veeraswami v. Union of India and Ors. (1991) 3 S. C. C. 655, while construing the provisions of the same Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 held that no sanction under Section 6 of that Act was necessary for prosecution of the appellant in that case sinec he had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation and was not a public servant on the date of filing the charge sheet. As the aforesaid case has considered other authorities relied on by Shri Desai, I consider it inexpedient to refer these cases separately. ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, I do not have the slightest doubt that as the petitioner has superannuated from the service no sanction for the prosecution under the ,prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and 1988 was necessary ( 10 ) SHRI Oberai then contended that in any view of the matter sanction was necessary for prosecution of the petitioner u/s. 409 and 120-B I. P. C. ( 11 ) ACCORDING to his submission admittedly the State Government has not sanctioned prosecution of the petitioner for the said offence and as such the trial of the petitioner is not competent. He further submitted that in case in which the accused is prosecuted for more than one offences and sanction is required in relation to anyone of the offence, and the same has not been obtained, the entire prosecution shall be important. ( 12 ) SHRI Desai, however, submits that aforesaid submissions made by counsel for the petitioner is academic as offence committed by the accused u/ss. 409 and 120-B I. P. C. cannot be said to have been committed in discharge of his official duty. According to Shri Desai thus no sanction at all is required for prosecution of the petitioner. ( 12 ) SHRI Desai, however, submits that aforesaid submissions made by counsel for the petitioner is academic as offence committed by the accused u/ss. 409 and 120-B I. P. C. cannot be said to have been committed in discharge of his official duty. According to Shri Desai thus no sanction at all is required for prosecution of the petitioner. He placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Mahesh Chandra Singh v. Raghunandan Prasad and Anr. it is also refer to the following passage from the aforesaid judgment: Moreover, the opposite party has contended that committing the offence of criminal breach of trust is no part of the official duties of the petitioner. By committing this offence he cannot be said to be acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties and therefore he cannot seek the aid of Section 197 of the Code; Obviously committing an offence of criminal breach of trust cannot be said to be in discharge of purported discharge of the official duties by any public servant. Hence, I find force in this contention of the opposite party. T ( 13 ) HAVING considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the offence allowed against the petitioner is no way connected with discharge purported 5. 1992 Cr. L. J. 792. discharge of his official duty and as such no sanction for prosecution of the petitioner u/ss. 409 and 120b I. P. C. was necessary. Once having held that no sanction u/ss. 409/120-B I. P. C. is necessary at all, I am not obliged to decide the question of effect of non-sanction of prosecution in relation to one offence, when an accused is tried for more than one offences. ( 14 ) SHRI Oberai then submitted that the F. I. R. in relation to alleged occurrence was instituted in the year 1986 and prosecution of the petitioner after such a long delay, violates his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is an old person and he has superannuated from the service as back as in the year 1986. It has been further averred that he is a heart patient and, in fact, suffered massive heart attack in the year 1988. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is an old person and he has superannuated from the service as back as in the year 1986. It has been further averred that he is a heart patient and, in fact, suffered massive heart attack in the year 1988. Strong reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramanand Choudhery v. State of Bihar) in support of the submission. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, Shri Desai submits that delay ipso facto do not entail quashing of prosecution on the ground of infaction of fundamental right but it has to be judged with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. He has submitted that the investigating agency was required to seek information from various places in the country and this took time. Shri Desai has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and Anr. ( 16 ) IN Ramanand Choudhery v. State of Bihar (supra) the Apex Court did not quash the prosecution only on the ground of delay. Other facts considered were that no action was taken for six years after the raid, the Public Prospecutor opined that no case was made out, Commissioner refused to grant sanction but later on changed the view at the instance of the D. I. G. and further the Apex Court took into consideration pendency of the Criminal Prosecution for 13 years. ( 17 ) THUS delay in isolation was not the ground to quash the prosecution. It is apt to refer to the following passage from the judgment of the 6. A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 948 (Distinguished ). 7. A. I. R. 1992 S. C. 1701. Supreme Court in the else of Ramanand Choudhery (Supra) It is not necessary to go into the legal points raised by Mr. Jam as we are inclined to quash the prosecution against the appellant in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. After the raid no action was taken by the prosecution for six years. The Public Prosecutor consistently opined that no criminal case was made out against the appellant. The Commissioner on independent consideration refused to grant the sanction but later on at the asking of the DIG (Vigilance) he changed his view. After the raid no action was taken by the prosecution for six years. The Public Prosecutor consistently opined that no criminal case was made out against the appellant. The Commissioner on independent consideration refused to grant the sanction but later on at the asking of the DIG (Vigilance) he changed his view. The prosecution against the appellant is pending for over a period f thirteen years and it would be travesty of justice to permit the prosecution at this stage which would mean that the appellant would suffer the trial/appeal for another decade. T ( 18 ) NOW in view of the authoritative pronouncement or the Apex Court, it is settled, that speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India but how much delay will affect the fundamental right of an accused depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is apt to refer to the following passage in A. R. Antulayts case (Supra)"but then speedy, trial - or other expressions conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in nature. On may ask-speedy means, how speedy? How long a delay is too long? We do not think it is possible to lay down any time schedules for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the work-load in the particular Court, means of communication and several other circumstances have to be kept in mind. For example, take the very case in which Ranjan Dwivedi (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 268 of 1987) is the accused. 151 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution over a period of five years. Examination of some of the witnesses runs into more than 100 typed pages each. The oral evidence adduced by the prosecution so far runs into, we are told more than 4000 pages. Even though, it was proposed to go on with the case five days of a week and week after week, it was not possible for various reasons viz, non- availability of the counsel, non-availability of accused, interlocutory proceedings and other systematic delays. A murder case may be a simple one involving say a dozen witnesses which can be concluded in a week while another case may involve a large number of witnesses, and may taken several weeks. A murder case may be a simple one involving say a dozen witnesses which can be concluded in a week while another case may involve a large number of witnesses, and may taken several weeks. Some offences by their very nature e. g. conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption against high public servants and high public officials take longer time for investigation and trial. Then again the workload in each Court, district, region and State varies. This fact is too well known to merit illustration at our hands. In many places, requisite number of Courts arc not available. In some places, frequent strikes by members of the Bar interferes with the work-schedules. In short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Even in the U. S. A. , the Supreme Court has refused to draw such a line. Except for the Patna Full Bench decision under appeal, no other decision of any High Court in this Country taking such a view has been brought to our notice. Nor, to our knowledge, in United Kingdom. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made; the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case including those mentioned above and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable- broadly speaking. Of course , if it is a minor offence-not being an economic offence, and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different consideration may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable- broadly speaking. Of course , if it is a minor offence-not being an economic offence, and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different consideration may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings, It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory. "i have called upon the state to give the details of the investigation and the material placed before me do suggest that in the very nature of the allegations made against the petitioner, a longer time was expected to be taken for investigation of the care. ( 19 ) HAVING considered the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the delay is not so inordinate that the prosecution of the petitioner can be quashed on this score. In the result all the petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. .