JUDGMENT (ORAL) Ashok Agarwal, J. - Criminal Writ Petition No. 753 of 1994 is filed, making various grievances against the police machinery. A prayer is made for police protection. In the said petition directions were issued calling for a report from the Police Commissioner. Despite the directions, no report of the Police Commissioner was filed. Instead a report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, and forwarded by the Joint Commissioner of Police, was filed. In view of the non-compliance, Criminal Application No. 2049 of 1994 is filed for Contempt of Court. It is now common ground that the Commissioner of Police has since filed his report in compliance with the directions. In the circumstances, we do not propose to take action in Criminal Application No. 2049 of 1994. Rule issued in the said Application is accordingly discharged. 2. In the meanwhile, on 26th of May, 1994 a proposal was issued by the Oshiwara Police Station to detain the petitioner in the aforesaid petition under the National Security Act On 10th of August, 1994 the Commissioner of Police issued an order of detention. The said order of detention was served on the detenu on the 23rd of August; 1994. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1015 of 1994 is filed by the wife of the detenu seeking to impugn the aforesaid order of detention. In view of the passing of the order of detention, the contentions contained in Criminal Writ Petition No. 753 of 1994 have not been pressed into service by the counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu. He has directed his energies in impugning the order of detention and no submissions have been advanced in Criminal Writ Petition No. 753 of 1994. In the circumstances Rule issued in Criminal Writ Petition No. 753 of 1994 is also discharged. 3. Shri Kotwal, the learned counsel appearing in support of the Criminal Writ Petition No. 1015 of 1994 has raised several grounds in order to impugn the order of detention. It is not necessary to detail all the grounds as one of the grounds raised by him are sufficient for the disposal of the present petition. Shri Kotwal has pointed out that the detenu in the instant case- was arrested under Section 151(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the 11th of May , 1994 and was produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court, Andheri, Bombay. Shri Kotwal has pointed out that the detenu in the instant case- was arrested under Section 151(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the 11th of May , 1994 and was produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court, Andheri, Bombay. On the very same day, by an order passed, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was pleased to discharge the detenu after holding that the detenu is not likely to commit any cognizable offence and the detenu remaining at large will not cause any prejudice to the maintenance of public order. According to Shri Kotwal, it was obligatory on the part of the Sponsoring Authority to place before the Detaining Authority these vital and material facts and it was equally obligatory on the part of Detaining Authority to consider the said vital and material facts before resorting to the drastic provisions of preventive detention without trial. The Detaining Authority has in the grounds of detention relied upon an incident which is alleged to have taken place on a day prior to the passing of the aforesaid by the Metropolitan Magistrate. Failure to place before the Detaining Authority and the consequent failure of the Detaining Authority to consider the said vital and material facts, according to Shri Kotwal, vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority thereby rendering the detention order unconstitutional, illegal and void. 4. Shri Page, the learned Public Prosecutor, has countered the submission of Shri Kotwal by placing reliance on Section 5 A of the Act. According to Shri Page, the material which was placed before the Detaining Authority and which was relied upon for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction was not at all placed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate who has passed an order of discharge. Similarly, the material that was placed before the Metropolitan Magistrate was that placed before the Detaining Authority. Hence, the non-placement of the order of discharge would not vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority which has been arrived at by placing reliance upon the material placed before the Detaining Authority. He, no doubt, has conceded that there is a reference to Crime Register No. 357 of 1994 in the grounds of detention which offence has also been taken into account for taking action against the detenu under Section 151 (3) Cr. P. Code. He, no doubt, has conceded that there is a reference to Crime Register No. 357 of 1994 in the grounds of detention which offence has also been taken into account for taking action against the detenu under Section 151 (3) Cr. P. Code. Despite this the order of discharge cannot be termed as a vital or material document for passing the order of detention. The order of detention cannot be vitiated on the ground of non-placement of the above material before the detaining authority. According to Shri Page, even if the above material is considered to be a vital material, Non-placement of the said material will, at best affect the first ground of detention which is contained in para 3 (a) of the grounds of detention. This however will not affect the other grounds which have been relied upon, by the detaining authority to pass the order of detention as the same will be saved by Section 5 A of the Act. The first ground based on the aforesaid Crime Register No. 357 of 1994 may at best fail but the same would not vitiate the other grounds which are made basis of the order of detention. Shri Page has placed reliance on the case of "Mrs. U. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Tamil Nadu and another”1. This is what the Supreme Court has stated: "Counsel for the detenu next contended that the second aspect of paragraph 4 shows that extraneous consideration weighed with the detaining authority in passing the impugned detention order. He submitted that it is too remote to think that tribals resort to drinking, gambling and turn anti-socials merely because some extra money falls into their hands. Assuming without deciding that this contention is well founded, we are of the opinion that Section 5 A of the Act takes care of it. Even if we were to hold that this ground is extraneous or irrelevant, that would not affect the validity of the detention order as Section 5 A was introduced precisely to take care of such a situation. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the second contention also." Shri Page next placed reliance on the case of "Attorney General for India etc. etc. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and others etc. etc."2. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the second contention also." Shri Page next placed reliance on the case of "Attorney General for India etc. etc. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and others etc. etc."2. The case related to the challenge in respect of the vires of Section 5 A of COFEPOSA Act and the Court inter alia has observed, as under: - “….It is difficult to conceive any inconsistency or conflict between Article 22 (5) and the first - the main part of Section 5 A. The Parliament is competent to create a legal fiction and it did so in this case. Article 22 (5) does not in terms or otherwise prohibit making of more than one order simultaneously against the same person, on different grounds. No decision saying so has been brought to our notice. Be that as it may, we do not see why the Parliament is not competent to say, by creating a legal fiction, that where an order of detention is made on more than one ground, it must be deemed that there areas many orders of detention as there are grounds. If this creation of a legal fiction is competent, then no question of any inconsistency between the Section and Article 22 (5) can arise." Shri Kotwal, on the other hand, has placed reliance on the case of Dharmadas Shamlal Agarwal v. The Police Commissioner and another"3. The grounds of detention in the said case, read thus: "Before adverting to the arguments advanced by Dr. Chitale, on behalf of the detenu; we would like to produce the relevant portion of the grounds of detention which reads thus: "... As such you are a dangerous person as defined in section 2(c) of the said Act, and shown as dangerous person. As you with the aid of your Associates create dangerous atmosphere in the said vicinity you disturb public peace, maintenance and as such following offences were registered against your with Police Records, and in which you were arrested. Sr. No. Police Station Offence Regarded No. Section Decision 1 Sabarmati 140/81 324, 114, I.P.C Compromised 16.2.1982. As you with the aid of your Associates create dangerous atmosphere in the said vicinity you disturb public peace, maintenance and as such following offences were registered against your with Police Records, and in which you were arrested. Sr. No. Police Station Offence Regarded No. Section Decision 1 Sabarmati 140/81 324, 114, I.P.C Compromised 16.2.1982. 2 Shrekota 411/82 332, 323, 114, I.P.C. P.T. 3 Shrekota 412/82 I.P.C.147, 148, 149, 307, B.P. Act 135(1) P.T. 4 Shrekota 452/85 I.P.C., 302, 20, 34 Not proved 5 Sabarmati 346/87 I.P.C. 302, 109, 34 In the Court While considering complaints, in the above cases, Identification (Chehra Nissan) Register, and charge-sheets contents carefully, it is found that you, with the aid of your associates, in the said area, give threats to innocent people, and cause injuries to them by showing dangerous weapons that like acid, knife, sharp weapons. As such you commit offences punishable for causing injuries to human body and which are punishable in Indian Penal Code…… " "Dr. Chitale, the learned counsel for the petitioner took us through the grounds of detention and the other relevant records, particularly the copies of the statements of witnesses on the basis of which the detaining authority has claimed to have drawn his subjective satisfaction for passing this impugned order of detention and raised various contentions inter-alia contending: (1) the material and vital fact, namely, the acquittal of the detenu in the cases registered in Crime Nos. 411 and 412 of 1982 of Sherkotta Police Station as shown at Serial Nos. 411 and 412 of 1982 of Sherkotta Police Station as shown at Serial Nos. 2 and 3 in the table appended to grounds of detention which fact would have influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, has not been placed before the detaining authority and this non-placing and the consequent non-consideration of the said material likely to influence the minds of the detaining authority vitiates the subjective satisfaction and invalidates the detention order; (2) Leave apart, the non-disclosure of the names of the witnesses on whose statements the detaining authority placed reliance to draw his subjective satisfaction, claiming privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act, the grounds of detention otherwise are vague or deficient and lacking details with regards to the names of the ‘associates', for the disclosure of which no privileges could be claimed and hence it was not possible for the detenu in the absence of the names of the so called 'associates' to make an effective representation against the order of detention, the deprivation of which amounts to an infringement of the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India; (3) Though the authority has mentioned in more than one place the words 'your associates' which fact evidently should have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in making this impugned order, the names of the associates are nowhere disclosed which fact would show either the authority did not know as to who the associates were or knowing the names of the associates, he has refrained from furnishing it to the detenu thereby disabling the detenu to make his effecting representation; and (4) The materials placed before the detaining authority were hardly sufficient to draw any conclusion that the alleged activities of the detenu were detrimental to the "maintenance of public order". In the context, the Supreme Court observed, as under: "Though as per S. 6 of the Act the grounds of detention are severable and the order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative if one ground or some of the grounds are invalid, the question that arises for consideration is whether the detaining authority was really aware of the acquittal of the detenu in those two cases mentioned under Serial Nos. 2 and 3 on the date of passing the impugned order. It is surprising that the detaining authority who has specifically mentioned in the grounds of detention that the petitioner's cases 2 and 3 were pending trial on the date of passing the order of detention has come forward with a sworn statement in reply, filed nearly three months after signing the grounds of detention, that he knew that the accused had been acquitted in both the cases. The averments made in paragraphs 12 and 13 in the affidavit in reply are not clear at what point of time the detaining authority came to know of the acquittal of the detenu in both the cases. At any rate, it is not his specific case that the fact of acquittal was placed before him for consideration at the time of passing the impugned order. But what the authority repeatedly states is that "Each activity of the petitioner is a separate ground for detention" and adds further that "the fact that the petitioner was acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 411/8 2 and 412/82 is of no consequence….” We are unable to comprehend the explanation given by the detaining authority. It has been admitted by Mr. Poti that the sponsoring authority initiated the proceedings and placed all the materials before the detaining authority on 14.9.1988 by which date the petitioner had already been acquitted in the above said two cases. Thus it is clear that either the sponsoring authority was not aware of the acquittals of those two cases or even having been aware of the acquittals had not placed that material before the detaining authority. So, at the time of signing the order of detention authority should have been ignorant of the acquittals. Evidently to get over the plea pf the detenu in the writ petition in this regard for the first time in the counter, the detaining authority is giving a varying statement as if he knew about the acquittal of the detenu in both the cases. As ruled by this Court in Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, 1985 Supp. (3) S.C.R. 843 at page 848: (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 610 at p. 613) "even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate the order of detention" because as pointed out by this court in Mohd. As ruled by this Court in Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, 1985 Supp. (3) S.C.R. 843 at page 848: (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 610 at p. 613) "even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate the order of detention" because as pointed out by this court in Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 S.C.C. 250 : (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 207) "the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the letter", the order of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. In the present case, we would make stress, not on the question of acquittal but on the question of non-placing of the material and vital fact of acquittal which if had been placed, would have influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or the other. Similar questions arose in Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2353 in which the detention order was passed under the provisions of Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In that case the ground of detention was founded on a solitary incident of theft of aluminum wire alleged to have been committed by the detenu therein. In respect of that incident a criminal case was filed which was ultimately dropped. It appeared on record that the history sheet of the detenu which was before the detaining authority did not make any reference to the criminal case launched against the petitioner, much less to the fact that the prosecution had been dropped or the date when the petitioner was discharged from the case. In connection with this aspect this Court observed as follows (at P. 2354 of A.I.R.): "We should have thought that the fact that a criminal case is pending against the person who is sought to be proceeded against by way of preventive detention is a very material circumst3nce which ought to be placed before the District Magistrate. That circumstance might quite possibly have an impact on his decision whether or not to make an order of detention. That circumstance might quite possibly have an impact on his decision whether or not to make an order of detention. It is not altogether unlikely that the District Magistrate may in a given case take the view that since a criminal case is pending against the person sought to be detained, no order of detention should be made for the present, but the criminal case should be allowed to run its full course and only if it fails to result in conviction, then preventive detention should be resorted to. It would be most unfair to the person sought to be detained not to disclose the pendency of a criminal case against him to the District Magistrate. ... .” From the above decisions it emerges that the requisite subjective satisfaction the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order. It is clear to our mind that in the case on hand, at the time when the detaining authority passed the detention order this vital fact, namely, the acquittals of the detenu in case Nos. mentioned at Serial Nos. 2 and 3 have not been brought to -his notice and on the other hand they were withheld and the detaining authority was given to understand that the trial of those cases were pending. The explanation given by the learned counsel for the respondents, as we have already pointed out, cannot be accepted for a moment. The result is that the non-placing of the material fact namely the acquittal of detenu in the above said two cases resulting in non-application of minds of the detaining authority to the-said fact has vitiated the requisite subjective satisfaction, rendering the impugned detention order invalid." 6. The result is that the non-placing of the material fact namely the acquittal of detenu in the above said two cases resulting in non-application of minds of the detaining authority to the-said fact has vitiated the requisite subjective satisfaction, rendering the impugned detention order invalid." 6. In our view, the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act cannot and will not save the order of attention as the order of discharge passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is not relevant only to ground contained in para 3 (a) of the grounds of detention but is also relevant to the grounds contained in paras 3 (b) to 3 (b iv) of the grounds of detention. In the said order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate a finding is given that there is no material to hold that the detenu is likely to commit it cognizable offence and a further finding is given that there is no material to justify a conclusion that the activities of the detenu are likely to affect public order. The order is passed on the 11th of May, 1994 which is only a fort-night prior to the making of the proposal for detention. The said order is vital and relevant piece of material for arriving at a subjective satisfaction whether to pass or not to pass an order of detention. The said order is relevant vis-a-vis all the grounds of detention and cannot be restricted to the ground contained in para 3 (a) of the grounds of detention as is sought to be contended by Shri Page. Non-placement of the aforesaid material piece of evidence before the detaining authority has, therefore adversely affected the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. Similarly, non-furnishing of the said piece of evidence to the detenu has adversely affected his right to make an effective representation to the detaining authority. Hence, both the facets of Article 22 (5) have been contravened rendering the order of detention null and void. 7. In view of the aforesaid finding, it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions advanced by Shri Kotwal. In the result, the petition being Criminal Writ Petition No. 1015 of 1994 succeeds. The impugned order of detention passed on the 20th of August, 1994 is quashed and set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless required in some other cases. Rule absolute. In the result, the petition being Criminal Writ Petition No. 1015 of 1994 succeeds. The impugned order of detention passed on the 20th of August, 1994 is quashed and set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless required in some other cases. Rule absolute. As already stated Rules in Criminal Writ Petition No. 753 of 1994 and in Criminal Application No. 2049 of 1994 are discharged. Petition Allowed. Order of detention quashed. 1. A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 165. 2. A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2179. 3. A.I.R 1989 S.C. 1282