JUDGMENT A. I. Vaidya,J. — The subject-matter of the dispute is the land described in khewat/khatauni No. 145-rnin-253 min bearing Khasra Nos. 632/7 and 74, Kitas 2, measuring 1.96 20 hectares, situate in Mauza Baag Buhla/ Dehan, Pargana Naval, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra. The present appellants have preferred a suit for declaration to the effect that the aforesaid land was being used for the benefit of village community, including playground of the school, and as such was not liable to vest in the State of Himachal Pradesh (defendant No. 1) as envisaged under section 3 of the H. P. Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilisation) Act, 1974 (herein after to be called as the Act). Consequential relief of permanent injunction has been asked for to restrain defendant Nos. 2 and 3 from interfering with the exclusive enjoyment of the land in dispute by village community as a playground for the school as well as for holding annual fair. 2. In the aforesaid suit, an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and read with sections 151, 141 and 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure was preferred, wherein it had been alleged that Defendants 2 and 3 were going ahead with the allotment of work and consequentially further going to start construction of 132 KV Grid sub-station and other constructions over the land in question and, according to the applicant-plaintiffs, in case they were allowed to do so, the very purpose of filing the suit would be defeat ed. It was prayed through the present application that Defendants 2 and be restrained from raising any constructions cither in response to the notice inviting tenders dated 26-9-1994 published in Dainik Punjab Kesari, Jalandhar in respect of Items 10 to 12 contained therein or any other sort of construction over the land in suit According to the applicant-plaintiffs, the land comprised in Khasra No. 159 which was situated adjacent to the suit land, has been leased out by the State of H. P. (defendant No. 1) in favour of defendant No. 2 for the construction of 132 KV Grid sub-station. As this land was contiguous to the land in dispate—defendant No. 2 under the garb of lease m its favour, in respect of Khasra No. 15, was encroaching upon the land in dispute whereby the plaintiffs apprehend that their rights in continuous enjoyment of the land in dispute were likely to be interfered with. 3. In reply to the aforesaid application, Defendants 2 and 3 submitted that the plaintiffs had no prima facie case in their favour nor the balance of convenience was in their favour. According to them, the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest in the property and the present suit has been filed with a view to harass the respondents and to stop the public utility project It was submitted that setting up of 132 KV sub-station at Dehan would serve £0000 consumers in the District of Kangra. The con testing defendants very specifically pleaded that earlier a suit in representative capacity was filed by one Sh Amrik Singh of village Maranda, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra for similar reliefs, as stated in the present suit, who nad also prayed for interim injunction by moving an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which application was disallowed by the Court of Sub Judge, Palampur, on 7-10-1993 and thereafter, the suit was not pressed and was dismissed by Sub-Judge, Palampur on 20-9-1994. Thereafter, according to the defendants, a civil writ petition No. 193 of 1994 was filed by one Sh. Mani Ram son of Sh Lehnu of village Dehan, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, against the State of H. P. which, after hearing the replying defendant, was dismissed as withdrawn on 30-3-1994. It was further averred that the suit was not maintainable and on the allegations made the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the controversy between the parties whether the property was rightly vested under section 3 of Act, in favour of defendant No 1 or not. It was also pleaded that in order to improve and strengthen the Electrical supply, a scheme for construction of 132 KV sub- station Transmission line from Bassi to Palampur with 2 x 16,132 KV sub station at Palampur was started by the defendant No. 2 on the estimated cost of Rs. 583.222 lacs and this scheme had been notified under section 29 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 583.222 lacs and this scheme had been notified under section 29 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. This notification also indicates route of line and sub-station, but no objection to that effect had been made against the said notification. It was also pleaded that the suit land was leased out in favour of defendant No. 2 and the permission to start the work was given by the Gram Panchayat Dehan (Palampur) vide its resolution No. 5 dated 12-7-199F and on this project Rs. 372,27 lacs had already been spent by the defendants. The necessary permission of the Central Government under the provisions of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 has also been procured for the construction of the aforesaid 132KVsub- station. 4. Originally this suit was being tried in the High Court, but because of the amendment made in the H. P. Courts Act, this case was transferred to the files of the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 5. This Court vide order dated 28-10-1994 directed the parties to maintain status quo as of that day over the suit land, till 2-11-1994, which interim order was extended from time to time and on 25-11-1994 this application, which had been registered as O. M. P, No 500 of 1994, was finally argued and reserved for order. In the meantime, before the order could be announced, the defendant-respondents put in two applications, which were registered as O. M. P. No. 565/94 and O. M. R No. 589/94 whereby the respondents prayed for placing on record the order dated 15-12 1994 where by the suit land was sanctioned on lease in favour of H. P. State Electricity Board and to place on record the lease deed dated 19-12-1994 executed by the State of H. P. in favour of H. P S. E. B. for 99 years w.e.f. 19-12-1994 on payment of Rs. 17,278 as annual rent of land, which has been described as Khasra No. 632/7/1 =-0-76-74 Hectares and under Khasra No. 74/1/1» 0-20-08 Hectares. The total land measures 0-96-82 Hectares. These petitions were being contested on behalf of the plaintiffs, when the suit was transferred as referred to above, to the Court of District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 6. The learned District Judge, Kangra after hearing the parties, dis-allowed the application for grant of temporary injunction and the same way rejected without there being any merit in the same. 7. These petitions were being contested on behalf of the plaintiffs, when the suit was transferred as referred to above, to the Court of District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 6. The learned District Judge, Kangra after hearing the parties, dis-allowed the application for grant of temporary injunction and the same way rejected without there being any merit in the same. 7. The aforesaid order of the learned District Judge, has been assailed in the present appeal on various grounds and pleas. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also scrutinised the entire record. 9. There is no dispute to the proposition that in order to grant relief of temporary injunction asked for by the applicant-plaintiffs, prayer can be favourably considered in case three essentials are established on the basis of the pleadings and documents filed therewith, which can safely be described as under : 1. The applicant has to establish a prima facie case in his favour which only reflects prima facie existance of a right in the applicant-plaintiff and its infringement by the opposite party. That means, applicant-plaintiff has to make out a case which will entitle him at all events to relief at the hearing. It is enough if the plaintiff can show at this stage that he has fair question to raise as to the existance of right which he alleged and he can satisfy the court that the property would be preserved in its present condition. 2. The plaintiff-applicant has also to establish at this stage that he would be put to irreparable loss in case the interim relief asked for is not granted in his favour 3. On the basis of the circumstances present in an individual case, it has also to be established that balance of convenience, after weighing all the pros and cons in favour and against the party, should be in favour of grant of injunction. The Courts have been unanimous in coming to the conclusion that the aforesaid three essentials must exist simultaneously and in case one of the ingredient was not made out, party asking for interim order could not be so granted. The Courts have been unanimous in coming to the conclusion that the aforesaid three essentials must exist simultaneously and in case one of the ingredient was not made out, party asking for interim order could not be so granted. These matters of urgent nature requiring exercise of discretionary power of courts, have been engaging the attention of the courts and after considering all aspects of the matter, relevant to the proposition, the courts held that fourth ingredient to be taken note of apart from the three referred to above would be the public interest involved in the matter, which would be one of the material and relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing to grant ad interim injunction 1955 (1) Scale p 829, Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and others V. The Puna Municipal Corporation and another,, can safely be referred at this stage. A part of para 14 of the aforesaid case is being reproduced for the sake of convenience: "It would thus be clear that in a suit for perpetual injunction, the Court would enquire on affidavit evidence and other material placed before the court to find strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of granting injunction otherwise irreparable damage or damage would ensue to the plaintiff. The Court should also find whether the plaintiff would adequately be compensated by damages if injunction is not granted. It is common experience that injunction normally is asked for and granted to prevent the public authorities or the respondents to proceed with execution of or implementing scheme of public utility or granted contracts for execution thereof. Public interest is, therefore, one of the material arid relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing to grant ad interim injunction“ The plea of public interest in itself may not be available in every case wherein ad interim injunction is asked for, but this aspect of the matter has to be always kept in mind where such an interest is involved and is reflected from the pleadings of the parties. In the present case, presence of public interest is writ large especially when both the parties are claiming those aspects to be in its own favour. Such variance can be looked into after scrutinising the facts brought on record. 10. In the present case, presence of public interest is writ large especially when both the parties are claiming those aspects to be in its own favour. Such variance can be looked into after scrutinising the facts brought on record. 10. The claim of the plaintiffs over the suit land, as pleaded in the plaint, has been that the suit land was being used for the benefit of village community inasmuch as it was a play-ground of the school children, which was contiguous to the land in suit and on that basis under section 3 of the Act, said land could not have vested in defendant No. 1 and the entries shown in the record of right to the contrary were therefore wrong and illegal. It was also pleaded that some public fair was also held in every year on the suit land which was attended by the public coming from distant places. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel appearing for appellants, in a way, very casually referred to their claim as pleaded in the plaint and as contained hereinabove, but on the other hand very strongly has tried to make out some case by making submission that suit land even if leased out, has been so leased in violation of sections 8 and 8 (a) of the Act and therefore Defendants 2 and 3 did not acquire any right whatsoever to possess the same and in this view of the matter it has been contended that the suit land having been reserved for the welfare of the village community, which included the said land being used as a play ground and as ground for holding fair could not be the subject-matter of the lease. It is not so simple a matter as has been contended on behalf of the appellants, 11. The plaintiffs have brought on record copies of record of right pertaining to the suit land for the year 1987 88 and 1992-93 respectively. In both these copies, State of Himachal Pradesh has been recorded to be the owner of the suit land while in the column of occupation the entry runs as Kabza Van Vibhag Tawey Bartan, Bartan Daraun (Reserve Pool). In both these copies, State of Himachal Pradesh has been recorded to be the owner of the suit land while in the column of occupation the entry runs as Kabza Van Vibhag Tawey Bartan, Bartan Daraun (Reserve Pool). This entry of possession as reserved pool has been so described in the copy of record of right for the year 1992-93, but in the copy of record of right for the year 1987-88 word reserved pool is not there, but the entry remains the same. No entry of record of right pertaining to the suit land prior to the year 1987-88 has been brought on record. Otherwise also, the submissions put forth on behalf of the plaintiffs is wanting the ground as to how the suit land could not be legally vested in the State of H. P. Simply some allegations have been made in the plaint that the suit land was playground or ground for holding fair etc., could not vest under section 3 of the Act, will not solve the legal requirement for the plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case in their favour and at least at the face, it should be reflected that vesting of the land under section 3 of the Act was illegal or otherwise untenable under the provisions of the Act. No provision of law for the time being in force has been pointed out whereby vesting of land under section 3 of the Act, could not have been materialised. To the latest entries in the record of right, legal presumption of truth is attached, which has to be rebutted by the plaintiffs in order to establish their claim and that stage would come when the suit is tried on merit. Vesting of suit land under the provisions of the Act, prima facie appears to be valid one. 12. Section 8 and section 8 (A) of the Act runs as under :— "Section 8. Vesting of suit land under the provisions of the Act, prima facie appears to be valid one. 12. Section 8 and section 8 (A) of the Act runs as under :— "Section 8. Utilisation of land vested in the State Government’—(1) All lands vested in the State Government under this Act shall be utilised for the following purposes :— (a) an area not leas than fifty per cent of the total area vested in die State Government under section 3 of this Act for grazing and other common purposes of the inhabitants of an estate; and (b) the remaining land— (i) for allotment to a landless person or any other eligible person ; or (ii) for allotment of site to a handicapped or houseless person for the construction of a house ; under a scheme to be framed by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette and the allottee shall pay an amount at the rate of forty-eight times of the land revenue and rates and cesses chargeable on the land allotted to him under the said scheme, either in lump sum or in six monthly instalments not exceeding four. (2) The land reserved under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of this sec- tion shall be demarcated by such Revenue Officer and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Any scheme framed by the State Government under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section may provide for the terms and conditions on which the land is to be allotted. (4) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, add to, amend, vary or revoke any scheme made under this section. Section 8 (A). (3) Any scheme framed by the State Government under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section may provide for the terms and conditions on which the land is to be allotted. (4) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, add to, amend, vary or revoke any scheme made under this section. Section 8 (A). Utilisation of land for development of the State.—Notwithstanding anything contained in section 8 of the Act, the State Government may utilise any area of the land vested in it under the Act by lease to any person or by transfer to any Department of the Government in the interests of the development of the State, if the State Government is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons to do so subject to the condition that land for the purposes mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8 in no case shall be less than fifty per cent of the land vested in the Government under the Act: Provided that when land is not used by a person for the purpose for which it has been leased, the lease shall stand terminated free from all encumbrances and the Government shall re-enter on the demised premises and lease money, if paid to the Government, shall be forfeited and no person shall be entitled to any compensation for any improvement made and for any building constructed thereon." 13. It has been contended on the basis of the aforesaid provisions of the Act that the State of Himachal Pradesh while leasing out the suit land in favour of Defendant 2 has ignored the aforesaid mandatory provisions especially when there is nothing on record to suggest even remotely that after leasing out a part of the suit land in favour of Defendants 2 and 3, fifty per cent of the area vested in the State had remained for utilisation of the village community or for other party, referred in the aforesaid provisions of law. 14. The aforesaid argument would have to be legally ignored on the sole point that the aforesaid cause of action is being submitted without their being any pleading to that effect. There is nothing in the plaint that while leasing out a part of the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2, pro visions of sections 8 and 8 (A) of the Act, have been violated and not complied with. There is nothing in the plaint that while leasing out a part of the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2, pro visions of sections 8 and 8 (A) of the Act, have been violated and not complied with. It is really strange to note that help is being taken from the argument without any base to support the same. Needless to say, prima facie case has to be adjudicated upon in the background of the claim of the plaintiffs as pleaded in the plaint. The plaint is absolutely silent so as to bring the case within the ambit of sections 8 and & (A) of the Act, as has been pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs. It has been contended by the , learned Counsel for the appellants that the lease of—part of the suit land in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 could not be assailed in the suit as the same had been granted during the pendency of the suit. We think such a submission again cannot be favourably considered. The simple case of the defendants as put up at the initial stage had been that apart from khasra No. 15 suit land has also been leased out in their favour, however, it remained an admitted fact that lease was sanctioned during the pendency of the suit and the lease deed was executed within that period. The defendants had put in applications to bring all these documents on record when the temporary injunction application had been reserved for orders by this Court, as has been referred earlier. Thereafter, plaintiffs did not take any step whatsoever to amend their pleadings, so as to base their claim assailing the alleged lease deed in favour of defendant No. 2. It cannot be said that they had no time to do so, but on the other hand, as pointed out earlier, these documents of lease were sought to be brought on record by the defendants when the matter was pending even before this Court, In the absence of any pleading, more so, in the plaint itself the appellants cannot be legally allowed to assail the lease deed executed in favour of defendant No. 2 by the defendant No. 1. In this behalf also, prima facie case on behalf of the plaintiffs has not been established at all. 15. In this behalf also, prima facie case on behalf of the plaintiffs has not been established at all. 15. Even otherwise, insofar as this case is concerned, prima facie the lease of the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2 by the State Government comes within the ambit of sections 8 and 8 (A) of the Act. 16. Under section 8 of the Act, the entire land vested in the State Government, is to be utilised to the extent of fifty per cent of the total area for grazing and other common purposes of the inhabitants of an estate and the remaining land is to be utilised for allotment to a landless person or any other eligible person or for allotment of site to a handicapped or houseless person for the construction of a house, 17. Section 8 (A) of the Act is an independent provision and has nothing to do with section 8 of the Act In this provision, it has been pro vided that the State Government can lease to any person or transfer to any Department of the Government in the interests of the development of the State. The lease has been executed in the name of defendant No. 2. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that defendant No, 2, H. P. S. E. B. was neither a Government department nor a person. This line of argument has to be straightway rejected, especially when the H. P. State Electricity Board is a creation of a statute and is a juristic person It may not be in its strict sense, a department of the State Government. Thus, the lease in favour of the defendant No. 2 was under the provisions of the aforesaid section 8 (A) of the Act. Thus, the lease in favour of the defendant No. 2 was under the provisions of the aforesaid section 8 (A) of the Act. The State Government before executing the lease was to be satisfied that there are sufficient reasons to do so, i. e. to lease for the development of the State, subject to the condition that land for the purposes mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8 in no case shall be fifty per cent of the land vested in the Government, In this behalf, presumption would be that these provisions have been complied with, especially in a case of present nature where the plaintiff has not at all taken even slight interest to include in his pleadings regarding the alleged violation of mandatory provisions. 18. It may be referred here that area of Khasra No. 632/7 comes out to be 1-01-44 Hectares and the area of Khasra No. 74 comes out to be 0-94-76 Hectares. Out of this area the following area has been leased out in favour of defendant No. 2. Khasra No. 632/7/1=0-76-74 Hectares. Khasra No. 74/4/1=0-20-08 Hectares. 0-96-82 Hectares. This aforesaid land leased is less than half of these two khasra numbers which together measured 1-96 20 Hectares. As per condition of the lease, this portion out of the suit land has been leased out for 99 years in favour of the H, P State Electricity Board on payment of Rs. 17,278 as rent and this has been leased out for the construction of KV sub-station. 19. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that earlier some other land had been acquired for the construction of this sub-station situate in village Patti, but without there being any reason, this construction was shifted to the place in dispute The defendants have brought on record sufficient material to establish prima facie that land purchased in village Patti in the year 1987 was not found suitable, because this land was close to the railway crossing and was obstructed by telephone lines and that it was rocky and was not technically fit for sub-station. 20. The defendants have brought on record plan of the area which clearly showed that the suit land has been fenced by the defendants and adjacent to the suit land an area has been provided for the play-ground and for the purpose of organising fair. 20. The defendants have brought on record plan of the area which clearly showed that the suit land has been fenced by the defendants and adjacent to the suit land an area has been provided for the play-ground and for the purpose of organising fair. Some photographs to that effect have also been brought on record. Thus, according to the defendants, in- so far as the facility of the playground for school was concerned that has been provided adjacently by the defendant-H. P. State Electricity Board by levelling the area. 21. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid facts brought on record, the plaintiff appellants have failed to establish prima facie case in their favour. 22. The irreparable injury in such circumstances has to be borne by the Public and department concerned, which has taken up the project for the benefit of public at large by providing land nearby to be used as a play-ground and as ground to celebrate the fair definitely will not cause any injury to the claim of the plaintiffs. The balance of convenience in such circumstances definitely goes in favour of defendant-respondents, who were providing electricity facility to the people of that area. 23. As referred earlier by grant of injunction as prayed for by the appellants would result against public interest, which is involved in the entire scheme meant for the supply of electricity to the people of that area. There is no doubt that according to the appellants, right of public to use the suit land as a play-ground and Mela ground might have been taken away, but those facilities have been provided as mentioned above. Even if those have not been provided the public interest in leasing out the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2 was more than the rights claimed by the plaintiffs, which rights prima facie at the first instance have not been established and even if established have not at all prima facie violated. In this view of the matter also, the plea of the appellants does not find favour at all. 24. In this view of the matter also, the plea of the appellants does not find favour at all. 24. Last but not the least, it has been contended on behalf of the defendant-respondents that various attempts made in this behalf to stop the construction of sub-station on the disputed land, have not found favour with the courts and repeatedly some attempts are being made by filing litigation through one person or the other to achieve that end which otherwise is not legally available to those persons including the present appellants. 25. There is no doubt that this exceptionally discretionary relief is to be granted in favour of a person whose conducts have been bonafide one. A person who is not coming with clean hands before the court of law, admittedly, cannot be granted such discretionary relief. Certain previous litigation have been brought on record whereby same relief asked for by various other persons had been disallowed by the courts. One Mani Ram filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 193/94, decided on 30th March, 1994 before this Court to achieve same object This Court observed that after the writ petition was heard for some time, on admission, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the writ petition, with liberty to agitate such rights which he claims to be enjoying in regard to grazing of cattle and holding of fair etc. in a separately constituted civil suit. In view of this, the writ petition was dismissed, subject to what has been stated earlier. 26. One Amrik Chand son of Sh. Chuni Lal also filed a civil suit in person as well as representative of residents of Dehan Panchayat as well as Pradhan and residents of Gram Panchayat, Ramshar in August 1993. An application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C P. C. was also preferred in that suit, which was decided on 7-10-1993 and temporary injunction asked for was not granted. It was on 12th May, 1994 when the learned Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew the suit against the defendants and the suit was dismissed as withdrawn. 27. Thereafter, the present suit was filed. 28. It was on 12th May, 1994 when the learned Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew the suit against the defendants and the suit was dismissed as withdrawn. 27. Thereafter, the present suit was filed. 28. In the aforesaid background, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that every individual person had an independent right to seek redress from the law of Court and for that purpose, plaintiffs who happened to be the residents of that area and owners had independent right to file suit of present nature and previous litigation will not reflect their conduct whatsoever. Insofar as technically speaking the aforesaid line of argument may be available to the applicant-plaintiffs but one fact remains that when a party approaches the court unsuccessfully, it is only thereafter that the other party comes into picture and files fresh litigation The first petitioner who filed the writ petition selected not to file a civil suit for which he had sought permission. Amrik Chand had also filed the suit and the present suit was filed after Amrik Chands suit had been dismissed being withdrawn and that too after temporary injunction asked for was not granted. In this background, the approach of the plaintiff-appellants does not appear to be bonafide one. 29. There are certain documents brought on record which established prima facie that permission under the Forest (Conservation) Act, has been sought for from the Central Government to raise construction of present nature. This permission was statutorily required to be taken as the suit land has been recorded in occupation of the Forest Department and the land has been described as protected forest, 30. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any reason whatsoever to interfere with the order passed by the learned District Judge, whereby application preferred for grant of temporary injunction has been disallowed. The present appeal, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel fee is assessed at Rs, 2,000 only. The observations made hereinabove will not in any way affect the parties case which is yet to be tried on merit. C. M. P. No. 254/95 In view of the aforesaid order passed in the main appeal, the present petition is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.